Democracy Watch’s 2024-2025 Annual Financial Statement
Democracy Watch’s 2023-2024 Annual Financial Statement
Author: Bradford
Will Carney Liberals protect 28 million financial consumers or Carney’s executive friends at Canada’s Big Banks?
Key measures needed (which U.S., Australia and/or England have enacted), to stop bank gouging, fraud, discrimination and abuse and ensure banks pay their fair share in taxes – Liberals have done little since 2015
Big Six Banks gouged out $70 billion in profits in 2025 (almost $50 billion more than 2010), paid their CEOs more than $12 million each, and gave out more than $27 billion in bonuses to employees
Five of the Big 6 are in top 50 most profitable banks in the world despite being much smaller than many banks in other countries
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Monday, December 15, 2025
OTTAWA – Today, as Canada’s big banks again recorded huge, gouging profits in 2025, Democracy Watch called on the Carney Liberals and all federal parties to work together to make key changes that the U.S., Australia and/or England have already made to protect bank customers from gouging, bank account fraud, discrimination and other abuses.
More than 120,000 voters have signed on to Democracy Watch’s letter-writing campaign or Change.org petition calling for these key changes, some of which the U.S. enacted decades ago, and some of which Australia and England have enacted in the past several years (See Full List of Key Bank Accountability Changes).
The Carney Liberals recently re-hashed old 2021 election promises made by the Trudeau government by proposing only weak, ineffective, largely voluntary measures in the 2025 budget Bill C-15 (sections 333-336) that will do nothing to address the role of telecom and Internet companies in allowing fraud scam calls and websites, and will let those companies and the Big Banks off when they allow or facilitate bank account fraud. The Conservatives promised similarly weak and incomplete anti-fraud measures in their 2025 federal election platform.
The banks often blame their customers for the fraud and refuse to compensate them for lost money even if the fraudsters do account transactions that the customer has never done in decades or if bank staff allow or facilitate the fraud.
The Liberals’ Budget 2025 document (pp. 116-122 and 163-164) also repeats the Liberals’ 2021 election promise to have the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC) review banking fees, and says nothing about decreasing fees or credit card interest rates from their current gouging levels. More than 30 U.S. states have had caps on credit card interest rates for decades.
Opposition parties should change Bill C-15 when they review it at the House Finance Committee to require banks to compensate customers for losses if the banks cannot prove to the Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSI) that they have adequate safeguards to prevent fraudulent account transactions, have fully trained their staff in those safeguards, and did their due diligence to prevent the fraud from happening. All federal parties should also work together to enact the same requirements for telecom and Internet companies.
“The Liberals continue to protect the big bank’s gouging profits and their executives’ excessive multi-million salaries instead of making the changes needed to stop banks from gouging billions from their 28 million customers and to protect bank customers from discrimination and other abuses,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “The Carney Liberal government’s proposed anti-bank account fraud measures amount to more hot air promises of future ineffective, mostly voluntary measures that, even if they are undertaken, are much weaker than the actual bank customer protection Australia and England have already imposed on banks, telecom and Internet companies that require them to pay customers back when they lose their money to frausters.” Click here to see a summary of the Australian anti-fraud measures.
“Every dollar of excessive profit for the banks, and every person and business the banks unjustifiably refuse to loan to, costs the Canadian economy because it means that the banks are overcharging for their essential services and loans, and choking off job creation and spending,” said Conacher.
The following additional eight key measures, which 120,000 Canadians have called for, are needed to actually stop gouging and abuse, to stop discrimination in bank lending and service, and ensure the banks serve everyone across Canada fairly and well at fair prices and interest rates (See the Full List of Key Bank Accountability Changes):
1. Require banks to cut their gouging credit card interest rates in half now, and allow people renewing their mortgages to re-renew without a penalty at a lower interest rate as interest rates decrease, and require banks to lower all their interest rates the same time as the Bank of Canada lowers its interest rate;
2. Require banks and insurance companies to promote a national financial consumer organization, and a national individual investor organization in their communications with individual customers and investors (as recommended in 1998 by the Liberal-controlled MacKay Task Force, House Finance and Senate Banking committees);
3. Require the banks to disclose detailed information annually about their lending and service records (as the U.S. has required banks to do for 30 years, including the U.S. banks that 4 of Canada’s Big 6 Banks own), categorized by race, gender, income level and neighbourhood, and require corrective action whenever banks discriminate against customers;
4. Require the banks to re-open basic banking branches in every neighbourhood that offer low-interest rate, small-value lines of credit to everyone to stop predatory lending across Canada (including through partnering with Canada Post outlets for postal banking, as TD started to do in November 2022 but then paused and then cancelled);
5. Require the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC) to do unannounced, mystery-shopper audits to find violations of consumer protection laws, and to identify all violators and fine them a minimum of $1 million for every violation (and the maximum $50 million for systemic violations);
6. Make all rulings of the Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSI) binding;
7. Close all the loopholes that allow Canada’s banks (and other big businesses) to evade paying taxes in Canada by pretending they make their money through companies they own in low-tax countries, and impose a special tax (as England and Australia have) on any Canadian business or bank that has excessively high profits like Canada’s Big Banks have, and;
8. Require the Big Banks and other financial institutions to cut the pay of their CEO and top executives to no more than 40 times their lowest paid employee (as in some European countries).
All of Canada’s Big 6 Banks are listed in the top 300 of Fortune’s Global 2000 for 2025 (based on 2024 size, assets, profits and market value). RBC (13th), TD (32nd), BMO (38th), CIBC (44th) and Scotiabank (48th) were also in the top 50 most profitable banks in the world in 2024 (more profitable than most other larger banks) and RBC, TD, BMO, CIBC and Scotiabank were the top five most profitable Canadian companies in 2024.
Canada’s Big 6 Banks also handed out $27.3 billion in 2025 in bonuses to their employees, 15% more than the $23.75 billion in bonuses to their employees in 2024.
Canada’s Big 6 Banks also paid their CEOs an average of $12.3 million in 2024 – 55% higher than in 2008.
See Canada’s Big Banks Backgrounder.
FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
Email: [email protected]
Democracy Watch’s Bank Accountability Campaign
Ethics Commissioner misled Parliament – rolls over on floor-crossing by MP Chris d’Entremont
Ethics Commissioner stated in 2024-2025 Annual Report that MP ethics code rule was enforceable – now says it isn’t enforceable
MP ethics code only expects, but doesn’t require, honesty and upholding highest standards to enhance public confidence and trust in integrity
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Monday, December 8, 2025
OTTAWA – Today, as federal Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner Konrad von Finckenstein testifies at 11 am ET before the House Ethics Committee, Democracy Watch released the letter it has received from the Ethics Commissioner ruling on the floor-crossing by MP Chris d’Entremont. As Democracy Watch’s complaint letter about the floor-crossing set out, Commissioner von Finckenstein stated last spring on p. 8 in his 2024-2025 Annual Report to Parliament that the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons (MP Code) “requires” MPs “to avoid both real and apparent conflicts of interest.” This rule is set out in section 2 of the MP Code.
In his letter ruling on the floor-crossing, Commissioner von Finckenstein now says:
“The purposes and principles of the Code (sections 1 and 2) are not intended to stand alone as rules of conduct or obligations; rather, they serve only as aids to the interpretation of the Code.”
