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Loophole-filled, weakly enforced lobbying and ethics laws a sad joke

The following op-ed by Democracy Watch Co-founder Duff Conacher was published in slightly edited form in the Hill Times on January 19, 2022.


The federal Lobbying Act and Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct, and federal ethics rules in the Conflict of Interest Act, MPs’ and Senators’ ethics codes, and public servants’ code, continue to be a collective sad joke because of huge loopholes, fatal flaws, and weak, secretive enforcement by the Ethics Commissioner, Lobbying Commissioner, deputy ministers and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner.

These commissioners are handpicked by the Cabinet through secretive processes that the Federal Court of Appeal has ruled are biased. The appointment process for these and all other federal democratic good government watchdogs, including judges, needs to be made much more independent of Cabinet to remove the taint of self-interested partisanship that undermines public confidence.

The Supreme Court ruled in 1996 that government ethics-related laws and codes must set high transparency and integrity standards, and be strictly and strongly enforced, or Canada will not be a democracy. More than 25 years later, we are still far from meeting the Supreme Court’s standard.

The loophole-filled, flawed federal rules: 1. allow for secret, unethical lobbying, mainly by big business lobbyists; 2. allow Cabinet ministers, their staff, top government officials, MPs and senators all to participate in decisions that they and their family members can profit or benefit from in secret, and; 3. do not even cover staff of MPs and senators.

Only one of the loopholes is usually mentioned in articles about the Lobbying Act – the rule that allows an employee of a business to lobby in secret without registering as long as they don’t lobby more than 20 percent of their work time. The House Ethics Committee unanimously called for that loophole to be closed 10 years ago, and again last June.

But there are other huge loopholes the Committee continues to ignore. Businesses often lobby enforcement agencies about the enforcement of a law or regulation – none of that lobbying is required to be disclosed. Many businesses also lobby for tax credits but in a highly questionable enforcement policy the Commissioner of Lobbying ruled that the credits are not a “financial benefit” (even though they clearly are) and, therefore, that lobbying also does not have to be disclosed.

No one is required to register and disclose their lobbying if they are not paid for it. Hired-gun “consultant” lobbyists can easily have their contract say their clients will pay them for advice, and then lobby for them in secret for free. This loophole also allows unpaid board members and retired executives of businesses and other organizations to lobby in secret.

Another loophole is that anyone can secretly lobby senior officials in any federal political party and they can pass on your demands to their party’s politicians.

Even if a person is required to register their lobbying, only oral, pre-arranged communications that they initiate with office holders are required to be disclosed. Emails, letters, and any communications initiated by the office holder (other than about a government financial benefit) can be kept secret.

If you can exploit a loophole so you are not required to register your lobbying, then the ethics rules in the Lobbyists’ Code don’t apply to you and you can do favours for politicians you are lobbying or will lobby, like fundraising and campaigning for them.

Even if you are a registered lobbyist, the Code together with a loophole in the MP and senator ethics codes legalize lobbyists giving MPs the gift of unlimited sponsored travel, and other loopholes allow all federal politicians to accept gifts from friends, even if they are lobbyists.

The Lobbying Commissioner is currently proposing to weaken other Code rules to allow for even more unethical lobbying.

The loopholes also allow federal politicians and officials to leave office and start lobbying federal politicians and government officials the next day, in secret and unregistered. The so-called “five-year ban” in the Lobbying Act only applies to registered lobbyists.

And while there is a cooling-off period in the ethics law for Cabinet ministers and top government officials after they leave office, it is also so full of loopholes that they can start working right away with most lobby groups. The stronger rules that prohibit giving advice based on secret information obtained in office, or taking improper advantage of your former office, have essentially been ignored by the Ethics Commissioner.

The much-too-high political donation and third-party spending limits in the Canada Elections Act, are additional layers in this smelly layer cake of unethical federal political decision-making. They allow people who can afford it to buy influence by donating up to $3,350 annually to each party and its riding associations, and wealthy individuals and lobby groups to spend more than $500,000 supporting parties during election campaigns, up to $1 million in the couple of months before that, and an unlimited amount between elections. Banks, which are regulated by the federal government, are also allowed to buy influence by making unlimited loans to parties and candidates.

