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Report Card 2022

Criteria used for the Report Card on the 2022 Democracy and Accountability Election Platforms of the Ontario Political Parties

Set out below are the 16 sub-categories for the five issue area categories that are the basis for the Report Card.


GRADING SYSTEM

A – Platform makes clear promise to implement proposal
B – Platform makes vague or partial promise to implement proposals
C – Platform makes clear promise to explore proposal
D – Platform makes vague or partial promise to explore proposal
D- – Platform mentions proposal area
F – Platform doesn’t mention proposal



I. Honest, Ethical Government Measures

  1. Requiring honesty-in-politics – Pass a law that requires all Cabinet ministers, MPPs, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees (including at Crown corporations, agencies, boards, commissions, courts and tribunals) nomination race and election candidates to tell the truth, with an easily accessible complaint process to a fully independent watchdog agency that is fully empowered to investigate and penalize anyone who lies. And require honesty in all political statements, especially online posts, and establish a new, fully independent, fully empowered commission to review and remove false online claims (Go to Honesty in Politics Campaign and the Stop Fake Online Election Ads Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  2. Strengthening ethics standards for politicians, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees, and ethics enforcement – Close the loopholes in the existing ethics rules (including closing the loophole that allows Cabinet ministers, MPPs, their staff and Cabinet appointees to be involved in decisions in which they have a financial interest, and including requiring resignation and a by-election if an MPP switches parties between elections) and apply them to all government institutions (including all Crown corporations) and, as proposed by the federal Department of Finance, place anyone with decision-making power on the anti-corruption watch list of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (Fintrac) so deposits to their bank accounts can be tracked. Strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the Ontario Integrity Commissioner by having the Commissioner selected by a fully independent non-partisan committee, having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budgets, prohibiting the watchdogs from giving secret advice, requiring them to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), fully empowering and requiring them to penalize rule-breakers, changing all the codes they enforce into laws, and ensuring that all their decisions can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to Government Ethics Campaign and Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  3. Making the political donations and election spending system democratic – Prohibit secret, unlimited donations or gifts of money, property or services by anyone for any reason to nomination, election and party leadership candidates; limit donations to $100 annually from individuals, and ban donations from corporations, unions and other organizations; also limit loans, including from financial institutions, to parties and all types of candidates to the same level as donations are limited; establish $1 per vote public funding of political parties (50 cents per vote for parties that elect a higher percentage of MPPs than the percentage of voter support they receive), and; ensure riding associations receive a fair share of this per-vote funding (so that party headquarters don’t have undue control over riding associations); require disclosure of all donations, gifts and loans of money, property or services (including the identity of the donor’s employer (as in the U.S.) and major affiliations) quarterly and before any election day; limit spending on campaigns for the leadership of political parties; limit advertising spending by the government and opposition parties and third parties (by number of members/supporters) in the six-month period leading up to an election, and limit advertising spending by third parties (by number of members/supporters) during the election campaign period (as spending by parties and candidates is limited). (Go to the Money in Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  4. Closing down the revolving door – Prohibit lobbyists from working for government departments or serving in senior positions for political parties or candidates for public office (as in New Mexico and Maryland), and from having business connections with anyone who does, and close the loopholes so that the actual cooling-off period for former Cabinet ministers, ministerial staff and senior public officials is five years (and three years for MPPs, their staff, and government employees) during which they are prohibited from becoming a lobbyist or working with people, corporations or organizations with which they had direct dealings while in government. Make the Integrity Commissioner more independent and effective by having them selected by a fully independent non-partisan commission, by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve their annual budget, by prohibiting the Commissioner from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioner to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), and by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioner to penalize rule-breakers, by ensuring all decisions of the Commissioner can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

II. Open Government Measures

  1. Strengthening access-to-information system – Strengthen the access-to-information law and government information management system by applying the law to all government/publicly funded institutions, requiring all institutions and officials to create records of all decisions and actions and disclose them proactively and regularly, creating a public interest override of all access exemptions, having the Information and Privacy Commissioner appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budgets, and giving the Commissioner the power and mandate to order changes to government institutions’ information systems, and to penalize violators of access laws, regulations, policies and rules. (Go to the Open Government Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  2. Exposing behind-closed-door communications – Require in a new law that Ministers and public officials and MPPs and their staff disclose their contacts with all lobbyists, whether paid or volunteer lobbyists. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  3. Strengthening lobbying disclosure and ethics, and the enforcement system – Strengthen the Lobbying Registration Act by including in it a Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct, by closing the loophole that currently allows corporations to hide the number of people involved in lobbying activities, and by requiring lobbyists to disclose their past work with any Canadian or foreign government, political party or candidate, to disclose all their government relations activities (whether paid or volunteer) involving gathering inside information or trying to influence policy-makers (as in the U.S.) and to disclose the amount they spend on lobbying campaigns (as in 33 U.S. states), and; strengthen the ethics and enforcement system by extending the limitation period for prosecutions of violations of the Act to 10 years. Strengthen the Integrity Commissioner appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budget, by prohibiting the Commissioner from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioner to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioner to penalize rule-breakers, by ensuring all Commissioner decisions can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