As a result, Commissioner von Finckenstein ruled that MPs are also not required to comply with the provisions in subsection 2(b) of the MP Code, which says they are to “fulfill their public duties with honesty and uphold the highest standards so as to maintain and enhance the public’s trust and confidence in their integrity.”
Therefore, it was not a violation of the MP Code for MP Chris d’Entremont to undertake the following series of dishonest actions that undermined instead of enhanced public trust:
1. Running as a Conservative candidate in the 2025 federal election (and the previous two elections);
2. Taking his oath of office in May as a Conservative MP;
3. Stating in the House of Commons in June that it was “an incredible honour” to be elected again as a Conservative MP and thanked voters in his electoral district in Nova Scotia for “placing their trust” in him to represent them again;
4. Voting with the Conservative Party caucus on all votes since then;
5. Stating on September 25, 2025 in the House that the Liberal government’s record was mismanagement, out-of-control spending, massive deficits, irresponsible, “a monstrous, irresponsible burden on future generations… that causes inflation and extra costs to future generations”, unacceptable and inhumane, and “absolutely the opposite” of what is needed to “to ease the burden that Nova Scotians and Canadians are seeing at the grocery store.”
6. According to media reports, switching from the Conservative Party caucus to the Liberal Party caucus before the Liberal government’s budget was made public, but then initially claiming that he switched because of the budget;
7. Then, the next day, offering another reason for why he switched, and;
8. Then, five days later, offering yet another reason for why he switched, which he then corrected because he had misled a media outlet when explaining that reason.
Several studies over the past 20 years have shown that only five to 15 percent of voters cast their ballot based on the identity of the local candidate, while the rest vote based on the party or party leader. An MP deciding on their own two switch parties, without any meaningful, comprehensive, demographically representative consultation with voters in their district (talking to a few constituents as MP d’Entremont did is far from adequate), is similar to a dictator making a decision that they claim is in the public’s interest.
Democracy Watch’s letter listed the media coverage from various outlets showing that many voters in MP d’Entremont’s district are angry about his floor-crossing.
The dishonesty at the core of the floor-crossing by MP d’Entremont and other MPs in the past is part of the reason that several surveys show that a large majority of Canadian voters do not trust politicians, including a national survey of 1,515 adult Canadians conducted from January 9 to 18, 2025 that found only 17% of Canadians trust politicians in general, and a national survey of 1,502 adult Canadians conducted between January 5-12, 2023 that found only 22% of Canadians trust politicians in general.
DWatch has filed ethics complaints about past floor-crossers, including Belinda Stronach, David Emerson among others (Click here to see details (the link is to DWatch’s archive website)).
“Floor-crossing is a fundamental violation of the right of voters to make an informed choice when voting, and the dishonesty and lack of integrity that is at the core of floor-crossing is a clear violation of the code of conduct for MPs,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “Unfortunately, the Ethics Commissioner has again rolled over like a lapdog and again failed to enforce federal ethics rules, as he has in so many other situations since the Trudeau Cabinet chose him.”
Click here to see the 8 ethics complaints, mainly re: Trudeau Liberal Cabinet ministers, that Ethics Commissioner von Finckenstein buried during his first six months in office.
Democracy Watch called on all parties to make the rules in section 2 of the MP Code clearly enforceable, and make other key changes to close huge loopholes in the Code, and to make enforcement independent, transparent, timely, effective and accountable (Click here to see the key changes needed to the MP Code). And click here to see the list of similar changes that are needed to the federal Conflict of Interest Act which contains ethics rules for Cabinet ministers, ministerial staff and top government officials, and click here to see the key changes needed to the Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code for Senators.
FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
Email: [email protected]
Democracy Watch’s Honesty in Politics Campaign and Government Ethics Campaign
Federal Cabinet office hiding details that will show Ethics Commissioner’s ethics screen for PM Carney is a loophole-filled, unethical smokescreen
Clerk of Privy Council Office testifying today before Ethics Committee – PCO unjustifiably claims it can’t respond to access-to-information request filed in October until mid-March
One of dirty dozen loopholes in federal ethics law means screens allow PM to secretly participate in almost all decisions that affect his investments in Brookfield and 655+ other companies, and his blind trust isn’t actually blind
Carney has as many financial conflicts of interest as Trump – law should be changed to require Carney to sell investments to remove the conflicts
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Wednesday, November 19, 2025
OTTAWA – Today, as Privy Council Clerk Michael Sabia will be testifying before the House Ethics Committee this afternoon at 4:30 pm, Democracy Watch revealed the letter it received on November 13th from the federal Cabinet Privy Council Office (PCO) extending PCO’s legally required mid-November disclosure deadline to March 14, 2026 for responding to an Access to Information Act (ATIA) request DWatch filed in October.
DWatch’s request asks for disclosure of a small set of records that provide basic details that PCO officials must have on hand every day if they actually enforce Prime Minister Mark Carney’s “ethics screen” – details that will reveal that the screen is actually a loophole-filled smokescreen.
DWatch’s ATIA request applies to the time period from when the loophole-filled “ethics screen” came into force that federal Ethics Commissioner Konrad von Finckenstein approved for Prime Minister Carney until the date PCO considers that it received the ATIA request. The exact date the Ethics Commissioner-approved screen came into force has not been publicly disclosed, but it was made public on July 11th.
DWatch’s request asks for records that contain the following information:
1. The date the Ethics Commissioner-approved ethics screen came into force;
2. The identities of anyone who has assisted Carney’s Chief of Staff and the Clerk of the PCO to enforce the screen;
3. How many discussions, decision-making processes and votes during the time period of July-October 2025 were flagged for review under the screen, and;
4. How many discussions, decision-making processes and votes during the time period of July-October 2025 that did Carney not participate in under the screen.
The PCO claims it needs four more months to do a “consultation” but this is completely unjustifiable because DWatch’s request is only for statistics and the identities of public officials (both of which the PCO must have in hand, and both are required to be disclosed), and DWatch’s request specified that it is not requesting anyone’s personal information (s. 19 of the ATIA) or any company’s or others’ “third-party” proprietary information (s. 20 of the ATIA), and those are the only two justifiable reasons for a consultation.
The PCO is also unjustifiably violating the ATIA by delaying until January the release of details that will show that Mark Carney’s initial, self-approved two ethics screens were also loophole-filled, unethical smokescreens, as DWatch revealed in the October 16, 2025 news release.
PM Carney’s so-called “ethics screen” (which only applies to 103 additional companies that are within or connected to the Brookfield conglomerate of companies) is a loophole-filled, unethical smokescreen that allows him to participate in, and hide that he is participating in, almost every decision that affects the companies in which he is invested.
As Democracy Watch detailed to the House Ethics Committee on October 1st during its ongoing review of the federal government ethics law, the loophole is one of a “dirty dozen” loopholes in the law (the Conflict of Interest Act). The loophole is that as long as the decision applies generally or affects a broad group of people or entities, then PM Carney is allowed to participate in the decision even though it will affect a business he is invested in, and even though he can profit from the decision. Almost all (99%) of decisions that the PM and Cabinet make apply generally or to a broad group of people or entities. Click here to see the loopholes in the definition of “private interest” in section 2 of the Act.
The screens also all hide the fact that the public office holder is not recusing themselves from decisions even when they have a conflict of interest. Subsection 25(1) of the Act requires a public declaration of recusal every time an office holder recuses themselves, but former Ethics Commissioner Mary Dawson created ethics screens to allow office holders to get around that requirement. They set up a screen, claim that they are recusing themselves from all decisions, and then can hide the fact that they are not actually recusing themselves from decisions that affect their financial or other interests.
