Background on Key Problems that Make the
Federal Judicial Appointments System Too Political

To become a federally appointed judge, a person must either be a lawyer for 10 years or a lawyer and quasi-judicial tribunal member for a combined total of 10 years (See s. 3 of the Judges Act, and ss. 5.2 and 5.3 of the Federal Courts Act). There are Judicial Advisory Committees for each province and territory that review applications and recommend long lists of qualified candidates to the Minister of Justice.

The problems with the federal judicial appointments system that the case challenges are longstanding, and have been raised in the past, (see also here and here and here, and also all the evidence linked in Democracy Watch’s December 2020 affidavit, and most provinces have the same problems with their appointment system), as follows:

1. Canada’s federal judicial appointment system is just a self-enforced policy of the federal government that can be changed at any time. In contrast, in the UK and in most provinces the appointment system is enshrined in law so that a Cabinet can’t change it without introducing a public bill that is debated by the legislature and the public.
2. The Minister of Justice and Cabinet appoint a majority of the seven members of each Judicial Advisory Committee. They appoint:
   1. three of the members directly;
   2. one from a list of nominees submitted by the Law Society of the province/territory;
   3. one from a list of nominees submitted by the provincial or territorial chapter of the Canadian Bar Association;
   4. one from a list of nominees submitted by the jurisdiction’s Attorney General, and;
   5. then the chief judge of the jurisdiction chooses the last member of each committee.

In contrast, Cabinet ministers in Quebec (sections 15 and 16) do not select any of the advisory committee members, and in Manitoba (s. 3.3) and B.C. (s. 21) choose a minority of the members of the advisory committee for their provincial courts. Ideally, the Cabinet should not choose any of the members of the committees. The federal Minister alone chooses to promote sitting judges to appeal courts. Ideally, a fully independent committee should be recommending a short list of 1-3 sitting judges as candidates for promotion to appeal courts.

3. The federal judicial advisory committees are appointed by the Minister and Cabinet to renewable two-year terms. Ideally, even if the Minister and Cabinet members are removed from appointing any of the committee members (as recommended above in #2) the terms should not be renewable, to ensure regular turnover of committee members.
4. Each committee submits a long list of candidates, which gives the Minister a lot of leeway to appoint whomever s/he wants. Ideally, the committees should submit only 1-3 candidates for each open judge position, with the minister required to choose from that short list, as in Quebec and the UK (and in the UK, where the committee only submits one candidate, the minister must explain in writing to the committee if s/he rejects the recommended candidate).
5. Before making the final choice, the Minister shares each list of candidates with Cabinet ministers and MPs, and also party officials, from the province or territory. Ideally, the Minister should be prohibited from sharing the list with anyone.

Background on Key Problems that Make the
Federal Judicial Appointments System Too Political

To become a federally appointed judge, a person must either be a lawyer for 10 years or a lawyer and quasi-judicial tribunal member for a combined total of 10 years (See s. 3 of the Judges Act, and ss. 5.2 and 5.3 of the Federal Courts Act). There are Judicial Advisory Committees for each province and territory that review applications and recommend long lists of qualified candidates to the Minister of Justice.

The problems with the federal judicial appointments system that the case challenges are longstanding, and have been raised in the past, (see also here and here and here, and also all the evidence linked in Democracy Watch’s December 2020 affidavit, and most provinces have the same problems with their appointment system), as follows:

1. Canada’s federal judicial appointment system is just a self-enforced policy of the federal government that can be changed at any time. In contrast, in the UK and in most provinces the appointment system is enshrined in law so that a Cabinet can’t change it without introducing a public bill that is debated by the legislature and the public.
2. The Minister of Justice and Cabinet appoint a majority of the seven members of each Judicial Advisory Committee. They appoint:
   1. three of the members directly;
   2. one from a list of nominees submitted by the Law Society of the province/territory;
   3. one from a list of nominees submitted by the provincial or territorial chapter of the Canadian Bar Association;
   4. one from a list of nominees submitted by the jurisdiction’s Attorney General, and;
   5. then the chief judge of the jurisdiction chooses the last member of each committee.

In contrast, Cabinet ministers in Quebec (sections 15 and 16) do not select any of the advisory committee members, and in Manitoba (s. 3.3) and B.C. (s. 21) choose a minority of the members of the advisory committee for their provincial courts. Ideally, the Cabinet should not choose any of the members of the committees. The federal Minister alone chooses to promote sitting judges to appeal courts. Ideally, a fully independent committee should be recommending a short list of 1-3 sitting judges as candidates for promotion to appeal courts.

