Backgrounder on Democracy Watch’s 9 cases challenging Ontario Integrity Commissioner rulings on lobbyists in 2019-2020, 6 cases filed in 2021, one case filed in 2022 and one case filed in 2023

From April 2018 to March 2020, Ontario Integrity Commissioner J. David Wake issued 192 secret Advisory Opinions, closed 135 secret compliance reviews at the initial stage, and resolved 436 cases informally in secret (Click here to see Backgrounder on Integrity Commissioner’s Rulings 2018-2020). At least some of those 763 secret decisions by Commissioner Wake allowed dozens of other lobbyists to lobby unethically.

The first three cases of the nine cases Democracy Watch filed in 2020 challenge rulings #6 and 7 on page 52 of the Commissioner’s 2019-2020 Annual Report, and ruling #10 on page 53 of the Report. These are the first public Commissioner rulings enforcing section 3.4 of the Lobbyists Registration Act (LR Act). The cases are Division Court file numbers 632/20, 633/20 and 634/20. Click here to see the Notice of Application challenging ruling #6 (the other two applications are very similar).

The cases challenge the first three public rulings of the Integrity Commissioner’s unknown number of decisions in the past few years that have let dozens of people (and maybe more) violate section 3.4 by lobbying Doug Ford and his Cabinet ministers soon after they campaigned, fundraised or worked for Ford and/or Ontario’s PC Party in the 2018 leadership race and election, and/or worked for Ford or one or more of his ministers since the election.

Section 3.4 was added to the LR Act on July 1, 2016, and it prohibits lobbying any politician or other public office holder if it will create a real or potential conflict of interest or make it improper for them to further the interests of the lobbyist or their clients.

The other six cases of the nine total cases challenge rulings #s 5, 14, 17 and 23 (the four lobbyists who also failed to register) and rulings #s 13 and 20 (the two lobbyists who violated the lobbying ethics rule) in the Commissioner’s 2019-2020 Annual Report. The six cases are Division Court file numbers 644/20, 645/20, 646/20, 647/20, 648/20 and 669/20.

In her November 2021 ruling, Ontario Divisional Court Justice Favreau unjustifiably blocked the cases from proceeding by falsely claiming that the nine cases did not challenge the Commissioner’s interpretation and application of the LR Act (in fact, all of them do), and falsely claiming that hearing the cases would expose the identity of the lobbyists. The Federal Court has allowed similar cases to proceed, with the lobbyists’ identity protected by a confidentiality order.

An August 2022 ruling of a Divisional Court panel of justices upheld the judge’s ruling blocking the nine cases.

All nine cases also ask the courts to rule that Commissioner Wake was biased when he issued the six rulings, given he knew that he would need the unanimous approval of Ford’s Cabinet and all MPPs to be re-appointed for a second five-year term, which happened on December 1, 2020 (although many MPPs were not present for that snap vote).

Democracy Watch is appealing to the Ontario Court of Appeal with the hope that it will allow the nine cases to proceed so that the courts will do a full review of the Integrity Commissioner’s rulings, and order them corrected.

Democracy Watch also filed six more cases in 2021 challenge rulings #1 and 3 on page 52 of the Commissioner’s 2020-2021 Annual Report and rulings #5, 6 and 8 on pages 53-54 of the Report. The cases are Division Court file numbers 587/21 to 592/21. Click here to see the Notice of Application challenging ruling #6 (the other five applications are very similar).

Democracy Watch filed one more case in 2022 challenging the ruling that begins at the bottom of page 57 and continues onto page 58 of the Commissioner’s 2021-2022 Annual Report in which the Integrity Commissioner again let a lobbyist off even though they violated the law in several ways. Click here to see the Notice of Application. The case is Division Court file number 390/22.

Democracy Watch filed another case in 2023 challenging the ruling that begins at the bottom of page 58 and continues onto page 59 of the Commissioner’s 2022-2023 Annual Report in which the Integrity Commissioner again let a lobbyist off even though they violated the law in several ways. Click here to see the Notice of Application.

These additional eight cases are on hold until the rulings are issued in the initial nine cases.

Democracy Watch’s total of 17 cases challenge 16 of the Integrity Commissioner’s rulings made in the past three years (two of the cases challenge different aspects of one of the Commissioner’s rulings). Nick Papageorge and Wade Poziomka of Ross McBride LLP are representing Democracy Watch for all the cases.

To access any of the court files on any of the 17 cases, email the Divisional Court registry office at: [email protected].

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Democracy Watch’s Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign and Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign

Backgrounder on Democracy Watch’s 9 cases challenging Ontario Integrity Commissioner rulings on lobbyists in 2019-2020, 6 cases filed in 2021, one case filed in 2022 and one case filed in 2023

From April 2018 to March 2020, Ontario Integrity Commissioner J. David Wake issued 192 secret Advisory Opinions, closed 135 secret compliance reviews at the initial stage, and resolved 436 cases informally in secret (Click here to see Backgrounder on Integrity Commissioner’s Rulings 2018-2020). At least some of those 763 secret decisions by Commissioner Wake allowed dozens of other lobbyists to lobby unethically.

The first three cases of the nine cases Democracy Watch filed in 2020 challenge rulings #6 and 7 on page 52 of the Commissioner’s 2019-2020 Annual Report, and ruling #10 on page 53 of the Report. These are the first public Commissioner rulings enforcing section 3.4 of the Lobbyists Registration Act (LR Act). The cases are Division Court file numbers 632/20, 633/20 and 634/20. Click here to see the Notice of Application challenging ruling #6 (the other two applications are very similar).

The cases challenge the first three public rulings of the Integrity Commissioner’s unknown number of decisions in the past few years that have let dozens of people (and maybe more) violate section 3.4 by lobbying Doug Ford and his Cabinet ministers soon after they campaigned, fundraised or worked for Ford and/or Ontario’s PC Party in the 2018 leadership race and election, and/or worked for Ford or one or more of his ministers since the election.

Section 3.4 was added to the LR Act on July 1, 2016, and it prohibits lobbying any politician or other public office holder if it will create a real or potential conflict of interest or make it improper for them to further the interests of the lobbyist or their clients.

The other six cases of the nine total cases challenge rulings #s 5, 14, 17 and 23 (the four lobbyists who also failed to register) and rulings #s 13 and 20 (the two lobbyists who violated the lobbying ethics rule) in the Commissioner’s 2019-2020 Annual Report. The six cases are Division Court file numbers 644/20, 645/20, 646/20, 647/20, 648/20 and 669/20.

In her November 2021 ruling, Ontario Divisional Court Justice Favreau unjustifiably blocked the cases from proceeding by falsely claiming that the nine cases did not challenge the Commissioner’s interpretation and application of the LR Act (in fact, all of them do), and falsely claiming that hearing the cases would expose the identity of the lobbyists. The Federal Court has allowed similar cases to proceed, with the lobbyists’ identity protected by a confidentiality order.

An August 2022 ruling of a Divisional Court panel of justices upheld the judge’s ruling blocking the nine cases.

All nine cases also ask the courts to rule that Commissioner Wake was biased when he issued the six rulings, given he knew that he would need the unanimous approval of Ford’s Cabinet and all MPPs to be re-appointed for a second five-year term, which happened on December 1, 2020 (although many MPPs were not present for that snap vote).

Democracy Watch is appealing to the Ontario Court of Appeal with the hope that it will allow the nine cases to proceed so that the courts will do a full review of the Integrity Commissioner’s rulings, and order them corrected.