“The federal Cabinet office can try to hide from reality for the next few months, but eventually it will reveal details that will show that, because of a huge loophole in Canada’s federal government ethics law, Prime Minister Carney’s ethics screen is an unethical, loophole-filled smokescreen as it allows him to participate in almost all decisions that affect the companies he is invested in, and it hides the fact that he is participating in those decisions even though he has a financial conflict of interest and can profit from the decisions,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch.
Click here to see these and a “dirty dozen” other loopholes in the federal Conflict of Interest Act that allow Cabinet ministers and other top government officials to secretly profit from their decisions.
Democracy Watch also again repeated its call for Prime Minister Mark Carney to sell his investments, including arranging to have Brookfield and other companies buy out his stock options, as the only effective way to end the serious, unethical and damaging financial conflicts of interest caused by his investments in more than 550 companies, and connections to 103 other companies through the Brookfield conglomerate of companies.
PM Carney’s so-called “blind” trust isn’t blind at all because he knows what he put in the trust, chose his own trustee, was allowed to give the trustee instructions such as “don’t sell anything” and the trustee is also allowed to give him regular updates. In addition, Mr. Carney owns stock options in Brookfield Corporation and Brookfield Asset Management that he can’t sell for years, so he knows for sure that he has those investments. Click here to see the list of shares in 550+ companies that Mr. Carney owns.
In 1987, Justice Parker of the Parker Commission on conflicts of interest recommended that top politicians and government officials be required to sell all investments, and that blind trusts be banned because they are an ineffective sham. Click here to see Justice Parker’s report (pages 343-361 (esp. 360-361)).
“Prime Minister Carney has as many financial conflicts of interest as Trump, and his blind trust isn’t blind at all because he knows what stocks he put in it, including stock options he will definitely own for years, and he chose his own trustee and was allowed to give the trustee instructions such as don’t sell anything, and his trustee is allowed to give him regular updates on his investments,” said Conacher. “The only way to resolve the conflicts is for the Prime Minister to sell his investments.”
What could PM Carney (and other Cabinet ministers and top government officials) do after selling all their investments? They are paid well compared to most Canadians, in the top 1-5% of annual salaries, and they have among the most generous benefits and pension plans of any employees in Canada. So, instead of enriching themselves further through investing in private businesses that cause financial conflicts of interest that taint their decision-making and policy-making, they can buy government bonds or guaranteed investment certificates or other similar financial products that are not connected to any specific business, and that offer a fixed rate of interest for the time period that they remain in office, and then when they leaves office they can again invest in shares and mutual funds and other financial products for investing in businesses.
Many other changes are needed to other federal laws to ensure democratic good government, including:
• Closing all the loopholes in the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons that allow for secret, unethical activities by MPs, and extend key rules in that code to apply to the staff of MPs (Click here to see details);
• Closing all the loopholes in the Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code for Senators that allow for secret, unethical activities by Senators, and extend key rules in that code to apply to the staff of Senators (Click here to see details);
• Closing all the loopholes that allow for secret, unethical lobbying (Click here to see details);
• Decreasing the donation limit in the Canada Elections Act to $75 (as the current annual individual donation limit of $3,500 (which increases by $50 each year) is essentially legalized bribery for those who can afford to make a top donation) (Click here to see details);
• Closing huge excessive secrecy loopholes in the federal Access to Information Act and strengthening enforcement (Click here to see details);
• Preventing, prohibiting and penalizing foreign interference (Click here to see a policy paper on key needed measures);
• Strengthening the whistleblower protection law (Click here to see details).
FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
Email: [email protected]
Democracy Watch’s Government Ethics Campaign and Open Government Campaign
Unethical Lobbying Loopholes in Canada’s Federal Lobbying Law
(Democracy Watch: November 2025)
Under Canada’s federal Lobbying Act, only some lobbyists are required to register and disclose only some of their lobbying activities and communications with federal Cabinet ministers, government officials, politicians, political staff etc.
The Act contains a “dirty dozen” loopholes that allow for secret, unregistered lobbying. Click here to see the loopholes.
Only lobbyists who are required to register under the Act are required to comply with the ethical lobbying rules in the federal Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct (Lobbyists’ Code), and the Code also has huge loopholes in it that allow even registered lobbyists to essentially bribe politicians and public officials they are lobbying with favours and gifts.
The loopholes were added to the federal Lobbyists’ Code in July 2023 after a skewed and dishonest public consultation process by Commissioner of Lobbying Nancy Bélanger, with the approval of MPs from all parties on the House of Commons Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics Committee. In adding the loopholes, which essentially gut key ethics rules in the Code, Commissioner Bélanger ignored the fact that adding the loopholes was opposed by more than 20,000 voters, by 26 citizen groups with a total membership of 1.5 million Canadians, by 15 lawyers from 7 law firms (and also lawyers in private practice or other roles), and by 26 law, politics and ethics professors from 15 universities in 9 provinces (Click here to see details).
The following are the loopholes in the federal Lobbyists’ Code that allow for unethical lobbying and essentially legalize bribery of federal politicians:
1. A lobbyist is allowed to do secret favours for politicians they are lobbying or are allowed to lobby them soon after doing the favours
In the pre-July 2023 version of the Lobbyists’ Code, Rules 6 and 9 and a guideline by the Commissioner prohibited lobbying for 4 years (i.e. until after the next election) after a person did any significant campaigning or event organizing, or any fundraising, for a politician or party.
Under Rule 4.2 in the new Code, depending on the level of campaigning or fundraising a person does for a politician or party, lobbying is allowed at the same time, or right afterwards, or at most only 1-2 years later (only at most 1 year later no matter how much money a lobbyist raises).
Rule 4.2 also gives the Commissioner of Lobbying the power to secretly reduce those lobbying prohibition periods.
When proposing the new loophole, Commissioner of Lobbying Bélanger made the very questionable claim that the Code’s previous 4-year cooling-off period violates the Canadian Charter right to freedom of expression, based on one opinion that the Commissioner paid law firm Goldblatt Partners for in a sole-source contract that was extended twice, increasing from $11,300 to $45,200 and then up to $90,400.
In fact, several Supreme Court of Canada and other Canadian court rulings have clearly stated that Charter rights must be restricted to protect government integrity, and as a result it is clear that the previous 4-year cooling-off period complies with the Charter while the new shorter or non-existent cooling-off periods violate the Charter.
The Lobbyists’ Code should be changed to again prohibit, without any exemptions, anyone from lobbying any party leader and any MP, Senator or their staff in their party and any party official for at least 4 years after they have done significant campaigning, fundraising, event organizing or any other favour for the party leader or party, and to prohibit anyone from lobbying any individual MP, Senator or their staff after they have done significant campaigning, fundraising, event organizing or any other favour for the MP or Senator. If the Commissioner is allowed to continue to have the power to grant exemptions, the Commissioner must also be required to publish each exemption as soon as it is granted in an online, searchable, public registry.
2. Gifts and hospitality are allowed to be given by lobbyists to politicians and public officials they lobby
Under Rules 3.1 to 3.3 of the Lobbyists’ Code, lobbyists are allowed to give a gift or hospitality (i.e. a meal or event) worth up to $40 each time, and up to $200 over any 12-month period.
