Please support democracy

Without your support, Democracy Watch can't win key changes to stop governments and big businesses from abusing their power and hurting you and your family. Please click here to support democracy now

Category: Uncategorized

List of Key Changes Needed Across Canada to Make Freedom of Information Laws, and Enforcement and Operation of Open Government Systems, Independent, Well-Resourced, Timely, Transparent, Effective and Accountable

Posted on by Bradford

(March 2026)

Freedom of information / access to information laws across Canada set out key rules for transparency of government institutions and public officials.  However, the laws across Canada have so many secrecy loopholes in them, and are so weakly enforced (especially given there are no penalties for violating the laws), that they really should be called the “guide to keeping information secret that the public has a right to know” laws.

Democracy Watch calls on all political parties at the federal level, and in every province and territory to work together to enact the 17 key changes set out below to make their freedom of information laws effective, and enforcement of the laws independent, timely, transparent, effective and accountable, and to ensure adequate training and resources to ensure their open government system operates effectively.

Key changes are needed to convert all exclusions in the laws into exemptions, and to narrow the scope of all exemptions and limit them with a proof of harm test and a public interest override, and to ensure the enforcement system is fully independent of the Cabinet, fully resourced, timely, transparent, effective and accountable, and to ensure training of all public and government officials concerning how to create and maintain records to ensure the public’s right to know is always respected and upheld, and to ensure penalties for violations of the laws (as it has become very clear that a main reason the laws are routinely and regularly violated is because there are no penalties for violations).

A. Key Changes Needed to Ensure the Freedom of Information Law Requires Timely, Low-Cost Disclosure of Information the Public Has a Right to Know

1. The freedom of information law (FOI law) should be changed to cover fully every “public institution” – meaning any entity which forms part of any branch of government, or which is established by or under the Constitution or a statute, or which is owned or controlled by another public institution, or has core operations substantially financed by a public institution, or which carries out a statutory or public function.

2. The FOI law should be changed to require every public institution to create detailed records of the process and reasons for all decisions and actions taken, including background factual and policy research (i.e. there must be a duty to document), and to retain and maintain those records, no matter how the records are created and no matter what type of device the records are created on, to ensure the public has access to the full record of each decision and action.

3. The FOI law should be changed to require every public institution to disclose records that are likely to be of public interest routinely and regularly, including online in a searchable database and in a machine-readable format.

4. The FOI law should be changed to require public institutions to respond to access requests “as soon as possible”.  An extension of the 30-day initial time limit for responding should require the permission of the Information Commissioner and should be limited to a maximum of an additional 60 days.

5. The exceptions to the right of access in the FOI law should be clearly and narrowly defined and limited to the areas in which secrecy is required in the public interest.  In particular:

a) The frequently abused Cabinet advice and Cabinet confidence secrecy exemptions in the FOI law should be changed by restricting the application of the exemptions to only the part of any record that actually contains advice or recommendations (in other words, all facts, statistics, policy options and proposals should be obtainable through an FOI law request;

b) All officers of the legislature, and all law enforcement entities, agencies, boards, commissions and tribunals, and the heads of government institutions, should be required to to disclose investigation records after each investigation is completed.

6. All exceptions in the FOI law should be strictly limited by a proof of harm test and a public interest override, and this condition should also be imposed on exceptions set out in other laws listed in any part or regulation listed in the FOI law.  All exceptions which protect the public interest should be subject to sunset clauses of maximum 20 years (and less than that for Cabinet records).

7. The FOI law should be changed to allow anyone who does factual or policy research for the government in an area not covered by an exception to speak to the media and publicly about the topic, findings and conclusions of their research without being required to seek approval first from anyone (including their superior, the Privy Council, the Prime Minister, a Cabinet minister, or any ministerial staff person).

8. The FOI law should be changed to remove the current restrictions on who may make an access request so that everyone, regardless of citizenship or residence, can make a request.

9. The FOI law should be changed to prohibit charging an application fee for filing an access request, and to prohibit charging search fees for records that have not been maintained in a way that facilitates access.

B. Key Changes Needed to Ensure Independent, Timely, Transparent, Effective and Accountable Enforcement of the FOI law

10. The FOI law should be changed to give the person/entity that enforces the law explicit powers to require systemic changes in government institutions to improve compliance with laws requirements, including requiring systemic changes to ensure records are managed effectively to facilitate public disclosure.

11. The FOI law should be changed to empower and require the person/entity that enforces the law to impose a sliding scale of mandatory minimum fines and unpaid suspensions as penalties for intentionally obstructing access, including by not creating records, not maintaining records properly or delaying disclosure, with loss of job and pension as the mandatory penalty for the most serious violations.  The penalties should include, for government officials that attempt to escape a penalty by resigning or retiring, loss or partial clawback of any severance payment and/or partial clawback of any pension payments.

12. The FOI law should be changed to require the person/entity that enforces thel aw to issue a public ruling published on a searchable website for every complaint they receive, and every situation they review, and the public must have a clear right in the FOI law to appeal any decision in court.

13. The FOI law should be changed to establish a fully independent, non-partisan appointments commission (with members, appointed by non-governmental organizations like the Canadian Judicial Council, serving fixed terms of office) to conduct a merit-based search for nominees for person who heads up the entity that enforces the law, and to nominate a single qualified candidate for approval by an all-party committee of the legislature.

14. If a fully independent appointments commission is established as recommended above, the commission should also have the power to decide if the person who heads up the entity that enforces the law will be reappointed for another term.  If the commission is not established, the FOI law should be changed to make that person ineligible for a renewal of their first fixed term in office (to ensure that they do not make decisions, especially during the last couple of years of their term, to try to get reappointed for another term).

C. Key Changes to Ensure Adequate Resources for an Effective Open Government System

15. The FOI law should be changed to require the legislature to provide annual funding to the person/entity that enforces the law based on the budget presented by that entity and an assessment by the Auditor General of the funding needed to ensure effective, timely enforcement of the FOI law, effective training, and effective promotion of the right of access.

16. The FOI law should be changed to require a set amount of regular training by the office of the entity that enforces the law for all federal politicians, staff, appointees and government employees concerning the requirements in the FOI law and best-practice information and record management systems.

17. The FOI law should be changed to expand the mandate and budget of office of the entity that enforces the law to include promotion of the right of access and public awareness activities.

Complaint re: ATIP file

Posted on by Bradford

To: [email protected]
From: [email protected]
09 Feb, 26 5:46:15 PM
Complaint re: ATIP file #A-2024-2025-005 Comm. of Lobbying illegal retractions

To whom it may concern,

I hope all is well.  I am filing this complaint about how the Commissioner of Lobbying has responded to the Access to Information Act (ATIA) request I filed with them in May 2024, their ATIP file #A-2024-2025-005. I tried to file the online form but it didn’t work.

I filed the request in May 2024.  I requested the records of concluded investigations of the Commissioner — specifically records of investigations that the Commissioner had referred to the RCMP for further investigation for violations of the federal Lobbying Act, and that the RCMP had returned to the Commissioner after deciding not to prosecute the lobbyists involved in each situation, and that the Commissioner had then concluded the investigation file.

Under subsection 16.2(2) of the ATIA, the Commissioner is required to disclose any record that contains information that was created by the Commissioner or on the Commissioner’s behalf in the course of an investigation conducted by, or under the authority of, the Commissioner once the investigation and all related proceedings, if any, are finally concluded.

As a result, the Commissioner is required to disclose the records that I specifically requested.  The RCMP concluded related proceedings, and the Commissioner’s office concluded her investigation.

I specifically stated in my request that I was not requesting disclosure in any record of any personal or third-party information covered by s. 19 or s. 20 of the ATIA. I did this in order to avoid the delay that still happened as the Commissioner blatantly violated the ATIA by failing to disclose the records for more than one year after the Commissioner’s own self-imposed extension of the disclosure deadline to October 18, 2024.

The Commissioner finally disclosed the records on December 11, 2025.  The records, split into 13 files (one for each investigation of alleged violation(s) by a lobbyist) are too large to email to you, but you can get them from the Commissioner’s office.

I am filing this complaint because the disclosed records contain several illegal redactions by the Commissioner.  As you can see in the attached cover letter from the Commissioner’s office that was sent to me with the disclosed records on December 11th, the Commissioner states that the RCMP returned 13 files to the Commissioner’s office, and it seems clear that the Commissioner has also concluded the investigations in those files.

As you can also see, the letter from the Commissioner cites subsection 16.2(1) as one of the reasons for redactions in the records.

As you will also see when you review the 13 files of records that the Commissioner disclosed, several of the records cite subsection 16.2(1) of the ATIA as the reason for a redaction in the records, a subsection that is overridden entirely by subsection 16.2(2) as soon as the Commissioner concludes the investigation.  Each instance in the records that the Commissioner invokes subsection 16.2(1) is a blatant violation of subsection 16.2(2).

The Commissioner of Lobbying testified on April 16, 2024 before the House Ethics Committee that she had referred 15 cases to the RCMP since she became Commissioner in January 2018, and they had let off the lobbyists in 9 cases returned to her, and that the RCMP still had 4 cases under investigation. See p. 12 of testimony at:
https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/441/ETHI/Evidence/EV13024643/ETHIEV112-E.PDF.

Commissioner Bélanger gave an update on October 6, 2025 before the House Ethics Committee, saying that she had referred 18 cases to the RCMP since she became Commissioner at the end of December 2017, and the RCMP had let off the lobbyists in 10 cases returned to her, and that 2 lobbyists had been prosecuted by the RCMP, 2 cases were “in discussion” (whatever that means), and that the RCMP still had 2 cases under investigation.  See p. 19 of testimony at:
https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/451/ETHI/Evidence/EV13632163/ETHIEV07-E.PDF.

As a result, at least 10 of the 13 files of records disclosed by the Commissioner are fully concluded and, therefore, it is a violation of the ATIA to cite subsection 16.2(1) of the ATIA as one of the reasons for redactions in the records.

In addition, you will see when you review the 13 files containing the records of each of the 13 investigations that the Commissioner’s office regularly cites as the reason for redactions all of the provisions in the ATIA from “16(1)(c) – 16.2(1)” — meaning all of the provisions of the ATIA from 16(1)(c) through to and including 16.2(1).

Provision 16(1)(c) of the ATIA can only be used as a reason for a redaction if the redacted information “could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the enforcement of any law of Canada or a province or the conduct of lawful investigations…”  It is completely unreasonable to expect that investigation records about a concluded investigation, which are required to be disclosed under subsection 16.2(2) (which arguably also overrides provision 16(1)(c)), would be injurious to the enforcement of the federal  Lobbying Act.

Provision 16(1)(d) of the ATIA can only be used as a reason for a redaction if the redacted information “could reasonably be expected to be injurious to the security of penal institutions.”  None of the investigations by the Commissioner have anything to do with the security of penal institutions.

Subsection 16(2) of the ATIA can only be used as a reason for a redaction if the redacted information “could reasonably be expected to facilitate the commission of an offence”.  It is completely unreasonable to expect that investigation records about a concluded investigation, which are required to be disclosed under subsection 16.2(2) (which arguably also overrides provision 16(1)(c)), would facilitate the commission of an offence.

Subsection 16(3) of the ATIA can only be used as a reason for a redaction if the redacted information “contains information that was obtained or prepared by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police while performing policing services for a province or municipality”.  None of the investigations by the Commissioner have anything to do with that kind of information.

Subsection 16(4) of the ATIA defines “investigation” — it doesn’t apply and, therefore, it is clearly illegal to cite it as a reason to redact any record.

Section 16.1 applies to other government institutions — it doesn’t apply to the Commissioner of Lobbying and, therefore, it is clearly illegal to cite it as a reason to redact any record.

To give you a summary of the 13 files of investigation records disclosed by the Commissioner, all of them are concluded investigations and, therefore, it is a clear violation of the ATIA  to cite subsection 16.2(1) of the ATIA as the reason to redact any record in each of the 13 files.  It is also a clear violation of the ATIA to cite subsections 16(3), 16(4) and 16.1 as the reason to redact any record in each of the 13 files.  It is also highly questionable, and clearly unreasonable, for the Commissioner to cite provisions 16(1)(c) and (d), and subsections 16(2) as the reason to redact any record in each of the 13 files.  It is very likely that the Commissioner could not actually point to any evidence or cite any reason at all that any of the redactions are in any way justified under provisions 16(1)(c) or (d) or subsection 16(2) of the ATIA.

As a result, a full investigation by the Information Commissioner is justified to reverse and sanction these clear violations of the ATIA by the Commissioner’s office.

Here is the list of the 13 files, and the dates which the records in each file say the Commissioner concluded her investigation:

File #1 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on Dec. 12, 2023.

File #2 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on May 2, 2024.

File #3 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on March 31, 2023.

File #4 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on May 2, 2024.

File #5 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on November 23, 2021.

File #6 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on March 31, 2023.

File #7 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on March 31, 2023.

File #8 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on March 31, 2023.

File #9 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on January 15, 2021.