Finally, the Ethics Commissioner and Lobbying Commissioner are allowed to make secret rulings, both have let many people off for clear violations of the rules and, even if you are found guilty, the only penalty in most cases is a public report. The commissioners should be required to rule publicly on every situation they examine, and to impose significant fines on all violators.

Add it all up and it’s essentially a legalized bribery system of unethical, biased favour-trading – pay to play, cash for access and influence. This is not to say that every federal political decision-making process is undermined by politicians and officials returning favours – only that every process is vulnerable to being tainted, in secret, by serious conflicts of interests.

The key question is, will a critical mass of MPs in the current minority government situation work together to pass a bill to clean up this unethical mess, finally?

To join the call for key changes, go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign and Government Ethics Campaign and Money in Politics CampaignThe following op-ed by Democracy Watch Co-founder Duff Conacher was published in slightly edited form in the Hill Times on January 19, 2022.


The federal Lobbying Act and Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct, and federal ethics rules in the Conflict of Interest Act, MPs’ and Senators’ ethics codes, and public servants’ code, continue to be a collective sad joke because of huge loopholes, fatal flaws, and weak, secretive enforcement by the Ethics Commissioner, Lobbying Commissioner, deputy ministers and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner.

These commissioners are handpicked by the Cabinet through secretive processes that the Federal Court of Appeal has ruled are biased. The appointment process for these and all other federal democratic good government watchdogs, including judges, needs to be made much more independent of Cabinet to remove the taint of self-interested partisanship that undermines public confidence.

The Supreme Court ruled in 1996 that government ethics-related laws and codes must set high transparency and integrity standards, and be strictly and strongly enforced, or Canada will not be a democracy. More than 25 years later, we are still far from meeting the Supreme Court’s standard.

The loophole-filled, flawed federal rules: 1. allow for secret, unethical lobbying, mainly by big business lobbyists; 2. allow Cabinet ministers, their staff, top government officials, MPs and senators all to participate in decisions that they and their family members can profit or benefit from in secret, and; 3. do not even cover staff of MPs and senators.

Only one of the loopholes is usually mentioned in articles about the Lobbying Act – the rule that allows an employee of a business to lobby in secret without registering as long as they don’t lobby more than 20 percent of their work time. The House Ethics Committee unanimously called for that loophole to be closed 10 years ago, and again last June.

But there are other huge loopholes the Committee continues to ignore. Businesses often lobby enforcement agencies about the enforcement of a law or regulation – none of that lobbying is required to be disclosed. Many businesses also lobby for tax credits but in a highly questionable enforcement policy the Commissioner of Lobbying ruled that the credits are not a “financial benefit” (even though they clearly are) and, therefore, that lobbying also does not have to be disclosed.

No one is required to register and disclose their lobbying if they are not paid for it. Hired-gun “consultant” lobbyists can easily have their contract say their clients will pay them for advice, and then lobby for them in secret for free. This loophole also allows unpaid board members and retired executives of businesses and other organizations to lobby in secret.

Another loophole is that anyone can secretly lobby senior officials in any federal political party and they can pass on your demands to their party’s politicians.

Even if a person is required to register their lobbying, only oral, pre-arranged communications that they initiate with office holders are required to be disclosed. Emails, letters, and any communications initiated by the office holder (other than about a government financial benefit) can be kept secret.

If you can exploit a loophole so you are not required to register your lobbying, then the ethics rules in the Lobbyists’ Code don’t apply to you and you can do favours for politicians you are lobbying or will lobby, like fundraising and campaigning for them.

Even if you are a registered lobbyist, the Code together with a loophole in the MP and senator ethics codes legalize lobbyists giving MPs the gift of unlimited sponsored travel, and other loopholes allow all federal politicians to accept gifts from friends, even if they are lobbyists.

The Lobbying Commissioner is currently proposing to weaken other Code rules to allow for even more unethical lobbying.