Democracy Watch also filed six more cases in 2021 challenge rulings #1 and 3 on page 52 of the Commissioner’s 2020-2021 Annual Report and rulings #5, 6 and 8 on pages 53-54 of the Report. The cases are Division Court file numbers 587/21 to 592/21. Click here to see the Notice of Application challenging ruling #6 (the other five applications are very similar).

Democracy Watch filed one more case in 2022 challenging the ruling that begins at the bottom of page 57 and continues onto page 58 of the Commissioner’s 2021-2022 Annual Report in which the Integrity Commissioner again let a lobbyist off even though they violated the law in several ways. Click here to see the Notice of Application. The case is Division Court file number 390/22.

Democracy Watch filed another case in 2023 challenging the ruling that begins at the bottom of page 58 and continues onto page 59 of the Commissioner’s 2022-2023 Annual Report in which the Integrity Commissioner again let a lobbyist off even though they violated the law in several ways. Click here to see the Notice of Application.

These additional eight cases are on hold until the rulings are issued in the initial nine cases.

Democracy Watch’s total of 17 cases challenge 16 of the Integrity Commissioner’s rulings made in the past three years (two of the cases challenge different aspects of one of the Commissioner’s rulings). Nick Papageorge and Wade Poziomka of Ross McBride LLP are representing Democracy Watch for all the cases.

To access any of the court files on any of the 17 cases, email the Divisional Court registry office at: [email protected].

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Democracy Watch’s Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign and Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign

Backgrounder on federal Commissioner of Lobbying’s attempt to gut key ethics rules in the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct

(Democracy Watch: February 2023)

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Summary

Commissioner of Lobbying Nancy Bélanger first proposed to reduce the cooling-off period during which a lobbyist would not be allowed to lobby from 5 years down to 1 to 2 years in her December 2021 draft of the new proposed Code.

Big businesses and unions pushed for even shorter cooling-off periods, and Commissioner Bélanger rolled over like a lapdog and gave them what they want by creating a huge loophole in proposed Rule 6 in the proposed new Code (November 2022 version), and in the proposed new definition of “other political work” in the new Code’s Appendix, that will allow lobbyists to fundraise and campaign for Cabinet ministers, political parties and MPs at the same time as lobbying them. Proposed new Rule 6 will also allow the Commissioner to secretly shorten the 1-2 year prohibition on lobbying that the Commissioner is proposing for lobbyists who work full-time on campaigns for politicians or parties.

Commissioner Bélanger also fails in her proposed new Code to specify exactly whom a lobbyist will be prohibited from lobbying if they campaign or fundraise for a party. Will they be prohibited from lobbying the party leader only or, given assisting a party assists everyone in the party, will they be prohibited from lobbying everyone in the party?

In complete contrast, the Commissioner’s new Code proposes to limit lobbyists to giving (directly or indirectly) no more than $80 annually in gifts or hospitality to politicians, political staff or government officials they are lobbying.

If a lobbyist giving gifts or hospitality to a politician worth more than $80 annually is unethical, so is a lobbyist raising thousands of dollars, campaigning or doing other valuable favours for a politician or their political party.

Commissioner Bélanger’s proposed new Rule 6 blatantly contradicts the proposed new Objectives and Expectations sections, and proposed Rules 5, 7.1 and 7.2, in the new Code, all of which strictly prohibit lobbying when there is even an appearance of a conflict of interest. New Rule 6 also blatantly contradicts the proposed new Rules 3 and 4 that prohibit lobbyists giving gifts or hospitality worth more than $30 annually. New Rule 6 also blatantly the 5-year prohibition in the Lobbying Act on lobbying by ministers, their staff and MPs after they leave their position.

By gutting the Code rules in ways that allow lobbyists to do favours for Cabinet ministers and MPs and Senators, the Commissioner will also likely gut the ethics rules for ministers, MPs and Senators. How? All of those ethics rules currently have a blanket rule that says you can’t “improperly” further another person’s or entity’s interests.

It would, of course, be improper for a Cabinet minister or MP or Senator to further the interests of a lobbyist who had raised money for them or done other favours for them. However, by changing the Lobbyists’ Code to legalize unlimited fundraising and favour-doing by lobbyists for ministers and other federal politicians, the Commissioner is effectively saying that it is proper for lobbyists to do these favours. As a result, it will no longer be “improper”.

That means that the Ethics Commissioner, or a court, could also conclude that it is no longer “improper” for a Cabinet minister to do favours for a lobbyist who has done favours for the minister or the minister’s party, no matter how badly that favour-trading smells.

The Commissioner has also made the very questionable claim that the current 4-year cooling-off period violates the Charter right to freedom of expression, based on one opinion that the Commissioner paid law firm Goldblatt Partners for in a sole-source contract that was extended twice, increasing from $11,300 to $45,200 and then up to $90,400. Several Supreme Court of Canada and other Canadian court rulings have clearly stated that Charter rights must be restricted to protect government integrity, and as a result it is clear that the current 4-year cooling-off period complies with the Charter.

Commissioner Bélanger has also backed off from requiring lobbyists to be honest always. In her December 2021 draft of the proposed new Code, Rule 2 clearly prohibited lobbyists making false claims to office holders and the public. In her latest draft, Rule 2.1 is has been weakened to only require taking reasonable steps to avoid misleading office holders and the public.

Details of the Commissioner’s proposed gutting of key ethical lobbying rules

Commissioner Bélanger gave no hint in her initial consultation in December 2020 on possible Lobbyists’ Code changes that she was planning to gut these key rules in the Code to roll back ethics standards for federal lobbyists 25 years in ways that will, once again, allow for rampant unethical lobbying and corrupt favour-trading between lobbyists and Cabinet ministers and other federal politicians.

Under the current Lobbyists’ Code rules, if a person does significant campaigning, or any fundraising, for a federal politician or political party, they are prohibited from lobbying for 4 years until after the next election (Click here to see the Commissioner’s guideline on current Code Rule 9).

The Commissioner proposes in the new draft Code Rule 6 (and in the proposed definition of “other political work” in the Appendix of the new Code) to allow lobbyists to secretly fundraise, campaign and do other favours for Cabinet ministers, MPs and Senators at the same time as lobbying them, as long as the lobbyist does those activities less than nearly full-time and without significant contact with the politician. No disclosure will be required of any lobbyist’s fundraising or campaigning activities for any politician or party.

For lobbyists who work full-time on politician or political party campaigns or fundraise for them to help them win an election, the Commissioner is proposing that they only be prohibited from lobbying for 1-2 years. As a result, these lobbyists will be allowed to lobby people they helped win the last election before the next election, with again no disclosure of their campaigning and fundraising.

The Commissioner is also proposing to give herself the power under new Code Rule 6 to secretly shorten the already-too-short 1-2 year lobbying prohibitions.

Democracy Watch’s interventions to stop the gutting of the rules

Democracy Watch filed a submission in December 2020, and a second submission in February 2022, and a third submission in June 2022, all calling for key changes to strengthen key Lobbyists’ Code rules, and enforcement, and the second submission also called on the Commissioner to stop proposing to gut key ethics rules in the Code.

By changing the rules, Commissioner Bélanger is also trying to negate the effect of an upcoming Federal Court ruling on two cases Democracy Watch filed in August 2020. The cases challenge the Commissioner’s rulings that let lobbyists Ben Bergen and Dana O’Born of the Council of Canadian Innovators (CCI) off even though they co-chaired Chrystia Freeland’s 2015 election campaign, and served in her riding association, and then lobbied her office. The ruling will determine whether the Commissioner failed to enforce the current Code rules.