III. Efficient Government Measures

  1. Increasing powers of Auditor General and FAO – Increase the independence of the Auditor General and Financial Accountability Office (FAO) by having them appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission; increase auditing resources of the Auditor General and FAO by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Auditor General’s and FAO’s annual budget, and; empower the Auditor General to audit all government institutions including the legislature and MPP offices, and also empower the Auditor General and FAO to make orders for changes to government institutions’ spending systems, and to penalize violators of Treasury Board spending rules or Auditor General or FAO orders or requests for information. (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  2. Restricting government and campaign advertising – Restore the Auditor General’s power to preview and prohibit government advertising contracting out if there is no reason to have the advertising developed by a contractor, and to reject any government advertising that is essentially a partisan ad for the ruling party, and strictly limit all advertising spending by the government in the six-month period leading up to an election. (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

IV. Representative, Citizen-Driven Government Measures

  1. Increasing meaningful public consultation – Pass a law requiring all government departments and institutions to use consultation processes that provide meaningful opportunities for citizen participation, especially concerning decisions that affect the lives of all Ontarians. (Go to the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  2. Restricting power of Cabinet to make appointments – Strengthen the Public Appointments Secretariat by making it a fully independent non-partisan commission that is appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, and have it appoint the approximately 2,000 judicial, agency, board, commission and tribunal appointments currently made by the Premier and Cabinet, especially for appointees to senior and law enforcement positions (including judges), after a merit-based nomination and screening process. (Go to the Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign and Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  3. Making the legislature more democratic – Change the law to restrict the Premier’s power to shut down (prorogue) the legislature to only for a very short time during time periods when the legislature is already adjourned, and only for an election (dissolution) or if the national situation has changed significantly or if the Premier can show that the government has completed all their pledged actions from the last Speech from the Throne (or attempted to do so, as the opposition parties may stop or delay completion of some actions). Give all party caucuses the power to choose which MPPs in their party sits on legislature committees, and allow any MPP to introduce a private member bill at any time, and define what a “vote of confidence” is in the law in a restrictive way so most votes in the legislature are free votes, and have a fully independent non-partisan commission choose a short-list of candidates for Lieutenant Governor after a public, merit-based search, with all party leaders making the final choice. (Go to the Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign and the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign and Democratic Head Campaign or details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  4. Ensuring free, fair and representative elections – Change the current voting law and system (the Elections Act) to specifically restrict the Premier’s power to call an unfair snap election, so that election dates are fixed as much as possible under the parliamentary system. Change the Act also so that nomination and party leadership races are regulated by Elections Ontario (including limiting spending on campaigns for party leadership), and so that party leaders cannot appoint candidates except when a riding does not have a riding association, and so that Elections Ontario determines which parties can participate in election debates based upon merit criteria, and so that voters can give a reason if they decline their ballot (i.e. vote for “none of the above”) and to require Elections Ontario to educate voters about their legal right to decline their ballot, and to provide a more equal number of voters in every riding, and a more accurate representation in the legislature of the actual voter support for each political party (with a safeguard to ensure that a party with low-level, narrow-base support does not have a disproportionately high level of power in the legislature). (Go to the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

V. General Accountability Measures

  1. Facilitating citizen watchdog groups over government and big business sectors – Require provincial government institutions to enclose one-page pamphlets periodically in their mailings to citizens, and to put a notice at the top of every email they send to citizens, inviting citizens to join citizen-funded and directed groups to represent citizen interests in policy-making and enforcement processes of key government departments (for example, on ethics, spending, and health care), and require big businesses in all provincially regulated industries (investment banking, property insurance, energy and other natural resources, food, water and landlords) to do the same thing, as has been proposed in the U.S. and recommended for Canadian banks and other financial institutions in 1998 by a federal task force, a legislature of Commons Committee, and a Senate Committee, and for the investment industry by an Ontario legislature committee. (Go to the Citizen Association Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  2. Ensuring effective whistleblower protection – Require everyone to report any violation of any law, regulation, policy, code, guideline or rule, and require all watchdog agencies over government (for example: Auditor General, Information and Privacy Commissioner, and Integrity Commissioner) to investigate and rule publicly on allegations of violations, and to penalize violators, to protect anyone (not just employees) who reports a violation (so-called “whistleblowers”) from retaliation, and to reward whistleblowers whose allegations are proven to be true, and to ensure a right to appeal to the courts. (Go to the Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  3. Ensuring loophole free laws and strong penalties for wrongdoers – Close any technical and other loopholes that have been identified in laws, regulations, policies, codes, guidelines and rules (especially those regulating government institutions and large corporations) to help ensure strong enforcement, and increase financial penalties for violations to a level that significantly effects the annual revenues/budget of the institution or corporation. (Go to the Campaigns page and the Corporate Responsibility Campaign page for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

Criteria used for the Report Card on the 2022 Democracy and Accountability Election Platforms of the Ontario Political Parties

Set out below are the 16 sub-categories for the five issue area categories that are the basis for the Report Card.