File #10 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on July 2, 2019.

File #11 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on February 6, 2023.

File #12 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on May 15, 2023.

File #13 — On the last page of this file of investigation records, it says the Commissioner made her final decision concerning this investigation on January 28, 2025.

I look forward to hearing back from you and to a full investigation of these violations of the ATIA by the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying.

Sincerely,
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Democracy Watch
P.O. Box 821, Stn. B
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada
K1P 5P9
Tel: 613-241-5179
Fax: 613-241-4758
Email: [email protected]
Internet: http://democracywatch.ca
Twitter: @DemocracyWatchr
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/DemocracyWatch

Unethical Lobbying Loopholes in Canada’s Federal Lobbying Law

Posted on by Bradford

(Democracy Watch: February 2026)

Under Canada’s federal Lobbying Act, only some lobbyists are required to register and disclose only some of their lobbying activities and communications with federal Cabinet ministers, government officials, politicians, political staff etc.

The Act contains a “dirty dozen” loopholes that allow for secret, unregistered lobbying.  Click here to see the loopholes. 

Only lobbyists who are required to register under the Act are required to comply with the ethical lobbying rules in the federal Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct (Lobbyists’ Code), and the Code also has huge loopholes in it that allow even registered lobbyists to essentially bribe politicians and public officials they are lobbying with favours and gifts.

The loopholes were added to the federal Lobbyists’ Code in July 2023 after a skewed and dishonest public consultation process by Commissioner of Lobbying Nancy Bélanger, with the approval of MPs from all parties on the House of Commons Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics Committee.  In adding the loopholes, which essentially gut key ethics rules in the Code, Commissioner Bélanger ignored the fact that adding the loopholes was opposed by more than 20,000 voters, by 26 citizen groups with a total membership of 1.5 million Canadians, by 15 lawyers from 7 law firms (and also lawyers in private practice or other roles), and by 26 law, politics and ethics professors from 15 universities in 9 provinces (Click here to see details).

The following are the loopholes in the federal Lobbyists’ Code that allow for unethical lobbying and essentially legalize bribery of federal politicians:

1.  A lobbyist is allowed to do secret favours for politicians they are lobbying or are allowed to lobby them soon after doing the favours
         In the pre-July 2023 version of the Lobbyists’ Code, Rules 6 and 9 and a guideline by the Commissioner prohibited lobbying for 4 years (i.e. until after the next election) after a person did any significant campaigning or event organizing, or any fundraising, for a politician or party.
         Under Rule 4.2 in the new Code, depending on the level of campaigning or fundraising a person does for a politician or party, lobbying is allowed at the same time, or right afterwards, or at most only 1-2 years later (only at most 1 year later no matter how much money a lobbyist raises).
         Rule 4.2 also gives the Commissioner of Lobbying the power to secretly reduce those lobbying prohibition periods.
         When proposing the new loophole, Commissioner of Lobbying Bélanger made the very questionable claim that the Code’s previous 4-year cooling-off period violates the Canadian Charter right to freedom of expression, based on one opinion that the Commissioner paid law firm Goldblatt Partners for in a sole-source contract that was extended twice, increasing from $11,300 to $45,200 and then up to $90,400.
         In fact, several Supreme Court of Canada and other Canadian court rulings have clearly stated that Charter rights must be restricted to protect government integrity, and as a result it is clear that the previous 4-year cooling-off period complies with the Charter while the new shorter or non-existent cooling-off periods violate the Charter.
         The Lobbyists’ Code should be changed to again prohibit, without any exemptions, anyone from lobbying any party leader and any MP, Senator or their staff in their party and any party official for at least 4 years after they have done significant campaigning, fundraising, event organizing or any other favour for the party leader or party, and to prohibit anyone from lobbying any individual MP, Senator or their staff after they have done significant campaigning, fundraising, event organizing or any other favour for the MP or Senator. If the Commissioner is allowed to continue to have the power to grant exemptions, the Commissioner must also be required to publish each exemption as soon as it is granted in an online, searchable, public registry.

2.  Gifts and hospitality are allowed to be given by lobbyists to politicians and public officials they lobby
         Under Rules 3.1 to 3.3 of the Lobbyists’ Code, lobbyists are allowed to give a gift or hospitality (i.e. a meal or event) worth up to $40 each time, and up to $200 over any 12-month period.
         While those dollar amounts are not exorbitantly high, and can be afforded by most lobbying organizations, and while these rules are stronger than in past versions of the Code, the rules open up gift-giving and wining and dining as a means of influence, and the limits are difficult to enforce because lobbyist’s interactions with public officials can’t be monitored in any comprehensive, detailed way.
         In addition, the Rules allow the Commissioner to secretly exempt lobbyists from the limits.
         In addition, the Rules allow lobbyists to give gifts to political party officials (who can pass them on to politicians or political staff in their party), and the Rules also allow lobbyists to offer or give other benefits to politicians and public officials, such as a donation to their favourite charity, or a gift or benefit or job to a family member, or the promise of a job in the future after they leave their political or government position.
         The Lobbyists’ Code should be changed to prohibit lobbyists, without any exemptions, from offering or giving, directly or indirectly, any gift or any other type of benefit or advantage to any politician, political staff, political party official or public official or to any member of their family. This clear prohibition not only closes loopholes in the current Code rules, it is also a better system because clinical studies by psychologists in many countries show that even small gifts influence decisions.

3.  Lobbying for clients that have conflicting interests is allowed
         In a past, pre-2015 version of the Lobbyists’ Code, lobbyists were prohibited from representing clients that had conflicting interests unless the clients consented.  The current version of the Code allows lobbyists to representing clients with conflicting interests, which has led to some lobbying firms doing that.  Click here to see details.
         The Lobbyists’ Code should be changed to again prohibit, without any exemptions, anyone from lobbying for a client whose interests conflict with another client unless all the clients consent in writing.

4.  Lobbyists are allowed to use secret information obtained from politicians and public officials
         In the pre-July 2023 version of the Lobbyists’ Code, Rule 5 stated that “If a lobbyist obtains a government document they should not have, they shall neither use nor disclose it.” Rule 2.2 of the new Code says a lobbyist can use or share information obtained from a public official in confidence if the lobbyist has the official’s informed consent.
         The Lobbyists’ Code should be changed to again prohibit, without any exemptions, lobbyists from using or sharing secret information they have obtained from any politician, political staff or public official.

Click here to see key changes needed to make lobbying law and lobbying code enforcement effective.

Join the call for key changes to stop secret, unethical lobbying across Canada at Democracy Watch’s Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign

Key Changes Needed to Close Loopholes in the Federal Senate Ethics Code, and to Make Enforcement of the Code Effective

Posted on by Bradford

(Democracy Watch: November 2025)

A. Key Changes Needed to Prevent, Prohibit and Penalize Unethical Activities by Senators and their Staff

The key changes needed to make the Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code for Senators (“Senator Code”) effective at preventing, prohibiting and penalizing conflicts of interest and unethical gift- and favour-trading are as follows:

1. Expand the Senator Code to cover Senators as soon as their appointment is decided, and to have key rules cover Senator staff who, because they are not covered by the Code, can do the things that Senators are prohibited from doing on behalf of the Senator who employs them, and can also accept all gifts and favours;

2. Add a new subsection to section 2 of the Senator Code to require Senators and their staff to tell the truth to stop the misleading spin that regularly and fatally undermines reasonable policy debates and discussions;

3. Close the huge loophole in the definition of “private interest” (in subsections 11(1) and (2)) to cover all conflicts of interest, not only specific financial conflicts, because the loophole means the Senator Code doesn’t apply to 99% of decisions Senators participate in, and that allows them to take part in decisions when they and their family or others can profit from the decision (and extend subsection 3(2) and sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Code to ensure Senators and their staff are also prohibited from acting in any way to further the private interests of their extended family and friends);

4. Change in subsection 2(2) of the Senator Code the word “expected” to “required” so that, as with sections 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3, Senators are required to comply with the provisions in subsection 2(2), and add a new rule to prohibit Senators and their staff from giving preferential treatment to anyone, especially anyone who has given them a gift or assisted them in any way;

5. As the Parker Commission recommended back in 1987, prohibit Senators and their staff from having investments in businesses, and from having blind trusts (both of which are allowed under sections 21-26);

6. Delete subsections 5(a) and (b) that allow Senators to have another job or business on the side, and require Senators to work full-time as Senators (other than professional requirements like doctors who have to practise a specific amount each year in order to retain their licence), as is essentially required by subsection 2(1) and the compliance requirements set out in the Guideline on Outside Activities (Section 5 of the Code) – Click here to see the PDF version of the Guideline (especially the example of prohibited and permissible outside activities on pages 8-12);

7. Change the gifts and benefits rule in section 17 of the Senator Code to ban Senators and their staff from accepting anything from anyone who is trying to influence their decisions because even small gifts influence decisions, and delete sections 18 and 19 of the Code so that a Senator or their staff accepting “sponsored travel” is clearly prohibited because it is an unethical gift and essentially a form of legalized bribery;

8. Change clause 28(1)(h) (and 31(1)(d)) of the Senator Code to require Senators and their staff to disclose in the Public Registry their assets and liabilities worth more than $1,000 (the current disclosure requirement is for everything worth more than $10,000, which is much too high), and change clause 28(1)(d) (and clause 31(1)(d)) to require disclosure of all income, and change subsection 28(4) to require confidential disclosure only to the Senate Ethics Officer of all the assets listed in that subsection except government benefits (as MPs are required to disclose to the Ethics Commissioner because monitoring those assets is key to ensuring integrity), and add a new subsection to sections 28 and 31 that requires disclosure of details about their past five year’s work before they became a Senator to make it easy to track which organizations and issues they have ties to, and to disclose in the Public Registry which members of their extended family they have close relationships with including being aware of their business, investments and other private interests;

9. Add a subsection to section 33 of the Senator Code to require the Senate Ethics Officer to determine for each departing Senator and Senate staff person the sliding-scale time period after they leave during which they will be prohibited from communicating with their former colleagues and government officials, with the scale based on what positions and committees they served in and how close their relationships are with Cabinet ministers, officials etc., and require Senators and Senate staff to disclose their post-activities online during this time period in a searchable database;

10. Delete clauses 44(2)(d) and (e) and subsections 49(1) to (3) and (5) and (6) and section 51 and delete references to the Senate Committee in section 52, and change subsection 49(4) to empower and require the Senate Ethics Officer and only the Officer to impose a sliding scale of penalties depending the seriousness of the violation (and add to subsection 49(4) for the most serious violations significant fines and a loss of Senate seat to the list of possible penalties – similar to the provision in subsection 502(3) of the Canada Elections Act (S.C. 2000, c. 9).  Senators should not be participating in decisions concerning determining violations or penalizing a Senator because Senators are tainted by partisan bias and other biases.  The Senate has empowered the Senate Ethics Officer to investigate and rule on violations, and so the Officer should also be empowered to impose the penalty (but penalties should be mandatory so that the Officer is required to impose a penalty for every violation).

B. Key Changes Needed to Make Enforcement of the Senator Code Independent, Transparent, Timely, Effective and Accountable

The following changes are needed to ensure the enforcement of the Senator Code is independent, transparent, timely, effective and accountable.  Click here to see a policy paper (in English only) that sets out details concerning these much-needed changes to the current federal enforcement system (similar changes are needed to every provincial, territorial and municipal ethics law enforcement system across Canada):

1. Establish, by adding new provisions to the Parliament of Canada Act (by completely changing section 20.1), a fully independent, fully non-partisan committee to conduct a public, merit-based search for short list (1-3) qualified candidates for Senate Ethics Officer, and then have that committee make the final choice and submit the choice to a Senate committee for appointment (with no possibility of re-appointment as that gives the enforcer an incentive to please office holders by letting them off when they violate the rules). This should also be the system for the appointment of all Officers of Parliament, the Commissioner and all other top officers of the RCMP, the head of FINTRAC, the new Foreign Interference Transparency Commissioner, and all judges, all of whom need to be fully independent in order to be perceived as being capable of impartially and effectively enforcing the key democratic good government and anti-corruption laws they enforce.

2. Add a new subsection to section 44 of the Senator Code that requires the Senate Ethics Officer to conduct regular, unannounced audits of a randomly selected sample of Senators’ (and their staffs’) financial statements, participation in discussions, decisions and votes, outside activities, gifts and benefits and other matters and activities covered by the Code.

3. Change subsection 42(6) and section 43 of the Senator Code to require the Senate Ethics Officer to publish online binding interpretations of every measure in the COIA with examples of real situations, and to publish online a summary of the Commissioner’s advice each time advice about a new situation is given to any person covered by the Code, so everyone knows exactly what the Code

4. Change subsection 27(8) of the Senator Code to require all Senators and their staff to take a formal training course when they first start their position, and annually.

5. Change section 47 of the Senator Code to give members of the public, who employ and pay all Senators and their staff, the right to file a complaint with the Senate Ethics Officer.