While those dollar amounts are not exorbitantly high, and can be afforded by most lobbying organizations, and while these rules are stronger than in past versions of the Code, the rules open up gift-giving and wining and dining as a means of influence, and the limits are difficult to enforce because lobbyist’s interactions with public officials can’t be monitored in any comprehensive, detailed way.
In addition, the Rules allow the Commissioner to secretly exempt lobbyists from the limits.
In addition, the Rules allow lobbyists to give gifts to political party officials (who can pass them on to politicians or political staff in their party), and the Rules also allow lobbyists to offer or give other benefits to politicians and public officials, such as a donation to their favourite charity, or a gift or benefit or job to a family member, or the promise of a job in the future after they leave their political or government position.
The Lobbyists’ Code should be changed to prohibit lobbyists, without any exemptions, from offering or giving, directly or indirectly, any gift or any other type of benefit or advantage to any politician, political staff, political party official or public official or to any member of their family. This clear prohibition not only closes loopholes in the current Code rules, it is also a better system because clinical studies by psychologists in many countries show that even small gifts influence decisions.
3. Lobbying for clients that have conflicting interests is allowed
In a past, pre-2015 version of the Lobbyists’ Code, lobbyists were prohibited from representing clients that had conflicting interests unless the clients consented. The current version of the Code allows lobbyists to representing clients with conflicting interests, which has led to some lobbying firms doing that. Click here to see details.
The Lobbyists’ Code should be changed to again prohibit, without any exemptions, anyone from lobbying for a client whose interests conflict with another client unless all the clients consent in writing.
4. Lobbyists are allowed to use secret information obtained from politicians and public officials
In the pre-July 2023 version of the Lobbyists’ Code, Rule 5 stated that “If a lobbyist obtains a government document they should not have, they shall neither use nor disclose it.” Rule 2.2 of the new Code says a lobbyist can use or share information obtained from a public official in confidence if the lobbyist has the official’s informed consent.
The Lobbyists’ Code should be changed to again prohibit, without any exemptions, lobbyists from using or sharing secret information they have obtained from any politician, political staff or public official.
Key Changes Needed to Make Enforcement of the Lobbying Act Independent, Transparent, Timely, Effective and Accountable
The following changes are needed to ensure the enforcement of the federal Lobbying Act and Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct (Lobbyists’ Code) and is independent, transparent, timely, effective and accountable, which it isn’t currently and hasn’t been at any time since the Act was enacted in 1988 and the Code was enacted in 1997. Click here to see a policy paper (in English only) that sets out details concerning these much-needed changes to the current federal enforcement system (similar changes are needed to every provincial, territorial and municipal ethics law enforcement system across Canada).
1. Establish, by adding new provisions to the Lobbying Act (by completely changing section 4.1), a fully independent, fully non-partisan committee to conduct a public, merit-based search for short list (1-3) qualified candidates for the Commissioner of Lobbying, and then have that committee make the final choice and submit the choice to an all-party committee for appointment (with no possibility of re-appointment as that gives the enforcer an incentive to please office holders by letting them off when they violate the rules). This should also be the system for the appointment of all Officers of Parliament, the Commissioner and all other top officers of the RCMP, the head of FINTRAC, the new Foreign Interference Transparency Commissioner, and all judges, all of whom need to be fully independent in order to be perceived as being capable of impartially and effectively enforcing the key democratic good government and anti-corruption laws they enforce.
2. Add a new section 10.6 that requires the Commissioner of Lobbying to conduct regular, unannounced audits of a randomly selected sample of lobbyists’ communications and other activities, gifts and benefits and other matters and activities covered by the Lobbying Act and Lobbyists’ Code.
3. Also in a new section 10.6, require the Commissioner of Lobbying to publish online binding interpretations of every measure in the Lobbying Act and Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct with examples of real situations, and to publish online a summary of the Commissioner’s advice or opinion each time advice or an opinion about a new situation is given to any person covered by the Lobbying Act or Lobbyists’ Code, so everyone knows exactly what the law and code prohibit.
4. Also in a new section 10.6, require the Commissioner of Lobbying to publish online a notice setting out all the details every time the Commissioner grants an exemption to any rule in the Lobbyists’ Code.
5. Require in a new subsections of sections 5 and 7 of the Lobbying Act that all lobbyists take a formal training course from the Commissioner of Lobbying when they first registering as a lobbyist, and annually.
6. Change subsection 10.4(1) the Lobbying Act to give members of the public, who employ and pay all office holders, a clear legal right to file a complaint with the Commissioner of Lobbying.
7. Delete clauses 10.4(1.1)(b) to (d) in the Lobbying Act, and change sections 4 and 10.5 to require the Commissioner of Lobbying to investigate and issue a public ruling on every complaint s/he receives and every situation s/he becomes aware of that raises any questions about whether a lobbyist has complied with the Lobbying Act or Lobbyists’ Code.
8. Add a new subsection to section 10.5 that empowers and requires the Commissioner of Lobbying to impose a sliding scale of mandatory penalties (specifically listed in the new subsection) depending on the seriousness of any and all violations of the Lobbying Act or the Lobbyists’ Code, with a set mandatory fine and prohibition on lobbying for a specified time period imposed on every violator, and more significant fines and prohibitions for longer time periods as the mandatory penalties for more serious violations. In addition, change subsections 10.4(7) to (9) of the Act to specify that the Commissioner is only required to refer the most serious violations of the Act to police, and that the Commissioner is not required to suspend any investigation concerning a violation of the Act or Code even if the Commissioner refers a matter to police that involves a violation of another law.
9. Add a new subsection to section 10.5 of the Lobbying Act giving any member of the public a clear right to apply in Federal Court for a judicial review of any decision made by the Commissioner of Lobbying under the Lobbying Act or Lobbyists’ Code.
The lobbying laws in provinces, territories and municipalities across Canada all have essentially the same or similar loopholes that allow for unethical lobbying (or that the commissioners in each jurisdiction, as in Ontario, have interpreted in ways that allow for unethical lobbying).
As long as these loopholes are left open, secret, unethical lobbying will continue to corrupt politics and government policy-making and contracting out processes across Canada.