GRADING SYSTEM

A – Platform makes clear promise to implement proposal
B – Platform makes vague or partial promise to implement proposals
C – Platform makes clear promise to explore proposal
D – Platform makes vague or partial promise to explore proposal
D- – Platform mentions proposal area
F – Platform doesn’t mention proposal



I. Honest, Ethical Government Measures

  1. Requiring honesty-in-politics – Pass a law that requires all Cabinet ministers, MPPs, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees (including at Crown corporations, agencies, boards, commissions, courts and tribunals) nomination race and election candidates to tell the truth, with an easily accessible complaint process to a fully independent watchdog agency that is fully empowered to investigate and penalize anyone who lies. And require honesty in all political statements, especially online posts, and establish a new, fully independent, fully empowered commission to review and remove false online claims (Go to Honesty in Politics Campaign and the Stop Fake Online Election Ads Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  2. Strengthening ethics standards for politicians, political staff, Cabinet appointees and government employees, and ethics enforcement – Close the loopholes in the existing ethics rules (including closing the loophole that allows Cabinet ministers, MPPs, their staff and Cabinet appointees to be involved in decisions in which they have a financial interest, and including requiring resignation and a by-election if an MPP switches parties between elections) and apply them to all government institutions (including all Crown corporations) and, as proposed by the federal Department of Finance, place anyone with decision-making power on the anti-corruption watch list of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (Fintrac) so deposits to their bank accounts can be tracked. Strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the Ontario Integrity Commissioner by having the Commissioner selected by a fully independent non-partisan committee, having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budgets, prohibiting the watchdogs from giving secret advice, requiring them to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), fully empowering and requiring them to penalize rule-breakers, changing all the codes they enforce into laws, and ensuring that all their decisions can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to Government Ethics Campaign and Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  3. Making the political donations and election spending system democratic – Prohibit secret, unlimited donations or gifts of money, property or services by anyone for any reason to nomination, election and party leadership candidates; limit donations to $100 annually from individuals, and ban donations from corporations, unions and other organizations; also limit loans, including from financial institutions, to parties and all types of candidates to the same level as donations are limited; establish $1 per vote public funding of political parties (50 cents per vote for parties that elect a higher percentage of MPPs than the percentage of voter support they receive), and; ensure riding associations receive a fair share of this per-vote funding (so that party headquarters don’t have undue control over riding associations); require disclosure of all donations, gifts and loans of money, property or services (including the identity of the donor’s employer (as in the U.S.) and major affiliations) quarterly and before any election day; limit spending on campaigns for the leadership of political parties; limit advertising spending by the government and opposition parties and third parties (by number of members/supporters) in the six-month period leading up to an election, and limit advertising spending by third parties (by number of members/supporters) during the election campaign period (as spending by parties and candidates is limited). (Go to the Money in Politics Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  4. Closing down the revolving door – Prohibit lobbyists from working for government departments or serving in senior positions for political parties or candidates for public office (as in New Mexico and Maryland), and from having business connections with anyone who does, and close the loopholes so that the actual cooling-off period for former Cabinet ministers, ministerial staff and senior public officials is five years (and three years for MPPs, their staff, and government employees) during which they are prohibited from becoming a lobbyist or working with people, corporations or organizations with which they had direct dealings while in government. Make the Integrity Commissioner more independent and effective by having them selected by a fully independent non-partisan commission, by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve their annual budget, by prohibiting the Commissioner from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioner to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), and by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioner to penalize rule-breakers, by ensuring all decisions of the Commissioner can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

II. Open Government Measures

  1. Strengthening access-to-information system – Strengthen the access-to-information law and government information management system by applying the law to all government/publicly funded institutions, requiring all institutions and officials to create records of all decisions and actions and disclose them proactively and regularly, creating a public interest override of all access exemptions, having the Information and Privacy Commissioner appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budgets, and giving the Commissioner the power and mandate to order changes to government institutions’ information systems, and to penalize violators of access laws, regulations, policies and rules. (Go to the Open Government Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  2. Exposing behind-closed-door communications – Require in a new law that Ministers and public officials and MPPs and their staff disclose their contacts with all lobbyists, whether paid or volunteer lobbyists. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  3. Strengthening lobbying disclosure and ethics, and the enforcement system – Strengthen the Lobbying Registration Act by including in it a Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct, by closing the loophole that currently allows corporations to hide the number of people involved in lobbying activities, and by requiring lobbyists to disclose their past work with any Canadian or foreign government, political party or candidate, to disclose all their government relations activities (whether paid or volunteer) involving gathering inside information or trying to influence policy-makers (as in the U.S.) and to disclose the amount they spend on lobbying campaigns (as in 33 U.S. states), and; strengthen the ethics and enforcement system by extending the limitation period for prosecutions of violations of the Act to 10 years. Strengthen the Integrity Commissioner appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Commissioner’s annual budget, by prohibiting the Commissioner from giving secret advice, by requiring the Commissioner to investigate and rule publicly on all complaints (including anonymous complaints), by fully empowering and requiring the Commissioner to penalize rule-breakers, by ensuring all Commissioner decisions can be reviewed by the courts. (Go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

III. Efficient Government Measures

  1. Increasing powers of Auditor General and FAO – Increase the independence of the Auditor General and Financial Accountability Office (FAO) by having them appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission; increase auditing resources of the Auditor General and FAO by having the legislature (as opposed to Cabinet) approve the Auditor General’s and FAO’s annual budget, and; empower the Auditor General to audit all government institutions including the legislature and MPP offices, and also empower the Auditor General and FAO to make orders for changes to government institutions’ spending systems, and to penalize violators of Treasury Board spending rules or Auditor General or FAO orders or requests for information. (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  2. Restricting government and campaign advertising – Restore the Auditor General’s power to preview and prohibit government advertising contracting out if there is no reason to have the advertising developed by a contractor, and to reject any government advertising that is essentially a partisan ad for the ruling party, and strictly limit all advertising spending by the government in the six-month period leading up to an election. (Go to the Stop Fraud Politician Spending Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