6. Change sections 47 and 48 of the Senator Code to require the Senate Ethics Officer to investigate and issue a public ruling on every complaint the Commissioner receives and every situation the Commissioner becomes aware of that raises any questions about whether a Senator or their staff have complied with the Code, and (as set out above) to impose a sliding scale of penalties depending the seriousness of the violation.

7. Add a new subsection to section 20.6 of the Parliament of Canada Act giving any member of the public a clear right to apply in Federal Court for a judicial review of any decision made by the Senate Ethics Officer under the Senator Code.

C. Many Other Changes Needed to Prevent, Prohibit and Penalize Conflicts of Interest and to Ensure Democratic Good Government

The following changes are needed to other federal laws to prevent, prohibit and penalize conflicts of interest and to ensure democratic good government:

• Closing all the loopholes in the Conflict of Interest Act that allow for secret, unethical activities by Cabinet ministers, their staff, Cabinet appointees and top government officials (Click here to see details);

• Closing all the loopholes in the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons that allow for secret, unethical activities by MPs, and extend key rules in that code to apply to the staff of MPs (Click here to see details);

• Closing all the loopholes that allow for secret, unethical lobbying (Click here to see details);

• Decreasing the donation limit in the Canada Elections Act to $75 (as the current annual individual donation limit of $3,500 (which increases by $50 each year) is essentially legalized bribery for those who can afford to make a top donation) (Click here to see details);

• Closing huge excessive secrecy loopholes in the federal Access to Information Act and strengthening enforcement (Click here to see details);

• Preventing, prohibiting and penalizing foreign interference (Click here to see a policy paper on key needed measures);

• Strengthening the whistleblower protection law (Click here to see details).

Join the call for these and other key government ethics changes across Canada at Democracy Watch’s Government Ethics Campaign

Key Changes Needed to Strengthen Whistleblower Protection Rules and Enforcement Systems Across Canada

Posted on by Bradford

(November 2025)

There are several systemic problems with the lack of effective whistleblower protection for both the public sector and the private sector, across Canada, in not only the Public Sector Disclosure Protection Act (PSDPA) but also all other federal, provincial, territorial and municipal laws.

The federal House of Commons Government Operations Committee called in its unanimous June 2017 report for many key changes to change the law and enforcement system to strengthen protection for whistleblowers who report wrongdoing by people in the federal government.  However, then-Treasury Board Minister Scott Brison rejected the Committee’s recommendations in an October 2017 letter – committing the government only to reinforcing the internal disclosure process. The Liberals’ Bill C-65 in 2018 did nothing to change the Canada Labour Code’s requirement that federal workplace victims file complaints with their boss, who is often the harasser, and so it left political staff and other whistleblowers essentially unprotected. In February 2021, the House Committee voted to send its June 2017 report back to the House of Commons and requested that the Cabinet respond to it again, but the Cabinet did not respond.

Bill C-86 in 2018 added sections 979.1 to 979.4 to the Bank Act to create a right for bank employees to blow the whistle on wrongdoing, but did not establish an independent enforcement agency or process to protect them.  In 2021, an international report ranked Canada tied for last out of 62 countries with whistleblower protections (See pp. 10 and 75 of PDF of report).  MPs from opposition parties supported private member Bill C-290 which proposed several key changes to the federal PSDPA, but unfortunately the bill was derailed by the prorogation of Parliament in January 2025 by then-Prime Minister Justin Trudeau

Provincial governments across Canada have failed to protect government and business whistleblowers fully and effectively, although the Ontario Securities Commission took a big step forward in protecting securities law whistleblowers with a new program launched in July 2016 which offers up to $5 million as a reward for whistleblowers whose claims are proven (which led to calls to reward securities law whistleblowers in other provinces and to reward Competition Act whistleblowers).

All of the following 17 changes are needed to strengthen whistleblower protection laws and enforcement systems to ensure everyone who blows the whistle on abuse, waste and law-breaking in government and business is fully and effectively protected:

1.  All whistleblowers must be effectively protected from retaliation, including politicians, political staff, government employees, suppliers and contractors, and members of the public, and in business all executives, employees, suppliers, contractors, customers and members of the public;

2.  Whistleblowers must be allowed, in all cases, to file their complaint directly with an integrity commissioner or similar enforcement agency;

3.  Everyone who witnesses or receives evidence of wrongdoing by anyone in politics, government or business must be required to report it to an integrity commissioner or similar enforcement agency (with the commissioner strictly and strongly required to keep their identity secret, and with everyone allowed to submit evidence anonymously);

4.  All whistleblowers must receive funding to pay for full legal advice (or a specialized, fully independent, publicly funded legal clinic should be established to provide this advice for free to all whistleblowers);

5.  Any person nominated and chosen to be the integrity commissioner or similar whistleblower protection commissioner must be required to have legal experience and a strong record of enforcing whistleblower protection, ethics rules or similar accountability laws;

6.  The process for choosing an integrity commissioner or similar commissioner for the public sector or private sector must be conducted by an independent committee of individuals from outside government and politics whose members have no ties to any political party, with the members chosen by all political parties represented in the legislature, and the committee must conduct a public, merit-based search for candidates, and submit one nominee to an all-party committee for appointment approval;

7.  The integrity commissioner or similar commissioner must not be eligible for a renewal of their fixed term in office (to ensure that the commissioner does not act as a lapdog to try to get re-appointed for another term);

8.  The integrity commissioner or similar commissioner must be clearly designated as the trainer (including by issuing interpretation bulletins), investigator and enforcer of all government policies and procedures, and must be required to conduct training sessions, conduct regular, unannounced, random audits of compliance and to investigate whistleblower complaints about violations of these policies, and the same powers must be given to an overall enforcement agency to protect business whistleblowers in every jurisdiction;

9.  When the integrity commissioner refers a whistleblower complaint about the violation of another law, regulation or policy for which a designated investigative and enforcement agency exists, the commissioner must be required to ensure that the agency investigates the complaint within 90 days, and if an investigation does not begin within this time frame the commissioner must be required and empowered to investigate the complaint;

10.  The law must require employers to prove that no retaliation against a whistleblower has taken place (as opposed to requiring the whistleblower to prove that retaliation has occurred);

11.  The integrity commissioner or similar commissioner must be given the power to order chief executives/heads of government departments and businesses to take corrective action, and chief executives/heads must be required to report to the commissioner and publicly on corrective actions taken;

12.  The integrity commissioner or similar commissioner must be given the power to penalize any chief executive/head with a fine, suspension or firing if the chief executive does not comply with the commissioner’s order, or if anyone retaliates against a whistleblower or does not maintain a system that complies with the law;

13.  The minimum fine for retaliating against a whistleblower must be $50,000, with a maximum range of fines from $100,000 to $200,000 for government officials, and 40% of total annual salary for business executives, and loss of any severance payment, and partial clawback of any pension payments;

14.  The integrity commissioner or commissioner or other enforcement agency must be required to identity publicly everyone in politics, government or business found guilty of wrongdoing or violation of any law, policy or code;

15.  Government whistleblowers whose allegations are proven must receive an immediate payment of at least one year’s salary from the government general revenue fund (and for business whistleblowers a payment of one year’s salary from the business) so that they can, if they want, seek another job if the whistleblowing process has left them completely alienated from all their co-workers (and they should also be given priority in switching jobs in the government or business);

16.  Whistleblowers, and members of the public, must be allowed to appeal to court for a review of any ruling by the integrity commissioner or similar commissioner or whistleblower protection enforcement entity, and;

17.  At least every 3 years, it must be required that an independent audit of the entire whistleblower protection system be conducted by the Auditor General or other independent body.

Join the call for these key changes across Canada at Democracy Watch’s Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign

List of Key Changes Needed to Make the Federal Access to Information Act, Enforcement and Operation of the Federal Open Government System Effective

Posted on by Bradford

(March 2026)

Democracy Watch calls on the Government of Canada to enact the following key 18 changes to make the federal Access to Information Act (ATIA) an effective open government law, and to make enforcement of the ATIA effective, and to ensure adequate training and resources to ensure the federal open government system operates effectively.

These 18 key changes are based in part upon annual reports that the federal Information Commissioner has issued over the past several years, each highlighting how loopholes, and abuse of the loopholes, by many federal government institutions undermine the public’s right to know.  Those annual reports can be seen at: https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/resources/reports-publications.  The 18 key changes are also based on the reports that the former federal Information Commissioner, and the current Information Commissioner, have issued containing more detailed recommendations, especially calling for changes to convert all exclusions in the ATIA into exemptions, and to narrow the scope of all exemptions and limit them with a proof of harm test and a public interest override.[1]

The list of 18 key changes is also based in part upon House of Commons Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics Committee’s June 2016 unanimous report calling for several key changes to close loopholes and strengthen access rights and enforcement of the ATIA.  That report can be seen at: https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/ETHI/report-2/.

The list of 18 key changes is also based in part on the Government of Canada’s interim report on its public consultation on the ATIA, which was conducted in spring-summer 2021.  The report made it clear that most stakeholders called for 10 changes that are incorporated into the list of 18 key changes set out below.  The report can be seen at: https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/access-information-privacy/reviewing-access-information/the-review-process/ati-review-interim-what-we-heard-report.html.

However, more changes are needed than have been recommended in all of the above reports, especially to ensure the enforcement system is fully independent of the Cabinet, fully resourced, and effective and transparent, and to ensure training of all public and government officials concerning how to create and maintain records to ensure the public’s right to know is always respected and upheld.

A.  Key Changes Needed to the Access to Information Act Rules

1.  The Access to Information Act (ATIA) should be changed to cover fully all “public institutions” – meaning any entity which forms part of any branch of government, which is established by or under the Constitution or a statute, which or is owned or controlled by another public institution, the core operations of which are substantially financed by another public institution, or which carries out a statutory or public function.

2.  The ATIA should be changed to require every public institution to create detailed records of the process and reasons for all decisions and actions taken, including background factual and policy research (duty to document).

3.  The ATIA should be changed to require every public institution to routinely disclose records that are likely to be of public interest, including online in a searchable database and in a machine-readable format.

4.  The ATIA should be changed to require public institutions to respond to access requests “as soon as possible”.  An extension of the 30-day initial time limit for responding should require the permission of the Information Commissioner and be limited to a maximum of an additional 60 days.

5.  The exceptions to the right of access in the ATIA should be clearly and narrowly defined and limited to the areas in which secrecy is required in the public interest. In particular:

a)  The frequently abused s. 21 (Cabinet advice) and s. 69 (Cabinet confidence) of the ATIA should be changed by restricting the application of the exemption in clauses 21(1)(a) and (b) and in clauses 69(1)(a), (b) and (e) to only the part of any record that actually contains advice or recommendations (in other words, all facts, statistics, policy options and proposals should be obtainable through an ATIA request, and this change means clause 69(3)(b) can be deleted from the ATIA);

b)  Sections 16.1 and 16.3 to 16.5 should be changed to require the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, the Chief Electoral Officer, the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner and the heads of government institutions to disclose investigation records after each investigation is completed (as other Officers of Parliament are required to do in ss. 16.1 and 16.2).

6.  All exceptions in the ATIA should be strictly limited by a proof of harm test and a public interest override, and this condition should also be imposed on exceptions set out in other laws listed in Schedule II of the ATIA.  All exceptions which protect public interests should be subject to sunset clauses of maximum 20 years (and less than that for Cabinet records).

7.  The ATIA should be changed to allow anyone who does factual or policy research for the government in an area not covered by an exception to speak to the media and publicly about the topic, findings and conclusions of their research without being required to seek approval first from anyone (including their superior, the Privy Council, the Prime Minister, a Cabinet minister, or any ministerial staff person).

8.  The ATIA should be changed to remove the current restrictions on who may make an access request so that everyone, regardless of citizenship or residence, can make a request.

9.  The ATIA should be changed to prohibit charging an application fee (the current fee is $5 for filing an access request), and to prohibit charging search fees for records that have not been maintained in a way that facilitates access.

B.  Key Changes Needed to the ATIA to Ensure Effective Enforcement

10.  The ATIA should be changed to give the Information Commissioner explicit powers to require systemic changes in government institutions to improve compliance with ATIA requirements, including managing records effectively.

11.  The ATIA should be changed to establish a sliding scale of mandatory minimum fines and unpaid suspensions penalties for intentionally obstructing access, including by not creating records, not maintaining records properly or delaying responding to a request, with loss of job and pension as the mandatory penalty for the most serious violations.

12.  The ATIA should be changed to give the Information Commissioner explicit powers as a tribunal, to require the Commissioner, to penalize violators of the law with, depending on the seriousness of the violation, a sliding scale of administrative monetary penalties (AMPs).  The penalties should include, for government officials attempting to escape penalty by resigning or retiring, loss or partial clawback of any severance payment and/or partial clawback of any pension payments.

13.  The ATIA should be changed to require the Information Commissioner to issue a public ruling published on a searchable website for every complaint they receive, and every situation they review, and the public must have a clear right in the ATIA to appeal any decision in court.