3. The federal judicial advisory committees are appointed by the Minister and Cabinet to renewable two-year terms. Ideally, even if the Minister and Cabinet members are removed from appointing any of the committee members (as recommended above in #2) the terms should not be renewable, to ensure regular turnover of committee members.
4. Each committee submits a long list of candidates, which gives the Minister a lot of leeway to appoint whomever s/he wants. Ideally, the committees should submit only 1-3 candidates for each open judge position, with the minister required to choose from that short list, as in Quebec and the UK (and in the UK, where the committee only submits one candidate, the minister must explain in writing to the committee if s/he rejects the recommended candidate).
5. Before making the final choice, the Minister shares each list of candidates with Cabinet ministers and MPs, and also party officials, from the province or territory. Ideally, the Minister should be prohibited from sharing the list with anyone.

Backgrounder on 4 Errors Made by federal Ethics Commissioner Mario Dion in his ruling on Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s participation in approving the WE Charity grant in spring 2020

(November 10, 2021)

Ethics Commissioner Mario Dion’s May 2021 ruling on Prime Minister Trudeau’s participation in the WE Charity grant approval process made four key errors in letting Trudeau off even though Trudeau clearly violated the federal government ethics law.

The Ethics Commissioner concluded that, because PM Trudeau’s spouse volunteers as an ambassador and champion for WE Charity, including hosting a podcast for it, and his mother and brother have been paid large sums to give speeches for the charity, and the PM has also appeared at several WE events, there was “a strong appearance of conflict between the Trudeau family’s relationship with WE and Mr. Trudeau’s duty to make decisions that best serve the public interest.” (paragraphs 248-250).

Trudeau has said he should have recused himself, and Ethics Commissioner Dion says at the end of his ruling that “it is always advisable to recuse oneself and inform the Commissioner promptly when facing an apparent conflict of interest” (paragraph 269). Why? Because it is clearly improper to take part in a decision when in an apparent conflict.

1. Failure to rule that Trudeau had a real conflict of interest

However, the Ethics Commissioner’s ruling first claims, wrongly, that Trudeau was not in a real or potential conflict of interest. Democracy Watch’s position is that, because of the extensive, direct and ongoing family ties between the Trudeau family and WE, especially the fact that his spouse is a WE ambassador and podcaster, the PM was clearly in a potential conflict of interest when WE Charity began engaging with the government about the grant, and then in a real conflict of interest as soon as WE Charity engaged with Cabinet and the PMO.

In the Trudeau II Report about the SNC-Lavalin scandal involving the Prime Minister and other top government officials, Commissioner Dion defined “private interests” as including “financial, social or political interests (paragraphs 288 to 292). In his ruling on the WE Charity grant, he concluded that the grant definitely benefited WE’s private interests but ignored the fact that the grant would very likely, by helping WE financially and deepening the relationship between WE and the PM’s government and family, also benefit the social interests of his WE-ambassador spouse and his family members who spoke at WE events, and the PM’s political interests as WE would have continued to promote the PM as it has for more than a decade (paragraphs 233-238 and 243-244).

2. Failure to rule that Conflict of Interest Act covers apparent conflicts of interest

Secondly, the Ethics Commissioner’s ruling claims, wrongly, that being in an appearance of a conflict of interest is not a violation of the federal Conflict of Interest Act (CofI Act), and that only being in a real or potential conflict of interest is (paragraphs 252-268).

This part of the ruling is wrong because the purpose of the CofI Act is to prevent all “conflicts of interest” whether real, apparent or potential (subsections 3(b) and (c)), and the Act prohibits federal politicians and government officials from participating in specific decisions like handing out grants and contracts when they are “in a conflict of interest” (sections 4 and 6) which includes any type of conflict of interest, real, apparent or potential (as the Federal Court of Appeal ruled unanimously in 2009 (para. 49)).

3. Failure to rule that Trudeau and Keilburger borthers, who head up WE Charity, are friends

Thirdly, the CofI Act prohibits politicians furthering not only their own interests but also “those of his or her relatives or friends or to improperly further another person’s private interests” (​sections 4 and 6). As mentioned above, the WE Charity grant could benefit Trudeau and his relatives’ interests. In addition, the Ethics Commissioner ignored evidence that Trudeau and his spouse are friends of the Kielburger brothers who head up WE. Craig Keilburger described Trudeau as a friend in a ​November 2015 interview with the Ottawa Citizen. At the same time ​at the WE event where he gave his first speech as Prime Minister, Trudeau describe both Craig and his brother Marc as friends. Given this, and that the ties between the families have only increased since then, again including that Trudeau’s spouse is a WE Ambassador, the Ethics Commissioner was wrong to conclude that that they are not friends (paragraphs 239 to 241 of his ruling).