IV. Representative, Citizen-Driven Government Measures

  1. Increasing meaningful public consultation – Pass a law requiring all government departments and institutions to use consultation processes that provide meaningful opportunities for citizen participation, especially concerning decisions that affect the lives of all Ontarians. (Go to the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  2. Restricting power of Cabinet to make appointments – Strengthen the Public Appointments Secretariat by making it a fully independent non-partisan commission that is appointed by a fully independent non-partisan commission, and have it appoint the approximately 2,000 judicial, agency, board, commission and tribunal appointments currently made by the Premier and Cabinet, especially for appointees to senior and law enforcement positions (including judges), after a merit-based nomination and screening process. (Go to the Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign and Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  3. Making the legislature more democratic – Change the law to restrict the Premier’s power to shut down (prorogue) the legislature to only for a very short time during time periods when the legislature is already adjourned, and only for an election (dissolution) or if the national situation has changed significantly or if the Premier can show that the government has completed all their pledged actions from the last Speech from the Throne (or attempted to do so, as the opposition parties may stop or delay completion of some actions). Give all party caucuses the power to choose which MPPs in their party sits on legislature committees, and allow any MPP to introduce a private member bill at any time, and define what a “vote of confidence” is in the law in a restrictive way so most votes in the legislature are free votes, and have a fully independent non-partisan commission choose a short-list of candidates for Lieutenant Governor after a public, merit-based search, with all party leaders making the final choice. (Go to the Stop Muzzling MPs Campaign and the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign and Democratic Head Campaign or details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  4. Ensuring free, fair and representative elections – Change the current voting law and system (the Elections Act) to specifically restrict the Premier’s power to call an unfair snap election, so that election dates are fixed as much as possible under the parliamentary system. Change the Act also so that nomination and party leadership races are regulated by Elections Ontario (including limiting spending on campaigns for party leadership), and so that party leaders cannot appoint candidates except when a riding does not have a riding association, and so that Elections Ontario determines which parties can participate in election debates based upon merit criteria, and so that voters can give a reason if they decline their ballot (i.e. vote for “none of the above”) and to require Elections Ontario to educate voters about their legal right to decline their ballot, and to provide a more equal number of voters in every riding, and a more accurate representation in the legislature of the actual voter support for each political party (with a safeguard to ensure that a party with low-level, narrow-base support does not have a disproportionately high level of power in the legislature). (Go to the Democratic Voting Systems Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

V. General Accountability Measures

  1. Facilitating citizen watchdog groups over government and big business sectors – Require provincial government institutions to enclose one-page pamphlets periodically in their mailings to citizens, and to put a notice at the top of every email they send to citizens, inviting citizens to join citizen-funded and directed groups to represent citizen interests in policy-making and enforcement processes of key government departments (for example, on ethics, spending, and health care), and require big businesses in all provincially regulated industries (investment banking, property insurance, energy and other natural resources, food, water and landlords) to do the same thing, as has been proposed in the U.S. and recommended for Canadian banks and other financial institutions in 1998 by a federal task force, a legislature of Commons Committee, and a Senate Committee, and for the investment industry by an Ontario legislature committee. (Go to the Citizen Association Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  2. Ensuring effective whistleblower protection – Require everyone to report any violation of any law, regulation, policy, code, guideline or rule, and require all watchdog agencies over government (for example: Auditor General, Information and Privacy Commissioner, and Integrity Commissioner) to investigate and rule publicly on allegations of violations, and to penalize violators, to protect anyone (not just employees) who reports a violation (so-called “whistleblowers”) from retaliation, and to reward whistleblowers whose allegations are proven to be true, and to ensure a right to appeal to the courts. (Go to the Protect Whistleblowers Who Protect You Campaign for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)
  3. Ensuring loophole free laws and strong penalties for wrongdoers – Close any technical and other loopholes that have been identified in laws, regulations, policies, codes, guidelines and rules (especially those regulating government institutions and large corporations) to help ensure strong enforcement, and increase financial penalties for violations to a level that significantly effects the annual revenues/budget of the institution or corporation. (Go to the Campaigns page and the Corporate Responsibility Campaign page for details about Democracy Watch’s proposals)

Key Changes Needed to Close Loopholes in the Federal MP Ethics Code, and to Make Enforcement of the Code Effective

(Democracy Watch: November 2025)

A.  Key Changes Needed to Prevent, Prohibit and Penalize Unethical Activities by MPs and their Staff

The key changes needed to make the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons (MP Code) effective at preventing, prohibiting and penalizing conflicts of interest and unethical gift- and favour-trading by MPs and their staff are as follows:

1.  Expand the MP Code to cover MPs as soon as their election is confirmed by Elections Canada, and to have key rules cover MP staff who, because they are not covered by the Code, can do the things that MPs are prohibited from doing on behalf of the MP who employs them, and can also accept all gifts and favours;

2.  Add a rule to require MPs and their staff to tell the truth to stop the misleading spin that regularly and fatally undermines reasonable policy debates and discussions, and another rule to prohibit MPs from switching parties in between elections except when their party leader violates the law or breaks significant election promises or the party leader changes and moves the party in a completely different direction;

3.  Change in section 2 the word “expected” to “required” but delete subsections 2(a), (c) and (e) because they establish standards that are either too subjective or that are found in other rules in the Code, and combine subsections 2(b) and (d) to read: “MPs and their staff are required to arrange their private affairs so that foreseeable real or apparent conflicts of interest are prevented from arising, and if they, their family member or friend have a private interest that causes a real or apparent conflict of interest they are prohibited from participating in any discussion, decision or vote that affects that interest.  And delete related s. 3.1 as it essentially says that s. 2 is not enforceable.