14.  The ATIA should be changed to establish a fully independent, non-partisan appointments commission (with members, appointed by non-governmental organizations like the Canadian Judicial Council, serving fixed terms of office) to conduct a merit-based search for nominees for Information Commissioner, and to nominate a qualified candidate for approval by an all-party committee of the House of Commons.

15.  If a fully independent appointments commission is established as recommended above, the commission should also have the power to decide if the Information Commissioner will be reappointed for another term.  If the commission is not established, the ATIA should be changed to make the Commissioner ineligible for a renewal of their first fixed term in office (to ensure that they do not make  decisions in the last year or so of their term to try to get reappointed for another term).

C.  Key Changes to Ensure Adequate Resources for an Effective Open Government System

16.  The ATIA should be changed to require Parliament to provide annual funding to the Office of the Information Commissioner based on the budget presented by that Office and an assessment by the Auditor General (or Parliamentary Budget Officer) of the funding needed to ensure effective, timely enforcement of the ATIA, effective training, and effective promotion of the right of access.

17.  The ATIA should be changed to require a set amount of regular training by the Office of the Information Commissioner for all federal politicians, staff, appointees and government employees concerning the rules of the ATIA and best-practice information and record management systems.

18.  The ATIA should be changed to expand the mandate and budget of Office of the Information Commissioner to include promotion of the right of access and public awareness activities.

Join the call for these key open government changes across Canada at Democracy Watch’s Open Government Campaign

[1] Caroline Maynard, “Observations and Recommendations from the Information Commissioner on the Government of Canada’s Review of the Access to Information Regime,” (January 2021) Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, online: https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/resources/reports-publications/observations-and-recommendations-information-commissioner-review.  Suzanne Legault, “Striking the Right Balance for Transparency, Recommendations to modernize the Access to Information Act,” (March 2015) Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, online: https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/resources/reports-publications/striking-right-balance-transparency.

The “Dirty Dozen” Loopholes in Canada’s Federal Government Ethics Law

Posted on by Bradford

Lapdog Federal Ethics Commissioner Has Created Some of the Loopholes, and Failed to Enforce the Law Effectively since 2006

(Democracy Watch: October 2025)

Almost impossible to be in a conflict of interest because of huge loopholes in law

The federal Conflict of Interest Act (COIA) is a law containing ethics requirements for the most powerful public office holders in the federal government (the Prime Minister, Cabinet ministers, their staff and all top government officials and Cabinet appointees (except ambassadors and federal judges)).

The COIA is a loophole-filled, sad joke that, because of huge loopholes in the law, doesn’t apply to 99% of the decisions and actions of these office holders.  It really should be called the “Almost Impossible to be in a Conflict of Interest Act”.

As the loopholes set out below show, the COIA is much weaker than the ethics requirements that apply to the least powerful federal government employees in the Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector and the Directive on Conflict of Interest, which together require all employees to act with integrity at all times in a manner that will bear the closest public scrutiny, and prohibit them from participating in any decision or action when they have even an appearance of a conflict of interest of any kind.

It is simply perverse that the most powerful politicians and office holders in Canada’s federal government have much weaker ethics requirements and standards than the least powerful public servants.

PM Code – strict, strong rules, but not enforced

There is also the Prime Minister’s Code (PM Code) and, among other strong and strict rules, it also requires the Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers to be honest, and act with integrity at all times in a manner that will bear the closest public scrutiny, and it prohibits them from participating in any decision or action when they have even an appearance of a conflict of interest of any kind (these measures essentially define what would be a violation of the COIA measure that prohibits “improperly” furthering one’s own or others’ interests (in ss. 4, 8 and 9).

The Ethics Commissioner has stated several times that the PM and Cabinet ministers are required to comply with this PM Code, but usually the Commissioner has not enforced that requirement.  Also, it is unclear if current Prime Minister Mark Carney is going to cancel, weaken or maintain the PM Code.  Click here to see details. 

The real solution, which any PM would do if they actually wanted Cabinet ministers and top government officials to be required to be ethical, is to add the ethics rules in the PM Code to the COIA so they are clearly required by law and enforceable.

Ethics enforcement is partisan, political, weak, secretive, slow, ineffective and largely unaccountable

Although the ethics rules for federal government employees are much stronger than for top politicians and government officials, the enforcement systems for the COIA and the rules for federal government employees (as well as for the ethics rules for MPs and senators) are all equally partisan, political, weak, secretive, slow, ineffective overall and largely unaccountable.

As the “dirty dozen” list below details, some of the loopholes have been created through negligently bad enforcement by the federal Ethics Commissioner since 2006, including by current Commissioner Konrad von Finckenstein, who buried eight investigations and created three new loopholes in his first six months as Commissioner.

Click here to see key changes needed to strengthen the enforcement of these and other key federal democracy laws, and click here to call for these key stronger enforcement measures, and click here to support efforts to win these changes.  See a summary list of key enforcement changes further below.

Key changes needed to close prevent, prohibit and penalize unethical activities by the PM, Cabinet ministers, their staff and appointees

The 12 key changes needed to close key loopholes and make the COIA actual effective at preventing conflicts of interest and unethical gift- and favour-trading are as follows (similar changes to close similar loopholes are needed for the MP Code and the Senate Code, and in every provincial, territorial and municipal ethics law across Canada):
 

1. Add a rule to require all public office holders to tell the truth to stop the misleading spin that regularly and fatally undermines reasonable policy debates and discussions, with high fines for misleaders. Canada needs political leaders, not misleaders.
 

2. Close the huge loophole in the definition of “private interest” (in ss. 2(1)) to clearly prohibit participating in any decision-making process when in a conflict of interest, not only decisions that are specific.

Currently, the COIA says that an office holder can never be in a conflict of interest when they are making a decision of “general application” or that applies to them as part of a “broad class of persons” or entities.  In other words, they can only be in a conflict of interest when they are making a decision that applies specifically to one person, business or organization or a small group of people, businesses or other types of organizations.

This is a huge loophole because 99% of the decisions and actions of office holders apply generally or to a broad class of people or entities.  As a result, the COIA currently doesn’t apply to 99% of decisions and actions that office holders participate in, and that allows them to take part in decisions when they, their family or friends can profit from the decision.  This loophole is the main reason the COIA should be called the Almost Impossible to be in a Conflict of Interest Act.

Until the “general application” and “broad class” loopholes are removed from the COIA, it will make no difference if the COIA is changed to prohibit office holders from being in an “apparent conflict of interest” as Ethics Commissioner von Finckenstein recommends on p. 8 of his 2024-2025 Annual Report.  Prohibiting apparent conflicts is an important change, but the loopholes must be closed to make that rule actually apply.

As well, the Ethics Commissioner recommends on p. 9 of his report that the “broad class” loophole in the COIA be expanded to match the larger loophole in the MP Code.  This is a very bad idea – loopholes need to be removed, not expanded.

The enforcement of the COIA by all the Ethics Commissioners since 2006 has been so negligently bad that none of them have even defined what “general application” or “broad class” actually mean, even though they are two of the most important terms that determine what decisions and actions by office holders are covered by the COIA.

The definition of “private interest” in ss. 2(1) of the COIA should be changed to prohibit public office holders from participating in any discussion, decision or vote, even about a matter that applies generally or applies to a broad class of people or entities, if they have even an appearance of a conflict of interest because they, their relatives or friends will benefit from the decision financially in a direct or indirect way (currently, the ethics code that applies to all federal government employees prohibits this).

In addition, the definition of ss. 2(1) of the COIA should be changed to prohibit the Prime Minister, Cabinet ministers and other public office holders from appointing or controlling the appointment process of anyone, especially a relative or friend, to any position that involves investigating, examining or auditing the office holder or any government institution in any way. This change is needed because, even though the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) found that the PM and Cabinet ministers are biased when appointing watchdogs who watch over their actions, the FCA allowed them to continue to handle the appointments. And it is needed because current Ethics Commissioner von Finckenstein allowed former PM Justin Trudeau to appoint his old family friend David Johnston to investigate foreign interference in Trudeau’s government.

3. Prohibit office holders from having investments in businesses.

The Parker Commission recommended banning investments (pages 343-361 (esp. 360-361)) way back in 1987 because it is the only effective way to actually prevent the conflicts of interest caused by investments.  Politicians, public officials, governments and political parties across Canada have all ignored Justice Parker’s recommendations ever since then because they all want to be allowed to secretly profit from their decisions.

Currently, the COIA has a loophole that allows office holders to place investments in a “not blind” trust (see details in #4 below) and another loophole (in s. 20) that allows secret “exempt assets” which include investments in: some mutual funds; RRSPs; RESPs; university, hospital and other public sector debt; annuities and; life insurance policies.

It’s true that some of these investments are not fully “controlled” by the public office holder, but if an office holder invests in a mutual fund (or exchange-traded fund (ETF)) that is focused on a specific industry (for example, the Canadian financial industry) or on big businesses generally in Canada, they know that the fund will own shares in companies in that industry or in those big businesses, and so they have a direct financial conflict but are allowed to keep it secret from the public.

In addition, the COIA has another loophole (in ss. 27(10)) that allows Cabinet staff and top government officials to secretly own so-called “minimal value” investments in businesses they regulate or make decisions about.  Truly incredibly, last year Ethics Commissioner Konrad von Finckenstein doubled from $30,000 to $60,000 the allowable value of these investments, and also specifically allowed members of the Canadian Energy Regulator (CER) to invest in exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and mutual funds that own shares in energy companies, because the Commissioner believes that $60,000 of shares is a “minimal” investment (even though $60,000 is almost double what an average Canadian earns each year), and that ETFs and mutual funds do not cause financial conflicts of interest.  Click here to read the Commissioner’s bizarre definition of financial conflicts of interest (see #3 re: Doubling the minimum value exemption and #4 re: CER appointees’ investments).

As well, on p. 9 of his 2024-2025 Annual Report, Ethics Commissioner von Finckenstein has recommended the very bad idea of weakening the investment rules in the COIA even more to allow the PM, Cabinet ministers, their staff and top government officials to secretly own ETFs because, again, he believes that ETFs don’t cause a conflict of interest, even though they clearly do if the ETF is focused on a specific industry, or generally on business sectors regulated by the federal government.

Ethics Commissioner von Finckenstein, and some other commentators, claim that it would be too much to require new office holders to sell investments in businesses, as they would have to pay taxes on capital gains from selling their investments.  A simple fix for this is to allow them to sell their investments without paying tax on them (or paying a much-reduced tax rate) in return for their public service.

What could the PM, Cabinet ministers, their staff and top government officials do after selling all their investments?  They are paid well compared to most Canadians, in the top 1-5% of annual salaries, and they have among the most generous benefits and pension plans of any employees in Canada.  So, instead of enriching themselves further through investing in private businesses that cause financial conflicts of interest that taint their decision-making and policy-making, they can buy government bonds or guaranteed investment certificates or other similar financial products that are not connected to any specific business, and that offer a fixed rate of interest for the time period that they remain in office, and then when they leaves office they can again invest in shares and mutual funds and other financial products for investing in businesses.
 

4. Ban the use of a so-called “blind” trust because they are not blind, and actually require selling investments (which is what “divestment” means).

Putting “controlled asset” investments like stocks, mutual funds in a blind trust is currently allowed under s. 20, clause 27(1)(b) and ss. 27(4) to (7) of the COIA. The 1984 Starr-Sharp Task Force on Conflict of Interest, and the 1987 Parker Commission (pages 343-361 (esp. 360-361)) both recommended against blind trusts because they are a sham façade that hide and do nothing effective to prevent or prohibit financial conflicts of interest.  A so-called “blind” trust isn’t blind at all because:

a)  the office holder knows what stocks and other investments they put in the trust;
b)  they chose their own trustee (ss. 27(4));
c)  they are allowed to give the trustee instructions such as don’t sell anything (ss. 27(5)), and;
d)  the trustee is allowed to give the office-holder regular updates on the trust (clause 27(4)(g)).

 

5. Ban the use of so-called “conflict of interest screens” or “ethics screens” because they are smokescreens that hide the fact that office holders participate in almost all decisions that affect their and their family’s and friends’ private interests.

The federal Ethics Commissioner’s website misleads the public and the media because it says that a “conflict of interest screen” includes a statement from the public office holder saying that they agree proactively “to abstain from any discussions, decisions, debate or votes concerning the matter that forms the subject of the conflict of interest.” The technical legal term for this is to “recuse” oneself from a decision-making process, and is called a “recusal”.

In fact, as can be seen in both Prime Minister Mark Carney’s ethics screen statement and Cabinet minister Daniel LeBlanc’s statement (among many other federal screen statements), their screens allow them to participate in discussions, decisions and votes “of general application” or that apply to a “broad class” (group) of people or entities, as long as the private interest affected by the decision is not “dominant” or “disproportionate” in the broad group.