The loopholes also allow federal politicians and officials to leave office and start lobbying federal politicians and government officials the next day, in secret and unregistered. The so-called “five-year ban” in the Lobbying Act only applies to registered lobbyists.

And while there is a cooling-off period in the ethics law for Cabinet ministers and top government officials after they leave office, it is also so full of loopholes that they can start working right away with most lobby groups. The stronger rules that prohibit giving advice based on secret information obtained in office, or taking improper advantage of your former office, have essentially been ignored by the Ethics Commissioner.

The much-too-high political donation and third-party spending limits in the Canada Elections Act, are additional layers in this smelly layer cake of unethical federal political decision-making. They allow people who can afford it to buy influence by donating up to $3,350 annually to each party and its riding associations, and wealthy individuals and lobby groups to spend more than $500,000 supporting parties during election campaigns, up to $1 million in the couple of months before that, and an unlimited amount between elections. Banks, which are regulated by the federal government, are also allowed to buy influence by making unlimited loans to parties and candidates.

Finally, the Ethics Commissioner and Lobbying Commissioner are allowed to make secret rulings, both have let many people off for clear violations of the rules and, even if you are found guilty, the only penalty in most cases is a public report. The commissioners should be required to rule publicly on every situation they examine, and to impose significant fines on all violators.

Add it all up and it’s essentially a legalized bribery system of unethical, biased favour-trading – pay to play, cash for access and influence. This is not to say that every federal political decision-making process is undermined by politicians and officials returning favours – only that every process is vulnerable to being tainted, in secret, by serious conflicts of interests.

The key question is, will a critical mass of MPs in the current minority government situation work together to pass a bill to clean up this unethical mess, finally?

To join the call for key changes, go to the Stop Secret, Unethical Lobbying Campaign and Government Ethics Campaign and Money in Politics Campaign

(Français) Federal Court rejects Trudeau Cabinet’s first attempt to have key evidence kept out of case challenging its too-political judicial appointments and promotions systemFederal Court rejects Trudeau Cabinet’s first attempt to have key evidence kept out of case challenging its too-political judicial appointments and promotions system

Trudeau Cabinet still trying to stop court from seeing government emails reported on in La Presse, and evidence that lawyer associations, law professors, experts and media all think the Liberals’ appointment process is too political

Case hearing in 2022 – case alleges Trudeau Liberal’s consultation with only Liberals across Canada taints appointments with partisan bias that violates independence of courts and public’s Charter right to impartial courts

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Wednesday, December 15, 2021

OTTAWA – Today, Democracy Watch announced that the Federal Court rejected (PDF) the Trudeau Cabinet’s first attempt to have key evidence thrown out in its case challenging the federal government’s too-political, unconstitutional system for appointing judges to the federal courts and all provincial superior courts and courts of appeal, and promoting judges within those courts.

The evidence shows clearly that federal appointments system for judges is too open to political interference that violates the constitutional principle that guarantees the independence of courts, and the public’s Charter right to impartial courts.

Department of Justice lawyers are still trying to prevent the Federal Court from considering almost all of the evidence that Democracy Watch filed in a December 2020 affidavit (PDF) and in a second affidavit (PDF) about internal government emails reported on in La Presse on October 31, 2020.

Parts of the evidence in exhibits attached to the second affidavit will be considered confidentially by the Federal Court under an order of the court (the PDF of the second affidavit that is linked above is redacted to remove the currently confidential information).

The Trudeau Cabinet’s lawyers are trying to hide from the Federal Court almost all of Democracy Watch’s December 2020 affidavit – exhibits D to J, N to W and Z to BB – which contain all of the open letters and articles that lawyer associations, law professors, lawyers, experts and media have produced in the last few years expressing their concerns about how political the federal judicial appointment is, and how that undermines the public’s confidence in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

Wade Poziomka of Ross & McBride LLP is leading the litigation team representing Democracy Watch and its co-founder Duff Conacher in the case.