4.  Close the huge ”general application” and “broad class of persons” and “financial interest” loopholes in the definition of “private interest” in subsections 3(2) and (3) and combine those subsections into a new rule that prohibits MPs and their staff from participating in any discussion, decision or vote when they have any real or apparent conflict of interest.  The loopholes currently in those subsections mean the MP Code only prohibits MPs from participating in decisions that affect very specific financial interests, and doesn’t apply to 99% of decisions MPs participate in, and so the loopholes allows them to take part in almost all decisions even when they, their family or friends can profit from the decision;

5.  Extend subsection 3(4) and sections 8-11 the MP Code to cover the private interests of extended family and friends of MPs and their staff so MPs and their staff are also prohibited from participating in discussions, decisions and votes when they have an opportunity to further the interests of those people;

6.  Add a new rule (as a restriction on s. 5 of the Code) to prohibit MPs from giving preferential treatment to anyone, especially anyone who has given them a gift or assisted them in any way;

7.  As the Parker Commission recommended back in 1987, prohibit MPs and their staff from having investments in businesses (which is allowed under ss. 17 and 24(3)(j)), and from having blind trusts (which is allowed under ss. 17 and 19);

8.  Change s. 7 of the MP Code to prohibit MPs and their staff from other outside activities, because they create clear conflicts of interest (other than professional requirements like doctors who have to practise a specific amount each year in order to retain their licence);

9.  Require MPs to work full-time, and to disclose a summary of their work activities, including communications with anyone or any entity who is trying to influence their decisions, in an online, searchable database;

10.  Change the gifts and benefits rule to ban MPs and their staff from accepting anything from anyone (including volunteer assistance under ss. 3(1)), who is trying to influence their decisions because even small gifts influence decisions, and delete s. 15 of the Code to ban “sponsored travel” because it is an unethical gift and essentially a form of legalized bribery;

11.  Change clauses in subsections 21(1) and 24(3) to require MPs and their staff to disclose in the Public Registry their assets and liabilities worth more than $1,000 (the current disclosure requirement is for everything worth more than $10,000, which is much too high), and add new clauses to require disclosure of all income (not just income of more than $1,000), and to disclose details about their past five year’s work before they became an MP to make it easy to track which organizations and issues they have ties to, and to disclose in the Public Registry which members of their extended family they have close relationships with including being aware of their business, investments and other private interests;

12.  Require the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (Ethics Commissioner) to determine for each departing MP and MP staff person the sliding-scale time period after they leave during which they will be prohibited from communicating with their former colleagues and government officials, with the scale based on what positions and committees they served in and how close their relationships are with Cabinet ministers, officials etc., and require former MPs and MP staff to disclose their post-activities online during this time period in a searchable database;

13.  Delete subsections 28(9) to (13) of the MP Code and replace them with provisions that empower and require the Ethics Commissioner, and only the Commissioner, to impose a sliding scale of penalties (specifically listed in the provisions) depending the seriousness of the violation of the MP Code, including significant fines and a loss of an MP’s seat in the House of Commons (or loss of job for an MP staff person) for the most serious violations – similar to the provision in subsection 502(3) of the Canada Elections Act (S.C. 2000, c. 9).  MPs should not be participating in decisions concerning determining violations or penalizing an MP or MP staff person because MPs are tainted by partisan bias and other biases.  The House of Commons has empowered the Ethics Commissioner to investigate and rule on violations, and so the Commissioner should also be empowered to impose the penalty (but penalties should be mandatory on a sliding scale so that the Commissioner is required to impose a penalty for every violation).


B.  Key Changes Needed to Make Enforcement of the MP Code Independent, Transparent, Timely, Effective and Accountable

The following changes are needed to ensure the enforcement of the MP Code is independent, transparent, timely, effective and accountable.  Click here to see a policy paper that sets out details concerning these much-needed changes to the current federal ethics enforcement system (similar changes are needed to every provincial, territorial and municipal ethics law enforcement system across Canada).

1.   Establish, by adding new provisions to the Parliament of Canada Act (by completely changing 81), a fully independent, fully non-partisan committee to conduct a public, merit-based search for short list (1-3) qualified candidates for the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner (Ethics Commissioner), and then have that committee make the final choice and submit the choice to an all-party committee for appointment (with no possibility of re-appointment as that gives the enforcer an incentive to please office holders by letting them off when they violate the rules). This should also be the system for the appointment of all Officers of Parliament, the Commissioner and all other top officers of the RCMP, the head of FINTRAC, the new Foreign Interference Transparency Commissioner, and all judges, all of whom need to be fully independent in order to be perceived as being capable of impartially and effectively enforcing the key democratic good government and anti-corruption laws they enforce.

2.   Add a new subsection to section 26 (or a new section after) of the MP Code that requires the Ethics Commissioner to conduct regular, unannounced audits of a randomly selected sample of office holders’ financial statements, participation in discussions, decisions and votes, outside activities, gifts and benefits and other matters and activities covered by the MP Code.

3.   Change subsection 26(6) of the MP Code to require the Ethics Commissioner publish online binding interpretations of every measure in the Code with examples of real situations, and to publish online a summary of the Commissioner’s advice each time an opinion about a new situation is given to any person covered by the Code, so everyone knows exactly what the law prohibits.