“Commissioner Bélanger not only has an equally bad record as past lobbying lapdogs, she is now proposing to change some of the rules she enforces to try to avoid being found guilty of failing to enforce those rules,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “The lobbying law needs to be changed to close huge loopholes that allow for secret, unethical lobbying, and to require effective enforcement by the Commissioner.”

“It is unfortunately not surprising that Commissioner Bélanger is trying to gut key federal ethics rules for lobbyists, given that she was handpicked by the Trudeau Cabinet through a secretive, dishonest process that the Federal Court of Appeal ruled was biased,” said Conacher.

History of Canada’s federal ethical lobbying rules

Since 1997 when the Lobbyists’ Code became federal law, it has been illegal for a registered lobbyist to do anything for, or give anything to, a federal politician, political staff person, government official or employee that would create even the appearance of a conflict of interest, including fundraising or campaigning for a politician or party and then lobbying them soon afterwards. Huge loopholes in the federal Lobbying Act unfortunately allow for secret, unregistered lobbying that is not covered by the Code’s rules.

Former Commissioner of Lobbying Karen Shepherd, forced by a unanimous Federal Court of Appeal ruling won by Democracy Watch in 2009, set a five-year cooling-off period under the Code that prohibited lobbying after fundraising or campaigning for a politician or party (Click here to see archive doc re: the Commissioner’s five-year rule, in “The risk diminishes with time” subsection).

Five years is still much too short, as the appearance of a conflict of interest continues for much longer, but it at least prohibits registered lobbyists from lobbying politicians they had helped until after the next election. The Lobbying Act also prohibits former office holders from being a registered lobbyist for five years after they leave office (Click here to see the five-year rule in section 10.11 of the Act).

Now, in her proposed new Code made public in late November, Commissioner Bélanger is gutting that rule and proposing new rules that will allow lobbyists to lobby politicians and parties soon after they fundraise or campaign for them – right after or one or two years later, depending on how much they fundraise or help the politician or party, and possibly an even shorter cooling-off period if the Commissioner grants a reduction. Click here to see the Commissioner’s proposed new Code Rule 6 and, in the Appendix, the “Political Work” section which sets out specific rules related to Rule 6’s no time, and one- and two-year prohibitions.

Backgrounder on federal Commissioner of Lobbying’s attempt to gut key ethics rules in the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct

(Democracy Watch: February 2023)

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Summary

Commissioner of Lobbying Nancy Bélanger first proposed to reduce the cooling-off period during which a lobbyist would not be allowed to lobby from 5 years down to 1 to 2 years in her December 2021 draft of the new proposed Code.

Big businesses and unions pushed for even shorter cooling-off periods, and Commissioner Bélanger rolled over like a lapdog and gave them what they want by creating a huge loophole in proposed Rule 6 in the proposed new Code (November 2022 version), and in the proposed new definition of “other political work” in the new Code’s Appendix, that will allow lobbyists to fundraise and campaign for Cabinet ministers, political parties and MPs at the same time as lobbying them. Proposed new Rule 6 will also allow the Commissioner to secretly shorten the 1-2 year prohibition on lobbying that the Commissioner is proposing for lobbyists who work full-time on campaigns for politicians or parties.

Commissioner Bélanger also fails in her proposed new Code to specify exactly whom a lobbyist will be prohibited from lobbying if they campaign or fundraise for a party. Will they be prohibited from lobbying the party leader only or, given assisting a party assists everyone in the party, will they be prohibited from lobbying everyone in the party?

In complete contrast, the Commissioner’s new Code proposes to limit lobbyists to giving (directly or indirectly) no more than $80 annually in gifts or hospitality to politicians, political staff or government officials they are lobbying.

If a lobbyist giving gifts or hospitality to a politician worth more than $80 annually is unethical, so is a lobbyist raising thousands of dollars, campaigning or doing other valuable favours for a politician or their political party.

Commissioner Bélanger’s proposed new Rule 6 blatantly contradicts the proposed new Objectives and Expectations sections, and proposed Rules 5, 7.1 and 7.2, in the new Code, all of which strictly prohibit lobbying when there is even an appearance of a conflict of interest. New Rule 6 also blatantly contradicts the proposed new Rules 3 and 4 that prohibit lobbyists giving gifts or hospitality worth more than $30 annually. New Rule 6 also blatantly the 5-year prohibition in the Lobbying Act on lobbying by ministers, their staff and MPs after they leave their position.

By gutting the Code rules in ways that allow lobbyists to do favours for Cabinet ministers and MPs and Senators, the Commissioner will also likely gut the ethics rules for ministers, MPs and Senators. How? All of those ethics rules currently have a blanket rule that says you can’t “improperly” further another person’s or entity’s interests.

It would, of course, be improper for a Cabinet minister or MP or Senator to further the interests of a lobbyist who had raised money for them or done other favours for them. However, by changing the Lobbyists’ Code to legalize unlimited fundraising and favour-doing by lobbyists for ministers and other federal politicians, the Commissioner is effectively saying that it is proper for lobbyists to do these favours. As a result, it will no longer be “improper”.

That means that the Ethics Commissioner, or a court, could also conclude that it is no longer “improper” for a Cabinet minister to do favours for a lobbyist who has done favours for the minister or the minister’s party, no matter how badly that favour-trading smells.

The Commissioner has also made the very questionable claim that the current 4-year cooling-off period violates the Charter right to freedom of expression, based on one opinion that the Commissioner paid law firm Goldblatt Partners for in a sole-source contract that was extended twice, increasing from $11,300 to $45,200 and then up to $90,400. Several Supreme Court of Canada and other Canadian court rulings have clearly stated that Charter rights must be restricted to protect government integrity, and as a result it is clear that the current 4-year cooling-off period complies with the Charter.

Commissioner Bélanger has also backed off from requiring lobbyists to be honest always. In her December 2021 draft of the proposed new Code, Rule 2 clearly prohibited lobbyists making false claims to office holders and the public. In her latest draft, Rule 2.1 is has been weakened to only require taking reasonable steps to avoid misleading office holders and the public.

Details of the Commissioner’s proposed gutting of key ethical lobbying rules

Commissioner Bélanger gave no hint in her initial consultation in December 2020 on possible Lobbyists’ Code changes that she was planning to gut these key rules in the Code to roll back ethics standards for federal lobbyists 25 years in ways that will, once again, allow for rampant unethical lobbying and corrupt favour-trading between lobbyists and Cabinet ministers and other federal politicians.

Under the current Lobbyists’ Code rules, if a person does significant campaigning, or any fundraising, for a federal politician or political party, they are prohibited from lobbying for 4 years until after the next election (Click here to see the Commissioner’s guideline on current Code Rule 9).

The Commissioner proposes in the new draft Code Rule 6 (and in the proposed definition of “other political work” in the Appendix of the new Code) to allow lobbyists to secretly fundraise, campaign and do other favours for Cabinet ministers, MPs and Senators at the same time as lobbying them, as long as the lobbyist does those activities less than nearly full-time and without significant contact with the politician. No disclosure will be required of any lobbyist’s fundraising or campaigning activities for any politician or party.

For lobbyists who work full-time on politician or political party campaigns or fundraise for them to help them win an election, the Commissioner is proposing that they only be prohibited from lobbying for 1-2 years. As a result, these lobbyists will be allowed to lobby people they helped win the last election before the next election, with again no disclosure of their campaigning and fundraising.

The Commissioner is also proposing to give herself the power under new Code Rule 6 to secretly shorten the already-too-short 1-2 year lobbying prohibitions.

Democracy Watch’s interventions to stop the gutting of the rules

Democracy Watch filed a submission in December 2020, and a second submission in February 2022, and a third submission in June 2022, all calling for key changes to strengthen key Lobbyists’ Code rules, and enforcement, and the second submission also called on the Commissioner to stop proposing to gut key ethics rules in the Code.