4. Failure to find that Trudeau acted improperly, which is a violation of the Act

Fourthly, Commissioner Dion’s ruling ignores the real meaning of the second part of section 4 of the CofI Act that prohibits taking part in a decision if it offers an opportunity to “improperly further” another person’s or entity’s interests. That is a very broad prohibition, as the Commissioner himself concluded in the Trudeau II Report on the SNC-Lavalin scandal (paragraphs 286 and 296-301). According to the Commissioner, “improper” includes a violation of any of the PM’s Code rules, and that Code’s Annex B rule prohibits the PM and ministers from being in an appearance of conflict of interest.

Again Trudeau has said he should have recused himself, and Ethics Commissioner Dion says at the end of his ruling that “it is always advisable to recuse oneself and inform the Commissioner promptly when facing an apparent conflict of interest” (paragraph 269). Why? Because it is clearly improper to take part in a decision when in an apparent conflict.

Sorry, this entry is only available in Français.

Sorry, this entry is only available in Français.

Sorry, this entry is only available in Français.

10 Key Rules for Fair, Democratic Minority Government

1. Until the Governor General has communicated directly with all the party leaders, the Governor General will not make a decision about which party or parties (through either a formal coalition or legislative agreement) will be given the opportunity to govern first (i.e. to appoint a Cabinet and introduce a Speech from the Throne in Parliament);
2. The party that wins the most seats in the election will be given the first opportunity to govern, including in partnership or coalition with another party, unless the leaders of other parties representing a majority of members of the legislature indicate clearly to the Governor General that they will not support that party and that they have agreed to form a coalition government or have agreed on a common legislative agenda;
3. Within 30 days after the Governor General decides which party or parties will be given the first opportunity to govern, the Governor General and the governing party/parties will open Parliament with a Speech from the Throne;
4. Even if the leaders of parties that represent a majority of members of the House of Commons do not indicate lack of support for the party that wins the most seats before that party’s Speech from the Throne, if they subsequently indicate lack of support for the Speech, the Governor General will not allow the Prime Minister-designate to prorogue the legislature before the Speech from the Throne is voted on by members of the House of Commons;
5. If a majority of members in the House of Commons vote against the Speech from the Throne, the Governor General, before agreeing to any request by the Prime Minister’s to call an election, will give the opposition parties an opportunity to govern if they present a written agreement to the Governor General for either a formal coalition or legislative agreement;
6. After the vote on the Speech from the Throne, the only vote in House of Commons that shall be a vote of non-confidence is a vote on a motion that states: “The House of Commons does not have confidence in the government.”
7. If opposition parties introduce a motion of non-confidence in the governing party at any time after election day, the Governor General will not allow the Prime Minister to prorogue the legislature before the motion is voted on by the House of Commons;
8. If a majority in the House of Commons votes to approve a motion of non-confidence in the governing party before the next fixed-election date, the Governor General will, before agreeing to any request by the Prime Minister that the Governor General call an election, give the opposition parties an opportunity to govern if they present a written agreement to the Governor General for either a formal coalition or legislative agreement;
9. As Britain’s fixed election date law set out, if a majority in the House of Commons votes to rescind the vote of non-confidence within two weeks after the vote passed, then an early election will not occur, but if the vote is not rescinded then the Prime Minister is required to request the Governor General to call an election, and;
10. As Britain’s fixed election date law set out, the Prime Minister is prohibited from calling an early snap election before the fixed election date unless a majority in the House of Commons have approved a voted of non-confidence and the vote has not been rescinded by a majority.

Sorry, this entry is only available in Français.

(August 2025)

Both watchdogs too weak in powers, and enforcement attitude, to protect financial consumers and investors

The federal government’s Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC) has a very weak enforcement record since it was created in 2003.

It has made only 145 compliance rulings, is prohibited from naming a law-violating bank unless it prosecutes the bank, and it has only prosecuted 2 banks (neither of them a Big 6 bank). The FCAC not only lacks resources by comparison to the similar watchdog agencies in Britain and the U.S., it is also clearly a lapdog compared to these two other agencies.

According to an article by Reuters in March 2017, and Democracy Watch’s research of fines imposed since then, the FCAC has issued fines totalling just $20 million since 2001 in the 145 rulings it has issued.

In contrast, since 2013 when it was created until the end of 2024, Britain’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) issued penalties totalling 4.76 billion pounds ($8.86 billion Can.), and since 2011 when it was created up to January 2025, the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) imposed penalties totalling $24.7 billion U.S. ($34.1 billion Can.).

Key consumer protection rules need to be strengthened, and the FCAC must be required to do unannounced, mystery-shopper audits to find violations, required to publicly identify financial institutions who violate the rules, and required to impose high fines on violators. The FCAC hasn’t done unannounced audits since 2005, tipped off the banks in March 2017 about the audit they did through the rest of 2017 on abuses, and then allowed the banks to see the draft audit results and suggest changes that weakened the report.