4.   Change section 32 of the MP Code to require the staff of all MPs to take the mandatory training within 120 days after the election, or whenever a new staff person joins an MP’s office, and to require all MPs and their staff to also take annual training.

5.   Add a new provision in section 27 of the MP Code to give members of the public, who employ and pay all MPs and their staff and the Ethics Commissioner, the right to file a complaint with the Ethics Commissioner.

6.   Change subsection 27(5.1) and add new subsections to section 27 of the MP Code to require the Ethics Commissioner to investigate and issue a public ruling on every complaint the Commissioner receives and every situation the Commissioner becomes aware of that raises any questions about whether an MP or their staff have complied with the Code, and (as set out above) to impose a sliding scale of penalties depending the seriousness of the violation.

7.   Add a new subsection to 86.1 of the Parliament of Canada Act giving any member of the public a clear right to challenge any decision by the Commissioner in court.


C.   Many Other Changes Needed to Prevent, Prohibit and Penalize Conflicts of Interest and to Ensure Democratic Good Government

The following changes are needed to other federal laws to prevent, prohibit and penalize conflicts of interest and to ensure democratic good government:

 Closing all the loopholes in the Conflict of Interest Act that allow for secret, unethical activities by Cabinet ministers, their staff, Cabinet appointees and top government officials (Click here to see details);

 Closing all the loopholes in the Ethics and Conflict of Interest Code for Senators that allow for secret, unethical activities by Senators, and extend key rules in that code to apply to the staff of Senators (Click here to see details (in English only));

 Closing all the loopholes that allow for secret, unethical lobbying (Click here to see details (in English only));

 Decreasing the donation limit in the Canada Elections Act to $75 (as the current annual individual donation limit of $3,500 (which increases by $50 each year) is essentially legalized bribery for those who can afford to make a top donation) (Click here to see details (in English only));

 Closing huge excessive secrecy loopholes in the federal Access to Information Act and strengthening enforcement (Click here to see details (in English only));

 Preventing, prohibiting and penalizing foreign interference (Click here to see a policy paper on key needed measures (in English only));

 Strengthening the whistleblower protection law (Click here to see details).


Join the call for these and other key government ethics changes across Canada at Democracy Watch’s Government Ethics Campaign


Background on Key Problems

Background on Key Problems that Make the
Federal Judicial Appointments System Too Political

To become a federally appointed judge, a person must either be a lawyer for 10 years or a lawyer and quasi-judicial tribunal member for a combined total of 10 years (See s. 3 of the Judges Act, and ss. 5.2 and 5.3 of the Federal Courts Act). There are Judicial Advisory Committees for each province and territory that review applications and recommend long lists of qualified candidates to the Minister of Justice.

The problems with the federal judicial appointments system that the case challenges are longstanding, and have been raised in the past, (see also here and here and here, and also all the evidence linked in Democracy Watch’s December 2020 affidavit, and most provinces have the same problems with their appointment system), as follows:

  1. Canada’s federal judicial appointment system is just a self-enforced policy of the federal government that can be changed at any time. In contrast, in the UK and in most provinces the appointment system is enshrined in law so that a Cabinet can’t change it without introducing a public bill that is debated by the legislature and the public.
  2. The Minister of Justice and Cabinet appoint a majority of the seven members of each Judicial Advisory Committee. They appoint:
    • three of the members directly;
    • one from a list of nominees submitted by the Law Society of the province/territory;
    • one from a list of nominees submitted by the provincial or territorial chapter of the Canadian Bar Association;
    • one from a list of nominees submitted by the jurisdiction’s Attorney General, and;
    • then the chief judge of the jurisdiction chooses the last member of each committee.

In contrast, Cabinet ministers in Quebec (sections 15 and 16) do not select any of the advisory committee members, and in Manitoba (s. 3.3) and B.C. (s. 21) choose a minority of the members of the advisory committee for their provincial courts. Ideally, the Cabinet should not choose any of the members of the committees. The federal Minister alone chooses to promote sitting judges to appeal courts. Ideally, a fully independent committee should be recommending a short list of 1-3 sitting judges as candidates for promotion to appeal courts.

  1. The federal judicial advisory committees are appointed by the Minister and Cabinet to renewable two-year terms. Ideally, even if the Minister and Cabinet members are removed from appointing any of the committee members (as recommended above in #2) the terms should not be renewable, to ensure regular turnover of committee members.
  2. Each committee submits a long list of candidates, which gives the Minister a lot of leeway to appoint whomever s/he wants. Ideally, the committees should submit only 1-3 candidates for each open judge position, with the minister required to choose from that short list, as in Quebec and the UK (and in the UK, where the committee only submits one candidate, the minister must explain in writing to the committee if s/he rejects the recommended candidate).
  3. Before making the final choice, the Minister shares each list of candidates with Cabinet ministers and MPs, and also party officials, from the province or territory. Ideally, the Minister should be prohibited from sharing the list with anyone.

BACKGROUNDER

Backgrounder on 4 Errors Made by federal Ethics Commissioner Mario Dion in his ruling on Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s participation in approving the WE Charity grant in spring 2020

(November 10, 2021)

Ethics Commissioner Mario Dion’s May 2021 ruling on Prime Minister Trudeau’s participation in the WE Charity grant approval process made four key errors in letting Trudeau off even though Trudeau clearly violated the federal government ethics law.