Join the call for key changes to stop secret, unethical lobbying across Canada at Democracy Watch’s Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign
Key Changes Needed to Close Loopholes in the Federal Senate Ethics Code, and to Make Enforcement of the Code Effective
(Democracy Watch: November 2025)
A. Key Changes Needed to Prevent, Prohibit and Penalize Unethical Activities by Senators and their Staff
The key changes needed to make the Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code for Senators (“Senator Code”) effective at preventing, prohibiting and penalizing conflicts of interest and unethical gift- and favour-trading are as follows:
1. Expand the Senator Code to cover Senators as soon as their appointment is decided, and to have key rules cover Senator staff who, because they are not covered by the Code, can do the things that Senators are prohibited from doing on behalf of the Senator who employs them, and can also accept all gifts and favours;
2. Add a new subsection to section 2 of the Senator Code to require Senators and their staff to tell the truth to stop the misleading spin that regularly and fatally undermines reasonable policy debates and discussions;
3. Close the huge loophole in the definition of “private interest” (in subsections 11(1) and (2)) to cover all conflicts of interest, not only specific financial conflicts, because the loophole means the Senator Code doesn’t apply to 99% of decisions Senators participate in, and that allows them to take part in decisions when they and their family or others can profit from the decision (and extend subsection 3(2) and sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Code to ensure Senators and their staff are also prohibited from acting in any way to further the private interests of their extended family and friends);
4. Change in subsection 2(2) of the Senator Code the word “expected” to “required” so that, as with sections 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3, Senators are required to comply with the provisions in subsection 2(2), and add a new rule to prohibit Senators and their staff from giving preferential treatment to anyone, especially anyone who has given them a gift or assisted them in any way;
5. As the Parker Commission recommended back in 1987, prohibit Senators and their staff from having investments in businesses, and from having blind trusts (both of which are allowed under sections 21-26);
6. Delete subsections 5(a) and (b) that allow Senators to have another job or business on the side, and require Senators to work full-time as Senators (other than professional requirements like doctors who have to practise a specific amount each year in order to retain their licence), as is essentially required by subsection 2(1) and the compliance requirements set out in the Guideline on Outside Activities (Section 5 of the Code) – Click here to see the PDF version of the Guideline (especially the example of prohibited and permissible outside activities on pages 8-12);
7. Change the gifts and benefits rule in section 17 of the Senator Code to ban Senators and their staff from accepting anything from anyone who is trying to influence their decisions because even small gifts influence decisions, and delete sections 18 and 19 of the Code so that a Senator or their staff accepting “sponsored travel” is clearly prohibited because it is an unethical gift and essentially a form of legalized bribery;
8. Change clause 28(1)(h) (and 31(1)(d)) of the Senator Code to require Senators and their staff to disclose in the Public Registry their assets and liabilities worth more than $1,000 (the current disclosure requirement is for everything worth more than $10,000, which is much too high), and change clause 28(1)(d) (and clause 31(1)(d)) to require disclosure of all income, and change subsection 28(4) to require confidential disclosure only to the Senate Ethics Officer of all the assets listed in that subsection except government benefits (as MPs are required to disclose to the Ethics Commissioner because monitoring those assets is key to ensuring integrity), and add a new subsection to sections 28 and 31 that requires disclosure of details about their past five year’s work before they became a Senator to make it easy to track which organizations and issues they have ties to, and to disclose in the Public Registry which members of their extended family they have close relationships with including being aware of their business, investments and other private interests;
9. Add a subsection to section 33 of the Senator Code to require the Senate Ethics Officer to determine for each departing Senator and Senate staff person the sliding-scale time period after they leave during which they will be prohibited from communicating with their former colleagues and government officials, with the scale based on what positions and committees they served in and how close their relationships are with Cabinet ministers, officials etc., and require Senators and Senate staff to disclose their post-activities online during this time period in a searchable database;
10. Delete clauses 44(2)(d) and (e) and subsections 49(1) to (3) and (5) and (6) and section 51 and delete references to the Senate Committee in section 52, and change subsection 49(4) to empower and require the Senate Ethics Officer and only the Officer to impose a sliding scale of penalties depending the seriousness of the violation (and add to subsection 49(4) for the most serious violations significant fines and a loss of Senate seat to the list of possible penalties – similar to the provision in subsection 502(3) of the Canada Elections Act (S.C. 2000, c. 9). Senators should not be participating in decisions concerning determining violations or penalizing a Senator because Senators are tainted by partisan bias and other biases. The Senate has empowered the Senate Ethics Officer to investigate and rule on violations, and so the Officer should also be empowered to impose the penalty (but penalties should be mandatory so that the Officer is required to impose a penalty for every violation).
B. Key Changes Needed to Make Enforcement of the Senator Code Independent, Transparent, Timely, Effective and Accountable
The following changes are needed to ensure the enforcement of the Senator Code is independent, transparent, timely, effective and accountable. Click here to see a policy paper (in English only) that sets out details concerning these much-needed changes to the current federal enforcement system (similar changes are needed to every provincial, territorial and municipal ethics law enforcement system across Canada):
1. Establish, by adding new provisions to the Parliament of Canada Act (by completely changing section 20.1), a fully independent, fully non-partisan committee to conduct a public, merit-based search for short list (1-3) qualified candidates for Senate Ethics Officer, and then have that committee make the final choice and submit the choice to a Senate committee for appointment (with no possibility of re-appointment as that gives the enforcer an incentive to please office holders by letting them off when they violate the rules). This should also be the system for the appointment of all Officers of Parliament, the Commissioner and all other top officers of the RCMP, the head of FINTRAC, the new Foreign Interference Transparency Commissioner, and all judges, all of whom need to be fully independent in order to be perceived as being capable of impartially and effectively enforcing the key democratic good government and anti-corruption laws they enforce.
2. Add a new subsection to section 44 of the Senator Code that requires the Senate Ethics Officer to conduct regular, unannounced audits of a randomly selected sample of Senators’ (and their staffs’) financial statements, participation in discussions, decisions and votes, outside activities, gifts and benefits and other matters and activities covered by the Code.
3. Change subsection 42(6) and section 43 of the Senator Code to require the Senate Ethics Officer to publish online binding interpretations of every measure in the COIA with examples of real situations, and to publish online a summary of the Commissioner’s advice each time advice about a new situation is given to any person covered by the Code, so everyone knows exactly what the Code
4. Change subsection 27(8) of the Senator Code to require all Senators and their staff to take a formal training course when they first start their position, and annually.
5. Change section 47 of the Senator Code to give members of the public, who employ and pay all Senators and their staff, the right to file a complaint with the Senate Ethics Officer.
6. Change sections 47 and 48 of the Senator Code to require the Senate Ethics Officer to investigate and issue a public ruling on every complaint the Commissioner receives and every situation the Commissioner becomes aware of that raises any questions about whether a Senator or their staff have complied with the Code, and (as set out above) to impose a sliding scale of penalties depending the seriousness of the violation.
7. Add a new subsection to section 20.6 of the Parliament of Canada Act giving any member of the public a clear right to apply in Federal Court for a judicial review of any decision made by the Senate Ethics Officer under the Senator Code.
C. Many Other Changes Needed to Prevent, Prohibit and Penalize Conflicts of Interest and to Ensure Democratic Good Government
The following changes are needed to other federal laws to prevent, prohibit and penalize conflicts of interest and to ensure democratic good government:
• Closing all the loopholes in the Conflict of Interest Act that allow for secret, unethical activities by Cabinet ministers, their staff, Cabinet appointees and top government officials (Click here to see details);
• Closing all the loopholes in the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons that allow for secret, unethical activities by MPs, and extend key rules in that code to apply to the staff of MPs (Click here to see details);
• Closing all the loopholes that allow for secret, unethical lobbying (Click here to see details);
• Decreasing the donation limit in the Canada Elections Act to $75 (as the current annual individual donation limit of $3,500 (which increases by $50 each year) is essentially legalized bribery for those who can afford to make a top donation) (Click here to see details);
• Closing huge excessive secrecy loopholes in the federal Access to Information Act and strengthening enforcement (Click here to see details);
• Preventing, prohibiting and penalizing foreign interference (Click here to see a policy paper on key needed measures);
• Strengthening the whistleblower protection law (Click here to see details).
Join the call for these and other key government ethics changes across Canada at Democracy Watch’s Government Ethics Campaign
Key Changes Needed to Strengthen Whistleblower Protection Rules and Enforcement Systems Across Canada
(November 2025)
There are several systemic problems with the lack of effective whistleblower protection for both the public sector and the private sector, across Canada, in not only the Public Sector Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA) but also all other federal, provincial, territorial and municipal laws.