As described above in point #2, this is a huge loophole in every ethics screen (and in all the ethics rules in the COIA) because 99% of decisions made by office holders apply generally or to a broad group. Because of this huge loophole, a so-called “ethics screen”, and the COIA overall, are actually smokescreens because they make it seem like the office holder will not participate in decisions when they have a conflict of interest but, in fact, because of the huge loophole they continue to secretly participate in almost every decision.

Other than the disclosure of the ethics screen statement, the way that the Ethics Commissioner has structured ethics screens means that no disclosure is required when an office holder is actually prevented from participating in a discussion, decision or vote (if this was required, it would show that, because of the loophole described above in #2, office holders are actually allowed to participate in almost every decision even when they have a conflict of interest). The Ethics Commissioner could require office holders to disclose this so that screens would be revealed to be the smokescreens that they actually are, but no Commissioner has shown any interest in making screens transparent.

The first federal Ethics Commissioner Bernard Shapiro invented “ethics screens” in 2004 because a requirement for public disclosure by a public office holder of the details every time office holders recuse themselves didn’t exist in the ethics code at that time.  Commissioner Shapiro recommended in several reports that public disclosure of every recusal be required.

When the code was enacted as the COIA in 2006, public disclosure of the details and reasons for every recusal was clearly required, with no exceptions, within 60 days after each recusal (ss. 21, 25(1) and clause 26(2)(b)).  However, the second Ethics Commissioner Mary Dawson ignored this requirement and continued using ethics screens to hide the fact that office holders were almost never recusing themselves.  Ethics Commissioner Mario Dion, and current Ethics Commissioner von Finckenstein, also continued using ethics smokescreens.

 

6. Change s. 7 of the COIA to prohibit office holders from giving preferential treatment to anyone, especially anyone who has given them a gift or assisted them in any way (currently s. 7 only prohibits giving preferential treatment to someone or any entity based on the person who represents them/lobbies for them).

This change would not mean that office holders would be prohibited from making a decision that favours one stakeholder over another (as most decisions do in one way or another), it would just mean that they would have to use a decision-making and public consultation process that gives all stakeholders an equal opportunity to communicate and meet with the office holder, and be listened to, before the office holder makes their decision.

 

7. Change the gifts and benefits rule to ban the PM, Cabinet minister, their staff and top government officials from accepting anything from anyone who is trying to influence their decisions because even small gifts influence decisions.

Currently, the COIA allows gifts from relatives and friends even if the relative or friend is a lobbyist (clause 11(2)(b)).
 

8. Change sections 20 and 22 and ss. 25(2) of the COIA to require office holders to disclose to the Ethics Commissioner and in the Public Registry their assets and liabilities worth more than $1,000 (the current disclosure requirement is only for liabilities worth more than $10,000, which is much too high), and to disclose details about their past five year’s work before they became an office holder to make it easy to track which organizations and issues they have ties to, and to disclose which members of their extended family (and which friends) they have close relationships with including being aware of their business, investments and other private interests.
 

9. Extend the cooling-off period in the COIA (ss. 35-42) during which an office holder is prohibited from contacting the government from to 2 to 5 years, and longer if a conflict of interest still exists, with no exceptions.

Currently, s. 35 of the COIA allows public office holders to leave their position and right away work for or lobby for a business, person or organization they have overseen or worked with as long as they didn’t have direct and significant official dealings with the business, person or organization during their last year in public office.

This is a significant loophole. This s. 35 of the COIA, and the other federal ethics codes, should be changed to prohibit the Prime Minister, Cabinet ministers and their senior staff, and top government officials and Cabinet appointees, and all other office holders (including all federal government employees) from going to work for or lobby for any person or entity if it would create even an appearance of a conflict of interest. This will likely result in a sliding-scale “cooling-off” time period of 2 to 5 years after an office holder leaves office depending on what positions and committees they served in and how close their relationships are with Cabinet ministers, officials etc. (it may be longer if an appearance conflict of interest still exists).

In addition, require former office holders to disclose their post-office holder activities online during this “cooling-off” time period in a searchable database to ensure their activities are tracked pro-actively, and require the Ethics Commissioner to do regular, random, unannounced audits of former office holders’ activities to ensure they are following the rules.
 

10. Clarify the measures in the COIA (ss. 33-34) that prohibit passing on secret information you learned while in public office and taking advantage of your former public office to make it clear that a former public office holder is prohibited from doing any work (including volunteering) or taking any job where they would clearly be in a position to give advice based on secret information they learned while in office.

Currently, former public office holders are prohibited from taking improper advantage of their former office in any way (s. 33), including by giving advice based on secret information they learned while in public office (ss. 34(2)). However, the Ethics Commissioner refuses to enforce these measures effectively by requiring proof that former office holders are actually giving advice using secret information even when, in their new private sector job, there is no way they could advise their employer or client(s) without using secret information they learned while in public office.

For example, former Ethics Commissioner Mario Dion allowed former Canadian Ambassador to China Dominic Barton to move directly into a board position with mining company Rio Tinto, which had operations in China, even though Barton would clearly be advising Rio Tinto as a board member using secret information he learned while he was Canada’s Ambassador. There is no way that Barton, when advising Rio Tinto, could split his mind and “forget” the secret information he learned as Ambassador, so just by taking the position at Rio Tinto he was clearly violating ss. 34(2) of the COIA.
 

11. Extend the COIA and/or MP Code rules to cover federal political party leadership contestants, and MPs as soon as their election is confirmed by Elections Canada, to prevent unethical decisions and actions even before they are elected as a party leader or MP.

Currently, only a couple of ethics-related rules apply to party leadership contestants and election candidates. Also, because of loopholes in the s. 118 definitions of “office” and “official” in the Criminal Code, and in the Parliament of Canada Act, it is actually legal to bribe a person who has been elected but has not yet taken their oath of office as an MP or Cabinet minister, or a person who is a party leader who has not yet been elected and taken their oath of office as an MP. Until they take their oath of office, they are not an “official” who holds a public “office”. These loopholes in the Criminal Code need to be closed, and either the COIA and MP Code both need to be extended to cover party leadership contestants and election candidates or a new ethics law with specific rules for contestants and candidates needs to be enacted.
 

12. Establish a sliding scale of mandatory, significant penalties for violating the key ethics rules in the COIA.

There currently are no penalties for violating the key ethics rules in the COIA. The only penalty is a meaningless fine of up to a maximum of only $500 for failing to disclose assets and liabilities accurately and on time (ss. 52-62).  To discourage violations, mandatory, significant fines should be established on a sliding scale depending on the seriousness of the violation and the annual income and net worth of the office holder (so better paid, wealthier office holders pay a higher fine to discourage them equally from violating the law, given they have the finances to pay a higher fine).  For the most serious violations, the office holder should automatically lose their public office position and be barred from public office for a significant time period.

In every case, if an office holder has profited from violating the COIA or ethics code that applies to them, the mandatory fine must also be greater than the amount of the profit so that violations are actually discouraged and no office holder is ever allowed to profit from their violation. Mandatory fines should also be imposed for every violation even if an office holder resigns or retires, including by clawing back any severance pay or pension payments.

In contrast, Ethics Commissioner von Finckenstein only recommends on pp. 9-10 and 36 of his 2024-2025 Annual Report that the maximum fine be increased to $3,000, which is still a meaningless amount for Cabinet ministers and top government officials who all make more than $200,000 annually.

Summary of Key Changes Needed to Make Political Ethics Enforcement Effective

1.  Establish a fully independent, fully non-partisan committee to conduct a public, merit-based search for short list (1-3) qualified candidates for ethics-related enforcement positions, and then have an all-party committee make the final choice (with no possibility of re-appointment as that gives the enforcer an incentive to please office holders by letting them off when they violate the rules).

2.  Add new sections to the COIA, MP Code and Senate Code to require the federal Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, and the Senate Ethics Officer, to regularly conduct an unannounced audit of a randomly selected sample of office holders’ financial statements and activities.

3.  Add new sections to the COIA, MP Code and Senate Code to require the Commissioner and Officer to publish online binding interpretations of every measure in the COIA, MP Code and Senate Code with examples of real situations, and to publish online a summary of the Commissioner’s or Officer’s advice each time advice about a new situation is given to any person covered by the COIA or a code, so everyone knows exactly what the law prohibits. Current section 30 of the MP Code should be deleted because it gives MPs the power to approve interpretations of the code and compliance forms, which allows MPs to gut interpretations. The Ethics Commissioner, as enforcer of the MP Code, should be the interpreter of the code (along with the courts when cases are filed for court review of the reasonableness of a Commissioner’s decision).

4.  Add new sections to the COIA, MP Code and Senate Code to require all office holders to take a formal training course when they first start their position, and annually. The MP Code currently requires MPs to take training within 120 days of being elected, but not annually.

5.  Add new sections to the COIA, MP Code and Senate Code to give members of the public, who employ and pay all office holders, the right to file a complaint with the Ethics Commissioner and Senate Ethics Officer.

6.  Add new sections to the COIA, MP Code and Senate Code to require the Commissioner and Officer to investigate and issue a public ruling on every complaint and situation s/he becomes aware of, and to impose a sliding scale of penalties depending the seriousness of the violation.

7.  Add new sections to the COIA, MP Code and Senate Code giving any member of the public a clear right to challenge any decision by the Commissioner or Officer in court.

Click here to see key changes needed to strengthen the enforcement of these and other key federal democracy laws, and click here to call for these key stronger enforcement measures, and click here to support efforts to win these changes.

Join the call for these and other key government ethics changes across Canada at Democracy Watch’s Government Ethics Campaign

Many Other Changes Needed to Prevent, Prohibit and Penalize Conflicts of Interest and to Ensure Democratic Good Government

The following changes are needed to other federal laws to prevent, prohibit and penalize conflicts of interest and to ensure democratic good government (and similar changes are needed in every province, territory and municipality across Canada):

•  Closing all the loopholes in the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons that allow for secret, unethical activities by MPs, and extend key rules in that code to apply to the staff of MPs (Click here to see details (in English only));

•  Closing all the loopholes in the Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code for Senators that allow for secret, unethical activities by Senators, and extend key rules in that code to apply to the staff of Senators (Click here to see details (in English only));

•  Closing all the loopholes that allow for secret, unethical lobbying (Click here to see details (in English only));

•  Decreasing the donation limit in the Canada Elections Act to $75 (as the current annual individual donation limit of $3,500 (which increases by $50 each year) is essentially legalized bribery for those who can afford to make a top donation) (Click here to see details (in English only));

•  Closing huge excessive secrecy loopholes in the federal Access to Information Act and strengthening enforcement (Click here to see details (in English only));

•  Preventing, prohibiting and penalizing foreign interference (Click here to see a policy paper on key needed measures (in English only));

•  Strengthening the whistleblower protection law (Click here to see details).

Speaker of House of Commons should not be MP, and should be chosen from a short list of experts after a search by independent committee

Posted on by Bradford

Speaker is a key guardian of Canada’s democracy – must have expertise and be fully independent and impartial, not an MP loyal to one party

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Monday, May 26, 2025

OTTAWA – Today, Democracy Watch called on federal party leaders to learn the lessons of past controversial rulings by Speakers of the House of Commons by reaching an agreement to have a non-MP chosen as Speaker after an independent committee does a public, merit-based search for a short list of qualified candidates who have expertise in parliamentary rules and procedure.

Like the Officers of Parliament, the Speaker is a key guardian of democracy and must be independent of all parties because s/he makes many key decisions about the actions of MPs and the operations of Parliament and the government.  As a result, the Speaker should not be an MP tainted with partisanship.

Democracy Watch proposes that an independent committee whose members are approved by all federal party leaders in the House of Commons be established to conduct a public, merit-based search for a shortlist of three non-MP, fully qualified nominees for Speaker who know parliamentary law and procedure, and then MPs would rank the nominees in a secret ballot as happens now.  The Speaker would be the person who receives the most votes from this ranked ballot vote, and would be protected from being removed during the full term of the Parliament until the next election (except for cause such as a violation of any law).

Because the Speaker is an MP from one of the parties, it is easy for leaders of other parties to accuse the Speaker of making partisan rulings whenever the ruling goes against the interests of their party.  Also, given party leaders determine whether MPs get to run for re-election, the MP who is Speaker remains under the influence of one party leader.  In addition, MPs who become Speaker often also take months or years before they are an effective referee who can maintain decorum in the House and has the knowledge and expertise to make reasonable, rules- and evidence-based rulings.

“Given how important it is for the Speaker of the House of Commons to be independent and impartial, especially in a minority government situation, federal party leaders should establish a new, independent process for choosing a fully qualified Speaker who is not an MP,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch.

– 30 –

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
Email: [email protected]

Democracy Watch’s Stop PM/Premier Abuses Campaign and Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign

Federal Report Card Criteria

Posted on by Bradford

Grading System, Categories and Sub-categories for the Report Card on the 2025 Democratic Reform Platforms of the Federal Political Parties

Set out below are the 16 sub-categories for the 5 issue area categories that are the basis for the Report Card


GRADING SYSTEM
A – Platform makes clear promise to implement proposal
B – Platform makes vague or partial promise to implement proposals
C – Platform makes clear promise to explore proposal
D – Platform makes vague or partial promise to explore proposal
D- – Platform mentions proposal
F – Platform mentions theme of proposal
I – Platform does not mention proposal

I. Honest, Ethical Government Measures

  1. Requiring honesty-in-politics – Pass a law that requires all federal Cabinet ministers, MPs, Senators, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees (including at Crown corporations, agencies, boards, commissions, courts and tribunals) nomination race, party leadership race and election candidates to tell the truth (like federal lobbyists are already required to be honest), with an easily accessible complaint process to a fully independent watchdog agency that is fully empowered to investigate and penalize anyone who lies (including about election promises, and including requiring resignation and a by-election if an MP switches parties between elections for an unjustifiable reason). Prohibit anyone and any entity from having a social media account that is anonymous and does not identify the person or entity behind the account, and prohibit all false claims including prohibiting Internet, TV, radio, social media and all other companies from allowing fake videos and audio files to be posted or aired on their sites or channels (especially that imitate politicians and public officials) and create a fully independent commission to require Internet and social media companies to remove posts that make any false claims, and to penalize anyone who posts a false claim. General complaints about false or fraudulent advertising or statements during elections should be reviewed by the Commissioner of Canada Elections, and between elections by the Ethics Commissioner, but if the alleged false claim is about a specialized area, it should be reviewed by the existing agency, board or commission that specializes in that area) (Go to the Honesty in Politics Campaign and Stop Fake Online Election Ads Campaign and Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  2. Strengthening ethics standards for politicians, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees, and ethics enforcement – Close the loopholes in the existing ethics rules so that all assets, investments and liabilities (except personal property) are required to be publicly disclosed, and top politicians, political staff and government officials are prohibited from having investments, and blind trusts are prohibited because they are a façade, and public recusal is required whenever an office holder is in even an appearance of a conflict of interest (even if the decision being made applies generally); and apply the rules to everyone in all government institutions (including all Crown corporations); and prohibit MPs and Senators from having outside jobs; and, as proposed by the federal Department of Finance place anyone with decision-making power on the anti-corruption watch list of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (Fintrac) so deposits to their bank accounts can be tracked, and; strengthen the independence and effectiveness of politician and government employee ethics watchdog positions (the Ethics Commissioner for Cabinet and MPs, the Senate Ethics Officer for senators, the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner for government employees, the Commissioner of Lobbyists for lobbyists) having a fully independent committee do a public, merit-based search for a short list of qualified candidates, and requiring approval of opposition party leaders of the person appointed to each position, by having Parliament (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner of Lobbying’s annual budget (as is currently the process for the Ethics Commissioner), by prohibiting the Commissioners from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioners to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioners to penalize rule-breakers with meaningful fines, by ensuring all decisions of the Commissioners can be reviewed by the courts, and by changing the codes they enforce (MP Code, Lobbyists’ Code and Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code for Senators into laws.  (Go to the Government Ethics Campaign and Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  3. Making the political donations system democratic – Lower the annual donation limit to parties and riding associations to $75 (the amount 75% of donors give annually); limit loans, including from financial institutions, to parties and all types of candidates to the same level as donations are limited; require disclosure of all donations (including the identity of the donor’s employer (as in the U.S.) and/or major affiliations) and loans quarterly and before any election day; limit spending on campaigns for the leadership of political parties; require full disclosure of the actual source(s) of third-party (interest group) funding, and maintain limits on third-party (non-political party) advertising during elections, and establish third-party registration and spending limits for between elections (for each policy-making process) and during nomination and party leadership contests, with all the limits allowing individuals and corporations to spend only a small amount, and citizen groups to spend a multiple of that amount based on the number of members/supporters they have. If they can prove they need it, lower the public funding of political parties from $2 per vote received to $1 per vote received for parties that elect more MPs than they deserve based on the percentage of voter support they receive (to ensure that in order to prosper these parties need to have active, ongoing support of a broad base of individuals), and; ensure riding associations receive a fair share of this per-vote funding (so that party headquarters don’t have undue control over riding associations), and; establish a sliding scale of public funding that matches donations, and; provide subsidies to economincalllh disadvantaged contestants and candidates if they can show that they have public support.  (Go to the Money in Politics Campaign and Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).
  4. Closing down the revolving door – Prohibit lobbyists from working for government departments or serving in senior positions for political parties or candidates for public office (as in New Mexico and Maryland), and from having business connections with anyone who does, and close the loopholes so that the actual cooling-off period for former Cabinet ministers, ministerial staff and senior public officials is five years (and three years for MPs, senators, their staff, and government employees) during which they are prohibited from becoming a lobbyist or working with people, corporations or organizations with which they had direct dealings while in government; and prohibit politicians, their staff and government officials from accepting gifts from anyone who has an interest in federal government decisions, including the gift of volunteering or sponsoring interns in politicians’ offices.  Make the Ethics Commissioner, Commissioner of Lobbying and Senate Ethics Officer more independent and effective by having a fully independent committee do a public, merit-based search for a short list of qualified candidates, and requiring approval of opposition party leaders of the person appointed to each position, by having Parliament (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner of Lobbying’s annual budget (as is currently the process for the Ethics Commissioner), by prohibiting the Commissioners from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioners to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioners to penalize rule-breakers with meaningful fines, by ensuring all decisions of the Commissioners can be reviewed by the courts, and by changing the codes they enforce (MP Code, Lobbyists’ Code and Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code for Senators into laws).  (Go to the Government Ethics Campaign and Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).

II. Open Government Measures

  1. Strengthening access-to-information system – Strengthen the federal access-to-information law and government information management system by applying the law to all government/publicly funded institutions, requiring all institutions and officials to create records of all decisions and actions and disclose them proactively and regularly, creating a public interest override of all access exemptions, giving opposition party leaders a veto over the appointment of the Information Commissioner, having Parliament (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Information Commissioner’s annual budgets (as is currently the process for the federal Ethics Commissioner), and giving the federal Information Commissioner the power and mandate to order the release of documents (as in Ontario, Alberta and B.C.), to order changes to government institutions’ information systems, and to penalize violators of access laws, regulations, policies and rules.  (Go to the Open Government Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).
  2. Exposing behind-closed-door communications – Require in a new law that Ministers and senior public officials to disclose their contacts with all lobbyists, whether paid or volunteer lobbyists.  (Go to the Government Ethics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).
  3. Strengthening lobbying disclosure and ethics, and the enforcement system – Strengthen the Lobbying Act and Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct disclosure system by closing the loophole that currently allows secret lobbying if the lobbyist is not paid, or if the lobbying is about the enforcement of laws and regulations or about tax credits; and close the loophole that allows businesses especially, but also organizations, to hide the number of people involved in lobbying activities; and require lobbyists to disclose their past work with any Canadian or foreign government, political party or candidate, to disclose all their government relations activities (whether paid or volunteer) involving gathering inside information or trying to influence policy-makers (as in the U.S.) and to disclose the amount they spend on lobbying campaigns (as in 33 U.S. states). Require everyone and every entity to register in a foreign-agent registry if they have any arrangement, paid or unpaid, with a foreign government, foreign entity or foreigner to be involved in Canada in public relations/communications, lobbying or any other activities aimed at influencing politicians, parties, governments, elections or politics in any way, including disclosing who is paying them, how much they are being paid, and details about the activities. Prohibit lobbyists from giving gifts to politicians or sponsoring interns in their offices; and strengthen the lobbying enforcement system by adding specific rules and closing loopholes in the Lobbyists’ Code and making it part of the Act, by extending the limitation period for prosecutions of violations of the Act to 10 years.  Establish a fully independent committee to do a public, merit-based search for a short list of qualified candidates, and require approval of opposition party leaders of the person appointed as Commissioner of Lobbying, and have Parliament (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner of Lobbying’s annual budget (as is currently the process for the Ethics Commissioner).  Prohibit the Commissioner from giving secret advice, require the Commissioner to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), and fully empower and require the Commissioner to penalize rule-breakers with meaningful fines, and ensure all decisions of the Commissioner can be reviewed by the courts.  (Go to the Government Ethics Campaign and Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign and Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).

III. Efficient Government Measures

  1. Increasing powers of Auditor General and Parliamentary Budget Officer – Increase the independence of the Auditor General (AG) and Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) by establishing a fully independent committee do a public, merit-based search for a short list of qualified candidates, and requiring approval of opposition party leaders of the person appointed to each position, by having Parliament (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the their annual budget (as is currently the process for the Ethics Commissioner), by prohibiting the AG from giving secret advice, by requiring the AG to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), by fully empowering and requiring the AG to penalize rule-breakers with meaningful fines, by ensuring all decisions of the AG can be reviewed by the courts, and by changing the spending they enforce (MP Code, Lobbyists’ Code and Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code for Senators into laws)., and by making the PBO a full Officer of Parliament with a fixed term who can only be dismissed for cause; increase auditing resources of the Auditor General and PBO by having Parliament (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Auditor General’s annual budget (as is currently the process for the federal Ethics Commissioner), and; empower and mandate the Auditor General to audit all government institutions (including the House of Commons and Senate), to make orders for changes to government institutions’ spending systems, and empower the Auditor General and PBO to penalize violators of federal Treasury Board spending rules or Auditor General or PBO orders o requests for information.  (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign and Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).
  2. Restricting government advertising – Empower a government watchdog agency to preview and prohibit government advertising that promotes the ruling party, especially leading up to an election (similar to the restrictions in Manitoba, Ontario and Saskatchewan).  (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

IV. Representative, Citizen-Driven Government Measures

  1. Increasing meaningful public consultation – Pass a law requiring all government departments and institutions to use consultation processes that provide meaningful opportunities for citizen participation, especially concerning decisions that affect the lives of all Canadians.  (Go to the Stop PM/Premier Power Abuses Campaign and Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign and Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign and Democratic Voting System Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  2. Restricting power of Cabinet to make appointments – Establish fully independent committees to do a public, merit-based search for a short list of qualified candidates, and requiring approval of opposition party leaders, of the person appointed to each position approval by opposition party leaders for the approximately 3,000 judicial, agency, board, commission and tribunal appointments currently made by the Prime Minister and Cabinet (including the board and President of the CBC), especially for appointees to senior and law enforcement positions (Go to the Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign and Stop PM/Premier Power Abuses Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  3. Making the House more democratic, and making the Senate democratic or abolish it – Change the Parliament of Canada Act to restrict the Prime Minister’s power to shut down (prorogue) Parliament to only for a very short time during a scheduled adjournment period, or only for an election (dissolution), or if the national situation has changed significantly or if the Prime Minister can show that the government has completed all their pledged actions from the last Speech from the Throne (or attempted to do so, as the opposition parties may stop or delay completion of some actions).  Give all party caucuses the power to choose which MPs and senators in their party sits on House and Senate committees, and allow any MP or senator to introduce a private member bill at any time, and define what a “vote of confidence” is in the Parliament of Canada Act in a restrictive way so most votes in the House of Commons are free votes.  Increase resources and change the enforcement policy for the RCMP so that anyone who harasses or intimidates a candidate, contestant or MP, including online, is charged and prosecuted. Attempt to reach an agreement with provincial governments (as required by the Constitution) to either abolish the Senate or reform the Senate (with a safeguard that Senate powers will not be increased unless senators are elected and their overall accountability increased).  (Go to the Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign and Stop PM/Premier Power Abuses Campaign and Shut Down the Senate Campaign and Democratic Head Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  4. Ensuring free, fair and representative elections – Change the current voting law and system (the Canada Elections Act) to specifically restrict the Prime Ministers’ power to call an unfair snap election, so that election dates are fixed as much as possible under the Canadian parliamentary system.  Change the Act also so that nomination and party leadership races are regulated by Elections Canada (including limiting spending on campaigns for party leadership), so that Elections Canada determines which parties can participate in election debates based upon merit criteria, so that party leaders cannot appoint candidates except when a riding does not have a riding association, so that voters are allowed to refuse their ballot (ie. vote for “none of the above”, as in Ontario), and to provide a more equal number of voters in every riding, and a more accurate representation in Parliament of the actual voter support for each political party (with a safeguard to ensure that a party with low-level, narrow-base support does not have a disproportionately high level of power in Parliament), and; require everyone and every entity to register in a foreign-agent registry if they have any arrangement, paid or unpaid, with a foreign government, foreign entity or foreigner to be involved in Canada in public relations/communications, lobbying or any other activities aimed at influencing politicians, parties, governments, elections or politics in any way, including disclosing who is paying them, how much they are being paid, and details about the activities. Increase resources and change the enforcement policy for the RCMP so that anyone who harasses or intimidates a candidate, contestant or MP, including online, is charged and prosecuted. (Go to the Democratic Voting System Campaign and Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

V. General Government Accountability Measures

  1. Facilitating citizen watchdog groups over government – Require federal government institutions to enclose one-page pamphlets periodically in their mailings to citizens inviting citizens to join citizen-funded and directed groups to represent citizen interests in policy-making and enforcement processes of key government departments (for example, on ethics, spending, and health care/welfare) as has been proposed in the U.S. and recommended for Canadian banks and other financial institutions in 1998 by a federal task force, a House of Commons Committee, and a Senate Committee.  (Go to the Citizen Association Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).
  2. Ensuring effective whistleblower protection – Require everyone to report any violation of any law, regulation, policy, code, guideline or rule, and require all watchdog agencies over government (for example: Auditor General, Information Commissioner, Privacy Commissioner, Public Service Commission, the four ethics watchdogs (especially the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner), Security and Intelligence Review Committee, the National Health Council) to investigate and rule publicly on allegations of violations, to penalize violators, to protect anyone (not just employees) who reports a violation (so-called “whistleblowers”) from retaliation, to reward whistleblowers whose allegations are proven to be true, and to ensure a right to appeal to the courts. (Go to the Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).
  3. Ensuring loophole free laws and strong penalties for wrongdoers – Close any technical and other loopholes that have been identified in laws, regulations, policies, codes, guidelines and rules (especially those regulating government institutions and large corporations) to help ensure strong enforcement, including closing all the loopholes that allow for “beneficial ownership” of any business across Canada that hides the identity of the actual owners, and require lawyers to report suspicious transactions to Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), and increase financial penalties for violations to a level that significantly effects the annual revenues/budget of the institution or corporation.  (Go to the Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign and Corporate Responsibility Campaign and Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).

Système de notation, catégories et sous-catégories pour le bilan des plates-formes de réforme démocratique 2025 des partis politiques fédéraux

Voici 16 sous-catégories pour les 5 catégories de thèmes qui sont à la base du bilan

.

Voici les 16 sous-catégories pour les 5 catégories de thèmes qui constituent la base du Bilan

.


SYSTEME DE CLASSEMENT
A – La plateforme promet clairement de mettre en œuvre la proposition
B – La plate-forme fait une promesse vague ou partielle de mise en œuvre des propositions.
C – La plate-forme promet clairement d’explorer la proposition
D – La plateforme fait une promesse vague ou partielle d’explorer la proposition
D- – La plateforme mentionne la proposition
F – La plate-forme mentionne le thème de la proposition
I – La plateforme ne mentionne pas la proposition

I. Des mesures gouvernementales honnêtes et éthiques

  1. Exiger l’honnêteté en politique – Adopter une loi qui exige que tous les ministres fédéraux, les députés, les sénateurs, le personnel politique, les personnes nommées par le Cabinet et les employés du gouvernement (y compris dans les sociétés d’État, les agences, les conseils, les commissions, les cours et les tribunaux), la course à l’investiture, la course à la direction du parti et les candidats aux élections disent la vérité (comme les lobbyistes fédéraux sont déjà tenus d’être honnêtes), avec une procédure de plainte facilement accessible auprès d’une agence de surveillance totalement indépendante et pleinement habilitée à enquêter et à sanctionner quiconque ment (y compris au sujet de promesses électorales, et en exigeant la démission et une élection partielle si un député change de parti entre deux élections pour une raison injustifiable). Interdire à toute personne et à toute entité d’avoir un compte de média social qui est anonyme et n’identifie pas la personne ou l’entité derrière le compte, et interdire toutes les fausses affirmations, y compris interdire à Internet, à la télévision, à la radio, aux médias sociaux et à toutes les autres entreprises d’autoriser de fausses vidéos et de faux fichiers audio à être affichés ou diffusés sur leurs sites ou canaux (en particulier ceux qui imitent les politiciens et les fonctionnaires) et créer une commission entièrement indépendante pour exiger des entreprises d’Internet et de médias sociaux qu’elles suppriment les messages qui contiennent de fausses affirmations, et pour pénaliser toute personne qui affiche une fausse affirmation. Les plaintes générales concernant des publicités ou des déclarations fausses ou frauduleuses pendant les élections devraient être examinées par le commissaire aux élections fédérales, et entre les élections par le commissaire à l’éthique, mais si la fausse allégation présumée concerne un domaine spécialisé, elle devrait être examinée par l’agence, le conseil ou la commission existant qui se spécialise dans ce domaine) (Allez à la page Campagne sur l’honnêteté en politique et Campagne pour arrêter les fausses publicités électorales en ligne et Campagne pour arrêter l’ingérence étrangère dans la politique canadienne pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch.)
  2. Renforcer les normes éthiques pour les politiciens, le personnel politique, les personnes nommées par le Cabinet et les employés du gouvernement, et l’application de l’éthique – Combler les lacunes des règles éthiques existantes de sorte que tous les actifs, investissements et passifs (à l’exception des biens personnels) doivent être divulgués publiquement, que les politiciens de haut niveau, le personnel politique et les fonctionnaires du gouvernement n’ont pas le droit d’avoir des investissements, que les fiducies sans droit de regard sont interdites parce qu’elles sont une façade, et que la récusation publique est requise chaque fois qu’un titulaire de poste se trouve même dans une apparence de conflit d’intérêts (même si la décision prise s’applique de manière générale) ; et appliquer les règles à tout le monde dans toutes les institutions gouvernementales (y compris toutes les sociétés d’État) ; et interdire aux députés et aux sénateurs d’avoir des emplois extérieurs ; et, comme le propose le ministère fédéral des Finances, placer toute personne ayant un pouvoir de décision sur la liste de surveillance anticorruption du Centre d’analyse des opérations et déclarations financières du Canada (Fintrac) afin que les dépôts sur leurs comptes bancaires puissent être suivis, et.. ; renforcer l’indépendance et l’efficacité des postes de surveillance de l’éthique des politiciens et des fonctionnaires (le commissaire à l’éthique pour le cabinet et les députés, le conseiller sénatorial en éthique pour les sénateurs, le commissaire à l’intégrité du secteur public pour les fonctionnaires, le commissaire au lobbying pour les lobbyistes) en demandant à un comité entièrement indépendant de procéder à une recherche publique et fondée sur le mérite d’une liste restreinte de candidats qualifiés et en exigeant que les chefs des partis d’opposition approuvent la personne nommée à chaque poste, en demandant au Parlement (plutôt qu’au cabinet) d’approuver le budget annuel du commissaire au lobbying (comme c’est actuellement le cas pour le commissaire à l’éthique), en interdisant aux commissaires de donner des conseils secrets, en exigeant que les commissaires enquêtent et statuent publiquement sur toutes les plaintes (y compris les plaintes anonymes), en donnant aux commissaires les pleins pouvoirs et en exigeant qu’ils pénalisent les contrevenants par des amendes significatives, en veillant à ce que toutes les décisions des commissaires puissent être révisées par les tribunaux et en transformant les codes qu’ils appliquent (Code du MP, Code des lobbyistes et Code de l’éthique et des conflits d’intérêts pour les sénateurs) en lois. (Voir les sites Government Ethics Campaign et Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
  3. Rendre le système de dons politiques démocratique – Abaisser la limite annuelle des dons aux partis et aux associations de circonscription à 75 $ (le montant que 75 % des donateurs donnent annuellement) ; limiter les prêts, y compris des institutions financières, aux partis et à tous les types de candidats au même niveau que les dons sont limités ; exiger la divulgation de tous les dons (y compris l’identité de l’employeur du donateur (comme aux États-Unis) et/ou de ses principales affiliations) et des prêts, au même niveau que les dons.) et les prêts tous les trimestres et avant tout jour d’élection ; limiter les dépenses pour les campagnes de direction des partis politiques ; exiger la divulgation complète de la (des) source(s) réelle(s) de financement des tiers (groupes d’intérêt) et maintenir des limites à la publicité des tiers (partis non politiques) pendant les élections, et établir des limites à l’enregistrement et aux dépenses des tiers entre les élections (pour chaque processus d’élaboration des politiques) et pendant les courses à l’investiture et à la direction des partis, toutes les limites permettant aux particuliers et aux entreprises de ne dépenser qu’un petit montant, et aux groupes de citoyens de dépenser un multiple de ce montant en fonction du nombre de membres/supporters qu’ils ont. S’ils peuvent prouver qu’ils en ont besoin, réduire le financement public des partis politiques de 2 $ par vote reçu à 1 $ par vote reçu pour les partis qui élisent plus de députés qu’ils ne le méritent en fonction du pourcentage de soutien des électeurs qu’ils reçoivent (afin de s’assurer que pour prospérer, ces partis doivent avoir le soutien actif et continu d’une large base d’individus), et ; veiller à ce que les associations de circonscription reçoivent une part équitable de ce financement par vote (afin que les sièges des partis n’exercent pas un contrôle excessif sur les associations de circonscription), et ; établir une échelle mobile de financement public qui correspond aux dons, et ; fournir des subventions aux candidats défavorisés sur le plan économique s’ils peuvent prouver qu’ils bénéficient d’un soutien public. (Voir les campagnes Money in Politics Campaign et Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).
  4. Fermer la porte tournante – Interdire aux lobbyistes de travailler pour des ministères ou d’occuper des postes de direction pour des partis politiques ou des candidats à des fonctions publiques (comme au Nouveau Mexique et dans le Maryland), et d’avoir des relations d’affaires avec quiconque le fait, et combler les lacunes de sorte que la période de réflexion réelle pour les anciens ministres, le personnel ministériel et les hauts fonctionnaires soit de trois ans, de cinq ans (et de trois ans pour les députés, les sénateurs, leur personnel et les fonctionnaires) pendant laquelle il leur est interdit de devenir lobbyistes ou de travailler avec des personnes, des entreprises ou des organisations avec lesquelles ils ont eu des relations directes pendant qu’ils étaient au pouvoir ; interdire aux hommes politiques, à leur personnel et aux fonctionnaires d’accepter des cadeaux de la part de toute personne ayant un intérêt dans les décisions du gouvernement fédéral, y compris le cadeau de bénévolat ou de parrainage de stagiaires dans les bureaux des hommes politiques. Rendre le commissaire à l’éthique, le commissaire au lobbying et le conseiller sénatorial à l’éthique plus indépendants et plus efficaces en confiant à un comité totalement indépendant la recherche publique et fondée sur le mérite d’une liste restreinte de candidats qualifiés, en exigeant l’approbation par les chefs des partis d’opposition de la personne nommée à chaque poste, en demandant au Parlement (et non au Cabinet) d’approuver le budget annuel du commissaire au lobbying (comme c’est actuellement le cas pour le commissaire à l’éthique), en interdisant aux commissaires de donner des conseils secrets, en exigeant que les commissaires enquêtent et statuent publiquement sur toutes les plaintes (y compris les plaintes anonymes), en donnant aux commissaires les pleins pouvoirs et en leur demandant de sanctionner les contrevenants par des amendes significatives, en veillant à ce que toutes les décisions des commissaires puissent être réexaminées par les tribunaux et en transformant les codes qu’ils appliquent (Code du MP, Code des lobbyistes et Code de l’éthique et des conflits d’intérêts pour les sénateurs en lois). (Consultez les sites Government Ethics Campaign et Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).

II. Mesures en faveur d’un gouvernement ouvert

    – Renforcer la loi fédérale sur l’accès à l’information et le système de gestion de l’information du gouvernement en appliquant la loi à toutes les institutions gouvernementales/financées par le secteur public, en exigeant de toutes les institutions et de tous les fonctionnaires qu’ils créent des dossiers sur toutes les décisions et actions et qu’ils les divulguent de manière proactive et régulière, en créant une dérogation à l’intérêt public pour toutes les exemptions d’accès, donner aux chefs des partis d’opposition un droit de veto sur la nomination du commissaire à l’information, faire en sorte que le Parlement (et non le Cabinet) approuve les budgets annuels du commissaire à l’information (comme c’est actuellement le cas pour le commissaire fédéral à l’éthique), et donner au commissaire fédéral à l’information le pouvoir et le mandat d’ordonner la publication de documents (comme en Ontario, en Alberta et en C.-B.), d’ordonner des modifications à la législation sur l’accès à l’information (comme en Ontario, en Alberta et en C.-B.).C.), d’ordonner des changements dans les systèmes d’information des institutions gouvernementales et de sanctionner les contrevenants aux lois, règlements, politiques et règles en matière d’accès à l’information. (Voir la Campagne pour un gouvernement ouvert pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).
  1. Exposer les communications à huis clos – Exiger dans une nouvelle loi que les ministres et les hauts fonctionnaires divulguent leurs contacts avec tous les lobbyistes, qu’ils soient rémunérés ou bénévoles. (Consultez le site Government Ethics Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).
  2. Renforcer la divulgation et l’éthique du lobbying, et le système d’application – Renforcer la Lobbying Act et le Code de conduite des lobbyistes en supprimant la faille qui permet actuellement le lobbying secret si le lobbyiste n’est pas payé, ou si le lobbying porte sur l’application des lois et des règlements ou sur les crédits d’impôt ; et en supprimant la faille qui permet aux entreprises, mais aussi aux organisations, de dissimuler le nombre de personnes impliquées dans des activités de lobbying ; et en exigeant des lobbyistes qu’ils divulguent leur travail passé avec tout gouvernement, parti politique ou candidat canadien ou étranger, qu’ils divulguent toutes leurs activités de relations gouvernementales (rémunérées ou bénévoles) impliquant la collecte d’informations privilégiées ou la tentative d’influencer les décideurs politiques (comme aux États-Unis) et qu’ils divulguent toutes leurs activités de relations gouvernementales (rémunérées ou bénévoles) impliquant la collecte d’informations privilégiées ou la tentative d’influencer les décideurs politiques (comme aux États-Unis).Les gouvernements canadiens ou étrangers, les partis politiques ou les candidats doivent divulguer toutes leurs activités de relations gouvernementales (qu’elles soient rémunérées ou bénévoles) impliquant la collecte d’informations privilégiées ou la tentative d’influencer les décideurs politiques (comme aux États-Unis) et divulguer le montant qu’ils consacrent aux campagnes de lobbying (comme dans 33 États américains). Rexiger de toute personne et de toute entité qu’elle s’inscrive dans un registre des agents étrangers si elle a conclu un accord, rémunéré ou non, avec un gouvernement étranger, une entité étrangère ou un étranger pour participer au Canada à des activités de relations publiques/communications, de lobbying ou à toute autre activité visant à influencer les politiciens, les partis, les gouvernements, les élections ou la politique de quelque manière que ce soit, y compris la divulgation de l’identité de la personne qui la paie, du montant de sa rémunération et des détails concernant les activités. Interdire aux lobbyistes d’offrir des cadeaux aux hommes politiques ou de parrainer des stagiaires dans leurs bureaux ; renforcer le système d’application des lois sur le lobbying en ajoutant des règles spécifiques et en comblant les lacunes du Code des lobbyistes et en l’intégrant à la Loi, en allongeant à 10 ans le délai de prescription pour les poursuites en cas de violation de la Loi. Établir un comité entièrement indépendant pour effectuer une recherche publique et fondée sur le mérite afin de dresser une liste restreinte de candidats qualifiés, et exiger l’approbation des chefs des partis d’opposition pour la personne nommée au poste de commissaire au lobbying, et faire en sorte que le Parlement (plutôt que le Cabinet) approuve le budget annuel du commissaire au lobbying (comme c’est actuellement le cas pour le commissaire à l’éthique). Interdire au commissaire de donner des conseils secrets, l’obliger à enquêter et à statuer publiquement sur toutes les plaintes (y compris les plaintes anonymes), lui donner les pleins pouvoirs et l’obliger à sanctionner les contrevenants par des amendes significatives, et veiller à ce que toutes les décisions du commissaire puissent être réexaminées par les tribunaux. (Voir la Campagne sur l’éthique gouvernementale et Campagne pour l’arrêt du lobbying secret et contraire à l’éthique et Campagne pour l’arrêt de l’ingérence étrangère dans la politique canadienne pour plus d’informations sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).

III. Mesures pour un gouvernement efficace

  1. Augmentation des pouvoirs du vérificateur général et du directeur parlementaire du budget – Accroître l’indépendance du vérificateur général (VG) et du directeur parlementaire du budget (DPB) en créant un comité entièrement indépendant, en procédant à une recherche publique et fondée sur le mérite d’une liste restreinte de candidats qualifiés et en exigeant l’approbation des chefs des partis d’opposition pour la personne nommée à chaque poste, en demandant au Parlement (plutôt qu’au Cabinet) d’approuver leur budget annuel (comme c’est actuellement le cas pour le commissaire à l’éthique), en interdisant à l’AG de donner des conseils secrets, en exigeant que l’AG enquête et se prononce publiquement sur toutes les plaintes (y compris les plaintes anonymes), en habilitant pleinement l’AG à sanctionner les contrevenants par des amendes significatives, en veillant à ce que toutes les décisions de l’AG puissent être réexaminées par les tribunaux, et en modifiant les dépenses qu’il applique (le Code de la PM, le Code des Lobbyistes et le Code de l’éthique et des conflits d’intérêts pour les sénateurs sont transformés en lois).Il faut également augmenter les ressources d’audit du vérificateur général et du DPB en demandant au Parlement (et non au Cabinet) d’approuver le budget annuel du vérificateur général (comme c’est actuellement le cas pour le commissaire fédéral à l’éthique), et.. ; habiliter et mandater l’Auditeur général pour contrôler toutes les institutions gouvernementales (y compris la Chambre des communes et le Sénat), pour ordonner des changements dans les systèmes de dépenses des institutions gouvernementales, et habiliter l’Auditeur général et le DPB à sanctionner ceux qui violent les règles de dépenses du Conseil du Trésor fédéral ou les ordonnances de l’Auditeur général ou du DPB ou les demandes d’information. (Voir la Campagne de lutte contre les dépenses frauduleuses des politiciens et Campagne de lutte contre les mauvaises nominations gouvernementales pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Démocratie en surveillance).
  2. Restriction de la publicité gouvernementale – Habiliter une agence de surveillance gouvernementale à prévoir et à interdire la publicité gouvernementale qui promeut le parti au pouvoir, en particulier à l’approche d’une élection (similaire aux restrictions en vigueur au Manitoba, en Ontario et en Saskatchewan). (Voir la campagne Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)

IV. Des mesures gouvernementales représentatives et axées sur les citoyens

Il n’y a pas d’autre solution que de faire appel à l’aide de l’État.

  1. Augmenter les consultations publiques significatives – Adopter une loi exigeant que tous les ministères et institutions du gouvernement utilisent des processus de consultation qui offrent des possibilités significatives de participation des citoyens, en particulier en ce qui concerne les décisions qui affectent la vie de tous les Canadiens. (Voir les campagnes Stop PM/Premier ministre/abus de pouvoir et Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign et Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign et Campagne pour un système de vote démocratique pour des détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
  2. Restriction du pouvoir du Cabinet de procéder à des nominations – Établir des comités entièrement indépendants pour effectuer une recherche publique, basée sur le mérite, d’une liste restreinte de candidats qualifiés, et exigeant l’approbation des dirigeants des partis d’opposition, de la personne nommée à chaque poste approbation des dirigeants des partis d’opposition pour les quelque 3,000 nominations de juges, d’agences, de conseils, de commissions et de tribunaux actuellement effectuées par le Premier ministre et le Cabinet (y compris le conseil d’administration et le président de la CBC), en particulier pour les personnes nommées à des postes de direction et d’application de la loi (voir le site campagne Stop Bad Government Appointments et campagne Stop PM/Premier Ministre Power Abuses pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
  3. Rendre la Chambre plus démocratique et rendre le Sénat démocratique ou l’abolir – Modifier la Loi sur le Parlement du Canada pour restreindre le pouvoir du Premier ministre de fermer (proroger) le Parlement uniquement pour une très courte période pendant une période d’ajournement prévue, ou seulement pour une élection (dissolution), ou si la situation nationale a changé de manière significative ou si le Premier ministre peut démontrer que le gouvernement a mené à bien toutes les actions promises dans le dernier discours du Trône (ou tenté de le faire, car les partis d’opposition peuvent arrêter ou retarder l’achèvement de certaines actions). Donner à tous les groupes parlementaires le pouvoir de choisir les députés et sénateurs de leur parti qui siègent dans les commissions de la Chambre des représentants et du Sénat, permettre à tout député ou sénateur de présenter un projet de loi d’initiative parlementaire à tout moment, et définir de manière restrictive ce qu’est un “vote de confiance” dans la loi sur le Parlement du Canada, de sorte que la plupart des votes à la Chambre des représentants soient des votes libres. Augmenter les ressources et modifier la politique d’application de la GRC afin que toute personne qui harcèle ou intimide un candidat, un concurrent ou un député, y compris en ligne, soit inculpée et poursuivie. Tenter de parvenir à un accord avec les gouvernements provinciaux (comme l’exige la Constitution) pour soit abolir le Sénat, soit le réformer (avec une garantie que les pouvoirs du Sénat ne seront pas augmentés à moins que les sénateurs ne soient élus et que leur responsabilité globale ne soit accrue). (Voir les campagnes Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign et Stop PM/Premier Ministre Power Abuses Campaign et Shut Down the Senate Campaign et Democratic Head Campaign pour des détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
  4. Assurer des élections libres, justes et représentatives – Modifier la loi et le système de vote actuels (la Loi électorale du Canada) pour restreindre spécifiquement le pouvoir des Premiers ministres de déclencher une élection éclair injuste, de sorte que les dates des élections soient fixées autant que possible dans le cadre du système parlementaire canadien. Modifier la Loi également de manière à ce que les courses à l’investiture et à la direction des partis soient réglementées par Élections Canada (y compris en limitant les dépenses liées aux campagnes pour la direction des partis), de manière à ce qu’Élections Canada détermine quels partis peuvent participer aux débats électoraux sur la base de critères de mérite, de manière à ce que les dirigeants des partis ne puissent pas nommer de candidats, sauf lorsqu’une circonscription n’a pas d’association de circonscription, de manière à ce que les électeurs soient autorisés à refuser leur bulletin de vote (c.-à-d. à voter pour “aucun des candidats ci-dessus”). voter pour “aucun des candidats”, comme en Ontario), et pour assurer un nombre plus égal d’électeurs dans chaque circonscription, et une représentation plus précise au Parlement du soutien réel des électeurs pour chaque parti politique (avec une sauvegarde pour s’assurer qu’un parti avec un soutien faible et étroit n’a pas un niveau de pouvoir disproportionné au Parlement), et.. ; exiger de toute personne et de toute entité qu’elle s’inscrive dans un registre des agents étrangers si elle a conclu un accord, rémunéré ou non, avec un gouvernement étranger, une entité étrangère ou un étranger pour participer au Canada à des activités de relations publiques/communications, de lobbying ou à toute autre activité visant à influencer les politiciens, les partis, les gouvernements, les élections ou la politique de quelque manière que ce soit, y compris la divulgation de l’identité de la personne qui la paie, du montant de sa rémunération et des détails concernant les activités. Augmenter les ressources et modifier la politique d’application de la GRC afin que toute personne qui harcèle ou intimide un candidat, un concurrent ou un député, y compris en ligne, soit inculpée et poursuivie. (Voir les campagnes Campagne pour un système de vote démocratique et Campagne pour l’arrêt de l’ingérence étrangère dans la politique canadienne pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)

V. Mesures générales de responsabilisation du gouvernement

V.

  1. Faciliter les groupes de surveillance des citoyens sur le gouvernement – Exiger des institutions du gouvernement fédéral qu’elles joignent périodiquement à leurs envois aux citoyens des brochures d’une page invitant les citoyens à se joindre à des groupes financés et dirigés par les citoyens pour représenter les intérêts des citoyens dans les processus d’élaboration et d’application des politiques des principaux ministères (par exemple, en matière d’éthique, de dépenses et de soins de santé/protection sociale), comme cela a été proposé aux États-Unis et recommandé pour les banques canadiennes et d’autres institutions financières en 1998 par un groupe de travail fédéral, un comité de la Chambre des communes et un comité du Sénat. (Voir la Citizen Association Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).
  2. Assurer une protection efficace des dénonciateurs – Exiger que chacun signale toute violation d’une loi, d’un règlement, d’une politique, d’un code, d’une ligne directrice ou d’une règle, et exiger que tous les organismes de surveillance du gouvernement (par exemple, l’auditeur général, le commissaire à l’information, le commissaire à la protection de la vie privée, etc : Auditeur général, Commissaire à l’information, Commissaire à la protection de la vie privée, Commission du service public, les quatre chiens de garde de l’éthique (en particulier le Commissaire à l’intégrité du secteur public), le Comité de surveillance de la sécurité et du renseignement, le Conseil national de la santé) d’enquêter et de statuer publiquement sur les allégations de violations, de pénaliser les contrevenants, de protéger toute personne (pas seulement les employés) qui signale une violation (ce qu’on appelle les “dénonciateurs”) contre les représailles, de récompenser les dénonciateurs dont les allégations sont avérées, et de garantir un droit d’appel devant les tribunaux. (Voir la campagne Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).
  3. Assurer des lois sans failles et des sanctions sévères pour les malfaiteurs – Fermer toutes les failles techniques et autres qui ont été identifiées dans les lois, les réglementations, les politiques, les codes, les lignes directrices et les règles (en particulier celles qui réglementent les institutions gouvernementales et les grandes entreprises) pour aider à assurer une application rigoureuse, notamment en comblant toutes les lacunes qui permettent la “propriété effective” de toute entreprise au Canada qui dissimule l’identité des propriétaires réels, et exiger des avocats qu’ils signalent les transactions suspectes au Centre d’analyse des opérations et déclarations financières du Canada (CANAFE), et augmenter les sanctions financières pour les violations à un niveau qui affecte de manière significative les revenus/budget annuels de l’institution ou de l’entreprise. (Voir les campagnes Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign et Corporate Responsibility Campaign et Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).

[ :]