By changing the rules, Commissioner Bélanger is also trying to negate the effect of an upcoming Federal Court ruling on two cases Democracy Watch filed in August 2020. The cases challenge the Commissioner’s rulings that let lobbyists Ben Bergen and Dana O’Born of the Council of Canadian Innovators (CCI) off even though they co-chaired Chrystia Freeland’s 2015 election campaign, and served in her riding association, and then lobbied her office. The ruling will determine whether the Commissioner failed to enforce the current Code rules.

“Commissioner Bélanger not only has an equally bad record as past lobbying lapdogs, she is now proposing to change some of the rules she enforces to try to avoid being found guilty of failing to enforce those rules,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “The lobbying law needs to be changed to close huge loopholes that allow for secret, unethical lobbying, and to require effective enforcement by the Commissioner.”

“It is unfortunately not surprising that Commissioner Bélanger is trying to gut key federal ethics rules for lobbyists, given that she was handpicked by the Trudeau Cabinet through a secretive, dishonest process that the Federal Court of Appeal ruled was biased,” said Conacher.

History of Canada’s federal ethical lobbying rules

Since 1997 when the Lobbyists’ Code became federal law, it has been illegal for a registered lobbyist to do anything for, or give anything to, a federal politician, political staff person, government official or employee that would create even the appearance of a conflict of interest, including fundraising or campaigning for a politician or party and then lobbying them soon afterwards. Huge loopholes in the federal Lobbying Act unfortunately allow for secret, unregistered lobbying that is not covered by the Code’s rules.

Former Commissioner of Lobbying Karen Shepherd, forced by a unanimous Federal Court of Appeal ruling won by Democracy Watch in 2009, set a five-year cooling-off period under the Code that prohibited lobbying after fundraising or campaigning for a politician or party (Click here to see archive doc re: the Commissioner’s five-year rule, in “The risk diminishes with time” subsection).

Five years is still much too short, as the appearance of a conflict of interest continues for much longer, but it at least prohibits registered lobbyists from lobbying politicians they had helped until after the next election. The Lobbying Act also prohibits former office holders from being a registered lobbyist for five years after they leave office (Click here to see the five-year rule in section 10.11 of the Act).

Now, in her proposed new Code made public in late November, Commissioner Bélanger is gutting that rule and proposing new rules that will allow lobbyists to lobby politicians and parties soon after they fundraise or campaign for them – right after or one or two years later, depending on how much they fundraise or help the politician or party, and possibly an even shorter cooling-off period if the Commissioner grants a reduction. Click here to see the Commissioner’s proposed new Code Rule 6 and, in the Appendix, the “Political Work” section which sets out specific rules related to Rule 6’s no time, and one- and two-year prohibitions.

List of Seriously Unethical, Secretive and Undemocratic Actions by Doug Ford’s PC Party Government from May 2018 to May 2022

Based on the following 25 seriously unethical, secretive and undemocratic actions, Democracy Watch gives the Doug Ford PC Party government an F fail grade for the past four years:

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1. Issued a brief, incomplete 2018 election platform that misled voters about what Ford’s PC Party planned to do (especially it’s planned unethical and undemocratic actions).
2. Ford refused to disclose his mandate letters to Cabinet ministers despite being ordered three times to disclose them, and wasted taxpayer’s money for four years trying to keep them secret.
3. Ford tried to appoint his old friend Ron Taverner as Ontario’s top cop.
4. When that was justifiably condemned as a dangerously unethical appointment that would damage law enforcement and government accountability, Ford offered Taverner an executive job at the Ontario Cannabis Store.
5. Imposed more political Cabinet control over appointments to agencies, boards, commissions and tribunals (ABCTs), and also made changes to give Cabinet more control over provincial judge appointments.
6. Then appointed inexperienced, party-connected people to many ABCTs, drastically decreasing protection of human rights, the rights of renters, social welfare rights, consumers and the environment, which resulted in record-high complaints.
7. Set up a PC Party fake news service on social media using the public’s money, and then Ford and Cabinet ministers gave exclusive access to the service’s fake reporters while refusing to answer the real media’s questions.
8. Ford appointed one of his top election campaign advisers to a plum job in Washington, and increasing his pay by $75,000.
9. Ford appointed his campaign adviser and staff person Jenni Byrne to the Ontario Energy Board.
10. Ford appointed his family lawyer as chairperson of the Public Accountants Council.
11. Allowed dozens of former 2018 PC Party campaign workers, and Cabinet minister staff, to lobby for big businesses.
12. Gave many of the big business clients of Ford-PC Party connected lobbyists what they want.
13. Ford allowed his Chief of Staff to pressure police to enforce a law the way the PC Party government wanted it enforced.
14. Ford allowed his Chief of Staff to do favours for family members, friends and PC-Party connected people.
15. Violated the right of Ontarians to sue the government for negligent, harmful actions.
16. Violated the right of Ontarians to health care services when they travel outside of Canada.
17. Violated the public consultation requirement in Ontario’s environment protection law.
18. And then again violated the public consultation requirement in Ontario’s environment protection law.
19. Violated the requirement to consult with Indigenous peoples before proceeding with resource developments.
20. Violated Charter rights by trying to force gas stations to put a PC Party government propaganda sticker on pumps.
21. Violated the rights of students to fund their own student associations.
22. Violated the Charter rights of interest groups to inform voters about issues leading up to an election, and also made changes to allow wealthy donors to have more influence over politicians and parties.
23. And then Ford became the first Ontario Premier to use the notwithstanding clause to ensure he could violate Charter rights.
24. Lied in an ad about the carbon tax.
25. Issued one-page 2022 election platform that is again likely misleading voters about everything a PC government will do (especially unethical and undemocratic actions).

List of Seriously Unethical, Secretive and Undemocratic Actions by Doug Ford’s PC Party Government from May 2018 to May 2022

Based on the following 25 seriously unethical, secretive and undemocratic actions, Democracy Watch gives the Doug Ford PC Party government an F fail grade for the past four years:

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1. Issued a brief, incomplete 2018 election platform that misled voters about what Ford’s PC Party planned to do (especially it’s planned unethical and undemocratic actions).
2. Ford refused to disclose his mandate letters to Cabinet ministers despite being ordered three times to disclose them, and wasted taxpayer’s money for four years trying to keep them secret.
3. Ford tried to appoint his old friend Ron Taverner as Ontario’s top cop.
4. When that was justifiably condemned as a dangerously unethical appointment that would damage law enforcement and government accountability, Ford offered Taverner an executive job at the Ontario Cannabis Store.
5. Imposed more political Cabinet control over appointments to agencies, boards, commissions and tribunals (ABCTs), and also made changes to give Cabinet more control over provincial judge appointments.
6. Then appointed inexperienced, party-connected people to many ABCTs, drastically decreasing protection of human rights, the rights of renters, social welfare rights, consumers and the environment, which resulted in record-high complaints.
7. Set up a PC Party fake news service on social media using the public’s money, and then Ford and Cabinet ministers gave exclusive access to the service’s fake reporters while refusing to answer the real media’s questions.
8. Ford appointed one of his top election campaign advisers to a plum job in Washington, and increasing his pay by $75,000.
9. Ford appointed his campaign adviser and staff person Jenni Byrne to the Ontario Energy Board.
10. Ford appointed his family lawyer as chairperson of the Public Accountants Council.
11. Allowed dozens of former 2018 PC Party campaign workers, and Cabinet minister staff, to lobby for big businesses.
12. Gave many of the big business clients of Ford-PC Party connected lobbyists what they want.
13. Ford allowed his Chief of Staff to pressure police to enforce a law the way the PC Party government wanted it enforced.
14. Ford allowed his Chief of Staff to do favours for family members, friends and PC-Party connected people.
15. Violated the right of Ontarians to sue the government for negligent, harmful actions.
16. Violated the right of Ontarians to health care services when they travel outside of Canada.
17. Violated the public consultation requirement in Ontario’s environment protection law.
18. And then again violated the public consultation requirement in Ontario’s environment protection law.
19. Violated the requirement to consult with Indigenous peoples before proceeding with resource developments.
20. Violated Charter rights by trying to force gas stations to put a PC Party government propaganda sticker on pumps.
21. Violated the rights of students to fund their own student associations.
22. Violated the Charter rights of interest groups to inform voters about issues leading up to an election, and also made changes to allow wealthy donors to have more influence over politicians and parties.
23. And then Ford became the first Ontario Premier to use the notwithstanding clause to ensure he could violate Charter rights.
24. Lied in an ad about the carbon tax.
25. Issued one-page 2022 election platform that is again likely misleading voters about everything a PC government will do (especially unethical and undemocratic actions).