The federal House of Commons Government Operations Committee called in its unanimous June 2017 report for many key changes to change the law and enforcement system to strengthen protection for whistleblowers who report wrongdoing by people in the federal government. However, then-Treasury Board Minister Scott Brison rejected the Committee’s recommendations in an October 2017 letter – committing the government only to reinforcing the internal disclosure process. The Liberals’ Bill C-65 in 2018 did nothing to change the Canada Labour Code’s requirement that federal workplace victims file complaints with their boss, who is often the harasser, and so it left political staff and other whistleblowers essentially unprotected. In February 2021, the House Committee voted to send its June 2017 report back to the House of Commons and requested that the Cabinet respond to it again, but the Cabinet did not respond.
Bill C-86 in 2018 added sections 979.1 to 979.4 to the Bank Act to create a right for bank employees to blow the whistle on wrongdoing, but did not establish an independent enforcement agency or process to protect them. In 2021, an international report ranked Canada tied for last out of 62 countries with whistleblower protections (See pp. 10 and 75 of PDF of report). MPs from opposition parties supported private member Bill C-290 which proposed several key changes to the federal PSDPA, but unfortunately the bill was derailed by the prorogation of Parliament in January 2025 by then-Prime Minister Justin Trudeau
Provincial governments across Canada have failed to protect government and business whistleblowers fully and effectively, although the Ontario Securities Commission took a big step forward in protecting securities law whistleblowers with a new program launched in July 2016 which offers up to $5 million as a reward for whistleblowers whose claims are proven (which led to calls to reward securities law whistleblowers in other provinces and to reward Competition Act whistleblowers).
All of the following 17 changes are needed to strengthen whistleblower protection laws and enforcement systems to ensure everyone who blows the whistle on abuse, waste and law-breaking in government and business is fully and effectively protected:
1. All whistleblowers must be effectively protected from retaliation, including politicians, political staff, government employees, suppliers and contractors, and members of the public, and in business all executives, employees, suppliers, contractors, customers and members of the public;
2. Whistleblowers must be allowed, in all cases, to file their complaint directly with an integrity commissioner or similar enforcement agency;
3. Everyone who witnesses or receives evidence of wrongdoing by anyone in politics, government or business must be required to report it to an integrity commissioner or similar enforcement agency (with the commissioner strictly and strongly required to keep their identity secret, and with everyone allowed to submit evidence anonymously);
4. All whistleblowers must receive funding to pay for full legal advice (or a specialized, fully independent, publicly funded legal clinic should be established to provide this advice for free to all whistleblowers);
5. Any person nominated and chosen to be the integrity commissioner or similar whistleblower protection commissioner must be required to have legal experience and a strong record of enforcing whistleblower protection, ethics rules or similar accountability laws;
6. The process for choosing an integrity commissioner or similar commissioner for the public sector or private sector must be conducted by an independent committee of individuals from outside government and politics whose members have no ties to any political party, with the members chosen by all political parties represented in the legislature, and the committee must conduct a public, merit-based search for candidates, and submit one nominee to an all-party committee for appointment approval;
7. The integrity commissioner or similar commissioner must not be eligible for a renewal of their fixed term in office (to ensure that the commissioner does not act as a lapdog to try to get re-appointed for another term);
8. The integrity commissioner or similar commissioner must be clearly designated as the trainer (including by issuing interpretation bulletins), investigator and enforcer of all government policies and procedures, and must be required to conduct training sessions, conduct regular, unannounced, random audits of compliance and to investigate whistleblower complaints about violations of these policies, and the same powers must be given to an overall enforcement agency to protect business whistleblowers in every jurisdiction;
9. When the integrity commissioner refers a whistleblower complaint about the violation of another law, regulation or policy for which a designated investigative and enforcement agency exists, the commissioner must be required to ensure that the agency investigates the complaint within 90 days, and if an investigation does not begin within this time frame the commissioner must be required and empowered to investigate the complaint;
10. The law must require employers to prove that no retaliation against a whistleblower has taken place (as opposed to requiring the whistleblower to prove that retaliation has occurred);
11. The integrity commissioner or similar commissioner must be given the power to order chief executives/heads of government departments and businesses to take corrective action, and chief executives/heads must be required to report to the commissioner and publicly on corrective actions taken;
12. The integrity commissioner or similar commissioner must be given the power to penalize any chief executive/head with a fine, suspension or firing if the chief executive does not comply with the commissioner’s order, or if anyone retaliates against a whistleblower or does not maintain a system that complies with the law;
13. The minimum fine for retaliating against a whistleblower must be $50,000, with a maximum range of fines from $100,000 to $200,000 for government officials, and 40% of total annual salary for business executives, and loss of any severance payment, and partial clawback of any pension payments;
14. The integrity commissioner or commissioner or other enforcement agency must be required to identity publicly everyone in politics, government or business found guilty of wrongdoing or violation of any law, policy or code;
15. Government whistleblowers whose allegations are proven must receive an immediate payment of at least one year’s salary from the government general revenue fund (and for business whistleblowers a payment of one year’s salary from the business) so that they can, if they want, seek another job if the whistleblowing process has left them completely alienated from all their co-workers (and they should also be given priority in switching jobs in the government or business);
16. Whistleblowers, and members of the public, must be allowed to appeal to court for a review of any ruling by the integrity commissioner or similar commissioner or whistleblower protection enforcement entity, and;
17. At least every 3 years, it must be required that an independent audit of the entire whistleblower protection system be conducted by the Auditor General or other independent body.
Join the call for these key changes across Canada at Democracy Watch’s Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign
List of Key Changes Needed to Make the Federal Access to Information Act, Enforcement and Operation of the Federal Open Government System Effective
(Democracy Watch: November 2025)
Democracy Watch calls on the Government of Canada to enact the following key 18 changes to make the federal Access to Information Act (ATIA) an effective open government law, and to make enforcement of the ATIA effective, and to ensure adequate training and resources to ensure the federal open government system operates effectively.
These 18 key changes are based in part upon annual reports that the federal Information Commissioner has issued over the past several years, each highlighting how loopholes, and abuse of the loopholes, by many federal government institutions undermine the public’s right to know. Those annual reports can be seen at: https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/resources/reports-publications. The 18 key changes are also based on the reports that the former federal Information Commissioner, and the current Information Commissioner, have issued containing more detailed recommendations, especially calling for changes to convert all exclusions in the ATIA into exemptions, and to narrow the scope of all exemptions and limit them with a proof of harm test and a public interest override.[1]
The list of 18 key changes is also based in part upon House of Commons Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics Committee’s June 2016 unanimous report calling for several key changes to close loopholes and strengthen access rights and enforcement of the ATIA. That report can be seen at: https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/ETHI/report-2/.
The list of 18 key changes is also based in part on the Government of Canada’s interim report on its public consultation on the ATIA, which was conducted in spring-summer 2021. The report made it clear that most stakeholders called for 10 changes that are incorporated into the list of 18 key changes set out below. The report can be seen at: https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/reviewing-access-information/the-review-process/ati-review-interim-what-we-heard-report.html.
However, more changes are needed than have been recommended in all of the above reports, especially to ensure the enforcement system is fully independent of the Cabinet, fully resourced, and effective and transparent, and to ensure training of all public and government officials concerning how to create and maintain records to ensure the public’s right to know is always respected and upheld.