Meanwhile, former Finance Minister Jim Flaherty, and former Finance Minister Bill Morneau, did nothing, and current Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland moved as slowly as possible to require TD, Royal, Scotiabank or National Bank to stop using their own complaint judges and return to the Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSI — which finally happened in November 2024).

All banks and investment companies should be required to use OBSI, and allow financial consumers and investors to complain directly to OBSI without having to go through a financial institution’s internal complaint system, and OBSI’s rulings on complaints by bank customers and investors must be made binding in every case.

An FCAC report released in February 2020 showed that the banks have a horrible record of dealing with financial consumer and investor complaints, especially the banks that use their own complaint judges.

And while the maximum fine allowed under the Bank Act was finally increased in 2018 to the meaningful penalty of $50 million, it is very unlikely the FCAC or a court will ever impose the maximum fine so they must be required to impose a minimum fine of at least $1 million for each violation, and a sliding scale of required penalties for more serious violations up to the $50 million maximum fine for the most serious, systemic violations.

The Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC) and the Ombudsman (OBSI) will continue to be ineffective until the federal government gives them key powers and requires them to use those powers to audit banks and other financial institutions regularly and to penalize every violation with a high fine (there should be minimum fines for various violations of at least $1 million, and the maximum fine should be $50 million) and public naming and shaming.

Finally, to ensure the FCAC and OBSI do their jobs properly, and to ensure that financial consumers and investors have help when complaining to the FCAC and OBSI, require banks, trust and insurance companies to promote in their mailings and emails to customers that they can join an independent, consumer-run Financial Consumer Organization (FCO – as recommended in 1998 by the MacKay Task Force, and the House Finance and Senate Banking committees) so consumers have a place to call for help if they are gouged or treated unfairly, and to get fully independent, expert advice (See details at: https://democracywatch.ca/question-and-answers-about-the-proposed-financial-consumer-organization/). Also, banks and the largest mutual fund companies must be required to promote in their mailings and emails to customers that they can join an independent, consumer-run Individual Investor Organization (IIO – as recommended by an Ontario legislative committee in 2006) so they have have a place to call for help if they are ripped off or treated unfairly, and to get fully independent, expert advice (See details at: https://democracywatch.ca/question-and-answers-about-individual-investor-organization-iio/).

For more information, see Democracy Watch’s
Bank Accountability Campaign

Sorry, this entry is only available in Français.

(December 2025)

Controlling the market, and gouging out world-leading, record profits year after year for the past decade, while reducing service and treating many customers unfairly

According to Finance Canada, despite the lowering of barriers to competition 20 years ago under a World Trade Organization agreement, Canada’s Big 6 Banks:

• Bank of Montreal (BMO)
• Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)
• National Bank
• Royal Bank of Canada (RBC)
• Bank of Nova Scotia (Scotiabank)
• Toronto Dominion Bank (TD)

control 93 per cent of all banking assets, and are more profitable than comparable banks in other countries, and than small banks in Canada, and Canada’s corporate sector overall. The big banks control of the market essentially allows them to gouge and abuse customers with excessive fees, high interest rates (especially on credit cards). As a result, government regulation is needed to stop them.

The federal government bailed out the banks with $114 billion in mortgage purchases during the financial industry fraud crisis in 2009. It hasn’t required the banks to do anything in return for that bailout, or for the protections from foreign competition that the government has given the banks since 1967.

Canada’s Big 6 Banks reported, yet again, excessively high annual profits totalling $70 billion in 2025, almost $50 billion higher than their 2010 profits, all reaped through gouging their customers with excessively high credit card and other credit interest rates and mutual fund and other banking fees.

The banks gouged all Canadians who had loans back in 2015 by failing to lower their interest rates as much as the Bank of Canada had lowered its interest rate, and then the banks abused everyone with savings accounts by failing to increase their deposit account interest rates as much as the Bank of Canada when it began raising its interest rate in 2022.

Canada’s Big 6 Banks also paid their CEOs an average of $11 million each in 2023, and the average increased to $12.3 million in 2024 – 55% higher than in 2008).

Canada’s Big 6 Banks also handed out $27.3 billion in 2025 in bonuses to their employees.

The federal government also continues to refuse to make the Big Banks pay their fair share of taxes. Canada’s Big Banks pay a tax rate of only 16% — lower than banks in other G7 countries. The Big Banks also exploit tax loopholes more more than all other Canadian big businesses. England imposed a permanent annual excess profits tax on its banks in 2011, and Australia did the same in 2017.

For more information, see Democracy Watch’s
Bank Accountability Campaign