The Ethics Commissioner concluded that, because PM Trudeau’s spouse volunteers as an ambassador and champion for WE Charity, including hosting a podcast for it, and his mother and brother have been paid large sums to give speeches for the charity, and the PM has also appeared at several WE events, there was a strong appearance of conflict between the Trudeau family’s relationship with WE and Mr. Trudeau’s duty to make decisions that best serve the public interest.” (paragraphs 248-250).

Trudeau has said he should have recused himself, and Ethics Commissioner Dion says at the end of his ruling that “it is always advisable to recuse oneself and inform the Commissioner promptly when facing an apparent conflict of interest” (paragraph 269). Why? Because it is clearly improper to take part in a decision when in an apparent conflict.

  1. Failure to rule that Trudeau had a real conflict of interest

However, the Ethics Commissioner’s ruling first claims, wrongly, that Trudeau was not in a real or potential conflict of interest. Democracy Watch’s position is that, because of the extensive, direct and ongoing family ties between the Trudeau family and WE, especially the fact that his spouse is a WE ambassador and podcaster, the PM was clearly in a potential conflict of interest when WE Charity began engaging with the government about the grant, and then in a real conflict of interest as soon as WE Charity engaged with Cabinet and the PMO.

In the Trudeau II Report about the SNC-Lavalin scandal involving the Prime Minister and other top government officials, Commissioner Dion defined “private interests” as including “financial, social or political interests (paragraphs 288 to 292). In his ruling on the WE Charity grant, he concluded that the grant definitely benefited WE’s private interests but ignored the fact that the grant would very likely, by helping WE financially and deepening the relationship between WE and the PM’s government and family, also benefit the social interests of his WE-ambassador spouse and his family members who spoke at WE events, and the PM’s political interests as WE would have continued to promote the PM as it has for more than a decade (paragraphs 233-238 and 243-244).

  1. Failure to rule that Conflict of Interest Act covers apparent conflicts of interest

Secondly, the Ethics Commissioner’s ruling claims, wrongly, that being in an appearance of a conflict of interest is not a violation of the federal Conflict of Interest Act (CofI Act), and that only being in a real or potential conflict of interest is (paragraphs 252-268).

This part of the ruling is wrong because the purpose of the CofI Act is to prevent all “conflicts of interest” whether real, apparent or potential (subsections 3(b) and (c)), and the Act prohibits federal politicians and government officials from participating in specific decisions like handing out grants and contracts when they are “in a conflict of interest” (sections 4 and 6) which includes any type of conflict of interest, real, apparent or potential (as the Federal Court of Appeal ruled unanimously in 2009 (para. 49)).

  1. Failure to rule that Trudeau and Keilburger borthers, who head up WE Charity, are friends

Thirdly, the CofI Act prohibits politicians furthering not only their own interests but also “those of his or her relatives or friends or to improperly further another person’s private interests” (​sections 4 and 6). As mentioned above, the WE Charity grant could benefit Trudeau and his relatives’ interests. In addition, the Ethics Commissioner ignored evidence that Trudeau and his spouse are friends of the Kielburger brothers who head up WE. Craig Keilburger described Trudeau as a friend in a ​November 2015 interview with the Ottawa Citizen. At the same time ​at the WE event where he gave his first speech as Prime Minister, Trudeau describe both Craig and his brother Marc as friends. Given this, and that the ties between the families have only increased since then, again including that Trudeau’s spouse is a WE Ambassador, the Ethics Commissioner was wrong to conclude that that they are not friends (paragraphs 239 to 241 of his ruling).

  1. Failure to find that Trudeau acted improperly, which is a violation of the Act

Fourthly, Commissioner Dion’s ruling ignores the real meaning of the second part of section 4 of the CofI Act that prohibits taking part in a decision if it offers an opportunity to “improperly further” another person’s or entity’s interests. That is a very broad prohibition, as the Commissioner himself concluded in the Trudeau II Report on the SNC-Lavalin scandal (paragraphs 286 and 296-301). According to the Commissioner, “improper” includes a violation of any of the PM’s Code rules, and that Code’s Annex B rule prohibits the PM and ministers from being in an appearance of conflict of interest.

Again Trudeau has said he should have recused himself, and Ethics Commissioner Dion says at the end of his ruling that “it is always advisable to recuse oneself and inform the Commissioner promptly when facing an apparent conflict of interest” (paragraph 269). Why? Because it is clearly improper to take part in a decision when in an apparent conflict.