A. Key Changes Needed to the Access to Information Act Rules
1. The Access to Information Act (ATIA) should be changed to cover fully all “public institutions” – meaning any entity which forms part of any branch of government, which is established by or under the Constitution or a statute, which or is owned or controlled by another public institution, the core operations of which are substantially financed by another public institution, or which carries out a statutory or public function.
2. The ATIA should be changed to require every public institution to create detailed records of the process and reasons for all decisions and actions taken, including background factual and policy research (duty to document).
3. The ATIA should be changed to require every public institution to routinely disclose records that are likely to be of public interest, including online in a searchable database and in a machine-readable format.
4. The ATIA should be changed to require public institutions to respond to access requests “as soon as possible”. An extension of the 30-day initial time limit for responding should require the permission of the Information Commissioner and be limited to a maximum of an additional 60 days.
5. The exceptions to the right of access in the ATIA should be clearly and narrowly defined and limited to the areas in which secrecy is required in the public interest. In particular:
a) The frequently abused s. 21 (Cabinet advice) of the ATIA should be changed by restricting the exemption in clauses 21(1)(a) and (b) to only the part of any record that contains advice, recommendations or conclusions;
b) Sections 16.1 and 16.3 to 16.5 should be changed to require the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, the Chief Electoral Officer, the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner and the heads of government institutions to disclose investigation records after each investigation is completed (as other Officers of Parliament are required to do in ss. 16.1 and 16.2).
6. All exceptions in the ATIA should be strictly limited by a proof of harm test and a public interest override, and this condition should also be imposed on exceptions set out in other laws listed in Schedule II of the ATIA. All exceptions which protect public interests should be subject to sunset clauses of maximum 20 years (and less than that for Cabinet records).
7. The ATIA should be changed to allow anyone who does factual or policy research for the government in an area not covered by an exception to speak to the media and publicly about the topic, findings and conclusions of their research without being required to seek approval first from anyone (including their superior, the Privy Council, the Prime Minister, a Cabinet minister, or any ministerial staff person).
8. The ATIA should be changed to remove the current restrictions on who may make an access request so that everyone, regardless of citizenship or residence, can make a request.
9. The ATIA should be changed to prohibit charging an application fee (the current fee is $5 for filing an access request), and to prohibit charging search fees for records that have not been maintained in a way that facilitates access.
B. Key Changes Needed to the ATIA to Ensure Effective Enforcement
10. The ATIA should be changed to give the Information Commissioner explicit powers to require systemic changes in government institutions to improve compliance with ATIA requirements, including managing records effectively.
11. The ATIA should be changed to establish a sliding scale of mandatory minimum fines and unpaid suspensions penalties for intentionally obstructing access, including by not creating records, not maintaining records properly or delaying responding to a request, with loss of job and pension as the mandatory penalty for the most serious violations.
12. The ATIA should be changed to give the Information Commissioner explicit powers as a tribunal, to require the Commissioner, to penalize violators of the law with, depending on the seriousness of the violation, a sliding scale of administrative monetary penalties (AMPs). The penalties should include, for government officials attempting to escape penalty by resigning or retiring, loss or partial clawback of any severance payment and/or partial clawback of any pension payments.
13. The ATIA should be changed to require the Information Commissioner to issue a public ruling published on a searchable website for every complaint they receive, and every situation they review, and the public must have a clear right in the ATIA to appeal any decision in court.
14. The ATIA should be changed to establish a fully independent, non-partisan appointments commission (with members, appointed by non-governmental organizations like the Canadian Judicial Council, serving fixed terms of office) to conduct a merit-based search for nominees for Information Commissioner, and to nominate a qualified candidate for approval by an all-party committee of the House of Commons.
15. If a fully independent appointments commission is established as recommended above, the commission should also have the power to decide if the Information Commissioner will be reappointed for another term. If the commission is not established, the ATIA should be changed to make the Commissioner ineligible for a renewal of their first fixed term in office (to ensure that they do not make decisions in the last year or so of their term to try to get reappointed for another term).
C. Key Changes to Ensure Adequate Resources for an Effective Open Government System
16. The ATIA should be changed to require Parliament to provide annual funding to the Office of the Information Commissioner based on the budget presented by that Office and an assessment by the Auditor General (or Parliamentary Budget Officer) of the funding needed to ensure effective, timely enforcement of the ATIA, effective training, and effective promotion of the right of access.
17. The ATIA should be changed to require a set amount of regular training by the Office of the Information Commissioner for all federal politicians, staff, appointees and government employees concerning the rules of the ATIA and best-practice information and record management systems.
18. The ATIA should be changed to expand the mandate and budget of Office of the Information Commissioner to include promotion of the right of access and public awareness activities.
Join the call for these key open government changes across Canada at Democracy Watch’s Open Government Campaign
[1] Caroline Maynard, “Observations and Recommendations from the Information Commissioner on the Government of Canada’s Review of the Access to Information Regime,” (January 2021) Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, online: https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/resources/reports-publications/observations-and-recommendations-information-commissioner-review. Suzanne Legault, “Striking the Right Balance for Transparency, Recommendations to modernize the Access to Information Act,” (March 2015) Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, online: https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/resources/reports-publications/striking-right-balance-transparency.
Group calls on Ethics Commissioner to rule on floor-crossing by MP Chris d’Entremont
MP ethics code requires honesty, upholding highest standards to enhance public confidence and trust in integrity
Running and supporting one party and then switching six months after an election to another party is dishonest and undermines public trust
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Friday, November 14, 2025
OTTAWA – Today, Democracy Watch released the letter it has sent to federal Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner Konrad von Finckenstein calling on him to rule on the floor-crossing by MP Chris d’Entremont. Democracy Watch raises serious questions in its letter concerning the floor-crossing being a violation of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons (MP Code), which requires MPs to fulfill their public duties with honesty and uphold the highest standards so as to maintain and enhance the public’s trust and confidence in their integrity (ss. 2(b)).
Incredibly, MPs from all parties have chosen to prohibit members of the public, who employ and pay all MPs and the Ethics Commissioner, and in whose interests they all are supposed to be serving, from filing requests under section 27 of the MP Code for an inquiry concerning whether an MP has violated any provision of the MP Code that would result in a public ruling by the Ethics Commissioner under section 28 of the MP Code.
As a result, the letter requests that the Ethics Commissioner make a public statement concerning the scope and requirements of section 2 of the MP Code generally, and subsection 2(b) specifically, and how the provisions in section 2 apply to floor-crossings in general, and MP d’Entremont’s floor-crossing specifically. If an MP files a similar complaint, then the Ethics Commissioner will be required to issue a ruling.
As the letter sets out, MP d’Entremont:
1. Ran as a Conservative candidate in the 2025 federal election (and the previous two elections);
2. Took his oath of office in May as a Conservative MP;
3. Stated in the House of Commons in June that it was “an incredible honour” to be elected again as a Conservative MP and thanked voters in his electoral district in Nova Scotia for “placing their trust” in him to represent them again;
4. Voted with the Conservative Party caucus on all votes since then, and;
5. Stated on September 25, 2025 in the House that the Liberal government’s record was mismanagement, out-of-control spending, massive deficits, irresponsible, “a monstrous, irresponsible burden on future generations… that causes inflation and extra costs to future generations”, unacceptable and inhumane, and “absolutely the opposite” of what is needed to “to ease the burden that Nova Scotians and Canadians are seeing at the grocery store.”