Criteria used for the Report Card on the 2022 Democracy and Accountability Election Platforms of the Ontario Political Parties

Set out below are the 16 sub-categories for the five issue area categories that are the basis for the Report Card.

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GRADING SYSTEM

A – Platform makes clear promise to implement proposal
B – Platform makes vague or partial promise to implement proposals
C – Platform makes clear promise to explore proposal
D – Platform makes vague or partial promise to explore proposal
D- – Platform mentions proposal area
F – Platform doesn’t mention proposal

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I. Honest, Ethical Government Measures

1. Requiring honesty-in-politics – Pass a law that requires all Cabinet ministers, MPPs, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees (including at Crown corporations, agencies, boards, commissions, courts and tribunals) nomination race and election candidates to tell the truth, with an easily accessible complaint process to a fully independent watchdog agency that is fully empowered to investigate and penalize anyone who lies. And require honesty in all political statements, especially online posts, and establish a new, fully independent, fully empowered commission to review and remove false online claims (Go to Honesty in Politics Campaign and the Stop Fake Online Election Ads Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
2. Strengthening ethics standards for politicians, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees, and ethics enforcement – Close the loopholes in the existing ethics rules (including closing the loophole that allows Cabinet ministers, MPPs, their staff and Cabinet appointees to be involved in decisions in which they have a financial interest, and including requiring resignation and a by-election if an MPP switches parties between elections) and apply them to all government institutions (including all Crown corporations) and, as proposed by the federal Department of Finance, place anyone with decision-making power on the anti-corruption watch list of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (Fintrac) so deposits to their bank accounts can be tracked. Strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the Ontario Integrity Commissioner by having the Commissioner selected by a fully independent non-partisan committee, having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budgets, prohibiting the watchdogs from giving secret advice, requiring them to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), fully empowering and requiring them to penalize rule-breakers, changing all the codes they enforce into laws, and ensuring that all their decisions can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to Government Ethics Campaign and Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
3. Making the political donations and election spending system democratic – Prohibit secret, unlimited donations or gifts of money, property or services by anyone for any reason to nomination, election and party leadership candidates; limit donations to $100 annually from individuals, and ban donations from corporations, unions and other organizations; also limit loans, including from financial institutions, to parties and all types of candidates to the same level as donations are limited; establish $1 per vote public funding of political parties (50 cents per vote for parties that elect a higher percentage of MPPs than the percentage of voter support they receive), and; ensure riding associations receive a fair share of this per-vote funding (so that party headquarters don’t have undue control over riding associations); require disclosure of all donations, gifts and loans of money, property or services (including the identity of the donor’s employer (as in the U.S.) and major affiliations) quarterly and before any election day; limit spending on campaigns for the leadership of political parties; limit advertising spending by the government and opposition parties and third parties (by number of members/supporters) in the six-month period leading up to an election, and limit advertising spending by third parties (by number of members/supporters) during the election campaign period (as spending by parties and candidates is limited). (Go to the Money in Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
4. Closing down the revolving door – Prohibit lobbyists from working for government departments or serving in senior positions for political parties or candidates for public office (as in New Mexico and Maryland), and from having business connections with anyone who does, and close the loopholes so that the actual cooling-off period for former Cabinet ministers, ministerial staff and senior public officials is five years (and three years for MPPs, their staff, and government employees) during which they are prohibited from becoming a lobbyist or working with people, corporations or organizations with which they had direct dealings while in government. Make the Integrity Commissioner more independent and effective by having them selected by a fully independent non-partisan commission, by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve their annual budget, by prohibiting the Commissioner from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioner to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), and by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioner to penalize rule-breakers, by ensuring all decisions of the Commissioner can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

II. Open Government Measures

5. Strengthening access-to-information system – Strengthen the access-to-information law and government information management system by applying the law to all government/publicly funded institutions, requiring all institutions and officials to create records of all decisions and actions and disclose them proactively and regularly, creating a public interest override of all access exemptions, having the Information and Privacy Commissioner appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budgets, and giving the Commissioner the power and mandate to order changes to government institutions’ information systems, and to penalize violators of access laws, regulations, policies and rules. (Go to the Open Government Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
6. Exposing behind-closed-door communications – Require in a new law that Ministers and public officials and MPPs and their staff disclose their contacts with all lobbyists, whether paid or volunteer lobbyists. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
7. Strengthening lobbying disclosure and ethics, and the enforcement system – Strengthen the Lobbying Registration Act by including in it a Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct, by closing the loophole that currently allows corporations to hide the number of people involved in lobbying activities, and by requiring lobbyists to disclose their past work with any Canadian or foreign government, political party or candidate, to disclose all their government relations activities (whether paid or volunteer) involving gathering inside information or trying to influence policy-makers (as in the U.S.) and to disclose the amount they spend on lobbying campaigns (as in 33 U.S. states), and; strengthen the ethics and enforcement system by extending the limitation period for prosecutions of violations of the Act to 10 years. Strengthen the Integrity Commissioner appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budget, by prohibiting the Commissioner from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioner to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioner to penalize rule-breakers, by ensuring all Commissioner decisions can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

III. Efficient Government Measures

8. Increasing powers of Auditor General and FAO – Increase the independence of the Auditor General and Financial Accountability Office (FAO) by having them appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission; increase auditing resources of the Auditor General and FAO by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Auditor General’s and FAO’s annual budget, and; empower the Auditor General to audit all government institutions including the legislature and MPP offices, and also empower the Auditor General and FAO to make orders for changes to government institutions’ spending systems, and to penalize violators of Treasury Board spending rules or Auditor General or FAO orders or requests for information. (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
9. Restricting government and campaign advertising – Restore the Auditor General’s power to preview and prohibit government advertising contracting out if there is no reason to have the advertising developed by a contractor, and to reject any government advertising that is essentially a partisan ad for the ruling party, and strictly limit all advertising spending by the government in the six-month period leading up to an election. (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

IV. Representative, Citizen-Driven Government Measures

10. Increasing meaningful public consultation – Pass a law requiring all government departments and institutions to use consultation processes that provide meaningful opportunities for citizen participation, especially concerning decisions that affect the lives of all Ontarians. (Go to the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
11. Restricting power of Cabinet to make appointments – Strengthen the Public Appointments Secretariat by making it a fully independent non-partisan commission that is appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, and have it appoint the approximately 2,000 judicial, agency, board, commission and tribunal appointments currently made by the Premier and Cabinet, especially for appointees to senior and law enforcement positions (including judges), after a merit-based nomination and screening process. (Go to the Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign and Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
12. Making the legislature more democratic – Change the law to restrict the Premier’s power to shut down (prorogue) the legislature to only for a very short time during time periods when the legislature is already adjourned, and only for an election (dissolution) or if the national situation has changed significantly or if the Premier can show that the government has completed all their pledged actions from the last Speech from the Throne (or attempted to do so, as the opposition parties may stop or delay completion of some actions). Give all party caucuses the power to choose which MPPs in their party sits on legislature committees, and allow any MPP to introduce a private member bill at any time, and define what a “vote of confidence” is in the law in a restrictive way so most votes in the legislature are free votes, and have a fully independent non-partisan commission choose a short-list of candidates for Lieutenant Governor after a public, merit-based search, with all party leaders making the final choice. (Go to the Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign and the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign and Democratic Head Campaign or details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
13. Ensuring free, fair and representative elections – Change the current voting law and system (the Elections Act) to specifically restrict the Premier’s power to call an unfair snap election, so that election dates are fixed as much as possible under the parliamentary system. Change the Act also so that nomination and party leadership races are regulated by Elections Ontario (including limiting spending on campaigns for party leadership), and so that party leaders cannot appoint candidates except when a riding does not have a riding association, and so that Elections Ontario determines which parties can participate in election debates based upon merit criteria, and so that voters can give a reason if they decline their ballot (i.e. vote for “none of the above”) and to require Elections Ontario to educate voters about their legal right to decline their ballot, and to provide a more equal number of voters in every riding, and a more accurate representation in the legislature of the actual voter support for each political party (with a safeguard to ensure that a party with low-level, narrow-base support does not have a disproportionately high level of power in the legislature). (Go to the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

V. General Accountability Measures

14. Facilitating citizen watchdog groups over government and big business sectors – Require provincial government institutions to enclose one-page pamphlets periodically in their mailings to citizens, and to put a notice at the top of every email they send to citizens, inviting citizens to join citizen-funded and directed groups to represent citizen interests in policy-making and enforcement processes of key government departments (for example, on ethics, spending, and health care), and require big businesses in all provincially regulated industries (investment banking, property insurance, energy and other natural resources, food, water and landlords) to do the same thing, as has been proposed in the U.S. and recommended for Canadian banks and other financial institutions in 1998 by a federal task force, a legislature of Commons Committee, and a Senate Committee, and for the investment industry by an Ontario legislature committee. (Go to the Citizen Association Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
15. Ensuring effective whistleblower protection – Require everyone to report any violation of any law, regulation, policy, code, guideline or rule, and require all watchdog agencies over government (for example: Auditor General, Information and Privacy Commissioner, and Integrity Commissioner) to investigate and rule publicly on allegations of violations, and to penalize violators, to protect anyone (not just employees) who reports a violation (so-called “whistleblowers”) from retaliation, and to reward whistleblowers whose allegations are proven to be true, and to ensure a right to appeal to the courts. (Go to the Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
16. Ensuring loophole free laws and strong penalties for wrongdoers – Close any technical and other loopholes that have been identified in laws, regulations, policies, codes, guidelines and rules (especially those regulating government institutions and large corporations) to help ensure strong enforcement, and increase financial penalties for violations to a level that significantly effects the annual revenues/budget of the institution or corporation. (Go to the Campaigns page and the Corporate Responsibility Campaign page for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

Criteria used for the Report Card on the 2022 Democracy and Accountability Election Platforms of the Ontario Political Parties

Set out below are the 16 sub-categories for the five issue area categories that are the basis for the Report Card.

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GRADING SYSTEM

A – Platform makes clear promise to implement proposal
B – Platform makes vague or partial promise to implement proposals
C – Platform makes clear promise to explore proposal
D – Platform makes vague or partial promise to explore proposal
D- – Platform mentions proposal area
F – Platform doesn’t mention proposal

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I. Honest, Ethical Government Measures

1. Requiring honesty-in-politics – Pass a law that requires all Cabinet ministers, MPPs, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees (including at Crown corporations, agencies, boards, commissions, courts and tribunals) nomination race and election candidates to tell the truth, with an easily accessible complaint process to a fully independent watchdog agency that is fully empowered to investigate and penalize anyone who lies. And require honesty in all political statements, especially online posts, and establish a new, fully independent, fully empowered commission to review and remove false online claims (Go to Honesty in Politics Campaign and the Stop Fake Online Election Ads Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
2. Strengthening ethics standards for politicians, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees, and ethics enforcement – Close the loopholes in the existing ethics rules (including closing the loophole that allows Cabinet ministers, MPPs, their staff and Cabinet appointees to be involved in decisions in which they have a financial interest, and including requiring resignation and a by-election if an MPP switches parties between elections) and apply them to all government institutions (including all Crown corporations) and, as proposed by the federal Department of Finance, place anyone with decision-making power on the anti-corruption watch list of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (Fintrac) so deposits to their bank accounts can be tracked. Strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the Ontario Integrity Commissioner by having the Commissioner selected by a fully independent non-partisan committee, having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budgets, prohibiting the watchdogs from giving secret advice, requiring them to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), fully empowering and requiring them to penalize rule-breakers, changing all the codes they enforce into laws, and ensuring that all their decisions can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to Government Ethics Campaign and Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
3. Making the political donations and election spending system democratic – Prohibit secret, unlimited donations or gifts of money, property or services by anyone for any reason to nomination, election and party leadership candidates; limit donations to $100 annually from individuals, and ban donations from corporations, unions and other organizations; also limit loans, including from financial institutions, to parties and all types of candidates to the same level as donations are limited; establish $1 per vote public funding of political parties (50 cents per vote for parties that elect a higher percentage of MPPs than the percentage of voter support they receive), and; ensure riding associations receive a fair share of this per-vote funding (so that party headquarters don’t have undue control over riding associations); require disclosure of all donations, gifts and loans of money, property or services (including the identity of the donor’s employer (as in the U.S.) and major affiliations) quarterly and before any election day; limit spending on campaigns for the leadership of political parties; limit advertising spending by the government and opposition parties and third parties (by number of members/supporters) in the six-month period leading up to an election, and limit advertising spending by third parties (by number of members/supporters) during the election campaign period (as spending by parties and candidates is limited). (Go to the Money in Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
4. Closing down the revolving door – Prohibit lobbyists from working for government departments or serving in senior positions for political parties or candidates for public office (as in New Mexico and Maryland), and from having business connections with anyone who does, and close the loopholes so that the actual cooling-off period for former Cabinet ministers, ministerial staff and senior public officials is five years (and three years for MPPs, their staff, and government employees) during which they are prohibited from becoming a lobbyist or working with people, corporations or organizations with which they had direct dealings while in government. Make the Integrity Commissioner more independent and effective by having them selected by a fully independent non-partisan commission, by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve their annual budget, by prohibiting the Commissioner from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioner to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), and by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioner to penalize rule-breakers, by ensuring all decisions of the Commissioner can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

II. Open Government Measures

5. Strengthening access-to-information system – Strengthen the access-to-information law and government information management system by applying the law to all government/publicly funded institutions, requiring all institutions and officials to create records of all decisions and actions and disclose them proactively and regularly, creating a public interest override of all access exemptions, having the Information and Privacy Commissioner appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budgets, and giving the Commissioner the power and mandate to order changes to government institutions’ information systems, and to penalize violators of access laws, regulations, policies and rules. (Go to the Open Government Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
6. Exposing behind-closed-door communications – Require in a new law that Ministers and public officials and MPPs and their staff disclose their contacts with all lobbyists, whether paid or volunteer lobbyists. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
7. Strengthening lobbying disclosure and ethics, and the enforcement system – Strengthen the Lobbying Registration Act by including in it a Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct, by closing the loophole that currently allows corporations to hide the number of people involved in lobbying activities, and by requiring lobbyists to disclose their past work with any Canadian or foreign government, political party or candidate, to disclose all their government relations activities (whether paid or volunteer) involving gathering inside information or trying to influence policy-makers (as in the U.S.) and to disclose the amount they spend on lobbying campaigns (as in 33 U.S. states), and; strengthen the ethics and enforcement system by extending the limitation period for prosecutions of violations of the Act to 10 years. Strengthen the Integrity Commissioner appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budget, by prohibiting the Commissioner from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioner to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioner to penalize rule-breakers, by ensuring all Commissioner decisions can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

III. Efficient Government Measures

8. Increasing powers of Auditor General and FAO – Increase the independence of the Auditor General and Financial Accountability Office (FAO) by having them appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission; increase auditing resources of the Auditor General and FAO by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Auditor General’s and FAO’s annual budget, and; empower the Auditor General to audit all government institutions including the legislature and MPP offices, and also empower the Auditor General and FAO to make orders for changes to government institutions’ spending systems, and to penalize violators of Treasury Board spending rules or Auditor General or FAO orders or requests for information. (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
9. Restricting government and campaign advertising – Restore the Auditor General’s power to preview and prohibit government advertising contracting out if there is no reason to have the advertising developed by a contractor, and to reject any government advertising that is essentially a partisan ad for the ruling party, and strictly limit all advertising spending by the government in the six-month period leading up to an election. (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

IV. Representative, Citizen-Driven Government Measures

10. Increasing meaningful public consultation – Pass a law requiring all government departments and institutions to use consultation processes that provide meaningful opportunities for citizen participation, especially concerning decisions that affect the lives of all Ontarians. (Go to the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
11. Restricting power of Cabinet to make appointments – Strengthen the Public Appointments Secretariat by making it a fully independent non-partisan commission that is appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, and have it appoint the approximately 2,000 judicial, agency, board, commission and tribunal appointments currently made by the Premier and Cabinet, especially for appointees to senior and law enforcement positions (including judges), after a merit-based nomination and screening process. (Go to the Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign and Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
12. Making the legislature more democratic – Change the law to restrict the Premier’s power to shut down (prorogue) the legislature to only for a very short time during time periods when the legislature is already adjourned, and only for an election (dissolution) or if the national situation has changed significantly or if the Premier can show that the government has completed all their pledged actions from the last Speech from the Throne (or attempted to do so, as the opposition parties may stop or delay completion of some actions). Give all party caucuses the power to choose which MPPs in their party sits on legislature committees, and allow any MPP to introduce a private member bill at any time, and define what a “vote of confidence” is in the law in a restrictive way so most votes in the legislature are free votes, and have a fully independent non-partisan commission choose a short-list of candidates for Lieutenant Governor after a public, merit-based search, with all party leaders making the final choice. (Go to the Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign and the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign and Democratic Head Campaign or details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
13. Ensuring free, fair and representative elections – Change the current voting law and system (the Elections Act) to specifically restrict the Premier’s power to call an unfair snap election, so that election dates are fixed as much as possible under the parliamentary system. Change the Act also so that nomination and party leadership races are regulated by Elections Ontario (including limiting spending on campaigns for party leadership), and so that party leaders cannot appoint candidates except when a riding does not have a riding association, and so that Elections Ontario determines which parties can participate in election debates based upon merit criteria, and so that voters can give a reason if they decline their ballot (i.e. vote for “none of the above”) and to require Elections Ontario to educate voters about their legal right to decline their ballot, and to provide a more equal number of voters in every riding, and a more accurate representation in the legislature of the actual voter support for each political party (with a safeguard to ensure that a party with low-level, narrow-base support does not have a disproportionately high level of power in the legislature). (Go to the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

V. General Accountability Measures

14. Facilitating citizen watchdog groups over government and big business sectors – Require provincial government institutions to enclose one-page pamphlets periodically in their mailings to citizens, and to put a notice at the top of every email they send to citizens, inviting citizens to join citizen-funded and directed groups to represent citizen interests in policy-making and enforcement processes of key government departments (for example, on ethics, spending, and health care), and require big businesses in all provincially regulated industries (investment banking, property insurance, energy and other natural resources, food, water and landlords) to do the same thing, as has been proposed in the U.S. and recommended for Canadian banks and other financial institutions in 1998 by a federal task force, a legislature of Commons Committee, and a Senate Committee, and for the investment industry by an Ontario legislature committee. (Go to the Citizen Association Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
15. Ensuring effective whistleblower protection – Require everyone to report any violation of any law, regulation, policy, code, guideline or rule, and require all watchdog agencies over government (for example: Auditor General, Information and Privacy Commissioner, and Integrity Commissioner) to investigate and rule publicly on allegations of violations, and to penalize violators, to protect anyone (not just employees) who reports a violation (so-called “whistleblowers”) from retaliation, and to reward whistleblowers whose allegations are proven to be true, and to ensure a right to appeal to the courts. (Go to the Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
16. Ensuring loophole free laws and strong penalties for wrongdoers – Close any technical and other loopholes that have been identified in laws, regulations, policies, codes, guidelines and rules (especially those regulating government institutions and large corporations) to help ensure strong enforcement, and increase financial penalties for violations to a level that significantly effects the annual revenues/budget of the institution or corporation. (Go to the Campaigns page and the Corporate Responsibility Campaign page for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

10 Key Changes Needed to Federal MP Ethics Code

(Democracy Watch: March 2022)

The 10 key changes needed to make the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons (“MP Code”) effective at preventing conflicts of interest and unethical gift- and favour-trading are as follows (Click here to see a detailed submission about these changes):

1. Add a rule to require MPs and their staff to tell the truth to stop the misleading spin that regularly and fatally undermines reasonable policy debates and discussions, and another rule to prohibit MPs from switching parties in between elections except when their party leader violates the law or breaks significant election promises (and, generally, expand the Code to cover MPs as soon as their election is confirmed by Elections Canada, and to cover MP staff who, because they are not covered by the Code, can currently do the things that MPs are prohibited from doing on their MP’s behalf, and can also accept all gifts and favours);
2. Close the huge loophole in the definition of “private interest” (in ss. 3(2) and (3)) to cover all conflicts of interest, not only specific financial conflicts, because the loophole means the Code doesn’t apply to 95% of decisions MPs participate in, and that allows them to take part in decisions when they, their family or friends can profit from the decision (and extend the Code to cover the private interests of extended family and friends of MPs and their staff);
3. Add a new rule (as a restriction on s. 5 of the Code) to prohibit MPs from giving preferential treatment to anyone, especially anyone who has given them a gift or assisted them in any way;
4. Prohibit MPs and their staff from having investments in businesses (which is allowed under ss. 17 and 24(3)(j)), and from having blind trusts, (both of which the Parker Commission recommended way back in 1987) and change s. 7 to prohibit them from other outside activities, because they create clear conflicts of interest (other than professional requirements like doctors who have to practise a specific amount each year in order to retain their licence);
5. Require MPs to work full-time, and to disclose a summary of their work activities, including communications with anyone or any entity who is trying to influence their decisions, in an online, searchable database;
6. Change the gifts and benefits rule to ban MPs and their staff from accepting anything from anyone (including volunteer assistance under ss. 3(1)), who is trying to influence their decisions because even small gifts influence decisions, and delete s. 15 of the Code to ban “sponsored travel” because it is an unethical gift and essentially a form of legalized bribery;
7. Require MPs to disclose in the Public Registry their assets and liabilities worth more than $1,000 (the current disclosure requirement is for everything worth more than $10,000, which is much too high), and to disclose details about their past five year’s work before they became an MP to make it easy to track which organizations and issues they have ties to, and to disclose in the Public Registry which members of their extended family they have close relationships with including being aware of their business, investments and other private interests;
8. Prohibit MPs and their staff from communicating with their former colleagues and government officials for a sliding-scale time period after they leave depending on what positions and committees they served in and how close their relationships are with Cabinet ministers, officials etc., and require them to disclose their post-activities online during this time period in a searchable database;
9. Require MPs and their staff to take a formal training course when they first start their position, and annually, and require the Ethics Commissioner to publish online a summary of his/her advice each time advice is given that covers a new situation to any person covered by the Code, and to publish online all advisory opinions and guidelines issued by the Commissioner, and to regularly conduct an audit of a randomly selected sample of MPs’ financial statements and activities;
10. Give members of the public, who employ and pay all MPs and their staff, the right to file a complaint with the Ethics Commissioner, and require the Commissioner to investigate and issue a public ruling on every complaint and situation s/he becomes aware of, and to impose a sliding scale of penalties depending the seriousness of the violation, and add a rule that anyone is allowed to challenge any decision by the Commissioner in court.

Many other changes are needed to other federal laws, including: closing similarly huge loopholes in the Conflict of Interest Act (which applies to Cabinet ministers, staff and appointees) and the Senate Ethics Code; closing huge secret, unethical lobbying loopholes; decreasing the donation and loan limit in the Canada Elections Act to $75 (as the current donation and loan limit of $3,300 is essentially legalized bribery for those who can afford to make the maximum donation); closing huge excessive secrecy loopholes in the federal Access to Information Act; strengthening the whistleblower protection law, and; changing the appointment process for the Ethics Commissioner and other democratic good government watchdogs (given MPs currently have a clear conflict of interest as they choose their own watchdogs) and banning re-appointments (as that gives a watchdog an incentive to please MPs in order to secure a re-appointment).

Join the call for these and other key government ethics changes across Canada at Democracy Watch’s Government Ethics Campaign

Background on Key Problems that Make the
Federal Judicial Appointments System Too Political

To become a federally appointed judge, a person must either be a lawyer for 10 years or a lawyer and quasi-judicial tribunal member for a combined total of 10 years (See s. 3 of the Judges Act, and ss. 5.2 and 5.3 of the Federal Courts Act). There are Judicial Advisory Committees for each province and territory that review applications and recommend long lists of qualified candidates to the Minister of Justice.

The problems with the federal judicial appointments system that the case challenges are longstanding, and have been raised in the past, (see also here and here and here, and also all the evidence linked in Democracy Watch’s December 2020 affidavit, and most provinces have the same problems with their appointment system), as follows:

1. Canada’s federal judicial appointment system is just a self-enforced policy of the federal government that can be changed at any time. In contrast, in the UK and in most provinces the appointment system is enshrined in law so that a Cabinet can’t change it without introducing a public bill that is debated by the legislature and the public.
2. The Minister of Justice and Cabinet appoint a majority of the seven members of each Judicial Advisory Committee. They appoint:
   1. three of the members directly;
   2. one from a list of nominees submitted by the Law Society of the province/territory;
   3. one from a list of nominees submitted by the provincial or territorial chapter of the Canadian Bar Association;
   4. one from a list of nominees submitted by the jurisdiction’s Attorney General, and;
   5. then the chief judge of the jurisdiction chooses the last member of each committee.

In contrast, Cabinet ministers in Quebec (sections 15 and 16) do not select any of the advisory committee members, and in Manitoba (s. 3.3) and B.C. (s. 21) choose a minority of the members of the advisory committee for their provincial courts. Ideally, the Cabinet should not choose any of the members of the committees. The federal Minister alone chooses to promote sitting judges to appeal courts. Ideally, a fully independent committee should be recommending a short list of 1-3 sitting judges as candidates for promotion to appeal courts.

3. The federal judicial advisory committees are appointed by the Minister and Cabinet to renewable two-year terms. Ideally, even if the Minister and Cabinet members are removed from appointing any of the committee members (as recommended above in #2) the terms should not be renewable, to ensure regular turnover of committee members.
4. Each committee submits a long list of candidates, which gives the Minister a lot of leeway to appoint whomever s/he wants. Ideally, the committees should submit only 1-3 candidates for each open judge position, with the minister required to choose from that short list, as in Quebec and the UK (and in the UK, where the committee only submits one candidate, the minister must explain in writing to the committee if s/he rejects the recommended candidate).
5. Before making the final choice, the Minister shares each list of candidates with Cabinet ministers and MPs, and also party officials, from the province or territory. Ideally, the Minister should be prohibited from sharing the list with anyone.

Background on Key Problems that Make the
Federal Judicial Appointments System Too Political

To become a federally appointed judge, a person must either be a lawyer for 10 years or a lawyer and quasi-judicial tribunal member for a combined total of 10 years (See s. 3 of the Judges Act, and ss. 5.2 and 5.3 of the Federal Courts Act). There are Judicial Advisory Committees for each province and territory that review applications and recommend long lists of qualified candidates to the Minister of Justice.

The problems with the federal judicial appointments system that the case challenges are longstanding, and have been raised in the past, (see also here and here and here, and also all the evidence linked in Democracy Watch’s December 2020 affidavit, and most provinces have the same problems with their appointment system), as follows:

1. Canada’s federal judicial appointment system is just a self-enforced policy of the federal government that can be changed at any time. In contrast, in the UK and in most provinces the appointment system is enshrined in law so that a Cabinet can’t change it without introducing a public bill that is debated by the legislature and the public.
2. The Minister of Justice and Cabinet appoint a majority of the seven members of each Judicial Advisory Committee. They appoint:
   1. three of the members directly;
   2. one from a list of nominees submitted by the Law Society of the province/territory;
   3. one from a list of nominees submitted by the provincial or territorial chapter of the Canadian Bar Association;
   4. one from a list of nominees submitted by the jurisdiction’s Attorney General, and;
   5. then the chief judge of the jurisdiction chooses the last member of each committee.

In contrast, Cabinet ministers in Quebec (sections 15 and 16) do not select any of the advisory committee members, and in Manitoba (s. 3.3) and B.C. (s. 21) choose a minority of the members of the advisory committee for their provincial courts. Ideally, the Cabinet should not choose any of the members of the committees. The federal Minister alone chooses to promote sitting judges to appeal courts. Ideally, a fully independent committee should be recommending a short list of 1-3 sitting judges as candidates for promotion to appeal courts.

3. The federal judicial advisory committees are appointed by the Minister and Cabinet to renewable two-year terms. Ideally, even if the Minister and Cabinet members are removed from appointing any of the committee members (as recommended above in #2) the terms should not be renewable, to ensure regular turnover of committee members.
4. Each committee submits a long list of candidates, which gives the Minister a lot of leeway to appoint whomever s/he wants. Ideally, the committees should submit only 1-3 candidates for each open judge position, with the minister required to choose from that short list, as in Quebec and the UK (and in the UK, where the committee only submits one candidate, the minister must explain in writing to the committee if s/he rejects the recommended candidate).
5. Before making the final choice, the Minister shares each list of candidates with Cabinet ministers and MPs, and also party officials, from the province or territory. Ideally, the Minister should be prohibited from sharing the list with anyone.

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Sorry, this entry is only available in Français.

Sorry, this entry is only available in Français.