Backgrounder

10 Key Rules for Fair, Democratic Minority Government

  1. Until the Governor General has communicated directly with all the party leaders, the Governor General will not make a decision about which party or parties (through either a formal coalition or legislative agreement) will be given the opportunity to govern first (i.e. to appoint a Cabinet and introduce a Speech from the Throne in Parliament);
  2. The party that wins the most seats in the election will be given the first opportunity to govern, including in partnership or coalition with another party, unless the leaders of other parties representing a majority of members of the legislature indicate clearly to the Governor General that they will not support that party and that they have agreed to form a coalition government or have agreed on a common legislative agenda;
  3. Within 30 days after the Governor General decides which party or parties will be given the first opportunity to govern, the Governor General and the governing party/parties will open Parliament with a Speech from the Throne;
  4. Even if the leaders of parties that represent a majority of members of the House of Commons do not indicate lack of support for the party that wins the most seats before that party’s Speech from the Throne, if they subsequently indicate lack of support for the Speech, the Governor General will not allow the Prime Minister-designate to prorogue the legislature before the Speech from the Throne is voted on by members of the House of Commons;
  5. If a majority of members in the House of Commons vote against the Speech from the Throne, the Governor General, before agreeing to any request by the Prime Minister’s to call an election, will give the opposition parties an opportunity to govern if they present a written agreement to the Governor General for either a formal coalition or legislative agreement;
  6. After the vote on the Speech from the Throne, the only vote in House of Commons that shall be a vote of non-confidence is a vote on a motion that states: “The House of Commons does not have confidence in the government.”
  7. If opposition parties introduce a motion of non-confidence in the governing party at any time after election day, the Governor General will not allow the Prime Minister to prorogue the legislature before the motion is voted on by the House of Commons;
  8. If a majority in the House of Commons votes to approve a motion of non-confidence in the governing party before the next fixed-election date, the Governor General will, before agreeing to any request by the Prime Minister that the Governor General call an election, give the opposition parties an opportunity to govern if they present a written agreement to the Governor General for either a formal coalition or legislative agreement;
  9. As Britain’s fixed election date law set out, if a majority in the House of Commons votes to rescind the vote of non-confidence within two weeks after the vote passed, then an early election will not occur, but if the vote is not rescinded then the Prime Minister is required to request the Governor General to call an election, and;
  10. As Britain’s fixed election date law set out, the Prime Minister is prohibited from calling an early snap election before the fixed election date unless a majority in the House of Commons have approved a voted of non-confidence and the vote has not been rescinded by a majority.

Backgrounder – Weak Enforcement of Financial Consumer and Investor Protection in Canada

(August 2025)

Both watchdogs too weak in powers, and enforcement attitude, to protect financial consumers and investors

The federal government’s Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC) has a very weak enforcement record since it was created in 2003.

It has made only 145 compliance rulings, is prohibited from naming a law-violating bank unless it prosecutes the bank, and it has only prosecuted 2 banks (neither of them a Big 6 bank). The FCAC not only lacks resources by comparison to the similar watchdog agencies in Britain and the U.S., it is also clearly a lapdog compared to these two other agencies.

According to an article by Reuters in March 2017, and Democracy Watch’s research of fines imposed since then, the FCAC has issued fines totalling just $20 million since 2001 in the 145 rulings it has issued.

In contrast, since 2013 when it was created until the end of 2024, Britain’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) issued penalties totalling 4.76 billion pounds ($8.86 billion Can.), and since 2011 when it was created up to January 2025, the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) imposed penalties totalling $24.7 billion U.S. ($34.1 billion Can.).

Key consumer protection rules need to be strengthened, and the FCAC must be required to do unannounced, mystery-shopper audits to find violations, required to publicly identify financial institutions who violate the rules, and required to impose high fines on violators. The FCAC hasn’t done unannounced audits since 2005, tipped off the banks in March 2017 about the audit they did through the rest of 2017 on abuses, and then allowed the banks to see the draft audit results and suggest changes that weakened the report.

Meanwhile, former Finance Minister Jim Flaherty, and former Finance Minister Bill Morneau, did nothing, and current Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland moved as slowly as possible to require TD, Royal, Scotiabank or National Bank to stop using their own complaint judges and return to the Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSI — which finally happened in November 2024).

All banks and investment companies should be required to use OBSI, and allow financial consumers and investors to complain directly to OBSI without having to go through a financial institution’s internal complaint system, and OBSI’s rulings on complaints by bank customers and investors must be made binding in every case.

An FCAC report released in February 2020 showed that the banks have a horrible record of dealing with financial consumer and investor complaints, especially the banks that use their own complaint judges.

And while the maximum fine allowed under the Bank Act was finally increased in 2018 to the meaningful penalty of $50 million, it is very unlikely the FCAC or a court will ever impose the maximum fine so they must be required to impose a minimum fine of at least $1 million for each violation, and a sliding scale of required penalties for more serious violations up to the $50 million maximum fine for the most serious, systemic violations.

The Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC) and the Ombudsman (OBSI) will continue to be ineffective until the federal government gives them key powers and requires them to use those powers to audit banks and other financial institutions regularly and to penalize every violation with a high fine (there should be minimum fines for various violations of at least $1 million, and the maximum fine should be $50 million) and public naming and shaming.

Finally, to ensure the FCAC and OBSI do their jobs properly, and to ensure that financial consumers and investors have help when complaining to the FCAC and OBSI, require banks, trust and insurance companies to promote in their mailings and emails to customers that they can join an independent, consumer-run Financial Consumer Organization (FCO – as recommended in 1998 by the MacKay Task Force, and the House Finance and Senate Banking committees) so consumers have a place to call for help if they are gouged or treated unfairly, and to get fully independent, expert advice (See details at: https://democracywatch.ca/question-and-answers-about-the-proposed-financial-consumer-organization/). Also, banks and the largest mutual fund companies must be required to promote in their mailings and emails to customers that they can join an independent, consumer-run Individual Investor Organization (IIO – as recommended by an Ontario legislative committee in 2006) so they have have a place to call for help if they are ripped off or treated unfairly, and to get fully independent, expert advice (See details at: https://democracywatch.ca/question-and-answers-about-individual-investor-organization-iio/).

For more information, see Democracy Watch’s
Bank Accountability Campaign