As the letter also sets out, concerning his floor-crossing, MP d’Entremont:
1. According to media reports, switched from the Conservative Party caucus to the Liberal Party caucus before the Liberal government’s budget was made public, but then initially claimed that he switched because of the budget;
2. Then the next day offered another reason for why he switched;
3. Then five days later offered another reason for why he switched, which he then corrected because he had misled a media outlet when explaining that reason.
These amount to a series of dishonest actions that undermine instead of enhance public trust, and the letter also sets out media coverage showing that many voters in MP d’Entremont’s district are angry about his floor-crossing.
The dishonesty at the core of the floor-crossing by MP d’Entremont and other MPs in the past is part of the reason that several surveys show that a large majority of Canadian voters do not trust politicians, including a national survey of 1,515 adult Canadians conducted from January 9 to 18, 2025 that found only 17% of Canadians trust politicians in general, and a national survey of 1,502 adult Canadians conducted between January 5-12, 2023 that found only 22% of Canadians trust politicians in general.
Several studies over the past 20 years have shown that only five to 15 percent of voters cast their ballot based on the identity of the local candidate, while the rest vote based on the party or party leader. An MP deciding on their own two switch parties, without any meaningful, comprehensive, demographically representative consultation with voters in their district (talking to a few constituents as MP d’Entremont did is far from adequate), is similar to a dictator making a decision that they claim is in the public’s interest.
DWatch has filed ethics complaints about past floor-crossers, including Belinda Stronach, David Emerson among others (Click here to see details (the link is to DWatch’s archive website)).
“Floor-crossing is a fundamental violation of the right of voters to make an informed choice when voting, and the dishonesty and lack of integrity that is at the core of floor-crossing is a clear violation of the code of conduct for MPs,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “The question is, will the Ethics Commissioner do anything about it, or will he roll over like a lapdog as he has in so many other situations since the Trudeau Cabinet chose him.”
Click here to see the 8 ethics complaints, mainly re: Trudeau Liberal Cabinet ministers, that Ethics Commissioner von Finckenstein buried during his first six months in office.
Democracy Watch also called on all parties to change section 27 of the MP Code to give members of the public the right to file complaints with the Ethics Commissioner concerning whether an MP has violated any provision of the MP Code that will result in a public ruling by the Ethics Commissioner issued under section 28 of the MP Code, and to change sections 44 and 45 of the Conflict of Interest Act also to give the public the same right concerning whether a Cabinet minister, ministerial staff and top government officials covered by the Act has violated the Act that will result in a public ruling by the Ethics Commissioner.
FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
Email: [email protected]
Democracy Watch’s Honesty in Politics Campaign and Government Ethics Campaign
More than a year later, Lobbying Commissioner still hiding her rulings on nine violations after RCMP let lobbyists off the hook
Did the Commissioner let off lobbyists, and fail to enforce the law, and gut key rules in Lobbyists’ Code, to get reappointed by Trudeau Cabinet last December for another 7-year term?
Did RCMP Commissioner let off lobbyists to get appointed by Trudeau Cabinet?
Do the violations include unregistered, unethical lobbying by Facebook, WE Charity, SNC-Lavalin, Imperial Oil and other big business lobbyists?
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Thursday, October 30, 2025
OTTAWA – Today, more than a year after requesting disclosure, Democracy Watch called on Commissioner of Lobbying Nancy Bélanger to stop hiding her rulings on 9 violations of the Lobbying Act that she referred to the RCMP, and that the RCMP referred back to her after letting all the lobbyists off the hook, as well as the ruling she has made on a 10th violation referred back to her by the RCMP sometime in the past year or so.
Democracy Watch filed an Access to Information Act (ATIA) request with the RCMP in October 2023 for the records of the investigations in the 9 cases it had referred back to the Commissioner (after the RCMP let all the lobbyists off without prosecuting any of them for violating the Act). DWatch filed a separate ATIA request with the Commissioner in May 2024 for her final rulings on each case, with each ruling to be disclosed separately as the Commissioner’s office processed the ruling records.
The RCMP has now delayed disclosing the records for two years, and the Commissioner’s office has delayed disclosing the records for one year (after it gave itself a disclosure extension until October 18, 2024). Both the RCMP and the Commissioner are blatantly violating the ATIA which requires records to be disclosed within 30 days or by the end of a reasonable extension.
“By continuing to hide her rulings on nine lobbying violations, Commissioner Bélanger is covering up scandalous situations, protecting the lobbyists and politicians and public officials they were lobbying, and making it even more clear she should not have been re-appointed for a second seven-year term,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “It’s shameful that the RCMP, whose top officers are chosen by and serve at the pleasure of the ruling party Cabinet, continues to take so long to investigate lobbyists who violate the law and that they fail to prosecute almost all violations. Their negligently bad enforcement record is more clear evidence that a new, fully independent anti-corruption federal police and prosecution force is needed.”
The 9 violations the RCMP referred back to the Commissioner may include:
1. The unregistered lobbying and favours for Cabinet ministers that Kevin Chan and others at Facebook did (click here to see DWatch’s April 2018 complaint to the Commissioner);
2. The unregistered lobbying that WE Charity lobbyists did from January 2019 to August 2020, and the trip gifts they gave to former Finance Minister Bill Morneau and his family;
3. The lobbying by former PCO Clerk Kevin Lynch for SNC-Lavalin that was not registered by CEO Neil Bruce (click here to see DWatch’s March 2019 complaint), and by SNC-Lavalin lawyer Robert Pritchard and others;
4. The lobbying by Imperial Oil of then-Conservative Party Leader Andrew Scheer, and by CPA Canada of Minister Karina Gould, at a May 2019 event they sponsored?
Did Commissioner Bélanger hide her 9 rulings, and fail to enforce the Act properly, and gut key rules in the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct (ignoring the opposition to the changes from a coalition of 26 citizen groups with 1.5 million total supporters, and 41 lawyers and professors, and 20,000+ voters – Click here for details), in order to get reappointed by the Trudeau Cabinet to a second seven-year term last December?
Did former RCMP Commissioner Brenda Lucki let off the lobbyists because she was appointed by and served at the pleasure of former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau? Did former Deputy RCMP Commissioner and current RCMP Commissioner Michael Duheme let off the lobbyists so Trudeau would appoint him first as Interim Commissioner in March 2023 and then as Commissioner in April 2024?
The Commissioner testified on April 16, 2024 before the House Ethics Committee that she had referred 15 cases to the RCMP since she became Commissioner in January 2018, and they had let off the lobbyists in 9 cases returned to her, and that the RCMP still had 4 cases under investigation (See p. 12 of testimony).
Commissioner Bélanger gave an update on October 6, 2025 before the House Ethics Committee, saying that she had referred 18 cases to the RCMP since she became Commissioner at the end of December 2017, and the RCMP had let off the lobbyists in 10 cases returned to her, and that 2 lobbyists had been prosecuted by the RCMP, 2 cases were “in discussion” (whatever that means), and that the RCMP still had 2 cases under investigation (See p. 19 of testimony).
A national survey commissioned by Democracy Watch in January 2025 showed that more than 80% of Canadians are concerned about the corrupting effects of secret, unethical lobbying on politicians’ policy-making decisions, and want to know about all lobbying activities.
FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
Email: [email protected]
Democracy Watch’s Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign and Open Government Campaign and Government Ethics Campaign and Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign and Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign