Grading System, Categories and Sub-categories for the Report Card on the 2025 Democratic Reform Platforms of the Federal Political Parties

Set out below are the 16 sub-categories for the 5 issue area categories that are the basis for the Report Card

GRADING SYSTEM
A – Platform makes clear promise to implement proposal
B – Platform makes vague or partial promise to implement proposals
C – Platform makes clear promise to explore proposal
D – Platform makes vague or partial promise to explore proposal
D- – Platform mentions proposal
F – Platform mentions theme of proposal
I – Platform does not mention proposal

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I. Honest, Ethical Government Measures

1. Requiring honesty-in-politics – Pass a law that requires all federal Cabinet ministers, MPs, Senators, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees (including at Crown corporations, agencies, boards, commissions, courts and tribunals) nomination race, party leadership race and election candidates to tell the truth (like federal lobbyists are already required to be honest), with an easily accessible complaint process to a fully independent watchdog agency that is fully empowered to investigate and penalize anyone who lies (including about election promises, and including requiring resignation and a by-election if an MP switches parties between elections for an unjustifiable reason). Prohibit anyone and any entity from having a social media account that is anonymous and does not identify the person or entity behind the account, and prohibit all false claims including prohibiting Internet, TV, radio, social media and all other companies from allowing fake videos and audio files to be posted or aired on their sites or channels (especially that imitate politicians and public officials) and create a fully independent commission to require Internet and social media companies to remove posts that make any false claims, and to penalize anyone who posts a false claim. General complaints about false or fraudulent advertising or statements during elections should be reviewed by the Commissioner of Canada Elections, and between elections by the Ethics Commissioner, but if the alleged false claim is about a specialized area, it should be reviewed by the existing agency, board or commission that specializes in that area) (Go to the Honesty in Politics Campaign and Stop Fake Online Election Ads Campaign and Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
2. Strengthening ethics standards for politicians, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees, and ethics enforcement – Close the loopholes in the existing ethics rules so that all assets, investments and liabilities (except personal property) are required to be publicly disclosed, and top politicians, political staff and government officials are prohibited from having investments, and blind trusts are prohibited because they are a façade, and public recusal is required whenever an office holder is in even an appearance of a conflict of interest (even if the decision being made applies generally); and apply the rules to everyone in all government institutions (including all Crown corporations); and prohibit MPs and Senators from having outside jobs; and, as proposed by the federal Department of Finance place anyone with decision-making power on the anti-corruption watch list of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (Fintrac) so deposits to their bank accounts can be tracked, and; strengthen the independence and effectiveness of politician and government employee ethics watchdog positions (the Ethics Commissioner for Cabinet and MPs, the Senate Ethics Officer for senators, the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner for government employees, the Commissioner of Lobbyists for lobbyists) having a fully independent committee do a public, merit-based search for a short list of qualified candidates, and requiring approval of opposition party leaders of the person appointed to each position, by having Parliament (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner of Lobbying’s annual budget (as is currently the process for the Ethics Commissioner), by prohibiting the Commissioners from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioners to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioners to penalize rule-breakers with meaningful fines, by ensuring all decisions of the Commissioners can be reviewed by the courts, and by changing the codes they enforce (MP Code, Lobbyists’ Code and Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code for Senators into laws.  (Go to the Government Ethics Campaign and Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
3. Making the political donations system democratic – Lower the annual donation limit to parties and riding associations to $75 (the amount 75% of donors give annually); limit loans, including from financial institutions, to parties and all types of candidates to the same level as donations are limited; require disclosure of all donations (including the identity of the donor’s employer (as in the U.S.) and/or major affiliations) and loans quarterly and before any election day; limit spending on campaigns for the leadership of political parties; require full disclosure of the actual source(s) of third-party (interest group) funding, and maintain limits on third-party (non-political party) advertising during elections, and establish third-party registration and spending limits for between elections (for each policy-making process) and during nomination and party leadership contests, with all the limits allowing individuals and corporations to spend only a small amount, and citizen groups to spend a multiple of that amount based on the number of members/supporters they have. If they can prove they need it, lower the public funding of political parties from $2 per vote received to $1 per vote received for parties that elect more MPs than they deserve based on the percentage of voter support they receive (to ensure that in order to prosper these parties need to have active, ongoing support of a broad base of individuals), and; ensure riding associations receive a fair share of this per-vote funding (so that party headquarters don’t have undue control over riding associations), and; establish a sliding scale of public funding that matches donations, and; provide subsidies to economincalllh disadvantaged contestants and candidates if they can show that they have public support.  (Go to the Money in Politics Campaign and Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).
4. Closing down the revolving door – Prohibit lobbyists from working for government departments or serving in senior positions for political parties or candidates for public office (as in New Mexico and Maryland), and from having business connections with anyone who does, and close the loopholes so that the actual cooling-off period for former Cabinet ministers, ministerial staff and senior public officials is five years (and three years for MPs, senators, their staff, and government employees) during which they are prohibited from becoming a lobbyist or working with people, corporations or organizations with which they had direct dealings while in government; and prohibit politicians, their staff and government officials from accepting gifts from anyone who has an interest in federal government decisions, including the gift of volunteering or sponsoring interns in politicians’ offices.  Make the Ethics Commissioner, Commissioner of Lobbying and Senate Ethics Officer more independent and effective by having a fully independent committee do a public, merit-based search for a short list of qualified candidates, and requiring approval of opposition party leaders of the person appointed to each position, by having Parliament (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner of Lobbying’s annual budget (as is currently the process for the Ethics Commissioner), by prohibiting the Commissioners from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioners to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioners to penalize rule-breakers with meaningful fines, by ensuring all decisions of the Commissioners can be reviewed by the courts, and by changing the codes they enforce (MP Code, Lobbyists’ Code and Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code for Senators into laws).  (Go to the Government Ethics Campaign and Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).

II. Open Government Measures

5. Strengthening access-to-information system – Strengthen the federal access-to-information law and government information management system by applying the law to all government/publicly funded institutions, requiring all institutions and officials to create records of all decisions and actions and disclose them proactively and regularly, creating a public interest override of all access exemptions, giving opposition party leaders a veto over the appointment of the Information Commissioner, having Parliament (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Information Commissioner’s annual budgets (as is currently the process for the federal Ethics Commissioner), and giving the federal Information Commissioner the power and mandate to order the release of documents (as in Ontario, Alberta and B.C.), to order changes to government institutions’ information systems, and to penalize violators of access laws, regulations, policies and rules.  (Go to the Open Government Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).
6. Exposing behind-closed-door communications – Require in a new law that Ministers and senior public officials to disclose their contacts with all lobbyists, whether paid or volunteer lobbyists.  (Go to the Government Ethics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).
7. Strengthening lobbying disclosure and ethics, and the enforcement system – Strengthen the Lobbying Act and Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct disclosure system by closing the loophole that currently allows secret lobbying if the lobbyist is not paid, or if the lobbying is about the enforcement of laws and regulations or about tax credits; and close the loophole that allows businesses especially, but also organizations, to hide the number of people involved in lobbying activities; and require lobbyists to disclose their past work with any Canadian or foreign government, political party or candidate, to disclose all their government relations activities (whether paid or volunteer) involving gathering inside information or trying to influence policy-makers (as in the U.S.) and to disclose the amount they spend on lobbying campaigns (as in 33 U.S. states). Require everyone and every entity to register in a foreign-agent registry if they have any arrangement, paid or unpaid, with a foreign government, foreign entity or foreigner to be involved in Canada in public relations/communications, lobbying or any other activities aimed at influencing politicians, parties, governments, elections or politics in any way, including disclosing who is paying them, how much they are being paid, and details about the activities. Prohibit lobbyists from giving gifts to politicians or sponsoring interns in their offices; and strengthen the lobbying enforcement system by adding specific rules and closing loopholes in the Lobbyists’ Code and making it part of the Act, by extending the limitation period for prosecutions of violations of the Act to 10 years.  Establish a fully independent committee to do a public, merit-based search for a short list of qualified candidates, and require approval of opposition party leaders of the person appointed as Commissioner of Lobbying, and have Parliament (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner of Lobbying’s annual budget (as is currently the process for the Ethics Commissioner).  Prohibit the Commissioner from giving secret advice, require the Commissioner to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), and fully empower and require the Commissioner to penalize rule-breakers with meaningful fines, and ensure all decisions of the Commissioner can be reviewed by the courts.  (Go to the Government Ethics Campaign and Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign and Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).

III. Efficient Government Measures

8. Increasing powers of Auditor General and Parliamentary Budget Officer – Increase the independence of the Auditor General (AG) and Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) by establishing a fully independent committee do a public, merit-based search for a short list of qualified candidates, and requiring approval of opposition party leaders of the person appointed to each position, by having Parliament (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the their annual budget (as is currently the process for the Ethics Commissioner), by prohibiting the AG from giving secret advice, by requiring the AG to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), by fully empowering and requiring the AG to penalize rule-breakers with meaningful fines, by ensuring all decisions of the AG can be reviewed by the courts, and by changing the spending they enforce (MP Code, Lobbyists’ Code and Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code for Senators into laws)., and by making the PBO a full Officer of Parliament with a fixed term who can only be dismissed for cause; increase auditing resources of the Auditor General and PBO by having Parliament (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Auditor General’s annual budget (as is currently the process for the federal Ethics Commissioner), and; empower and mandate the Auditor General to audit all government institutions (including the House of Commons and Senate), to make orders for changes to government institutions’ spending systems, and empower the Auditor General and PBO to penalize violators of federal Treasury Board spending rules or Auditor General or PBO orders o requests for information.  (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign and Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).
9. Restricting government advertising – Empower a government watchdog agency to preview and prohibit government advertising that promotes the ruling party, especially leading up to an election (similar to the restrictions in Manitoba, Ontario and Saskatchewan).  (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

IV. Representative, Citizen-Driven Government Measures

10. Increasing meaningful public consultation – Pass a law requiring all government departments and institutions to use consultation processes that provide meaningful opportunities for citizen participation, especially concerning decisions that affect the lives of all Canadians.  (Go to the Stop PM/Premier Power Abuses Campaign and Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign and Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign and Democratic Voting System Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
11. Restricting power of Cabinet to make appointments – Establish fully independent committees to do a public, merit-based search for a short list of qualified candidates, and requiring approval of opposition party leaders, of the person appointed to each position approval by opposition party leaders for the approximately 3,000 judicial, agency, board, commission and tribunal appointments currently made by the Prime Minister and Cabinet (including the board and President of the CBC), especially for appointees to senior and law enforcement positions (Go to the Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign and Stop PM/Premier Power Abuses Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
12. Making the House more democratic, and making the Senate democratic or abolish it – Change the Parliament of Canada Act to restrict the Prime Minister’s power to shut down (prorogue) Parliament to only for a very short time during a scheduled adjournment period, or only for an election (dissolution), or if the national situation has changed significantly or if the Prime Minister can show that the government has completed all their pledged actions from the last Speech from the Throne (or attempted to do so, as the opposition parties may stop or delay completion of some actions).  Give all party caucuses the power to choose which MPs and senators in their party sits on House and Senate committees, and allow any MP or senator to introduce a private member bill at any time, and define what a “vote of confidence” is in the Parliament of Canada Act in a restrictive way so most votes in the House of Commons are free votes.  Increase resources and change the enforcement policy for the RCMP so that anyone who harasses or intimidates a candidate, contestant or MP, including online, is charged and prosecuted. Attempt to reach an agreement with provincial governments (as required by the Constitution) to either abolish the Senate or reform the Senate (with a safeguard that Senate powers will not be increased unless senators are elected and their overall accountability increased).  (Go to the Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign and Stop PM/Premier Power Abuses Campaign and Shut Down the Senate Campaign and Democratic Head Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
13. Ensuring free, fair and representative elections – Change the current voting law and system (the Canada Elections Act) to specifically restrict the Prime Ministers’ power to call an unfair snap election, so that election dates are fixed as much as possible under the Canadian parliamentary system.  Change the Act also so that nomination and party leadership races are regulated by Elections Canada (including limiting spending on campaigns for party leadership), so that Elections Canada determines which parties can participate in election debates based upon merit criteria, so that party leaders cannot appoint candidates except when a riding does not have a riding association, so that voters are allowed to refuse their ballot (ie. vote for “none of the above”, as in Ontario), and to provide a more equal number of voters in every riding, and a more accurate representation in Parliament of the actual voter support for each political party (with a safeguard to ensure that a party with low-level, narrow-base support does not have a disproportionately high level of power in Parliament), and; require everyone and every entity to register in a foreign-agent registry if they have any arrangement, paid or unpaid, with a foreign government, foreign entity or foreigner to be involved in Canada in public relations/communications, lobbying or any other activities aimed at influencing politicians, parties, governments, elections or politics in any way, including disclosing who is paying them, how much they are being paid, and details about the activities. Increase resources and change the enforcement policy for the RCMP so that anyone who harasses or intimidates a candidate, contestant or MP, including online, is charged and prosecuted. (Go to the Democratic Voting System Campaign and Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

V. General Government Accountability Measures

14. Facilitating citizen watchdog groups over government – Require federal government institutions to enclose one-page pamphlets periodically in their mailings to citizens inviting citizens to join citizen-funded and directed groups to represent citizen interests in policy-making and enforcement processes of key government departments (for example, on ethics, spending, and health care/welfare) as has been proposed in the U.S. and recommended for Canadian banks and other financial institutions in 1998 by a federal task force, a House of Commons Committee, and a Senate Committee.  (Go to the Citizen Association Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).
15. Ensuring effective whistleblower protection – Require everyone to report any violation of any law, regulation, policy, code, guideline or rule, and require all watchdog agencies over government (for example: Auditor General, Information Commissioner, Privacy Commissioner, Public Service Commission, the four ethics watchdogs (especially the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner), Security and Intelligence Review Committee, the National Health Council) to investigate and rule publicly on allegations of violations, to penalize violators, to protect anyone (not just employees) who reports a violation (so-called “whistleblowers”) from retaliation, to reward whistleblowers whose allegations are proven to be true, and to ensure a right to appeal to the courts. (Go to the Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).
16. Ensuring loophole free laws and strong penalties for wrongdoers – Close any technical and other loopholes that have been identified in laws, regulations, policies, codes, guidelines and rules (especially those regulating government institutions and large corporations) to help ensure strong enforcement, including closing all the loopholes that allow for “beneficial ownership” of any business across Canada that hides the identity of the actual owners, and require lawyers to report suspicious transactions to Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), and increase financial penalties for violations to a level that significantly effects the annual revenues/budget of the institution or corporation.  (Go to the Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign and Corporate Responsibility Campaign and Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals).

Système de notation, catégories et sous-catégories pour le bilan des plates-formes de réforme démocratique 2025 des partis politiques fédéraux

Voici 16 sous-catégories pour les 5 catégories de thèmes qui sont à la base du bilan

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Voici les 16 sous-catégories pour les 5 catégories de thèmes qui constituent la base du Bilan

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SYSTEME DE CLASSEMENT
A – La plateforme promet clairement de mettre en œuvre la proposition
B – La plate-forme fait une promesse vague ou partielle de mise en œuvre des propositions.
C – La plate-forme promet clairement d’explorer la proposition
D – La plateforme fait une promesse vague ou partielle d’explorer la proposition
D- – La plateforme mentionne la proposition
F – La plate-forme mentionne le thème de la proposition
I – La plateforme ne mentionne pas la proposition

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I. Des mesures gouvernementales honnêtes et éthiques

1. Exiger l’honnêteté en politique – Adopter une loi qui exige que tous les ministres fédéraux, les députés, les sénateurs, le personnel politique, les personnes nommées par le Cabinet et les employés du gouvernement (y compris dans les sociétés d’État, les agences, les conseils, les commissions, les cours et les tribunaux), la course à l’investiture, la course à la direction du parti et les candidats aux élections disent la vérité (comme les lobbyistes fédéraux sont déjà tenus d’être honnêtes), avec une procédure de plainte facilement accessible auprès d’une agence de surveillance totalement indépendante et pleinement habilitée à enquêter et à sanctionner quiconque ment (y compris au sujet de promesses électorales, et en exigeant la démission et une élection partielle si un député change de parti entre deux élections pour une raison injustifiable). Interdire à toute personne et à toute entité d’avoir un compte de média social qui est anonyme et n’identifie pas la personne ou l’entité derrière le compte, et interdire toutes les fausses affirmations, y compris interdire à Internet, à la télévision, à la radio, aux médias sociaux et à toutes les autres entreprises d’autoriser de fausses vidéos et de faux fichiers audio à être affichés ou diffusés sur leurs sites ou canaux (en particulier ceux qui imitent les politiciens et les fonctionnaires) et créer une commission entièrement indépendante pour exiger des entreprises d’Internet et de médias sociaux qu’elles suppriment les messages qui contiennent de fausses affirmations, et pour pénaliser toute personne qui affiche une fausse affirmation. Les plaintes générales concernant des publicités ou des déclarations fausses ou frauduleuses pendant les élections devraient être examinées par le commissaire aux élections fédérales, et entre les élections par le commissaire à l’éthique, mais si la fausse allégation présumée concerne un domaine spécialisé, elle devrait être examinée par l’agence, le conseil ou la commission existant qui se spécialise dans ce domaine) (Allez à la page Campagne sur l’honnêteté en politique et Campagne pour arrêter les fausses publicités électorales en ligne et Campagne pour arrêter l’ingérence étrangère dans la politique canadienne pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch.)
2. Renforcer les normes éthiques pour les politiciens, le personnel politique, les personnes nommées par le Cabinet et les employés du gouvernement, et l’application de l’éthique – Combler les lacunes des règles éthiques existantes de sorte que tous les actifs, investissements et passifs (à l’exception des biens personnels) doivent être divulgués publiquement, que les politiciens de haut niveau, le personnel politique et les fonctionnaires du gouvernement n’ont pas le droit d’avoir des investissements, que les fiducies sans droit de regard sont interdites parce qu’elles sont une façade, et que la récusation publique est requise chaque fois qu’un titulaire de poste se trouve même dans une apparence de conflit d’intérêts (même si la décision prise s’applique de manière générale) ; et appliquer les règles à tout le monde dans toutes les institutions gouvernementales (y compris toutes les sociétés d’État) ; et interdire aux députés et aux sénateurs d’avoir des emplois extérieurs ; et, comme le propose le ministère fédéral des Finances, placer toute personne ayant un pouvoir de décision sur la liste de surveillance anticorruption du Centre d’analyse des opérations et déclarations financières du Canada (Fintrac) afin que les dépôts sur leurs comptes bancaires puissent être suivis, et.. ; renforcer l’indépendance et l’efficacité des postes de surveillance de l’éthique des politiciens et des fonctionnaires (le commissaire à l’éthique pour le cabinet et les députés, le conseiller sénatorial en éthique pour les sénateurs, le commissaire à l’intégrité du secteur public pour les fonctionnaires, le commissaire au lobbying pour les lobbyistes) en demandant à un comité entièrement indépendant de procéder à une recherche publique et fondée sur le mérite d’une liste restreinte de candidats qualifiés et en exigeant que les chefs des partis d’opposition approuvent la personne nommée à chaque poste, en demandant au Parlement (plutôt qu’au cabinet) d’approuver le budget annuel du commissaire au lobbying (comme c’est actuellement le cas pour le commissaire à l’éthique), en interdisant aux commissaires de donner des conseils secrets, en exigeant que les commissaires enquêtent et statuent publiquement sur toutes les plaintes (y compris les plaintes anonymes), en donnant aux commissaires les pleins pouvoirs et en exigeant qu’ils pénalisent les contrevenants par des amendes significatives, en veillant à ce que toutes les décisions des commissaires puissent être révisées par les tribunaux et en transformant les codes qu’ils appliquent (Code du MP, Code des lobbyistes et Code de l’éthique et des conflits d’intérêts pour les sénateurs) en lois. (Voir les sites Government Ethics Campaign et Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
3. Rendre le système de dons politiques démocratique – Abaisser la limite annuelle des dons aux partis et aux associations de circonscription à 75 $ (le montant que 75 % des donateurs donnent annuellement) ; limiter les prêts, y compris des institutions financières, aux partis et à tous les types de candidats au même niveau que les dons sont limités ; exiger la divulgation de tous les dons (y compris l’identité de l’employeur du donateur (comme aux États-Unis) et/ou de ses principales affiliations) et des prêts, au même niveau que les dons.) et les prêts tous les trimestres et avant tout jour d’élection ; limiter les dépenses pour les campagnes de direction des partis politiques ; exiger la divulgation complète de la (des) source(s) réelle(s) de financement des tiers (groupes d’intérêt) et maintenir des limites à la publicité des tiers (partis non politiques) pendant les élections, et établir des limites à l’enregistrement et aux dépenses des tiers entre les élections (pour chaque processus d’élaboration des politiques) et pendant les courses à l’investiture et à la direction des partis, toutes les limites permettant aux particuliers et aux entreprises de ne dépenser qu’un petit montant, et aux groupes de citoyens de dépenser un multiple de ce montant en fonction du nombre de membres/supporters qu’ils ont. S’ils peuvent prouver qu’ils en ont besoin, réduire le financement public des partis politiques de 2 $ par vote reçu à 1 $ par vote reçu pour les partis qui élisent plus de députés qu’ils ne le méritent en fonction du pourcentage de soutien des électeurs qu’ils reçoivent (afin de s’assurer que pour prospérer, ces partis doivent avoir le soutien actif et continu d’une large base d’individus), et ; veiller à ce que les associations de circonscription reçoivent une part équitable de ce financement par vote (afin que les sièges des partis n’exercent pas un contrôle excessif sur les associations de circonscription), et ; établir une échelle mobile de financement public qui correspond aux dons, et ; fournir des subventions aux candidats défavorisés sur le plan économique s’ils peuvent prouver qu’ils bénéficient d’un soutien public. (Voir les campagnes Money in Politics Campaign et Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).
4. Fermer la porte tournante – Interdire aux lobbyistes de travailler pour des ministères ou d’occuper des postes de direction pour des partis politiques ou des candidats à des fonctions publiques (comme au Nouveau Mexique et dans le Maryland), et d’avoir des relations d’affaires avec quiconque le fait, et combler les lacunes de sorte que la période de réflexion réelle pour les anciens ministres, le personnel ministériel et les hauts fonctionnaires soit de trois ans, de cinq ans (et de trois ans pour les députés, les sénateurs, leur personnel et les fonctionnaires) pendant laquelle il leur est interdit de devenir lobbyistes ou de travailler avec des personnes, des entreprises ou des organisations avec lesquelles ils ont eu des relations directes pendant qu’ils étaient au pouvoir ; interdire aux hommes politiques, à leur personnel et aux fonctionnaires d’accepter des cadeaux de la part de toute personne ayant un intérêt dans les décisions du gouvernement fédéral, y compris le cadeau de bénévolat ou de parrainage de stagiaires dans les bureaux des hommes politiques. Rendre le commissaire à l’éthique, le commissaire au lobbying et le conseiller sénatorial à l’éthique plus indépendants et plus efficaces en confiant à un comité totalement indépendant la recherche publique et fondée sur le mérite d’une liste restreinte de candidats qualifiés, en exigeant l’approbation par les chefs des partis d’opposition de la personne nommée à chaque poste, en demandant au Parlement (et non au Cabinet) d’approuver le budget annuel du commissaire au lobbying (comme c’est actuellement le cas pour le commissaire à l’éthique), en interdisant aux commissaires de donner des conseils secrets, en exigeant que les commissaires enquêtent et statuent publiquement sur toutes les plaintes (y compris les plaintes anonymes), en donnant aux commissaires les pleins pouvoirs et en leur demandant de sanctionner les contrevenants par des amendes significatives, en veillant à ce que toutes les décisions des commissaires puissent être réexaminées par les tribunaux et en transformant les codes qu’ils appliquent (Code du MP, Code des lobbyistes et Code de l’éthique et des conflits d’intérêts pour les sénateurs en lois). (Consultez les sites Government Ethics Campaign et Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).

II. Mesures en faveur d’un gouvernement ouvert

– Renforcer la loi fédérale sur l’accès à l’information et le système de gestion de l’information du gouvernement en appliquant la loi à toutes les institutions gouvernementales/financées par le secteur public, en exigeant de toutes les institutions et de tous les fonctionnaires qu’ils créent des dossiers sur toutes les décisions et actions et qu’ils les divulguent de manière proactive et régulière, en créant une dérogation à l’intérêt public pour toutes les exemptions d’accès, donner aux chefs des partis d’opposition un droit de veto sur la nomination du commissaire à l’information, faire en sorte que le Parlement (et non le Cabinet) approuve les budgets annuels du commissaire à l’information (comme c’est actuellement le cas pour le commissaire fédéral à l’éthique), et donner au commissaire fédéral à l’information le pouvoir et le mandat d’ordonner la publication de documents (comme en Ontario, en Alberta et en C.-B.), d’ordonner des modifications à la législation sur l’accès à l’information (comme en Ontario, en Alberta et en C.-B.).C.), d’ordonner des changements dans les systèmes d’information des institutions gouvernementales et de sanctionner les contrevenants aux lois, règlements, politiques et règles en matière d’accès à l’information. (Voir la Campagne pour un gouvernement ouvert pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).
5. Exposer les communications à huis clos – Exiger dans une nouvelle loi que les ministres et les hauts fonctionnaires divulguent leurs contacts avec tous les lobbyistes, qu’ils soient rémunérés ou bénévoles. (Consultez le site Government Ethics Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).
6. Renforcer la divulgation et l’éthique du lobbying, et le système d’application – Renforcer la Lobbying Act et le Code de conduite des lobbyistes en supprimant la faille qui permet actuellement le lobbying secret si le lobbyiste n’est pas payé, ou si le lobbying porte sur l’application des lois et des règlements ou sur les crédits d’impôt ; et en supprimant la faille qui permet aux entreprises, mais aussi aux organisations, de dissimuler le nombre de personnes impliquées dans des activités de lobbying ; et en exigeant des lobbyistes qu’ils divulguent leur travail passé avec tout gouvernement, parti politique ou candidat canadien ou étranger, qu’ils divulguent toutes leurs activités de relations gouvernementales (rémunérées ou bénévoles) impliquant la collecte d’informations privilégiées ou la tentative d’influencer les décideurs politiques (comme aux États-Unis) et qu’ils divulguent toutes leurs activités de relations gouvernementales (rémunérées ou bénévoles) impliquant la collecte d’informations privilégiées ou la tentative d’influencer les décideurs politiques (comme aux États-Unis).Les gouvernements canadiens ou étrangers, les partis politiques ou les candidats doivent divulguer toutes leurs activités de relations gouvernementales (qu’elles soient rémunérées ou bénévoles) impliquant la collecte d’informations privilégiées ou la tentative d’influencer les décideurs politiques (comme aux États-Unis) et divulguer le montant qu’ils consacrent aux campagnes de lobbying (comme dans 33 États américains). Rexiger de toute personne et de toute entité qu’elle s’inscrive dans un registre des agents étrangers si elle a conclu un accord, rémunéré ou non, avec un gouvernement étranger, une entité étrangère ou un étranger pour participer au Canada à des activités de relations publiques/communications, de lobbying ou à toute autre activité visant à influencer les politiciens, les partis, les gouvernements, les élections ou la politique de quelque manière que ce soit, y compris la divulgation de l’identité de la personne qui la paie, du montant de sa rémunération et des détails concernant les activités. Interdire aux lobbyistes d’offrir des cadeaux aux hommes politiques ou de parrainer des stagiaires dans leurs bureaux ; renforcer le système d’application des lois sur le lobbying en ajoutant des règles spécifiques et en comblant les lacunes du Code des lobbyistes et en l’intégrant à la Loi, en allongeant à 10 ans le délai de prescription pour les poursuites en cas de violation de la Loi. Établir un comité entièrement indépendant pour effectuer une recherche publique et fondée sur le mérite afin de dresser une liste restreinte de candidats qualifiés, et exiger l’approbation des chefs des partis d’opposition pour la personne nommée au poste de commissaire au lobbying, et faire en sorte que le Parlement (plutôt que le Cabinet) approuve le budget annuel du commissaire au lobbying (comme c’est actuellement le cas pour le commissaire à l’éthique). Interdire au commissaire de donner des conseils secrets, l’obliger à enquêter et à statuer publiquement sur toutes les plaintes (y compris les plaintes anonymes), lui donner les pleins pouvoirs et l’obliger à sanctionner les contrevenants par des amendes significatives, et veiller à ce que toutes les décisions du commissaire puissent être réexaminées par les tribunaux. (Voir la Campagne sur l’éthique gouvernementale et Campagne pour l’arrêt du lobbying secret et contraire à l’éthique et Campagne pour l’arrêt de l’ingérence étrangère dans la politique canadienne pour plus d’informations sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).

III. Mesures pour un gouvernement efficace

8. Augmentation des pouvoirs du vérificateur général et du directeur parlementaire du budget – Accroître l’indépendance du vérificateur général (VG) et du directeur parlementaire du budget (DPB) en créant un comité entièrement indépendant, en procédant à une recherche publique et fondée sur le mérite d’une liste restreinte de candidats qualifiés et en exigeant l’approbation des chefs des partis d’opposition pour la personne nommée à chaque poste, en demandant au Parlement (plutôt qu’au Cabinet) d’approuver leur budget annuel (comme c’est actuellement le cas pour le commissaire à l’éthique), en interdisant à l’AG de donner des conseils secrets, en exigeant que l’AG enquête et se prononce publiquement sur toutes les plaintes (y compris les plaintes anonymes), en habilitant pleinement l’AG à sanctionner les contrevenants par des amendes significatives, en veillant à ce que toutes les décisions de l’AG puissent être réexaminées par les tribunaux, et en modifiant les dépenses qu’il applique (le Code de la PM, le Code des Lobbyistes et le Code de l’éthique et des conflits d’intérêts pour les sénateurs sont transformés en lois).Il faut également augmenter les ressources d’audit du vérificateur général et du DPB en demandant au Parlement (et non au Cabinet) d’approuver le budget annuel du vérificateur général (comme c’est actuellement le cas pour le commissaire fédéral à l’éthique), et.. ; habiliter et mandater l’Auditeur général pour contrôler toutes les institutions gouvernementales (y compris la Chambre des communes et le Sénat), pour ordonner des changements dans les systèmes de dépenses des institutions gouvernementales, et habiliter l’Auditeur général et le DPB à sanctionner ceux qui violent les règles de dépenses du Conseil du Trésor fédéral ou les ordonnances de l’Auditeur général ou du DPB ou les demandes d’information. (Voir la Campagne de lutte contre les dépenses frauduleuses des politiciens et Campagne de lutte contre les mauvaises nominations gouvernementales pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Démocratie en surveillance).
9. Restriction de la publicité gouvernementale – Habiliter une agence de surveillance gouvernementale à prévoir et à interdire la publicité gouvernementale qui promeut le parti au pouvoir, en particulier à l’approche d’une élection (similaire aux restrictions en vigueur au Manitoba, en Ontario et en Saskatchewan). (Voir la campagne Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)

IV. Des mesures gouvernementales représentatives et axées sur les citoyens

Il n’y a pas d’autre solution que de faire appel à l’aide de l’État.

10. Augmenter les consultations publiques significatives – Adopter une loi exigeant que tous les ministères et institutions du gouvernement utilisent des processus de consultation qui offrent des possibilités significatives de participation des citoyens, en particulier en ce qui concerne les décisions qui affectent la vie de tous les Canadiens. (Voir les campagnes Stop PM/Premier ministre/abus de pouvoir et Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign et Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign et Campagne pour un système de vote démocratique pour des détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
11. Restriction du pouvoir du Cabinet de procéder à des nominations – Établir des comités entièrement indépendants pour effectuer une recherche publique, basée sur le mérite, d’une liste restreinte de candidats qualifiés, et exigeant l’approbation des dirigeants des partis d’opposition, de la personne nommée à chaque poste approbation des dirigeants des partis d’opposition pour les quelque 3,000 nominations de juges, d’agences, de conseils, de commissions et de tribunaux actuellement effectuées par le Premier ministre et le Cabinet (y compris le conseil d’administration et le président de la CBC), en particulier pour les personnes nommées à des postes de direction et d’application de la loi (voir le site campagne Stop Bad Government Appointments et campagne Stop PM/Premier Ministre Power Abuses pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
12. Rendre la Chambre plus démocratique et rendre le Sénat démocratique ou l’abolir – Modifier la Loi sur le Parlement du Canada pour restreindre le pouvoir du Premier ministre de fermer (proroger) le Parlement uniquement pour une très courte période pendant une période d’ajournement prévue, ou seulement pour une élection (dissolution), ou si la situation nationale a changé de manière significative ou si le Premier ministre peut démontrer que le gouvernement a mené à bien toutes les actions promises dans le dernier discours du Trône (ou tenté de le faire, car les partis d’opposition peuvent arrêter ou retarder l’achèvement de certaines actions). Donner à tous les groupes parlementaires le pouvoir de choisir les députés et sénateurs de leur parti qui siègent dans les commissions de la Chambre des représentants et du Sénat, permettre à tout député ou sénateur de présenter un projet de loi d’initiative parlementaire à tout moment, et définir de manière restrictive ce qu’est un “vote de confiance” dans la loi sur le Parlement du Canada, de sorte que la plupart des votes à la Chambre des représentants soient des votes libres. Augmenter les ressources et modifier la politique d’application de la GRC afin que toute personne qui harcèle ou intimide un candidat, un concurrent ou un député, y compris en ligne, soit inculpée et poursuivie. Tenter de parvenir à un accord avec les gouvernements provinciaux (comme l’exige la Constitution) pour soit abolir le Sénat, soit le réformer (avec une garantie que les pouvoirs du Sénat ne seront pas augmentés à moins que les sénateurs ne soient élus et que leur responsabilité globale ne soit accrue). (Voir les campagnes Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign et Stop PM/Premier Ministre Power Abuses Campaign et Shut Down the Senate Campaign et Democratic Head Campaign pour des détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
13. Assurer des élections libres, justes et représentatives – Modifier la loi et le système de vote actuels (la Loi électorale du Canada) pour restreindre spécifiquement le pouvoir des Premiers ministres de déclencher une élection éclair injuste, de sorte que les dates des élections soient fixées autant que possible dans le cadre du système parlementaire canadien. Modifier la Loi également de manière à ce que les courses à l’investiture et à la direction des partis soient réglementées par Élections Canada (y compris en limitant les dépenses liées aux campagnes pour la direction des partis), de manière à ce qu’Élections Canada détermine quels partis peuvent participer aux débats électoraux sur la base de critères de mérite, de manière à ce que les dirigeants des partis ne puissent pas nommer de candidats, sauf lorsqu’une circonscription n’a pas d’association de circonscription, de manière à ce que les électeurs soient autorisés à refuser leur bulletin de vote (c.-à-d. à voter pour “aucun des candidats ci-dessus”). voter pour “aucun des candidats”, comme en Ontario), et pour assurer un nombre plus égal d’électeurs dans chaque circonscription, et une représentation plus précise au Parlement du soutien réel des électeurs pour chaque parti politique (avec une sauvegarde pour s’assurer qu’un parti avec un soutien faible et étroit n’a pas un niveau de pouvoir disproportionné au Parlement), et.. ; exiger de toute personne et de toute entité qu’elle s’inscrive dans un registre des agents étrangers si elle a conclu un accord, rémunéré ou non, avec un gouvernement étranger, une entité étrangère ou un étranger pour participer au Canada à des activités de relations publiques/communications, de lobbying ou à toute autre activité visant à influencer les politiciens, les partis, les gouvernements, les élections ou la politique de quelque manière que ce soit, y compris la divulgation de l’identité de la personne qui la paie, du montant de sa rémunération et des détails concernant les activités. Augmenter les ressources et modifier la politique d’application de la GRC afin que toute personne qui harcèle ou intimide un candidat, un concurrent ou un député, y compris en ligne, soit inculpée et poursuivie. (Voir les campagnes Campagne pour un système de vote démocratique et Campagne pour l’arrêt de l’ingérence étrangère dans la politique canadienne pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)

V. Mesures générales de responsabilisation du gouvernement

V.

14. Faciliter les groupes de surveillance des citoyens sur le gouvernement – Exiger des institutions du gouvernement fédéral qu’elles joignent périodiquement à leurs envois aux citoyens des brochures d’une page invitant les citoyens à se joindre à des groupes financés et dirigés par les citoyens pour représenter les intérêts des citoyens dans les processus d’élaboration et d’application des politiques des principaux ministères (par exemple, en matière d’éthique, de dépenses et de soins de santé/protection sociale), comme cela a été proposé aux États-Unis et recommandé pour les banques canadiennes et d’autres institutions financières en 1998 par un groupe de travail fédéral, un comité de la Chambre des communes et un comité du Sénat. (Voir la Citizen Association Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).
15. Assurer une protection efficace des dénonciateurs – Exiger que chacun signale toute violation d’une loi, d’un règlement, d’une politique, d’un code, d’une ligne directrice ou d’une règle, et exiger que tous les organismes de surveillance du gouvernement (par exemple, l’auditeur général, le commissaire à l’information, le commissaire à la protection de la vie privée, etc : Auditeur général, Commissaire à l’information, Commissaire à la protection de la vie privée, Commission du service public, les quatre chiens de garde de l’éthique (en particulier le Commissaire à l’intégrité du secteur public), le Comité de surveillance de la sécurité et du renseignement, le Conseil national de la santé) d’enquêter et de statuer publiquement sur les allégations de violations, de pénaliser les contrevenants, de protéger toute personne (pas seulement les employés) qui signale une violation (ce qu’on appelle les “dénonciateurs”) contre les représailles, de récompenser les dénonciateurs dont les allégations sont avérées, et de garantir un droit d’appel devant les tribunaux. (Voir la campagne Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).
16. Assurer des lois sans failles et des sanctions sévères pour les malfaiteurs – Fermer toutes les failles techniques et autres qui ont été identifiées dans les lois, les réglementations, les politiques, les codes, les lignes directrices et les règles (en particulier celles qui réglementent les institutions gouvernementales et les grandes entreprises) pour aider à assurer une application rigoureuse, notamment en comblant toutes les lacunes qui permettent la “propriété effective” de toute entreprise au Canada qui dissimule l’identité des propriétaires réels, et exiger des avocats qu’ils signalent les transactions suspectes au Centre d’analyse des opérations et déclarations financières du Canada (CANAFE), et augmenter les sanctions financières pour les violations à un niveau qui affecte de manière significative les revenus/budget annuels de l’institution ou de l’entreprise. (Voir les campagnes Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign et Corporate Responsibility Campaign et Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch).

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List of “Dirty Dozen” Seriously Unethical, Secretive and Undemocratic Actions by Doug Ford’s PC Party Government from June 2022 to February 2025

Based on the following “dirty dozen” seriously unethical, secretive and undemocratic actions, Democracy Watch gives the Doug Ford PC Party government an F fail grade since the June 2022 Ontario election:

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1. As 80% of Ontario voters think, Ford calling a self-interested snap election for no good reason, and also Ford refusing to take questions from the media, and having PC Party candidates not show up to all-candidates debates.
2. The Greenbelt scandal in which the Ford government attempted to transfer protected public land to mostly PC Party-connected property developers who would have reaped an $8 billion profit (the RCMP continues to investigate the scandal).
3. Doubling the political donation limit and keeping it doubled which has allowed rich donors to continue to corrupt political party decision-making.
4. Allowing lobbyists to fundraise, campaign and work for Ford and his Cabinet and then cash in by lobbying Ford’s government soon afterwards.
5. Breaking Ford’s promise to strengthen Ontario’s lobbying law as recommended by the Auditor General.
6. Ford illegally hiding his cellphone records, even though he uses it for government calls.
7. Violating Charter rights to impartial courts by weakening Ontario’s judicial appointment system to give the Ford Cabinet more power to appoint PC Party supporters as judges (Click here to see DWatch’s news release re: the court case it plans to file soon challenging Ford’s appointment system).
8. Extending “strong mayor powers” to 46 cities across Ontario which allow mayors to arbitrarily override city council decisions.
9. Using Ministerial Zoning Orders 17 times more than previous governments, with little or no justification for overriding city and town council decisions and plans.
10. Violating Charter rights by using notwithstanding clause to maintain arbitrary, undemocratic limits on spending by interest groups in election years (the Supreme Court of Canada will soon rule on Ford’s law).
11. Re-developing Ontario Place through a process the Auditor General concluded was not “fair, transparent or accountable” and that increased the cost by $1.8 billion (Click here to see legal arguments DWatch and other groups have jointly filed in the Ontario Court of Appeal case challenging the re-development as a violation of the “public trust”).
12. Accepting family gifts from lobbyists at his daughter’s stag-and-doe party.

Liste des “Douze sales” actions gravement contraires à l’éthique, secrètes et antidémocratiques du gouvernement du Parti PC de Doug Ford de juin 2022 à février 2025

Sur la base de la ” sale douzaine ” d’actions gravement contraires à l’éthique, secrètes et antidémocratiques, Democracy Watch donne au gouvernement du Parti PC de Doug Ford la note F depuis les élections ontariennes de juin 2022:

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1. Comme le pensent 80 % des électeurs ontariens, Ford a déclenché une élection éclair intéressée sans raison valable, et aussi Ford refuse de répondre aux questions des médias, et fait en sorte que les candidats du Parti PC ne se présentent pas aux débats réunissant tous les candidats.
2. Le scandale de la Ceinture de verdure dans lequel le gouvernement Ford a tenté de transférer des terres publiques protégées à des promoteurs immobiliers pour la plupart liés au Parti PC qui auraient récolté un profit de 8 milliards de dollars (le RCMP continue d’enquêter sur le scandale).
3. Doubler la limite des dons politiques et la maintenir, ce qui a permis aux riches donateurs de continuer à corrompre le processus décisionnel des partis politiques.
4. Autoriser les lobbyistes à collecter des fonds, à faire campagne et à travailler pour Ford et son cabinet, puis mettre la main à la poche en faisant du lobbying auprès du gouvernement de Ford peu de temps après.
5. Rompre la promesse de Ford de renforcer la loi ontarienne sur le lobbying comme l’a recommandé le vérificateur général.
6. Ford cacher illégalement les enregistrements de son téléphone cellulaire, même s’il l’utilise pour des appels gouvernementaux.
7. Violation des droits de la Charte à des tribunaux impartiaux en améliorant le système de nomination des juges de l’Ontario pour donner au Cabinet Ford plus de pouvoir pour nommer des partisans du Parti PC comme juges (Cliquez ici pour voir le communiqué de presse de DWatch concernant l’action en justice qu’il prévoit de déposer bientôt pour contester le système de nomination de Ford).
8. Extension des ” pouvoirs du maire fort ” à 46 villes de l’Ontario qui permettent aux maires d’annuler arbitrairement les décisions du conseil municipal.
9. Utilisation des arrêtés ministériels de zonage 17 fois plus que les gouvernements précédents, avec peu ou pas de justification pour passer outre les décisions et les plans des conseils municipaux.
10. Violation des droits de la Charte en utilisant la clause dérogatoire pour maintenir des limites arbitraires et antidémocratiques aux dépenses des groupes d’intérêt pendant les années électorales (la Cour suprême du Canada se prononcera bientôt sur la loi de Ford).
11. Réaménagement de la Place de l’Ontario par le biais d’un processus que le vérificateur général a conclu ne pas être “juste, transparent ou responsable” et qui a augmenté le coût de 1,8 milliard de dollars (Cliquez ici pour voir les arguments juridiques que DWatch et d’autres groupes ont conjointement déposés dans l’affaire de la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario qui conteste le réaménagement en tant que violation de la “confiance du public”).
12. Acceptation de cadeaux familiaux de la part de lobbyistes lors de l’enterrement de vie de garçon de sa fille.

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Criteria used for the Report Card on the 2025 Democracy and Accountability Election Platforms of the Ontario Political Parties

Set out below are the 16 sub-categories for the five issue area categories that are the basis for the Report Card.

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GRADING SYSTEM

A – Platform makes clear promise to implement proposal
B – Platform makes vague or partial promise to implement proposals
C – Platform makes clear promise to explore proposal
D – Platform makes vague or partial promise to explore proposal
D- – Platform mentions proposal area
F – Platform doesn’t mention proposal

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I. Honest, Ethical Government Measures

1. Requiring honesty-in-politics – Pass a law that requires all Cabinet ministers, MPPs, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees (including at Crown corporations, agencies, boards, commissions, courts and tribunals) nomination race and election candidates to tell the truth, with an easily accessible complaint process to a fully independent watchdog agency that is fully empowered to investigate and penalize anyone who lies. And require honesty in all political statements, especially online posts, and establish a new, fully independent, fully empowered commission to review and remove false online claims (Go to Honesty in Politics Campaign and the Stop Fake Online Election Ads Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
2. Strengthening ethics standards for politicians, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees, and ethics enforcement – Close the loopholes in the existing ethics rules (including closing the loophole that allows Cabinet ministers, MPPs, their staff and Cabinet appointees to be involved in decisions in which they have a financial interest, and including requiring resignation and a by-election if an MPP switches parties between elections) and apply them to all government institutions (including all Crown corporations) and, as proposed by the federal Department of Finance, place anyone with decision-making power on the anti-corruption watch list of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (Fintrac) so deposits to their bank accounts can be tracked. Strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the Ontario Integrity Commissioner by having the Commissioner selected by a fully independent non-partisan committee, having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budgets, prohibiting the watchdogs from giving secret advice, requiring them to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), fully empowering and requiring them to penalize rule-breakers, changing all the codes they enforce into laws, and ensuring that all their decisions can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to Government Ethics Campaign and Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
3. Making the political donations and election spending system democratic – Prohibit secret, unlimited donations or gifts of money, property or services by anyone for any reason to nomination, election and party leadership candidates; limit donations to $100 annually from individuals, and ban donations from corporations, unions and other organizations; also limit loans, including from financial institutions, to parties and all types of candidates to the same level as donations are limited; establish $1 per vote public funding of political parties (50 cents per vote for parties that elect a higher percentage of MPPs than the percentage of voter support they receive), and; ensure riding associations receive a fair share of this per-vote funding (so that party headquarters don’t have undue control over riding associations); require disclosure of all donations, gifts and loans of money, property or services (including the identity of the donor’s employer (as in the U.S.) and major affiliations) quarterly and before any election day; limit spending on campaigns for the leadership of political parties; limit advertising spending by the government and opposition parties and third parties (by number of members/supporters) in the six-month period leading up to an election, and limit advertising spending by third parties (by number of members/supporters) during the election campaign period (as spending by parties and candidates is limited). (Go to the Money in Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
4. Closing down the revolving door – Prohibit lobbyists from working for government departments or serving in senior positions for political parties or candidates for public office (as in New Mexico and Maryland), and from having business connections with anyone who does, and close the loopholes so that the actual cooling-off period for former Cabinet ministers, ministerial staff and senior public officials is five years (and three years for MPPs, their staff, and government employees) during which they are prohibited from becoming a lobbyist or working with people, corporations or organizations with which they had direct dealings while in government. Make the Integrity Commissioner more independent and effective by having them selected by a fully independent non-partisan commission, by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve their annual budget, by prohibiting the Commissioner from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioner to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), and by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioner to penalize rule-breakers, by ensuring all decisions of the Commissioner can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

II. Open Government Measures

5. Strengthening access-to-information system – Strengthen the access-to-information law and government information management system by applying the law to all government/publicly funded institutions, requiring all institutions and officials to create records of all decisions and actions and disclose them proactively and regularly, creating a public interest override of all access exemptions, having the Information and Privacy Commissioner appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budgets, and giving the Commissioner the power and mandate to order changes to government institutions’ information systems, and to penalize violators of access laws, regulations, policies and rules. (Go to the Open Government Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
6. Exposing behind-closed-door communications – Require in a new law that Ministers and public officials and MPPs and their staff disclose their contacts with all lobbyists, whether paid or volunteer lobbyists. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
7. Strengthening lobbying disclosure and ethics, and the enforcement system – Strengthen the Lobbying Registration Act by including in it a Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct, by closing the loophole that currently allows corporations to hide the number of people involved in lobbying activities, and by requiring lobbyists to disclose their past work with any Canadian or foreign government, political party or candidate, to disclose all their government relations activities (whether paid or volunteer) involving gathering inside information or trying to influence policy-makers (as in the U.S.) and to disclose the amount they spend on lobbying campaigns (as in 33 U.S. states), and; strengthen the ethics and enforcement system by extending the limitation period for prosecutions of violations of the Act to 10 years. Strengthen the Integrity Commissioner appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budget, by prohibiting the Commissioner from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioner to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioner to penalize rule-breakers, by ensuring all Commissioner decisions can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

III. Efficient Government Measures

8. Increasing powers of Auditor General and FAO – Increase the independence of the Auditor General and Financial Accountability Office (FAO) by having them appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission; increase auditing resources of the Auditor General and FAO by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Auditor General’s and FAO’s annual budget, and; empower the Auditor General to audit all government institutions including the legislature and MPP offices, and also empower the Auditor General and FAO to make orders for changes to government institutions’ spending systems, and to penalize violators of Treasury Board spending rules or Auditor General or FAO orders or requests for information. (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
9. Restricting government and campaign advertising – Restore the Auditor General’s power to preview and prohibit government advertising contracting out if there is no reason to have the advertising developed by a contractor, and to reject any government advertising that is essentially a partisan ad for the ruling party, and strictly limit all advertising spending by the government in the six-month period leading up to an election. (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

IV. Representative, Citizen-Driven Government Measures

10. Increasing meaningful public consultation – Pass a law requiring all government departments and institutions to use consultation processes that provide meaningful opportunities for citizen participation, especially concerning decisions that affect the lives of all Ontarians. (Go to the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
11. Restricting power of Cabinet to make appointments – Strengthen the Public Appointments Secretariat by making it a fully independent non-partisan commission that is appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, and have it appoint the approximately 2,000 judicial, agency, board, commission and tribunal appointments currently made by the Premier and Cabinet, especially for appointees to senior and law enforcement positions (including judges), after a merit-based nomination and screening process. (Go to the Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign and Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
12. Making the legislature more democratic – Change the law to restrict the Premier’s power to shut down (prorogue) the legislature to only for a very short time during time periods when the legislature is already adjourned, and only for an election (dissolution) or if the national situation has changed significantly or if the Premier can show that the government has completed all their pledged actions from the last Speech from the Throne (or attempted to do so, as the opposition parties may stop or delay completion of some actions). Give all party caucuses the power to choose which MPPs in their party sits on legislature committees, and allow any MPP to introduce a private member bill at any time, and define what a “vote of confidence” is in the law in a restrictive way so most votes in the legislature are free votes, and have a fully independent non-partisan commission choose a short-list of candidates for Lieutenant Governor after a public, merit-based search, with all party leaders making the final choice. (Go to the Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign and the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign and Democratic Head Campaign or details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
13. Ensuring free, fair and representative elections – Change the current voting law and system (the Elections Act) to specifically restrict the Premier’s power to call an unfair snap election, so that election dates are fixed as much as possible under the parliamentary system. Change the Act also so that nomination and party leadership races are regulated by Elections Ontario (including limiting spending on campaigns for party leadership), and so that party leaders cannot appoint candidates except when a riding does not have a riding association, and so that Elections Ontario determines which parties can participate in election debates based upon merit criteria, and so that voters can give a reason if they decline their ballot (i.e. vote for “none of the above”) and to require Elections Ontario to educate voters about their legal right to decline their ballot, and to provide a more equal number of voters in every riding, and a more accurate representation in the legislature of the actual voter support for each political party (with a safeguard to ensure that a party with low-level, narrow-base support does not have a disproportionately high level of power in the legislature). (Go to the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

V. General Accountability Measures

14. Facilitating citizen watchdog groups over government and big business sectors – Require provincial government institutions to enclose one-page pamphlets periodically in their mailings to citizens, and to put a notice at the top of every email they send to citizens, inviting citizens to join citizen-funded and directed groups to represent citizen interests in policy-making and enforcement processes of key government departments (for example, on ethics, spending, and health care), and require big businesses in all provincially regulated industries (investment banking, property insurance, energy and other natural resources, food, water and landlords) to do the same thing, as has been proposed in the U.S. and recommended for Canadian banks and other financial institutions in 1998 by a federal task force, a legislature of Commons Committee, and a Senate Committee, and for the investment industry by an Ontario legislature committee. (Go to the Citizen Association Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
15. Ensuring effective whistleblower protection – Require everyone to report any violation of any law, regulation, policy, code, guideline or rule, and require all watchdog agencies over government (for example: Auditor General, Information and Privacy Commissioner, and Integrity Commissioner) to investigate and rule publicly on allegations of violations, and to penalize violators, to protect anyone (not just employees) who reports a violation (so-called “whistleblowers”) from retaliation, and to reward whistleblowers whose allegations are proven to be true, and to ensure a right to appeal to the courts. (Go to the Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
16. Ensuring loophole free laws and strong penalties for wrongdoers – Close any technical and other loopholes that have been identified in laws, regulations, policies, codes, guidelines and rules (especially those regulating government institutions and large corporations) to help ensure strong enforcement, and increase financial penalties for violations to a level that significantly effects the annual revenues/budget of the institution or corporation. (Go to the Campaigns page and the Corporate Responsibility Campaign page for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

Critères utilisés pour le bulletin sur les programmes électoraux des partis politiques de l’Ontario en matière de démocratie et de responsabilité en 2025

Voici les 16 sous-catégories des cinq domaines d’intérêt qui constituent la base du bulletin.

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SYSTEME DE CLASSEMENT

Système de classement

A – La plateforme promet clairement de mettre en œuvre la proposition
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B – La plate-forme fait une promesse vague ou partielle de mise en œuvre des propositions
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C – La plate-forme fait une promesse claire d’explorer la proposition
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D – La plateforme fait une promesse vague ou partielle d’explorer la proposition
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D- – La plateforme mentionne le domaine de la proposition
F – La plateforme ne mentionne pas de proposition

La plateforme ne mentionne pas de proposition

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La plateforme ne mentionne pas la proposition.

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I. Des mesures gouvernementales honnêtes et éthiques

1. Exiger l’honnêteté en politique – Adopter une loi qui exige que tous les ministres, les députés, le personnel politique, les personnes nommées par le Cabinet et les employés du gouvernement (y compris dans les sociétés d’État, les agences, les conseils, les commissions, les cours et les tribunaux), les candidats aux courses à l’investiture et aux élections disent la vérité, avec un processus de plainte facilement accessible auprès d’une agence de surveillance totalement indépendante qui est pleinement habilitée à enquêter et à sanctionner toute personne qui ment. Exiger l’honnêteté dans toutes les déclarations politiques, en particulier dans les messages en ligne, et créer une nouvelle commission totalement indépendante et dotée de tous les pouvoirs nécessaires pour examiner et supprimer les fausses déclarations en ligne (voir Honesty in Politics Campaign et la Stop Fake Online Election Ads Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
2. Renforcer les normes éthiques pour les politiciens, le personnel politique, les personnes nommées au Cabinet et les employés du gouvernement, et l’application de l’éthique – Combler les lacunes des règles éthiques existantes (y compris combler la lacune qui permet aux ministres du Cabinet, aux députés, à leur personnel et aux personnes nommées au Cabinet d’être impliqués dans des décisions dans lesquelles ils ont un intérêt financier, et exiger la démission et une élection partielle si un député change de parti entre deux élections) et les appliquer à toutes les institutions gouvernementales (y compris toutes les sociétés d’État) et, comme le propose le ministère fédéral des Finances, inscrire toute personne ayant un pouvoir de décision sur la liste de surveillance anticorruption du Centre d’analyse des opérations et déclarations financières du Canada (Fintrac) afin que les dépôts effectués sur leurs comptes bancaires puissent être retracés. Renforcer l’indépendance et l’efficacité du commissaire à l’intégrité de l’Ontario en faisant en sorte que le commissaire soit sélectionné par un comité non partisan totalement indépendant, que la législature (et non le Cabinet) approuve les budgets annuels du commissaire, en interdisant aux chiens de garde de donner des conseils secrets, en exigeant qu’ils enquêtent et se prononcent publiquement sur toutes les plaintes (y compris les plaintes anonymes), en leur donnant les pleins pouvoirs et en exigeant qu’ils pénalisent ceux qui enfreignent les règles, en transformant tous les codes qu’ils appliquent en lois et en veillant à ce que toutes leurs décisions puissent être réexaminées par les tribunaux. (Voir Government Ethics Campaign et Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
3. Rendre le système de dons politiques et de dépenses électorales démocratique – Interdire les dons secrets et illimités d’argent, de biens ou de services par quiconque, pour quelque raison que ce soit, aux candidats à l’investiture, à l’élection et à la direction des partis ; limiter les dons des particuliers à 100 dollars par an et interdire les dons des entreprises, des syndicats et d’autres organisations ; limiter également les prêts, y compris ceux des institutions financières, aux partis et à tous les types de candidats au même niveau que les dons sont limités ; établir un financement public des partis politiques à hauteur d’un dollar par voix (50 cents par voix pour les partis qui élisent un pourcentage de députés plus élevé que le pourcentage de soutien des électeurs qu’ils reçoivent) et veiller à ce que les associations de circonscription reçoivent une part équitable de ce financement par voix (afin que les sièges des partis n’exercent pas un contrôle excessif sur les associations de circonscription) ; exiger la divulgation de tous les dons, cadeaux et prêts d’argent, de biens ou de services (y compris l’identité de l’employeur du donateur (comme aux États-Unis) et ses principales affiliations).Les dépenses publicitaires du gouvernement, des partis d’opposition et des tiers (en fonction du nombre de membres ou de partisans) sont limitées dans les six mois précédant une élection, et les dépenses publicitaires des tiers (en fonction du nombre de membres ou de partisans) sont limitées pendant la période de la campagne électorale (les dépenses des partis et des candidats étant limitées). (Voir la campagne Money in Politics pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
4. Fermer la porte tournante – Interdire aux lobbyistes de travailler pour des ministères ou d’occuper des postes de direction pour des partis politiques ou des candidats à des fonctions publiques (comme au Nouveau Mexique et dans le Maryland), et d’avoir des relations d’affaires avec quiconque le fait, et combler les lacunes de sorte que la période de réflexion réelle pour les anciens ministres, le personnel ministériel et les hauts fonctionnaires soit de trois ans, de cinq ans (et de trois ans pour les députés provinciaux, leur personnel et les fonctionnaires) pendant laquelle il leur est interdit de devenir lobbyistes ou de travailler avec des personnes, des entreprises ou des organisations avec lesquelles ils ont eu des relations directes pendant qu’ils étaient au pouvoir. Rendre le commissaire à l’intégrité plus indépendant et plus efficace en le faisant sélectionner par une commission totalement indépendante et non partisane, en faisant approuver son budget annuel par la législature (et non par le Cabinet), en interdisant au commissaire de donner des conseils secrets, en exigeant du commissaire qu’il enquête et se prononce publiquement sur toutes les plaintes (y compris les plaintes anonymes), en lui donnant les pleins pouvoirs et en exigeant qu’il pénalise ceux qui enfreignent les règles, en veillant à ce que toutes les décisions du commissaire puissent être réexaminées par les tribunaux. (Voir la page Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)

II. Mesures en faveur d’un gouvernement ouvert

Campagne pour un gouvernement ouvert pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
5. Exposer les communications à huis clos – Exiger dans une nouvelle loi que les ministres, les fonctionnaires, les députés et leur personnel divulguent leurs contacts avec tous les lobbyistes, qu’ils soient rémunérés ou bénévoles. (Voir la page Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
6. Renforcer la divulgation et l’éthique du lobbying, et le système d’application – Renforcer la Lobbying Registration Act en y incluant un Code de conduite des lobbyistes, en comblant la faille qui permet actuellement aux entreprises de dissimuler le nombre de personnes impliquées dans les activités de lobbying, et en exigeant des lobbyistes qu’ils divulguent leur travail passé avec un gouvernement, un parti politique ou un candidat canadien ou étranger, qu’ils divulguent toutes leurs activités de relations gouvernementales (rémunérées ou bénévoles) impliquant la collecte d’informations privilégiées ou la tentative d’influencer les décideurs politiques (comme aux États-Unis) et qu’ils divulguent toutes leurs activités de relations gouvernementales (rémunérées ou bénévoles) impliquant la collecte d’informations privilégiées ou la tentative d’influencer les décideurs politiques (comme aux États-Unis).Renforcer le système d’éthique et d’application de la loi en allongeant à 10 ans le délai de prescription pour les poursuites en cas de violation de la Loi. Renforcer le commissaire à l’intégrité nommé par une commission totalement indépendante et non partisane, en faisant approuver le budget annuel du commissaire par le corps législatif (et non par le cabinet), en interdisant au commissaire de donner des conseils secrets, en exigeant du commissaire qu’il enquête et se prononce publiquement sur toutes les plaintes (y compris les plaintes anonymes), en donnant au commissaire les pleins pouvoirs et en exigeant de lui qu’il pénalise ceux qui enfreignent les règles, en garantissant que toutes les décisions du commissaire puissent être réexaminées par les tribunaux. (Voir la page Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)

III. Mesures pour un gouvernement efficace

8. Augmentation des pouvoirs du vérificateur général et du FAO – Augmenter l’indépendance du vérificateur général et du Bureau de la responsabilité financière (FAO) en les faisant nommer par une commission totalement indépendante et non partisane ; augmenter les ressources d’audit du vérificateur général et du FAO en faisant approuver le budget annuel du vérificateur général et du FAO par le corps législatif (par opposition au Cabinet), et ; habiliter le vérificateur général à contrôler toutes les institutions gouvernementales, y compris le corps législatif et les bureaux des députés, et habiliter également le vérificateur général et la FAO à ordonner des changements dans les systèmes de dépenses des institutions gouvernementales et à sanctionner les personnes qui enfreignent les règles de dépenses du Conseil du Trésor, les ordres du vérificateur général ou de la FAO ou les demandes d’information. (Voir la Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
9. Restreindre la publicité gouvernementale et de campagne – Restaurer le pouvoir de l’Auditeur général de prévoir et d’interdire la sous-traitance de la publicité gouvernementale s’il n’y a pas de raison que la publicité soit développée par un entrepreneur, et de rejeter toute publicité gouvernementale qui est essentiellement une publicité partisane pour le parti au pouvoir, et limiter strictement toutes les dépenses publicitaires du gouvernement au cours de la période de six mois précédant une élection. (Voir la Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)

IV. Mesures gouvernementales représentatives et axées sur les citoyens

Les mesures gouvernementales représentatives et axées sur les citoyens

10. Augmenter les consultations publiques significatives – Adopter une loi exigeant que tous les ministères et institutions du gouvernement utilisent des processus de consultation qui offrent des possibilités significatives de participation des citoyens, en particulier en ce qui concerne les décisions qui affectent la vie de tous les Ontariens et Ontariennes. (Voir la Campagne pour des systèmes de vote démocratiques pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
11. Restreindre le pouvoir du Cabinet de procéder à des nominations – Renforcer le Secrétariat des nominations publiques en en faisant une commission non partisane entièrement indépendante qui est nommée par une commission non partisane entièrement indépendante, et lui faire nommer les quelque 2 000 nominations judiciaires, d’agences, de conseils, de commissions et de tribunaux actuellement effectuées par le Premier ministre et le Cabinet, en particulier pour les personnes nommées à des postes de direction et d’application de la loi (y compris les juges), à l’issue d’un processus de nomination et de présélection fondé sur le mérite. (Voir les campagnes Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign et Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
12. Rendre la législature plus démocratique – Modifier la loi pour restreindre le pouvoir du premier ministre de fermer (proroger) la législature uniquement pour une très courte période pendant les périodes où la législature est déjà ajournée, et seulement pour une élection (dissolution) ou si la situation nationale a changé de manière significative ou si le premier ministre peut montrer que le gouvernement a achevé toutes les actions promises dans le dernier discours du Trône (ou a tenté de le faire, car les partis d’opposition peuvent arrêter ou retarder l’achèvement de certaines actions). Donner à tous les caucus des partis le pouvoir de choisir les députés de leur parti qui siègent dans les commissions législatives, permettre à tout député de présenter un projet de loi d’initiative parlementaire à tout moment, définir ce qu’est un “vote de confiance” dans la loi de manière restrictive afin que la plupart des votes à la législature soient des votes libres, et faire en sorte qu’une commission totalement indépendante et non partisane choisisse une liste restreinte de candidats au poste de lieutenant-gouverneur après une recherche publique et fondée sur le mérite, tous les chefs de parti faisant le choix final. (Voir la campagne Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign et la campagne Democratic Voting Systems Campaign et Democratic Head Campaign ou des détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
13. Assurer des élections libres, justes et représentatives – Modifier la loi et le système de vote actuels (la Loi sur les élections) pour restreindre spécifiquement le pouvoir du Premier ministre de convoquer une élection éclair injuste, de sorte que les dates des élections soient fixées autant que possible dans le cadre du système parlementaire. Modifier la Loi également pour que les courses à l’investiture et à la direction des partis soient réglementées par Élections Ontario (y compris la limitation des dépenses pour les campagnes à la direction des partis), et pour que les chefs de parti ne puissent pas nommer de candidats sauf lorsqu’une circonscription n’a pas d’association de circonscription, et pour qu’Élections Ontario détermine quels partis peuvent participer aux débats électoraux sur la base de critères de mérite, et pour que les électeurs puissent donner une raison s’ils refusent leur bulletin de vote (c’est-à-dire voter pour “aucun”).) et pour exiger qu’Élections Ontario informe les électeurs de leur droit légal de refuser leur bulletin de vote, et pour assurer un nombre plus égal d’électeurs dans chaque circonscription, et une représentation plus précise dans la législature du soutien réel des électeurs pour chaque parti politique (avec une sauvegarde pour assurer qu’un parti avec un soutien de faible niveau et de base étroite n’ait pas un niveau de pouvoir disproportionné dans la législature). (Voir la Campagne sur les systèmes de vote démocratiques pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)

V. Mesures générales de responsabilisation

14. Faciliter les groupes de surveillance des citoyens sur les secteurs du gouvernement et des grandes entreprises – Exiger des institutions gouvernementales provinciales qu’elles joignent périodiquement des brochures d’une page dans leurs envois aux citoyens, et qu’elles placent un avis en haut de chaque courriel qu’elles envoient aux citoyens, inviter les citoyens à se joindre à des groupes financés et dirigés par des citoyens pour représenter les intérêts des citoyens dans les processus d’élaboration et d’application des politiques des principaux ministères (par exemple, en matière d’éthique, de dépenses et de soins de santé), et exiger des grandes entreprises de tous les secteurs réglementés par les provinces (banques d’investissement, assurances immobilières, énergie et autres ressources naturelles, alimentation, eau et propriétaires) qu’elles fassent de même, comme cela a été proposé aux États-Unis et recommandé pour les banques canadiennes et les propriétaires de logements).États-Unis et recommandé pour les banques et autres institutions financières canadiennes en 1998 par un groupe de travail fédéral, un comité de la législature des Communes et un comité du Sénat, et pour le secteur de l’investissement par un comité de la législature de l’Ontario. (Voir la Citizen Association Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
15. Assurer une protection efficace des dénonciateurs – Exiger que chacun signale toute violation d’une loi, d’un règlement, d’une politique, d’un code, d’une ligne directrice ou d’une règle, et exiger que toutes les agences de surveillance du gouvernement (par exemple : Auditeur général, Commissaire à l’information et à la protection de la vie privée, Commissaire à l’intégrité) d’enquêter et de se prononcer publiquement sur les allégations de violations, et de pénaliser les contrevenants, de protéger toute personne (pas seulement les employés) qui signale une violation (ce qu’on appelle les “dénonciateurs”) contre les représailles, et de récompenser les dénonciateurs dont les allégations sont avérées, et de garantir le droit de faire appel devant les tribunaux. (Voir la campagne Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)
16. Assurer des lois sans failles et des sanctions sévères pour les contrevenants – Fermer toutes les failles techniques et autres qui ont été identifiées dans les lois, les réglementations, les politiques, les codes, les lignes directrices et les règles (en particulier celles qui réglementent les institutions gouvernementales et les grandes entreprises) pour aider à assurer une application rigoureuse, et augmenter les sanctions financières pour les violations à un niveau qui affecte de manière significative les revenus/budget annuels de l’institution ou de l’entreprise. (Voir la page Campagnes et la page Campagne sur la responsabilité des entreprises pour plus de détails sur les propositions de Democracy Watch)

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Backgrounder on Key Loopholes in Canada’s Lobbying, Ethics, Election, Political Donation and Spending Laws that Allow for Foreign Interference

(June 2024)

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Foreign-agent registry must cover all foreign-influence activities, not just lobbying

The proposed foreign-agent registry must require anyone or any entity to register if they are paid or compensated in any way, directly or indirectly, by a foreign government, foreign entity or foreigner, or have any other type of arrangement with them, to be involved in Canada in public relations/communications or any political activities aimed at influencing politicians, parties or governments.

If the registry only requires people or entities paid to directly influence Canadian politics (which are the only activities covered by the bills that former Conservative Kenny Chiu and Senator Leo Housakas proposed), then it will require nothing more to be disclosed than what is already disclosed in the federal Registry of Lobbyists (under the federal Lobbying Act), and foreign agents will easily avoid being required to register (as some lobbyists do) by arranging to be compensated for other services or in some other way while doing the influence activities for free.

In June 2024, MPs from all parties approved Bill C-70, which creates a Foreign Influence Registry (FIR), but the bill has huge loopholes in it and the enforcement system will be weak, partisan, political and secretive. Click here to see details.

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Commissioner of Lobbying and so-called Ethics Committee gutted key ethical lobbying rules in ways that will increase foreign interference

As more than 40 lawyers and professors, and 26 citizen groups, and the Globe and Mail (twice) have called for, the House Ethics Committee must reverse its positions and reject federal Commissioner of Lobbying Nancy Bélanger’s gutting last year of key ethical lobbying rules in the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct in ways that will make secret interference in elections and secret activities to influence federal MPs easier for China and other foreign governments.

Commissioner Bélanger is gutting key ethical lobbying rules in the Lobbyists’ Code in ways that will allow lobbyists to secretly fundraise unlimited amounts of money for, and do significant campaigning for, politicians and their parties and lobby them at the same time or soon afterwards.

The so-called Ethics Committee also ensured loopholes were added to allow lobbyists to give MPs hundreds of dollars in gifts and meals annually, and also tried to convince the Commissioner to continue to allow lobbyists to give MPs trip junkets worth thousands of dollars annually.

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Loopholes in lobbying law allow for secret lobbying

The federal Lobbying Act contains huge loopholes that allow for secret lobbying and hiding who is behind and funding influence activities such as ad and social media campaigns that appeal to voters to pressure MPs. Some of the biggest loopholes are:

1. Lobbying and influence activities do not have to be registered, even if they are well-funded efforts by a business or organization, if the people overseeing or doing the activities are not paid specifically to do the lobbying activities;
2. Lobbying and influence activities also do not have to be registered if the lobbying is about the enforcement of a law, a government contract or a tax credit (which businesses mostly lobby about, so these loopholes hide mostly big business lobbying);
3. Businesses and organizations are not required to register and disclose their attempts to influence MPs if their employees all together lobby less than 20% of their work time;
4. Even if a lobbyist, business or organization is required to register and disclose its lobbying, it is allowed to keep secret most of its lobbying communications with politicians, their staff and government officials, and;
5. Even if a business or lobby group is registered, it is not required to disclose its source of funding (other than Canadian government funding) or how much it spends on its lobbying and influence activities.

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Loopholes in ethics laws allow for unethical decision-making

Federal ethics rules have huge loopholes that allow MPs to have secret jobs, Cabinet ministers and top government officials to have secret investments, and everyone to participate in decisions that they profit from, and to act unethically in many other ways.

The Procedure and House Affairs Committee failed to address any of these loopholes when it reviewed MP ethics rules in secret last year and issued an initial report in June 2022. In fact, the Committee proposed, and the House approved on March 30, 2023, a new loophole in their ethics code that now allows lobby groups, including foreign-government sponsored groups, to pay for interns in MPs’ offices.

The Senate’s ethics code has many of the same loopholes, although it contains a few rules enacted in 2014 that, if the Senate Ethics Officer ever enforces the rules properly, will finally prohibit the unethical business activities and decision-making conflicts of interest by many Senators that the code currently allows.

Federal ethics laws also allow foreign governments and organizations to give MPs and Senators the gift of unlimited trips and junkets, and they are allowed to take their family members, staff and associates with them (known as the “sponsored travel” loophole).

In addition, politicians and public officials are allowed to accept hundreds of dollars worth of gifts each year from anyone, including lobbyists, foreign governments and front groups and individuals they sponsor to interfere in and influence Canadian politics. Incredibly, the Criminal Code of Canada (clauses 121(1)(b) and (c)) and many ethics codes for government employees across Canada, allow politicians and public officials to accept even bigger gifts and benefits as long as their boss approves it.

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Loopholes in election law makes foreign interference and influence easy

The Canada Elections Act has several flaws that make interference and influence easy by foreign-government connected or sponsored individuals, businesses and organizations, as follows:

1. Individuals, businesses and organizations are allowed to collude with and provide secret support to nomination race contestants and party leadership race contestants;
2. Non-citizens and people who are younger than 18 are allowed to vote in nomination races and party leadership races;
3. The high donation limit of $3,450 annually to each party and its riding associations makes it easy to funnel large donations to candidates and parties through just a few people;
4. The identities of people who donate less than $200 annually are not required to be disclosed, making it easy to funnel donations of less than $200 through many people to candidates and parties;
5. Individuals, businesses and organizations are allowed to funnel money to each other to hide the actual source of funds used in election campaign spending;
6. One wealthy individual, or a business with just a couple of shareholders, or an organization supported by just a couple of voters, is allowed to spend up to $1 million during the pre-election period, and more than $500,000 during the election campaign, trying to influence voters;
7. Nomination race contestants, election candidates, parties and party leadership contestants are allowed to audit their own campaigns, which makes it easy for them to hide illegal donations and spending.

(Click here to see infographic webpage and video about the flaws)

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Lack of effective honesty-in-politics law makes false claims, misinformation and disinformation legal

Many types of false claims are allowed about election candidates, party leaders and MPs, and no enforcement agency has the power to order social media companies to remove false online posts or ads.

In November 2018, the Chief Electoral Officer and Commissioner of Canada Elections (CCE) both told the Senate that one of key rules prohibiting false claims, misinformation and disinformation is essentially unenforceable because it requires the CCE to prove that the statement was intended to influence the election.

As well, the Liberal government’s election integrity plan was too weak and focused on the twin charades of educating citizens to recognize misinformation (which is impossible unless you are an expert in everything) and cooperating with social media companies that continue largely ineffective efforts to stop misinformation.

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Enforcement watchdogs are handpicked partisan lapdogs who are allowed to issue secret rulings, and can’t be held accountable for failing to enforce the law properly

Enforcement of Canada’s election, political donation, lobbying, ethics, anti-corruption and whistleblower protection laws is very weak, as all the watchdogs are handpicked by Cabinet through secretive, partisan, political appointment processes and they are largely unaccountable even if they don’t enforce the law effectively or properly. All of the watchdogs other than the Chief Electoral Officer and Commissioner of Canada Elections can also be re-appointed for more than one term in office solely by the ruling party Cabinet, which creates an incentive for the watchdog, during the last part of each term in office, to rule on situations in ways that please the Cabinet.

The watchdogs are also allowed to refuse to investigate an alleged violation of the law they enforce, even if there is clear evidence of a violation, and even if they do investigate they are allowed to keep their rulings on violations secret, which hides whether they are actually enforcing the law properly. Click here to see how the Ethics Commissioner from 2007 to 2017 made more than 200 secret rulings that let off federal politicians and senior government officials for alleged violations of the federal ethics laws. Click here to see how the Commissioner of Lobbying and RCMP from 2008 to 2017 made almost 90 secret rulings that let off lobbyists for violations of the federal lobbying law. And click here to see how the Commissioner of Canada Elections and Elections Canada kept secret how they dealt with more than 3,000 complaints filed with them between 1997 and 2011 about violations of the federal elections law

The watchdogs also can’t be challenged in court if they fail to do their jobs properly.

Under the RCMP Act, the RCMP Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner and the Commanding Officer of each Division of the RCMP, are also all appointed by the federal Cabinet alone (no consultation with the opposition parties is required, nor is an independent, merit-based search for qualified candidates required) and all of them also serve at the pleasure of Cabinet (i.e. they can be fired at any time for any reason).

The Liberal government’s so-called “independent” Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel is not independent at all, as it is made up of public servants who were chosen by, and serve at the pleasure of, Prime Minister Trudeau, and the Cabinet Directive for the Protocol has several flaws that allow for coverups of foreign interference. If the Panel members are not fully independent of the government and all political parties, and the flaws in the Protocol are not corrected, then the Panel will continue to cover up foreign interference instead of reporting it publicly and stopping it.

Also, the Trudeau Liberals’ Cabinet Directive for the Protocol has several flaws, as follows:

1. It is not legally binding on the Panel, and there are no penalties if the Panel violates any part of the Protocol;
2. The section 6.0 process sets a much-too-high threshold for informing the public of interference (the interference essentially must threaten the ability of the entire national election to be free and fair);
3. Even if the Panel decides (by consensus) that the interference meets the threshold, the section 5.0 process does not set any deadline by which the Panel is required to inform anyone of the interference;
4. The section 9.0 Assessment also does not set any deadline by which a so-called “independent” report is required to be released about the effectiveness of the Protocol at “addressing threats” during the previous election.
5. The section 9.0 Assessment is done by whomever the ruling party Cabinet chooses, so the assessor is not independent in any way. Trudeau’s Cabinet chose Morris Rosenberg, former head of the Trudeau Foundation when the Foundation received a $200,000 donation donation from two China-connected businessmen, to do the assessment for the 2021 election. Mr. Rosenberg’s contract terms have not been disclosed in the federal government contract registry.

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Whistleblowers are not protected

People who blow the whistle on wrongdoing in Canada are not protected when blowing the whistle, and are also not protected from retaliation after they report wrongdoing. A key step in effective enforcement to prevent foreign interference is to establish a best-practice whistleblower protection system that protects anyone who blows the whistle on violations of any of the laws/rules listed above, including empowering the independent commissions to pay for a lawyer to advise whistleblowers of their rights, to reward whistleblowers if their claims are proven, and to protect them from retaliation and penalize anyone who retaliates against them.

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See more details at Democracy Watch’s Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign, Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign, Government Ethics Campaign, Money in Politics Campaign, Honesty in Politics Campaign, Stop Fake Online Election Ads Campaign, Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign, Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign and Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign

Document d’information sur les principales lacunes des lois canadiennes sur le lobbying, l’éthique, les élections, les dons politiques et les dépenses qui permettent l’ingérence étrangère

(juin 2024)

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Le registre des agents étrangers doit couvrir toutes les activités d’influence étrangère, pas seulement le lobbying

Le registre des agents étrangers proposé doit obliger toute personne ou entité à s’enregistrer si elle est payée ou indemnisée de quelque manière que ce soit, directement ou indirectement, par un gouvernement étranger, une entité étrangère ou un étranger, ou si elle a conclu tout autre type d’accord avec eux, pour participer au Canada à des activités de relations publiques/communications ou à toute activité politique visant à influencer des politiciens, des partis ou des gouvernements.

Si le registre ne concerne que les personnes ou entités payées pour influencer directement la politique canadienne (qui sont les seules activités couvertes par les projets de loi proposés par l’ancien conservateur Kenny Chiu et le sénateur Leo Housakas), il n’exigera rien de plus que ce qui est déjà divulgué dans le registre fédéral des lobbyistes (en vertu de la Lobbying Act fédérale), et les agents étrangers éviteront facilement d’être obligés de s’enregistrer (comme le font certains lobbyistes) en s’arrangeant pour être rémunérés pour d’autres services ou d’une autre manière, tout en exerçant gratuitement leurs activités d’influence.

En juin 2024, les députés de tous les partis ont approuvé le projet de loi C-70, qui crée un registre de l’influence étrangère (RIE), mais le projet de loi comporte d’énormes lacunes et le système d’application sera faible, partisan, politique et secret. Cliquez ici pour voir les détails.

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Le commissaire au lobbying et le soi-disant comité d’éthique ont vidé de leur substance les principales règles éthiques en matière de lobbying de manière à accroître l’ingérence étrangère.

Comme plus de 40 avocats et professeurs, et 26 groupes de citoyens, et le Globe and Mail (deux fois) ont demandé, le Comité d’éthique de la Chambre des communes doit revenir sur ses positions et rejeter la décision de la commissaire fédérale au lobbying, Nancy Bélanger, de vider de leur substance, l’an dernier, les principales règles d’éthique en matière de lobbying contenues dans le Code de conduite des lobbyistes, de manière à faciliter l’ingérence secrète dans les élections et les activités secrètes visant à influencer les députés fédéraux, pour la Chine et d’autres gouvernements étrangers.

La commissaire Bélanger est en train de vider de leur substance les principales règles d’éthique en matière de lobbying du Code de conduite des lobbyistes de manière à permettre aux lobbyistes de collecter secrètement des sommes d’argent illimitées pour les politiciens et leurs partis, de faire des campagnes importantes pour eux et de faire du lobbying auprès d’eux en même temps ou peu après.

Le soi-disant comité d’éthique a également veillé à ce que des failles soient ajoutées pour permettre aux lobbyistes d’offrir aux députés des centaines de dollars de cadeaux et de repas par an, et a également tenté de convaincre le commissaire de continuer à autoriser les lobbyistes à offrir aux députés des voyages organisés d’une valeur de plusieurs milliers de dollars par an.

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Les lacunes de la loi sur le lobbying permettent le lobbying secret

La Lobbying Act fédérale contient d’énormes lacunes qui permettent le lobbying secret et de cacher qui est derrière et finance les activités d’influence telles que les campagnes de publicité et de médias sociaux qui font appel aux électeurs pour faire pression sur les députés. Voici quelques-unes des lacunes les plus importantes :

1. Les activités de lobbying et d’influence ne doivent pas être enregistrées, même s’il s’agit d’efforts bien financés par une entreprise ou une organisation, si les personnes qui supervisent ou réalisent les activités ne sont pas rémunérées spécifiquement pour effectuer les activités de lobbying;

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Même si un lobbyiste, une entreprise ou une organisation est tenu de s’enregistrer et de divulguer ses activités de lobbying, il est autorisé à garder secrètes la plupart de ses communications de lobbying avec les politiciens, leur personnel et les fonctionnaires du gouvernement, et;

2. Même si une entreprise ou un groupe de pression est enregistré, il n’est pas tenu de divulguer sa source de financement (autre que le financement du gouvernement canadien) ou le montant qu’il consacre à ses activités de lobbying et d’influence.

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Les lacunes des lois sur l’éthique permettent des prises de décision contraires à l’éthique

Les règles éthiques fédérales comportent d’énormes lacunes qui permettent aux députés d’avoir des emplois secrets, aux ministres et aux hauts fonctionnaires d’avoir des investissements secrets, et à tout le monde de participer à des décisions dont ils profitent, et d’agir de manière contraire à l’éthique de bien d’autres façons.

La commission de la procédure et des affaires de la Chambre n’a abordé aucune de ces failles lorsqu’elle a examiné les règles d’éthique des députés en secret l’année dernière et a publié un rapport initial en juin 2022. En fait, la commission a proposé, et la Chambre a approuvé le 30 mars 2023, une nouvelle faille dans leur code d’éthique qui permet désormais aux groupes de pression, y compris les groupes parrainés par des gouvernements étrangers, de rémunérer des stagiaires dans les bureaux des députés.

Le Code d’éthique du Sénat présente un grand nombre des mêmes lacunes, bien qu’il contienne quelques règles adoptées en 2014 qui, si le déontologue du Sénat les applique correctement, interdiront enfin les activités commerciales contraires à l’éthique et les conflits d’intérêts décisionnels de nombreux sénateurs que le code autorise à l’heure actuelle.

Les lois fédérales sur l’éthique permettent également aux gouvernements et organisations étrangers d’offrir aux députés et aux sénateurs des voyages illimités et des junkets, et ils sont autorisés à emmener avec eux les membres de leur famille, leur personnel et leurs associés (c’est ce qu’on appelle l’échappatoire des “voyages sponsorisés”).

En outre, les politiciens et les fonctionnaires sont autorisés à accepter chaque année des cadeaux d’une valeur de plusieurs centaines de dollars de la part de n’importe qui, y compris des lobbyistes, des gouvernements étrangers, des groupes de façade et des individus qu’ils parrainent pour s’immiscer dans la politique canadienne et l’influencer. Aussi incroyable que cela puisse paraître, le Code pénal du Canada (clauses 121(1)(b) et (c)) et de nombreux codes de déontologie destinés aux fonctionnaires du Canada autorisent les politiciens et les fonctionnaires à accepter des cadeaux et des avantages encore plus importants, pour autant que leur patron l’approuve.

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Les lacunes de la loi électorale facilitent l’ingérence et l’influence étrangères

La Loi électorale du Canada présente plusieurs lacunes qui facilitent l’ingérence et l’influence de personnes, d’entreprises et d’organisations liées ou parrainées par un gouvernement étranger :

1. Les individus, les entreprises et les organisations sont autorisés à être de connivence avec les candidats à la course à l’investiture et à la course à la direction du parti et à leur fournir un soutien secret;
2. Les non-citoyens et les personnes âgées de moins de 18 ans sont autorisés à voter dans les courses à l’investiture et les courses à la direction du parti;
3. La limite élevée de dons de 3 450 $ par année à chaque parti et à ses associations de circonscription facilite la circulation de dons importants aux candidats et aux partis par l’entremise de quelques personnes seulement;
4. L’identité des personnes qui font des dons de moins de 200 $ par an n’est pas tenue d’être divulguée, ce qui facilite l’acheminement des dons de moins de 200 $ vers les candidats et les partis par l’intermédiaire de nombreuses personnes;
5. Les particuliers, les entreprises et les organisations sont autorisés à circuler de l’argent entre eux pour dissimuler la source réelle des fonds utilisés dans les dépenses des campagnes électorales;
6. Un individu fortuné, ou une entreprise avec seulement quelques actionnaires, ou une organisation soutenue par seulement quelques électeurs, est autorisé à dépenser jusqu’à 1 million de dollars pendant la période pré-électorale, et plus de 500 000 dollars pendant la campagne électorale, pour tenter d’influencer les électeurs;

Cliquez ici pour voir la page web de l’infographie et la vidéo sur les failles)

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L’absence d’une loi efficace sur l’honnêteté en politique rend les fausses affirmations, la désinformation et les informations erronées légales

De nombreux types de fausses allégations sont autorisés au sujet des candidats aux élections, des chefs de parti et des députés, et aucun organisme de contrôle n’a le pouvoir d’ordonner aux sociétés de médias sociaux de supprimer les faux messages ou les fausses publicités en ligne.

En novembre 2018, le directeur général des élections et le commissaire aux élections fédérales (CCE) ont tous deux déclaré au Sénat que l’une des règles clés interdisant les fausses affirmations, la désinformation et la mésinformation est essentiellement inapplicable parce qu’elle exige que le CCE prouve que la déclaration avait pour but d’influencer l’élection.

En outre, le plan d’intégrité électorale du gouvernement libéral était trop faible et se concentrait sur les deux charades de éduquer les citoyens à reconnaître la désinformation (ce qui est impossible à moins d’être un expert en tout) et coopérer avec les entreprises de médias sociaux qui poursuivent des efforts largement inefficaces pour mettre fin à la désinformation.

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Les chiens de garde de l’application de la loi sont des chiens de poche partisans triés sur le volet qui sont autorisés à rendre des décisions secrètes et qui ne peuvent être tenus pour responsables de l’absence d’application correcte de la loi.

L’application des lois canadiennes sur les élections, les dons politiques, le lobbying, l’éthique, la lutte contre la corruption et la protection des dénonciateurs est très faible, car tous les chiens de garde sont triés sur le volet par le Cabinet dans le cadre de processus de nomination secrets, partisans et politiques et ils n’ont pratiquement aucun compte à rendre, même s’ils n’appliquent pas la loi de manière efficace ou correcte. Tous les chiens de garde, à l’exception du directeur général des élections et du commissaire aux élections fédérales, peuvent également être reconduits dans leurs fonctions pour plus d’un mandat uniquement par le cabinet du parti au pouvoir, ce qui incite le chien de garde, au cours de la dernière partie de chaque mandat, à statuer sur les situations d’une manière qui plaise au cabinet.

Les chiens de garde sont également autorisés à refuser d’enquêter sur une violation présumée de la loi qu’ils appliquent, même s’il existe des preuves évidentes d’une violation, et même s’ils enquêtent, ils sont autorisés à garder secrètes leurs décisions sur les violations, ce qui permet de ne pas savoir s’ils appliquent réellement la loi de manière appropriée. Cliquez ici pour voir comment le commissaire à l’éthique a rendu, entre 2007 et 2017, plus de 200 décisions secrètes qui ont permis à des politiciens fédéraux et à des hauts fonctionnaires d’échapper à des violations présumées des lois fédérales en matière d’éthique. Cliquez ici pour voir comment le commissaire au lobbying et à la GRC, de 2008 à 2017, a rendu près de 90 décisions secrètes qui ont permis à des lobbyistes d’échapper à des infractions à la loi fédérale sur le lobbying. Et cliquez ici pour voir comment le commissaire aux élections fédérales et Élections Canada ont gardé secrète la façon dont ils ont traité plus de 3 000 plaintes déposées auprès d’eux entre 1997 et 2011 concernant des violations de la loi électorale fédérale.

Les chiens de garde ne peuvent pas non plus être attaqués en justice s’ils ne font pas correctement leur travail.

En vertu de la Loi sur la GRC, le commissaire et le commissaire adjoint de la GRC, ainsi que le commandant de chaque division de la GRC, sont également tous nommés par le seul Cabinet fédéral (aucune consultation avec les partis d’opposition n’est requise, pas plus qu’une recherche indépendante et fondée sur le mérite de candidats qualifiés) et tous servent également selon le bon vouloir du Cabinet (c’est-à-dire qu’ils peuvent être renvoyés à tout moment pour n’importe quelle raison).

Le groupe d’experts du protocole public sur les incidents électoraux critiques du gouvernement libéral soi-disant “indépendant” n’est pas indépendant du tout, puisqu’il est composé de fonctionnaires choisis par le Premier ministre Trudeau et servant selon le bon vouloir de ce dernier, et que la directive du Cabinet relative au protocole présente plusieurs lacunes qui permettent de dissimuler les ingérences étrangères. Si les membres du groupe d’experts ne sont pas totalement indépendants du gouvernement et de tous les partis politiques, et si les lacunes du protocole ne sont pas corrigées, le groupe d’experts continuera à dissimuler l’ingérence étrangère au lieu de la dénoncer publiquement et d’y mettre un terme.

En outre, la directive du Cabinet des libéraux de Trudeau concernant le protocole présente plusieurs lacunes, comme suit :

1. Elle n’est pas juridiquement contraignante pour le Groupe d’experts, et aucune sanction n’est prévue si le Groupe d’experts enfreint une quelconque partie du Protocole;
2. Le processus de l’article 6.0 fixe un seuil beaucoup trop élevé pour informer le public de l’ingérence (l’ingérence doit essentiellement menacer la capacité de l’ensemble de l’élection nationale à être libre et équitable);
3. Même si la commission décide (par consensus) que l’interférence atteint le seuil, le processus de l’article 5.0 ne fixe aucune date limite à laquelle la commission est tenue d’informer quiconque de l’interférence;

Morris Rosenberg, ancien responsable de la Fondation Trudeau lorsque celle-ci a reçu un don de 200 000 $ de la part de deux hommes d’affaires ayant des liens avec la Chine, pour effectuer l’évaluation en vue de l’élection de 2021. Les termes du contrat de M. Rosenberg n’ont pas été divulgués dans le registre des contrats du gouvernement fédéral.

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Les dénonciateurs ne sont pas protégés

Les personnes qui dénoncent des actes répréhensibles au Canada ne sont pas protégées lorsqu’elles le font et ne sont pas non plus protégées contre les représailles après avoir dénoncé des actes répréhensibles. Une étape clé dans l’application efficace de la loi pour prévenir l’ingérence étrangère consiste à établir un système de protection des dénonciateurs fondé sur les meilleures pratiques qui protège toute personne qui dénonce des violations de l’une des lois/règles énumérées ci-dessus, notamment en habilitant les commissions indépendantes à payer un avocat pour informer les dénonciateurs de leurs droits, à récompenser les dénonciateurs si leurs allégations sont prouvées, à les protéger contre les représailles et à pénaliser toute personne qui exerce des représailles à leur encontre.

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Voir plus de détails sur la campagne Stop Foreign Interference in Canadian Politics Campaign de Democracy Watch, Campagne Stop au lobbying secret et contraire à l’éthique, Campagne sur l’éthique gouvernementale, Campagne sur l’argent en politique, campagne Honnêteté en politique, campagne Stop aux fausses publicités électorales en ligne, Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign, Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign et Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign

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(February 2024)

To be eligible to be appointed as a provincial judge in Ontario, a person must either be a lawyer for 10 years, or a lawyer and then working full-time in a position that involves exercising powers and duties that are “judicial in nature” for a combined total of 10 years (See section 42(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43).

In 1988, a Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee (JAAC) was established to search for and evaluate candidates to be appointed as judges.  The Ontario government’s Attorney General appointed 7 of the 13 members of the JAAC, and the JAAC submitted 2 or more candidates to the Attorney General for each open position.  While not ideal, the system was considered to be one of the leading systems in the world because of its level of independence from, and restriction of, political influence.

The Ontario government enacted Bill 245 in 2021, and Schedule 3 in the bill changed Ontario’s previous judicial appointment system.  The changes proposed to the Courts of Justice Act in Schedule 3 of Bill 245 made the Ontario system more political, partisan and Cabinet-controlled by:

1. Increasing the number of members of Ontario’s Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee (JAAC) that the Attorney General appoints from 7 to 10 (of 13 total);
2. Increasing the number of candidates the JAAC sends to the Attorney General for each judge position from 2 or more to 6 or more, and;
3. Empowering the Attorney General to reject the entire list of recommended candidates and ask for a new list of candidates as many times as s/he wants.

Under Ontario’s system, the Attorney General is also allowed to consult with anyone, including ruling party members, about the candidates recommended by the JAAC.

Democracy Watch filed a submission in March 2021 with the committee of the Legislature that reviewed Bill 245 that criticized the negative effects the changes in the Bill would have on the independence and impartiality of Ontario judges.

The Advocates’ Society, the Federation of Ontario Law Associations, the Canadian Council of Criminal Defence Lawyers, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and several associations representing racialized lawyers also all expressed concerns about the negative effect of Bill 245’s changes on the independence and impartiality of Ontario judges.

All of the above parts of Ontario’s system open up the appointments system to political interference, patronage and cronyism.

Ontario’s 2021 changes made Ontario’s appointment system similar to the federal system (the federal Minister appoints 6 of 7 members of the federal Judicial Advisory Committees (JACs), and the JACs send long lists of candidates to the Minister, who then consults with many ruling party politicians and members).

Democracy Watch has an ongoing court case now at the Federal Court of Appeal challenging the federal government’s system for appointing judges because it is open to political interference that violates the public’s Charter right to impartial courts, and the constitutional principle that guarantees the structural independence of judges so that the public can have confidence in the independence and impartiality of the courts.

Democracy Watch’s position is that the 2021 changes made Ontario’s system for appointing judges similarly unconstitutionally political and partisan.

The constitutional principle that guarantees the independence of judges and the courts has been upheld in several rulings on the measures in Part VII of the Constitution. And sections 7 and 11(d) (and, indirectly, 24(1)) of the Charter have been applied in rulings to ensure impartial court hearings.

Like Ontario’s previous system before 2021, the Minister in Manitoba (section 3.3) and in B.C. (section 21) choose a minority of the members of the advisory committee for their provincial courts (ideally the Cabinet should not choose any of the members).

Much better is Quebec’s system in which the Minister in chooses at most one member (in consultation with others) of the 5-6 member advisory committee (Click here and see sections 14-16 and 26).  Ideally, the Cabinet should not choose any of the members of the committees.

Also like Ontario’s previous system before 2021, the advisory committees in Quebec (section 26) and the UK submit only 1-3 candidates for each open judge position, and the minister is required to choose from that short list (and in the UK where the committee only submits one candidate, the minister must explain in writing to the committee if s/he rejects the recommended candidate).

(February 2024)

To be eligible to be appointed as a provincial judge in Ontario, a person must either be a lawyer for 10 years, or a lawyer and then working full-time in a position that involves exercising powers and duties that are “judicial in nature” for a combined total of 10 years (See section 42(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43).

In 1988, a Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee (JAAC) was established to search for and evaluate candidates to be appointed as judges.  The Ontario government’s Attorney General appointed 7 of the 13 members of the JAAC, and the JAAC submitted 2 or more candidates to the Attorney General for each open position.  While not ideal, the system was considered to be one of the leading systems in the world because of its level of independence from, and restriction of, political influence.

The Ontario government enacted Bill 245 in 2021, and Schedule 3 in the bill changed Ontario’s previous judicial appointment system.  The changes proposed to the Courts of Justice Act in Schedule 3 of Bill 245 made the Ontario system more political, partisan and Cabinet-controlled by:

1. Increasing the number of members of Ontario’s Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee (JAAC) that the Attorney General appoints from 7 to 10 (of 13 total);
2. Increasing the number of candidates the JAAC sends to the Attorney General for each judge position from 2 or more to 6 or more, and;
3. Empowering the Attorney General to reject the entire list of recommended candidates and ask for a new list of candidates as many times as s/he wants.

Under Ontario’s system, the Attorney General is also allowed to consult with anyone, including ruling party members, about the candidates recommended by the JAAC.

Democracy Watch filed a submission in March 2021 with the committee of the Legislature that reviewed Bill 245 that criticized the negative effects the changes in the Bill would have on the independence and impartiality of Ontario judges.

The Advocates’ Society, the Federation of Ontario Law Associations, the Canadian Council of Criminal Defence Lawyers, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and several associations representing racialized lawyers also all expressed concerns about the negative effect of Bill 245’s changes on the independence and impartiality of Ontario judges.

All of the above parts of Ontario’s system open up the appointments system to political interference, patronage and cronyism.

Ontario’s 2021 changes made Ontario’s appointment system similar to the federal system (the federal Minister appoints 6 of 7 members of the federal Judicial Advisory Committees (JACs), and the JACs send long lists of candidates to the Minister, who then consults with many ruling party politicians and members).

Democracy Watch has an ongoing court case now at the Federal Court of Appeal challenging the federal government’s system for appointing judges because it is open to political interference that violates the public’s Charter right to impartial courts, and the constitutional principle that guarantees the structural independence of judges so that the public can have confidence in the independence and impartiality of the courts.

Democracy Watch’s position is that the 2021 changes made Ontario’s system for appointing judges similarly unconstitutionally political and partisan.

The constitutional principle that guarantees the independence of judges and the courts has been upheld in several rulings on the measures in Part VII of the Constitution. And sections 7 and 11(d) (and, indirectly, 24(1)) of the Charter have been applied in rulings to ensure impartial court hearings.

Like Ontario’s previous system before 2021, the Minister in Manitoba (section 3.3) and in B.C. (section 21) choose a minority of the members of the advisory committee for their provincial courts (ideally the Cabinet should not choose any of the members).

Much better is Quebec’s system in which the Minister in chooses at most one member (in consultation with others) of the 5-6 member advisory committee (Click here and see sections 14-16 and 26).  Ideally, the Cabinet should not choose any of the members of the committees.

Also like Ontario’s previous system before 2021, the advisory committees in Quebec (section 26) and the UK submit only 1-3 candidates for each open judge position, and the minister is required to choose from that short list (and in the UK where the committee only submits one candidate, the minister must explain in writing to the committee if s/he rejects the recommended candidate).

The 1,815 pages of Trudeau Cabinet/SNC-Lavalin scandal investigation records disclosed in September 2023 by the RCMP to Democracy Watch raise the following serious questions (Click here to see a summary of what the records revealed, and a detailed list of, and links to, the records with page references):

1. When will the RCMP disclose the 2,200 pages of investigation records that it has not disclosed since Democracy Watch requested them in July 2022 under the Access to Information Act?  Why is the RCMP still hiding these records even though its ATIP Branch committed to disclose them in October 2023?
2. Why did the RCMP not even try to apply to court to obtain a search warrant for any of the Trudeau Cabinet documents and records of communications (or parts of the documents or records) that were claimed to be “Cabinet confidences” even though they could have likely obtained some or some parts of the documents and records? And, when former Privy Council Office (PCO) Clerk Michael Wernick testifies before the House Ethics Committee, he must be asked why the PCO/Trudeau Cabinet refused to disclose the documents, especially given that the Cabinet disclosed all Cabinet confidence documents to the inquiry into the use of the Emergencies Act?
3. Why did the RCMP only interview three witnesses – former Attorney General and Minister of Justice Jody Wilson-Raybould, her assistant Jessica Prince, and former Deputy Minister of Justice Nathalie Drouin (who was appointed Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council in 2021, and then in January was appointed as the PM’s National Security Intelligence Adviser)?
4. Why did the RCMP rely almost entirely on public statements the PM, PMO staff, Cabinet ministers and their staff, and Mr. Wernick made, which of course were all aimed at trying to make it seem like they had done nothing wrong?  And why did the RCMP always characterize their statements in a favourable way whenever possible, and always argue in favour of doubts concerning the success of a prosecution?
5. Why did the RCMP continue to call the investigation an “assessment” even though it was clearly an investigation (was it to hide the fact that they were investigating the Prime Minister and others re: a violation of the Criminal Code)?
6. Why did the RCMP national command wait almost two years (from March 2021 to January 2023) to make its decision to end its superficial investigation of the situation without even doing a full investigation, let alone prosecuting anyone?  Why did the RCMP national command try, through its almost two-year delay, to bury and cover-up its investigation?
7. Who exactly in the RCMP was involved in making the delay decision and the decision not to prosecute anyone?
8. Who did they communicate with while making these delay and failure to prosecute decisions?  Did they communicate with anyone in the PCO or Trudeau Cabinet or Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)?
9. Why did the RCMP’s investigating officer initially establish that, to prove obstruction of justice in court, pressure must have been placed on someone to obstruct a proceeding in the justice system (which the RCMP had clear evidence of), but then switched the standard to require proof of “a corrupt intent to interfere”? and;
10. What were the actual legal reasons no one was prosecuted (the RCMP redacted from the records that were disclosed last September the legal opinion it received)?  Who made the decision not to prosecute, and who did they communicate with when making the decision?  Did they communicate with anyone in the PCO or Trudeau Cabinet or PMO?

Les 1 815 pages de dossiers d’enquête sur le scandale du Cabinet Trudeau/SNC-Lavalin divulguées en septembre 2023 par la GRC à Democracy Watch soulèvent les graves questions suivantes (Cliquez ici pour voir un résumé de ce que les dossiers ont révélé, ainsi qu’une liste détaillée et des liens vers les dossiers avec les références des pages):

Les dossiers d’enquête sur le scandale du Cabinet Trudeau/SNC-Lavalin ont été divulgués en septembre 2023 par la GRC à Democracy Watch et à Democracy Watch.

1. Quand la GRC divulguera-t-elle les 2 200 pages de dossiers d’enquête qu’elle n’a pas divulgués depuis que Democracy Watch les a demandés en juillet 2022 en vertu de la Access to Information Act ? Pourquoi la GRC cache-t-elle encore ces dossiers alors que sa direction de l’AIPRP s’est engagée à les divulguer en octobre 2023 ? “

sont considérés comme des “documents confidentiels du Cabinet” alors qu’elle aurait probablement pu obtenir certains ou certaines parties des documents et des enregistrements ? Et, lorsque l’ancien greffier du Bureau du Conseil privé (BCP) Michael Wernick témoignera devant le Comité d’éthique de la Chambre, il faudra lui demander pourquoi le BCP/Cabinet Trudeau a refusé de divulguer les documents, d’autant plus que le Cabinet a divulgué tous les documents confidentiels du Cabinet à l’enquête sur l’utilisation de la Emergencies Act?

.

2. Pourquoi la GRC n’a-t-elle interrogé que trois témoins – l’ancienne procureure générale et ministre de la Justice Jody Wilson-Raybould, son assistante Jessica Prince, et l’ancienne sous-ministre de la Justice Nathalie Drouin (qui a été nommée sous-greffière du Conseil privé en 2021, puis en janvier a été nommée conseillère du Premier ministre en matière de renseignement sur la sécurité nationale) ?

Code pénal) ?


[ :]

The rules in Canada for donations and loans to political parties are unfair, undemocratic, corrupting and rigged in favour of a few wealthy voters, wealthy candidates, the big parties and Canada’s Big Banks, and is essentially a legalized bribery system

The only way to stop the unethical influence of big money donations and loans is to prohibit big money donations and loans

This video gives a brief summary of key facts and figures, and all the details are set out below

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---

Voters are allowed to donate thousands
to federal political parties each year

The amount that a voter is allowed to donate each year to a federal political party grows each year by $25, so the amount was $1,525 in 2016 and the amount in 2024 is $1,725.

Each voter is also allowed in 2024 to donate another $1,725 to each party’s riding associations.

So the total amount each voter is allowed to donate in 2024 to each federal party and its riding associations is $3,450.

Wealthy nomination contestants that can afford it are also allowed to donate an additional $1,000 to their own campaign, and wealthy election candidates are allowed to donate an additional $5,000 to their own campaign, and wealthy party leadership contestants are allowed to donate an additional $25,000 to their own campaign.

---

---

But a large majority of voters only donate about $75 a year

Do you have an extra $3,450 laying around to donate to a federal party?

Did you know that, on average from 2016 to 2022, out of every 100 donors to the main Canadian federal political parties, approximately 75 donors donated only about $75 each year?

To see details about donations to the main federal parties from 2016 to 2022, click here.

NOTE: 2023 donation figures are not included in these calculations because final statistics for the number of voters who donated various amounts to a federal party in 2023 will not be available until summer 2023. To see the 2023 statistics that are available, click here.

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Only about 5% of donors donate more than $1,000 to a federal party

Did you know that only about 5 out of every 100 donors donates more than $1,000 a year?

To put it another way, out of more than 27 million voters, on average only about 11,000 voters donate more than $1,000 a year to any of the main federal parties.

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Wealthy donors use their big donations to buy influence

Because their donations are so much bigger than what most people give, those 11,000 donors, which again are only about 5% of all donors each year, donate on average

• about 40% of the total amount donated each year to the Liberal Party
• about 30% of the total amount donated to the Conservative Party
• about 20% of the total amount donated to the NDP
• about 17% of the total amount donated to Green Party
• and about 11% of the total amount donated each year to the Bloc Quebecois

Donors who donate $1,000 or more donated on average 30% of the total average amount raised by the 5 main parties each year from 2016 to 2022.

So those wealthy donors who donate more than $1,000 are very valuable to the main federal parties, especially to the Liberals and Conservatives.

Studies conducted worldwide have shown that the best way to influence someone’s decisions is to give them something or do them a favour, and big money donors give a lot to politicians, which is a huge favour for them. Click here to see a summary of these studies.

There have been examples across Canada of wealthy donors using big donations to gain access to, and influence, politicians:

• at the federal level with the SNC-Lavalin scandal;
• and also at the federal level when B.C. donors donated to Ontario and Quebec ridings;
• and when Quebec construction firm executives made large federal donations;
• and in Ontario with the Greenbelt scandal;
• also in Ontario with the Hydro One scandal;
• in Alberta with the labour law scandal;
• and elsewhere.

To see details about the top donors to the main federal parties, click here.

NOTE: 2023 donation figures are not included in these calculations because final statistics for the number of voters who donated various amounts to a federal party in 2023 will not be available until summer 2023. However, the available 2023 statistics show that donors who donated $1,000 or more donated about 46% of the total amount raised by the Liberals; about 35% of the Conservative total; about 19% of the NDP and Green Party total; about 17% of the PPC total, and about 15% of the Bloc total. To see the 2023 statistics that are available, click here.

Of course, parties supported most by wealthy donors benefit most from big money donations, as do nomination contestants, election candidates and party leadership contestants who are supported by wealthy donors.

Canada’s big money donation system also favours wealthy nomination contestants as they are allowed to donate an additional $1,000 to their own campaign, wealthy election candidates as they are allowed to donate an additional $5,000 to their own campaign, and wealthy party leadership contestants as they are allowed to donate an additional $25,000 to their own campaign.

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Allowing big money donations also makes it easy to funnel large amounts of money to parties, including from foreign governments

Also, while it is illegal for a business, union, organization or voter to funnel money through other voters, because voters are allowed to donate more than $3,000 a year to federal political parties and their riding associations, it is easy to funnel tens of thousands of dollars annually.

Big businesses and other organizations can do this easily by giving their executives a bonus each year that they donate to the party that does the most for the business or organization.

It is impossible to charge or prosecute any business or organization that does this because all the executives have to do is say that they donated with their own money.

In fact, this has happened at the federal level and in every province and territory because they all, except Quebec, allow donations of more than $1,000 annually.  To see details about all of these donation-funneling schemes across Canada, click here.

When big money donations are allowed, it also makes it easier for foreign governments to funnel large amounts of money through individuals and lobby groups to influence Canadian politicians and parties.

---

No matter what problems concern you, as long as wealthy interests can use big money donations to influence politicians, it is unlikely politicians will solve the problems that concern you.

Democracy Watch needs your support now to stop the unethical, undemocratic influence of big money on politicians across Canada!

Please donate now at: https://democracywatch.ca/donate/

And please go to StopBigMoney.ca and join the tens of thousands of voters calling for these and other key changes to stop the unethical, undemocratic influence of big money on politicians across Canada!

---

Only about 240,000 voters donate to a federal party each year, and 9 out of 10 donate less than $500

What about the people in the middle of the 5% or so of wealthy big money donors who donate more than $1,000 and the 75% or so of donors who donate only about $75 a year?

Only 6 out of every 100 donors donates between $500 and $1,000, while 16 out of every 100 donors donates between $200 and $500.

Only a very small percentage of Canadians donate to any of the main federal political parties.  Out of more than 27 million voters, only about 240,000 donate each year, less than 1% of all voters:

• about 173,000 voters donate only about $75 each year
• about 38,000 donate between $200 and $500
• about 15,000 donate between $500 and $1,000
• and again only about 11,000 donate more than $1,000

In total, all the voters together donate an average of about $52 million each year to the main federal political parties.

To see details about donations to the main federal parties from 2016 to 2022, click here.

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Federal parties spend most of what they raise each year, and rely on unethical big money loans from banks to pay for their election campaigns

However, most of the main federal parties spend almost all of the money they raise each year, and so when an election happens they don’t have very much money to pay for their election campaign.

So what do they do?  The 3 main parties, the Liberals, Conservatives and NDP, get huge loans of millions of dollars from banks and other financial institutions to pay 70% to 80% of their total election costs (and sometimes even more).

These banks and other financial institutions are covered by the federal Bank Act which is under the control of federal politicians.  So giving these loans is a huge favour that the banks do for the main parties, a favour that creates an appearance of a conflict of interest for all the politicians in these parties.

To see details about bank loans to parties, click here.

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Tens of millions of your tax money is given to the parties each year, mostly to help wealthy donors and the big parties

Canadian taxpayers support the main political parties just as much.  Parties that receive more than 2% of the total number of votes each election – or 5% of the total votes in the ridings where the party runs candidates – get half, 50%, of the money they spent on the election back, reimbursed with our tax money.

Also, election candidates from any party who win 10% or more of the total votes in their riding get 60% of the money they spent on their election back.

On average, the 5 main federal parties all together receive about $34 million back after each election, and their candidates receive about $29 million in total back, paid for with our tax money.

Only 1 other party in one election (the People’s Party of Canada in 2021), and only a few other candidates in each election, have received these taxpayer subsidies since 2004.

To see details about how much the federal election reimbursement system is unfair and favours the main parties, click here.

You may be thinking – but aren’t small donations and big money donations equalized because small donors are allowed to deduct most of their donation from their taxes?

It’s true that all Canadians support federal political parties through the tax system as part of a donation can be deducted from income tax that a donor pays.

But, as with donations, the income tax deduction favours wealthy donors.

First, you have to pay taxes to benefit from the deduction, so people with low incomes, even if they have money to donate to a party, don’t benefit from the deduction because they don’t pay income tax.

Secondly, wealthy voters who make big money donations claim most of the tax deduction.  On average from 2017 to 2020, voters who earn $100,000 or more claimed almost half, 50%, of the about $27 million in total tax deductions claimed each year for donations to federal political parties.

Meanwhile, voters who earn $45,000 or less, the amount most voters make each year, only claimed 13% of all the tax deductions for donations.

To see details about who claims tax deductions, click here.

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Conclusion: We need to prohibit big money donations and loans and, if public funding is given, make it democratic

So that’s how the rules in Canada for donations and loans to political parties are unfair, undemocratic, corrupting and rigged in favour of a few wealthy voters, wealthy candidates, the big parties and Canada’s Big Banks, and is essentially a legalized bribery system:

1. A small number of wealthy voters donates a large part of the money each of the main federal parties raise each year (especially to the Liberals and Conservatives).
2. The system favours wealthy contestants and candidates – if they can afford it, nomination contestants are allowed to donate an additional $1,000 to their own campaign; election candidates are allowed to donate an additional $5,000 to their own campaign, and party leadership contestants are allowed to donate an additional $25,000 to their own campaign.
3. A small number of banks loan the main parties 70% to 80% of the total amount of money they spend each election.
4. All taxpayers give about $27 million each year to the main parties in subsidies through tax deductions that mostly go to their wealthy big money donors.
5. And after each election all taxpayers give the main parties about $34 million, and their candidates about $29 million, in direct reimbursements of 50% and 60% of the money they spent on their election campaign.

None of this is fair, ethical or democratic.

If we want to have a fair, democratic political system that is not corrupted by wealthy big money interests, the amount that a voter is allowed to donate to each party should be limited to the amount most voters give – only about $75 a year.

And the amount that any voter can loan to a party should also be limited to $75.

If the amount that a voter is allowed to donate and loan to each party is limited to only $75, which is again the amount that about 75% of donors donate each year, what would happen?

The main political parties would likely claim that they would have much less money than they have now, and that would cause problems for them reaching and informing voters, running their operations, and running their election campaigns.

But these would be false claims.

Remember, only about 240,000 out of more than 27 million voters currently donate to any of the main federal parties each year.  So the parties have more than 26 million other voters they could get donations from to make up the amount they would lose from stopping big money donations and limiting donations to $75 each year.

About 1 million voters belong to the 5 main federal parties.  So all the parties have to do is get about 500,000 more of those 1 million voters to donation $75 each a year and they would raise the same amount of money they raise currently each year. Again, that’s only about 500,000 extra new donors out of the total of more than 26 million voters who currently don’t donate to any federal party.

The Conservatives would need to convince about 220,000 more voters to donate to them, the Liberals about 170,000, the NDP about 63,000, the Greens about 30,000 and the Bloc about 10,000.

NOTE: 2023 donation figures are not included in the calculations in the above chart because final statistics for the number of voters who donated various amounts to a federal party in 2023 will not be available until summer 2023. To see the 2023 statistics that are available, click here.

Lowering the donation limit to $75 a year would make all the parties more connected with more voters, and more connected with the concerns of more voters, which is democratic.

Lowering the donation limit to $75 a year would also prohibit wealthy individuals and businesses and lobby groups (including foreign government-sponsored lobby groups) from using big money donations and big money fundraising events as a way of unethically influencing the decisions of politicians and party leaders.

With a donation limit of $75 a year, the only voters who should receive a tax deduction or subsidy for making a donation should be voters who have very low incomes.

What if the parties can’t raise as much as they raise now if donations are limited to $75 a year?

If the parties claim they can’t raise enough from donations to inform voters and run their offices, or that they can’t save some of their money each year so that they have enough to pay for their next election campaign, they should be required to prove both those claims before they are given any public funding.

If the parties can prove either of these claims, the best way to provide public funding is to match the donations the parties raise with public funding, so that the parties always have to convince voters to donate in order to get public funding.

If matching donations still doesn’t give the parties enough to run their election campaigns, a public fund should be set up to lend them money for their campaign based on the number of candidates each party has.

This will stop the Big Banks from buying influence by giving the parties big loans worth millions of dollars for their election campaigns.

And, to make the public election subsidies fair, every party should receive 50% of the money they spend on elections back from public funds, and every candidate should receive 60% of what they spend back.

Making these changes will make Canada’s political donations and loans system fair and democratic, instead of unfair, undemocratic, corrupting and rigged in favour of a few wealthy voters, wealthy candidates, the big parties and Canada’s Big Banks.

Making these changes will also help stop foreign interference in Canadian politics.

These same changes are also needed in all provinces and territories except Quebec which already has a $100 limit on donations each year and donation-matching public funding. 

Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador and the Yukon have no limits on donations, and still allow donations from businesses, unions and organizations even from outside the province or territory.  They are the most undemocratic and unethical jurisdictions in Canada with their “best government money can buy” systems.

But all other provinces and territories also still allow big money interest to unethically influence politicians and parties, as they all still allow individual voters to donate from $1,200 up to $10,000 dollars annually to parties and their riding associations, which is much more than most voters can afford.

---

No matter what problems concern you, as long as wealthy interests can use big money donations to influence politicians, it is unlikely politicians will solve the problems that concern you.

Democracy Watch needs your support now to stop the unethical, undemocratic influence of big money on politicians across Canada!

Please donate now at: https://democracywatch.ca/donate/

And please go to StopBigMoney.ca and join the tens of thousands of voters calling for these and other key changes to stop the unethical, undemocratic influence of big money on politicians across Canada!

The rules in Canada for donations and loans to political parties are unfair, undemocratic, corrupting and rigged in favour of a few wealthy voters, wealthy candidates, the big parties and Canada’s Big Banks, and is essentially a legalized bribery system

The only way to stop the unethical influence of big money donations and loans is to prohibit big money donations and loans

This video gives a brief summary of key facts and figures, and all the details are set out below

---

---

Voters are allowed to donate thousands
to federal political parties each year

The amount that a voter is allowed to donate each year to a federal political party grows each year by $25, so the amount was $1,525 in 2016 and the amount in 2024 is $1,725.

Each voter is also allowed in 2024 to donate another $1,725 to each party’s riding associations.

So the total amount each voter is allowed to donate in 2024 to each federal party and its riding associations is $3,450.

Wealthy nomination contestants that can afford it are also allowed to donate an additional $1,000 to their own campaign, and wealthy election candidates are allowed to donate an additional $5,000 to their own campaign, and wealthy party leadership contestants are allowed to donate an additional $25,000 to their own campaign.

---

---

But a large majority of voters only donate about $75 a year

Do you have an extra $3,450 laying around to donate to a federal party?

Did you know that, on average from 2016 to 2022, out of every 100 donors to the main Canadian federal political parties, approximately 75 donors donated only about $75 each year?

To see details about donations to the main federal parties from 2016 to 2022, click here.

NOTE: 2023 donation figures are not included in these calculations because final statistics for the number of voters who donated various amounts to a federal party in 2023 will not be available until summer 2023. To see the 2023 statistics that are available, click here.

---

Only about 5% of donors donate more than $1,000 to a federal party

Did you know that only about 5 out of every 100 donors donates more than $1,000 a year?

To put it another way, out of more than 27 million voters, on average only about 11,000 voters donate more than $1,000 a year to any of the main federal parties.

---

Wealthy donors use their big donations to buy influence

Because their donations are so much bigger than what most people give, those 11,000 donors, which again are only about 5% of all donors each year, donate on average

• about 40% of the total amount donated each year to the Liberal Party
• about 30% of the total amount donated to the Conservative Party
• about 20% of the total amount donated to the NDP
• about 17% of the total amount donated to Green Party
• and about 11% of the total amount donated each year to the Bloc Quebecois

Donors who donate $1,000 or more donated on average 30% of the total average amount raised by the 5 main parties each year from 2016 to 2022.

So those wealthy donors who donate more than $1,000 are very valuable to the main federal parties, especially to the Liberals and Conservatives.

Studies conducted worldwide have shown that the best way to influence someone’s decisions is to give them something or do them a favour, and big money donors give a lot to politicians, which is a huge favour for them. Click here to see a summary of these studies.

There have been examples across Canada of wealthy donors using big donations to gain access to, and influence, politicians:

• at the federal level with the SNC-Lavalin scandal;
• and also at the federal level when B.C. donors donated to Ontario and Quebec ridings;
• and when Quebec construction firm executives made large federal donations;
• and in Ontario with the Greenbelt scandal;
• also in Ontario with the Hydro One scandal;
• in Alberta with the labour law scandal;
• and elsewhere.

To see details about the top donors to the main federal parties, click here.

NOTE: 2023 donation figures are not included in these calculations because final statistics for the number of voters who donated various amounts to a federal party in 2023 will not be available until summer 2023. However, the available 2023 statistics show that donors who donated $1,000 or more donated about 46% of the total amount raised by the Liberals; about 35% of the Conservative total; about 19% of the NDP and Green Party total; about 17% of the PPC total, and about 15% of the Bloc total. To see the 2023 statistics that are available, click here.

Of course, parties supported most by wealthy donors benefit most from big money donations, as do nomination contestants, election candidates and party leadership contestants who are supported by wealthy donors.

Canada’s big money donation system also favours wealthy nomination contestants as they are allowed to donate an additional $1,000 to their own campaign, wealthy election candidates as they are allowed to donate an additional $5,000 to their own campaign, and wealthy party leadership contestants as they are allowed to donate an additional $25,000 to their own campaign.

---

Allowing big money donations also makes it easy to funnel large amounts of money to parties, including from foreign governments

Also, while it is illegal for a business, union, organization or voter to funnel money through other voters, because voters are allowed to donate more than $3,000 a year to federal political parties and their riding associations, it is easy to funnel tens of thousands of dollars annually.

Big businesses and other organizations can do this easily by giving their executives a bonus each year that they donate to the party that does the most for the business or organization.

It is impossible to charge or prosecute any business or organization that does this because all the executives have to do is say that they donated with their own money.

In fact, this has happened at the federal level and in every province and territory because they all, except Quebec, allow donations of more than $1,000 annually.  To see details about all of these donation-funneling schemes across Canada, click here.

When big money donations are allowed, it also makes it easier for foreign governments to funnel large amounts of money through individuals and lobby groups to influence Canadian politicians and parties.

---

No matter what problems concern you, as long as wealthy interests can use big money donations to influence politicians, it is unlikely politicians will solve the problems that concern you.

Democracy Watch needs your support now to stop the unethical, undemocratic influence of big money on politicians across Canada!

Please donate now at: https://democracywatch.ca/donate/

And please go to StopBigMoney.ca and join the tens of thousands of voters calling for these and other key changes to stop the unethical, undemocratic influence of big money on politicians across Canada!

---

Only about 240,000 voters donate to a federal party each year, and 9 out of 10 donate less than $500

What about the people in the middle of the 5% or so of wealthy big money donors who donate more than $1,000 and the 75% or so of donors who donate only about $75 a year?

Only 6 out of every 100 donors donates between $500 and $1,000, while 16 out of every 100 donors donates between $200 and $500.

Only a very small percentage of Canadians donate to any of the main federal political parties.  Out of more than 27 million voters, only about 240,000 donate each year, less than 1% of all voters:

• about 173,000 voters donate only about $75 each year
• about 38,000 donate between $200 and $500
• about 15,000 donate between $500 and $1,000
• and again only about 11,000 donate more than $1,000

In total, all the voters together donate an average of about $52 million each year to the main federal political parties.

To see details about donations to the main federal parties from 2016 to 2022, click here.

---

Federal parties spend most of what they raise each year, and rely on unethical big money loans from banks to pay for their election campaigns

However, most of the main federal parties spend almost all of the money they raise each year, and so when an election happens they don’t have very much money to pay for their election campaign.

So what do they do?  The 3 main parties, the Liberals, Conservatives and NDP, get huge loans of millions of dollars from banks and other financial institutions to pay 70% to 80% of their total election costs (and sometimes even more).

These banks and other financial institutions are covered by the federal Bank Act which is under the control of federal politicians.  So giving these loans is a huge favour that the banks do for the main parties, a favour that creates an appearance of a conflict of interest for all the politicians in these parties.

To see details about bank loans to parties, click here.

---

Tens of millions of your tax money is given to the parties each year, mostly to help wealthy donors and the big parties

Canadian taxpayers support the main political parties just as much.  Parties that receive more than 2% of the total number of votes each election – or 5% of the total votes in the ridings where the party runs candidates – get half, 50%, of the money they spent on the election back, reimbursed with our tax money.

Also, election candidates from any party who win 10% or more of the total votes in their riding get 60% of the money they spent on their election back.

On average, the 5 main federal parties all together receive about $34 million back after each election, and their candidates receive about $29 million in total back, paid for with our tax money.

Only 1 other party in one election (the People’s Party of Canada in 2021), and only a few other candidates in each election, have received these taxpayer subsidies since 2004.

To see details about how much the federal election reimbursement system is unfair and favours the main parties, click here.

You may be thinking – but aren’t small donations and big money donations equalized because small donors are allowed to deduct most of their donation from their taxes?

It’s true that all Canadians support federal political parties through the tax system as part of a donation can be deducted from income tax that a donor pays.

But, as with donations, the income tax deduction favours wealthy donors.

First, you have to pay taxes to benefit from the deduction, so people with low incomes, even if they have money to donate to a party, don’t benefit from the deduction because they don’t pay income tax.

Secondly, wealthy voters who make big money donations claim most of the tax deduction.  On average from 2017 to 2020, voters who earn $100,000 or more claimed almost half, 50%, of the about $27 million in total tax deductions claimed each year for donations to federal political parties.

Meanwhile, voters who earn $45,000 or less, the amount most voters make each year, only claimed 13% of all the tax deductions for donations.

To see details about who claims tax deductions, click here.

---

Conclusion: We need to prohibit big money donations and loans and, if public funding is given, make it democratic

So that’s how the rules in Canada for donations and loans to political parties are unfair, undemocratic, corrupting and rigged in favour of a few wealthy voters, wealthy candidates, the big parties and Canada’s Big Banks, and is essentially a legalized bribery system:

1. A small number of wealthy voters donates a large part of the money each of the main federal parties raise each year (especially to the Liberals and Conservatives).
2. The system favours wealthy contestants and candidates – if they can afford it, nomination contestants are allowed to donate an additional $1,000 to their own campaign; election candidates are allowed to donate an additional $5,000 to their own campaign, and party leadership contestants are allowed to donate an additional $25,000 to their own campaign.
3. A small number of banks loan the main parties 70% to 80% of the total amount of money they spend each election.
4. All taxpayers give about $27 million each year to the main parties in subsidies through tax deductions that mostly go to their wealthy big money donors.
5. And after each election all taxpayers give the main parties about $34 million, and their candidates about $29 million, in direct reimbursements of 50% and 60% of the money they spent on their election campaign.

None of this is fair, ethical or democratic.

If we want to have a fair, democratic political system that is not corrupted by wealthy big money interests, the amount that a voter is allowed to donate to each party should be limited to the amount most voters give – only about $75 a year.

And the amount that any voter can loan to a party should also be limited to $75.

If the amount that a voter is allowed to donate and loan to each party is limited to only $75, which is again the amount that about 75% of donors donate each year, what would happen?

The main political parties would likely claim that they would have much less money than they have now, and that would cause problems for them reaching and informing voters, running their operations, and running their election campaigns.

But these would be false claims.

Remember, only about 240,000 out of more than 27 million voters currently donate to any of the main federal parties each year.  So the parties have more than 26 million other voters they could get donations from to make up the amount they would lose from stopping big money donations and limiting donations to $75 each year.

About 1 million voters belong to the 5 main federal parties.  So all the parties have to do is get about 500,000 more of those 1 million voters to donation $75 each a year and they would raise the same amount of money they raise currently each year. Again, that’s only about 500,000 extra new donors out of the total of more than 26 million voters who currently don’t donate to any federal party.

The Conservatives would need to convince about 220,000 more voters to donate to them, the Liberals about 170,000, the NDP about 63,000, the Greens about 30,000 and the Bloc about 10,000.

NOTE: 2023 donation figures are not included in the calculations in the above chart because final statistics for the number of voters who donated various amounts to a federal party in 2023 will not be available until summer 2023. To see the 2023 statistics that are available, click here.

Lowering the donation limit to $75 a year would make all the parties more connected with more voters, and more connected with the concerns of more voters, which is democratic.

Lowering the donation limit to $75 a year would also prohibit wealthy individuals and businesses and lobby groups (including foreign government-sponsored lobby groups) from using big money donations and big money fundraising events as a way of unethically influencing the decisions of politicians and party leaders.

With a donation limit of $75 a year, the only voters who should receive a tax deduction or subsidy for making a donation should be voters who have very low incomes.

What if the parties can’t raise as much as they raise now if donations are limited to $75 a year?

If the parties claim they can’t raise enough from donations to inform voters and run their offices, or that they can’t save some of their money each year so that they have enough to pay for their next election campaign, they should be required to prove both those claims before they are given any public funding.

If the parties can prove either of these claims, the best way to provide public funding is to match the donations the parties raise with public funding, so that the parties always have to convince voters to donate in order to get public funding.

If matching donations still doesn’t give the parties enough to run their election campaigns, a public fund should be set up to lend them money for their campaign based on the number of candidates each party has.

This will stop the Big Banks from buying influence by giving the parties big loans worth millions of dollars for their election campaigns.

And, to make the public election subsidies fair, every party should receive 50% of the money they spend on elections back from public funds, and every candidate should receive 60% of what they spend back.

Making these changes will make Canada’s political donations and loans system fair and democratic, instead of unfair, undemocratic, corrupting and rigged in favour of a few wealthy voters, wealthy candidates, the big parties and Canada’s Big Banks.

Making these changes will also help stop foreign interference in Canadian politics.

These same changes are also needed in all provinces and territories except Quebec which already has a $100 limit on donations each year and donation-matching public funding. 

Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador and the Yukon have no limits on donations, and still allow donations from businesses, unions and organizations even from outside the province or territory.  They are the most undemocratic and unethical jurisdictions in Canada with their “best government money can buy” systems.

But all other provinces and territories also still allow big money interest to unethically influence politicians and parties, as they all still allow individual voters to donate from $1,200 up to $10,000 dollars annually to parties and their riding associations, which is much more than most voters can afford.

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No matter what problems concern you, as long as wealthy interests can use big money donations to influence politicians, it is unlikely politicians will solve the problems that concern you.

Democracy Watch needs your support now to stop the unethical, undemocratic influence of big money on politicians across Canada!

Please donate now at: https://democracywatch.ca/donate/

And please go to StopBigMoney.ca and join the tens of thousands of voters calling for these and other key changes to stop the unethical, undemocratic influence of big money on politicians across Canada!

Backgrounder on Interim Ethics Commissioner Konrad von Finckenstein’s negligently bad enforcement record and the 6 new loopholes he has created in federal ethics laws
(February 7, 2024)

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Konrad von Finckenstein was handpicked in secret by the Trudeau Cabinet and appointed Interim Ethics Commissioner at the end of August 2023, replacing Mario Dion who resigned last February due to health reasons, and replacing Martine Richard who served briefly as Interim Ethics Commissioner but resigned after serious questions were raised about her independence and impartiality given she is Trudeau Cabinet minister Dominic LeBlanc’s sister-in-law.

In addition to being handpicked in secret by the ruling party Cabinet, Mr. von Finckenstein has a long history in the federal bureaucracy, as well as ties to big businesses, that raise serious questions about his independence and impartiality.  Mario Dion was also handpicked in secret by the Trudeau Cabinet, and also had a long history in the federal bureaucracy, and a record of 8 unethical actions when he was federal Integrity Commissioner.

Mr. von Finckenstein has buried at least 8 ethics complaints with secret rulings that let off everyone who was alleged to have violated conflict of interest or other ethics rules, based on what is known so far since September when he started his 6-month term in the position of Interim Ethics Commissioner.

In September he testified before the House Ethics Committee that he had “Eight open cases, which involve 11 people” (p. 3 of testimony).  Then in October he testified again and said that the cases were “gone” (p. 18 of testimony).  He has not issued any rulings finding anyone guilty, which means he let off all 11 of the alleged wrongdoers.

While Mr. von Finckenstein refused DWatch’s request that he disclose all 8 rulings (even though nothing in the Conflict of Interest Act nor in ss. 27(5.1) of the MP Code prohibits such disclosure), 2 of the 8 rulings address complaints that DWatch filed.

The first ruling is about DWatch’s complaint alleging Prime Minister Trudeau violated the Act by appointing his long-time friend David Johnston to investigate the PM’s actions on foreign interference.  Mr. von Finckenstein refused to even investigate the complaint based on the bizarre claim that the PM has a “constitutional prerogative” to appoint whomever he wants to any public office.  This ruling sets a dangerous precedent that allows the PM to appoint family, relatives and close friends to any federal government position.

The second ruling is about DWatch’s complaint requesting an investigation into Energy and Natural Resources Minister Jonathan Wilkinson, who is Trudeau’s senior B.C. minister, participating in meetings concerning B.C.-based Teck Resources Ltd. (which lobbied Wilkinson six times while his spouse has significant investments in financial institutions that are among the top investors in Teck).  Mr. von Finckenstein also refused to even investigate the situation based on the equally bizarre claim that the private interests “are too remote and speculative to cause them to conflict” with Wilkinson’s public duties.  This ruling also sets a dangerous precedent that allows Cabinet ministers and top government officials to participate in decisions when they have a financial conflict of interest.

Mr. von Finckenstein has also created 6 new loopholes in federal ethics laws to add to the 10 huge loopholes in the MP Code and the 10 huge loopholes in the Conflict of Interest Act that applies to the PM, Cabinet ministers, Cabinet staff, Cabinet appointees and top government officials.

The 6 new loopholes Mr. von Finckenstein has created are as follows:

1. He is doubling from $30,000 to $60,000 the value of shares that Cabinet staff and top government officials can own in businesses they regulate or make decisions about, (Click here to see his bizarre interpretation – #3 re: Doubling the minimum value exemption and #4 re: CER appointees). This will allow Cabinet staff, top government officials and CER appointees to be in a direct, significant financial conflict of interest and to profit from the decisions they make.
2. He is now allowing members of the Canadian Energy Regulator (CER) to secretly invest in energy companies, which is possibly why the CER just approved Trans Mountain Corp. changing its pipeline construction plan. (Click here to see his bizarre interpretation – #4 re: CER appointees).
3. He is now allowing the Prime Minister to appoint anyone to any government position, even family members and friends (like David Johnston) even when they are investigating wrongdoing by the PM. As mentioned above, see for details his ruling on DWatch’s complaint alleging Prime Minister Trudeau violated the Act by appointing his long-time friend David Johnston to investigate the PM’s actions on foreign interference. Mr. von Finckenstein refused to even investigate the complaint based on the bizarre claim that the PM has a “constitutional prerogative” to appoint whomever he wants to any public office.
4. He is now allowing Cabinet ministers and top government officials to participate in a decision-making process even if their spouses have significant financial interests that will be affect by the decision. As mentioned above, see for details his ruling on DWatch’s complaint requesting an investigation into Energy and Natural Resources Minister Jonathan Wilkinson, who is Trudeau’s senior B.C. minister, participating in meetings concerning B.C.-based Teck Resources Ltd. (which lobbied Wilkinson six times while his spouse has significant investments in financial institutions that are among the top investors in Teck). Mr. von Finckenstein also refused to even investigate the situation based on the equally bizarre claim that the private interests “are too remote and speculative to cause them to conflict” with Wilkinson’s public duties.
5. He is now allowing Cabinet staff and top government officials to leave their position and move to another position in the government, or take a contract with the government, without any cooling-off period, even if the position conflicts with the past position. He is doing this because, he told the House Ethics Committee in October, he believes “there cannot be any conflict of interest between different government departments or agencies” and no one in government ever has “confidential information that would be harmful to the government” (Click here to see his bizarre interpretation – #1 re: Definition of the term “entity”).  Among many other conflicts of interest between government departments, his interpretation ignores the obvious reality that the interests and information held by ministers and their staff directly conflict with the interests of any agency, board, commission or tribunal that enforces laws that apply to the minister and his/her department.  It also ignores the reason for the cooling-off period, which is to prevent ministerial staff from developing relationships with top department officials and then receiving preferential treatment in hiring processes.
6. He has set a precedent by deciding not to investigate ethics complaints about a former MP simply because the MP is no longer an MP, which means all MPs have to do is hide their wrongdoing until they resign or retire or are defeated and then they will never be found guilty of violating the law. Mr. von Finckenstein disclosed when he testified on January 20, 2024 before the House Ethics Committee that he had decided not to investigate 4 complaints about a former MP solely because the MP was no longer an MP.

See more on Democracy Watch’s Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign
and Government Ethics Campaign pages.

Backgrounder on Interim Ethics Commissioner Konrad von Finckenstein’s negligently bad enforcement record and the 6 new loopholes he has created in federal ethics laws
(February 7, 2024)

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Konrad von Finckenstein was handpicked in secret by the Trudeau Cabinet and appointed Interim Ethics Commissioner at the end of August 2023, replacing Mario Dion who resigned last February due to health reasons, and replacing Martine Richard who served briefly as Interim Ethics Commissioner but resigned after serious questions were raised about her independence and impartiality given she is Trudeau Cabinet minister Dominic LeBlanc’s sister-in-law.

In addition to being handpicked in secret by the ruling party Cabinet, Mr. von Finckenstein has a long history in the federal bureaucracy, as well as ties to big businesses, that raise serious questions about his independence and impartiality.  Mario Dion was also handpicked in secret by the Trudeau Cabinet, and also had a long history in the federal bureaucracy, and a record of 8 unethical actions when he was federal Integrity Commissioner.

Mr. von Finckenstein has buried at least 8 ethics complaints with secret rulings that let off everyone who was alleged to have violated conflict of interest or other ethics rules, based on what is known so far since September when he started his 6-month term in the position of Interim Ethics Commissioner.

In September he testified before the House Ethics Committee that he had “Eight open cases, which involve 11 people” (p. 3 of testimony).  Then in October he testified again and said that the cases were “gone” (p. 18 of testimony).  He has not issued any rulings finding anyone guilty, which means he let off all 11 of the alleged wrongdoers.

While Mr. von Finckenstein refused DWatch’s request that he disclose all 8 rulings (even though nothing in the Conflict of Interest Act nor in ss. 27(5.1) of the MP Code prohibits such disclosure), 2 of the 8 rulings address complaints that DWatch filed.

The first ruling is about DWatch’s complaint alleging Prime Minister Trudeau violated the Act by appointing his long-time friend David Johnston to investigate the PM’s actions on foreign interference.  Mr. von Finckenstein refused to even investigate the complaint based on the bizarre claim that the PM has a “constitutional prerogative” to appoint whomever he wants to any public office.  This ruling sets a dangerous precedent that allows the PM to appoint family, relatives and close friends to any federal government position.

The second ruling is about DWatch’s complaint requesting an investigation into Energy and Natural Resources Minister Jonathan Wilkinson, who is Trudeau’s senior B.C. minister, participating in meetings concerning B.C.-based Teck Resources Ltd. (which lobbied Wilkinson six times while his spouse has significant investments in financial institutions that are among the top investors in Teck).  Mr. von Finckenstein also refused to even investigate the situation based on the equally bizarre claim that the private interests “are too remote and speculative to cause them to conflict” with Wilkinson’s public duties.  This ruling also sets a dangerous precedent that allows Cabinet ministers and top government officials to participate in decisions when they have a financial conflict of interest.

Mr. von Finckenstein has also created 6 new loopholes in federal ethics laws to add to the 10 huge loopholes in the MP Code and the 10 huge loopholes in the Conflict of Interest Act that applies to the PM, Cabinet ministers, Cabinet staff, Cabinet appointees and top government officials.

The 6 new loopholes Mr. von Finckenstein has created are as follows:

1. He is doubling from $30,000 to $60,000 the value of shares that Cabinet staff and top government officials can own in businesses they regulate or make decisions about, (Click here to see his bizarre interpretation – #3 re: Doubling the minimum value exemption and #4 re: CER appointees). This will allow Cabinet staff, top government officials and CER appointees to be in a direct, significant financial conflict of interest and to profit from the decisions they make.
2. He is now allowing members of the Canadian Energy Regulator (CER) to secretly invest in energy companies, which is possibly why the CER just approved Trans Mountain Corp. changing its pipeline construction plan. (Click here to see his bizarre interpretation – #4 re: CER appointees).
3. He is now allowing the Prime Minister to appoint anyone to any government position, even family members and friends (like David Johnston) even when they are investigating wrongdoing by the PM. As mentioned above, see for details his ruling on DWatch’s complaint alleging Prime Minister Trudeau violated the Act by appointing his long-time friend David Johnston to investigate the PM’s actions on foreign interference. Mr. von Finckenstein refused to even investigate the complaint based on the bizarre claim that the PM has a “constitutional prerogative” to appoint whomever he wants to any public office.
4. He is now allowing Cabinet ministers and top government officials to participate in a decision-making process even if their spouses have significant financial interests that will be affect by the decision. As mentioned above, see for details his ruling on DWatch’s complaint requesting an investigation into Energy and Natural Resources Minister Jonathan Wilkinson, who is Trudeau’s senior B.C. minister, participating in meetings concerning B.C.-based Teck Resources Ltd. (which lobbied Wilkinson six times while his spouse has significant investments in financial institutions that are among the top investors in Teck). Mr. von Finckenstein also refused to even investigate the situation based on the equally bizarre claim that the private interests “are too remote and speculative to cause them to conflict” with Wilkinson’s public duties.
5. He is now allowing Cabinet staff and top government officials to leave their position and move to another position in the government, or take a contract with the government, without any cooling-off period, even if the position conflicts with the past position. He is doing this because, he told the House Ethics Committee in October, he believes “there cannot be any conflict of interest between different government departments or agencies” and no one in government ever has “confidential information that would be harmful to the government” (Click here to see his bizarre interpretation – #1 re: Definition of the term “entity”).  Among many other conflicts of interest between government departments, his interpretation ignores the obvious reality that the interests and information held by ministers and their staff directly conflict with the interests of any agency, board, commission or tribunal that enforces laws that apply to the minister and his/her department.  It also ignores the reason for the cooling-off period, which is to prevent ministerial staff from developing relationships with top department officials and then receiving preferential treatment in hiring processes.
6. He has set a precedent by deciding not to investigate ethics complaints about a former MP simply because the MP is no longer an MP, which means all MPs have to do is hide their wrongdoing until they resign or retire or are defeated and then they will never be found guilty of violating the law. Mr. von Finckenstein disclosed when he testified on January 20, 2024 before the House Ethics Committee that he had decided not to investigate 4 complaints about a former MP solely because the MP was no longer an MP.

See more on Democracy Watch’s Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign
and Government Ethics Campaign pages.