The federal appointment process for the federal and provincial superior and appeal courts matters a lot because the Supreme Court of Canada refuses to hear 90% of appeals from these courts, and many appeals are also refused by provincial appeal courts, so in many cases the provincial superior courts are the public’s court of last resort. The constitutional guarantee of the independence of the courts has been upheld in several rulings on the measures in Part VII of the Constitution. And sections 7 and 11(d) (and, indirectly, 24(1)) of the Charter have been applied in rulings to ensure impartial court hearings.

The problems are longstanding, and have been raised in the past: unlike in the UK and Quebec, the federal Minister of Justice has too much political control of the process from start to finish, from choosing the majority of the members of the judicial appointment advisory committees in each province and territory (who serve renewable two-year terms), to receiving long lists of candidates from those committees, to circulating those lists secretly to MPs, Cabinet ministers and ruling party officials before making the final choice. The Minister also makes the decision, without any advisory committee involved making recommendations, to promote a sitting judge by appointing them to a court of appeal. (See Backgrounder for details)

Details about how many ruling party officials the Minister of Justice involves in reviewing the long lists of candidates for judicial appointments submitted by the advisory committees have been confirmed by whistleblowers disclosing internal government emails to the Globe and Mail and CBC and Radio-Canada.

And in April 2020 the Canadian Judicial Council found that Justice Colleen Suche, spouse of then-federal Natural Resources Cabinet Minister Jim Carr, had violated the judiciary’s ethics code by providing suggestions about who the federal Cabinet should appoint as judges.

In November 2020, the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) expressed concern about the final step of the federal appointment process in which the Minister circulates the long lists of candidates to many ruling party officials, saying that it is “a process that is open to speculation about political interference” that may be “a factor in the number of vacancies on the bench, which is a direct contributor to court delays and the access to justice crisis in Canada.”

There are also concerns that the partisan nature of the appointment process may be inhibiting the appointment of judges that reflect Canada’s diversity. Last June, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada expressed the need for a “our courts, including our highest court, to reflect the diversity of Canadians.” In September 2020, 36 lawyers associations, legal clinics and advocacy groups called for changes to the appointment process, as did the CBA, to increase the appointment of more Black, Indigenous and People of Colour (BIPOC) judges.

“The current federal judicial appointment system is open to too much political interference by the ruling party, which violates the independence of the courts that is need to ensure democratic good government and fair law enforcement for all,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “Hopefully this case will lead to key changes that will ensure the appointment process for judges across Canada is truly independent and merit-based.”

“The power of Parliament is checked by the power of the judiciary, which has the ability to declare laws enacted by Parliament to be unconstitutional,” said Wade Poziomka, a partner at Ross & McBride LLP who is leading the litigation team representing Democracy Watch. “The independence of the judiciary is a necessary safeguard in a healthy democracy. This case challenges an appointment process that has been in place over more than one government, a process that is ripe for change because it allows partisan considerations to affect appointments.”

“Democracy Watch wants to strengthen the independence of our judiciary and, in turn, public confidence in the justice system,” said Poziomka. “Our first choice is to work with federal politicians and other stakeholders to achieve this goal. If litigation is necessary however, Democracy Watch will argue the merits of its case before the Federal Court.”

– 30 –

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
Email: [email protected]

See more at Democracy Watch’s Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign and Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign

Trudeau Cabinet still trying to stop court from seeing government emails reported on in La Presse, and evidence that lawyer associations, law professors, experts and media all think the Liberals’ appointment process is too political

Case hearing in 2022 – case alleges Trudeau Liberal’s consultation with only Liberals across Canada taints appointments with partisan bias that violates independence of courts and public’s Charter right to impartial courts

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Wednesday, December 15, 2021

OTTAWA – Today, Democracy Watch announced that the Federal Court rejected (PDF) the Trudeau Cabinet’s first attempt to have key evidence thrown out in its case challenging the federal government’s too-political, unconstitutional system for appointing judges to the federal courts and all provincial superior courts and courts of appeal, and promoting judges within those courts.

The evidence shows clearly that federal appointments system for judges is too open to political interference that violates the constitutional principle that guarantees the independence of courts, and the public’s Charter right to impartial courts.

Department of Justice lawyers are still trying to prevent the Federal Court from considering almost all of the evidence that Democracy Watch filed in a December 2020 affidavit (PDF) and in a second affidavit (PDF) about internal government emails reported on in La Presse on October 31, 2020.

Parts of the evidence in exhibits attached to the second affidavit will be considered confidentially by the Federal Court under an order of the court (the PDF of the second affidavit that is linked above is redacted to remove the currently confidential information).

The Trudeau Cabinet’s lawyers are trying to hide from the Federal Court almost all of Democracy Watch’s December 2020 affidavit – exhibits D to J, N to W and Z to BB – which contain all of the open letters and articles that lawyer associations, law professors, lawyers, experts and media have produced in the last few years expressing their concerns about how political the federal judicial appointment is, and how that undermines the public’s confidence in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

Wade Poziomka of Ross & McBride LLP is leading the litigation team representing Democracy Watch and its co-founder Duff Conacher in the case.

The federal appointment process for the federal and provincial superior and appeal courts matters a lot because the Supreme Court of Canada refuses to hear 90% of appeals from these courts, and many appeals are also refused by provincial appeal courts, so in many cases the provincial superior courts are the public’s court of last resort. The constitutional guarantee of the independence of the courts has been upheld in several rulings on the measures in Part VII of the Constitution. And sections 7 and 11(d) (and, indirectly, 24(1)) of the Charter have been applied in rulings to ensure impartial court hearings.

The problems are longstanding, and have been raised in the past: unlike in the UK and Quebec, the federal Minister of Justice has too much political control of the process from start to finish, from choosing the majority of the members of the judicial appointment advisory committees in each province and territory (who serve renewable two-year terms), to receiving long lists of candidates from those committees, to circulating those lists secretly to MPs, Cabinet ministers and ruling party officials before making the final choice. The Minister also makes the decision, without any advisory committee involved making recommendations, to promote a sitting judge by appointing them to a court of appeal. (See Backgrounder for details)

Details about how many ruling party officials the Minister of Justice involves in reviewing the long lists of candidates for judicial appointments submitted by the advisory committees have been confirmed by whistleblowers disclosing internal government emails to the Globe and Mail and CBC and Radio-Canada.

And in April 2020 the Canadian Judicial Council found that Justice Colleen Suche, spouse of then-federal Natural Resources Cabinet Minister Jim Carr, had violated the judiciary’s ethics code by providing suggestions about who the federal Cabinet should appoint as judges.

In November 2020, the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) expressed concern about the final step of the federal appointment process in which the Minister circulates the long lists of candidates to many ruling party officials, saying that it is “a process that is open to speculation about political interference” that may be “a factor in the number of vacancies on the bench, which is a direct contributor to court delays and the access to justice crisis in Canada.”

There are also concerns that the partisan nature of the appointment process may be inhibiting the appointment of judges that reflect Canada’s diversity. Last June, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada expressed the need for a “our courts, including our highest court, to reflect the diversity of Canadians.” In September 2020, 36 lawyers associations, legal clinics and advocacy groups called for changes to the appointment process, as did the CBA, to increase the appointment of more Black, Indigenous and People of Colour (BIPOC) judges.

“The current federal judicial appointment system is open to too much political interference by the ruling party, which violates the independence of the courts that is need to ensure democratic good government and fair law enforcement for all,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “Hopefully this case will lead to key changes that will ensure the appointment process for judges across Canada is truly independent and merit-based.”

“The power of Parliament is checked by the power of the judiciary, which has the ability to declare laws enacted by Parliament to be unconstitutional,” said Wade Poziomka, a partner at Ross & McBride LLP who is leading the litigation team representing Democracy Watch. “The independence of the judiciary is a necessary safeguard in a healthy democracy. This case challenges an appointment process that has been in place over more than one government, a process that is ripe for change because it allows partisan considerations to affect appointments.”

“Democracy Watch wants to strengthen the independence of our judiciary and, in turn, public confidence in the justice system,” said Poziomka. “Our first choice is to work with federal politicians and other stakeholders to achieve this goal. If litigation is necessary however, Democracy Watch will argue the merits of its case before the Federal Court.”

– 30 –

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
Email: [email protected]

See more at Democracy Watch’s Stop Bad Government Appointments Campaign and Stop Unfair Law Enforcement Campaign

(Français) Background on Key ProblemsBackground on Key Problems

Background on Key Problems that Make the
Federal Judicial Appointments System Too Political

To become a federally appointed judge, a person must either be a lawyer for 10 years or a lawyer and quasi-judicial tribunal member for a combined total of 10 years (See s. 3 of the Judges Act, and ss. 5.2 and 5.3 of the Federal Courts Act). There are Judicial Advisory Committees for each province and territory that review applications and recommend long lists of qualified candidates to the Minister of Justice.

The problems with the federal judicial appointments system that the case challenges are longstanding, and have been raised in the past, (see also here and here and here, and also all the evidence linked in Democracy Watch’s December 2020 affidavit, and most provinces have the same problems with their appointment system), as follows:

  1. Canada’s federal judicial appointment system is just a self-enforced policy of the federal government that can be changed at any time. In contrast, in the UK and in most provinces the appointment system is enshrined in law so that a Cabinet can’t change it without introducing a public bill that is debated by the legislature and the public.
  2. The Minister of Justice and Cabinet appoint a majority of the seven members of each Judicial Advisory Committee. They appoint:
    1. three of the members directly;
    2. one from a list of nominees submitted by the Law Society of the province/territory;
    3. one from a list of nominees submitted by the provincial or territorial chapter of the Canadian Bar Association;
    4. one from a list of nominees submitted by the jurisdiction’s Attorney General, and;
    5. then the chief judge of the jurisdiction chooses the last member of each committee.

In contrast, Cabinet ministers in Quebec (sections 15 and 16) do not select any of the advisory committee members, and in Manitoba (s. 3.3) and B.C. (s. 21) choose a minority of the members of the advisory committee for their provincial courts. Ideally, the Cabinet should not choose any of the members of the committees. The federal Minister alone chooses to promote sitting judges to appeal courts. Ideally, a fully independent committee should be recommending a short list of 1-3 sitting judges as candidates for promotion to appeal courts.

  1. The federal judicial advisory committees are appointed by the Minister and Cabinet to renewable two-year terms. Ideally, even if the Minister and Cabinet members are removed from appointing any of the committee members (as recommended above in #2) the terms should not be renewable, to ensure regular turnover of committee members.
  2. Each committee submits a long list of candidates, which gives the Minister a lot of leeway to appoint whomever s/he wants. Ideally, the committees should submit only 1-3 candidates for each open judge position, with the minister required to choose from that short list, as in Quebec and the UK (and in the UK, where the committee only submits one candidate, the minister must explain in writing to the committee if s/he rejects the recommended candidate).
  3. Before making the final choice, the Minister shares each list of candidates with Cabinet ministers and MPs, and also party officials, from the province or territory. Ideally, the Minister should be prohibited from sharing the list with anyone.

Background on Key Problems that Make the
Federal Judicial Appointments System Too Political

To become a federally appointed judge, a person must either be a lawyer for 10 years or a lawyer and quasi-judicial tribunal member for a combined total of 10 years (See s. 3 of the Judges Act, and ss. 5.2 and 5.3 of the Federal Courts Act). There are Judicial Advisory Committees for each province and territory that review applications and recommend long lists of qualified candidates to the Minister of Justice.

The problems with the federal judicial appointments system that the case challenges are longstanding, and have been raised in the past, (see also here and here and here, and also all the evidence linked in Democracy Watch’s December 2020 affidavit, and most provinces have the same problems with their appointment system), as follows:

  1. Canada’s federal judicial appointment system is just a self-enforced policy of the federal government that can be changed at any time. In contrast, in the UK and in most provinces the appointment system is enshrined in law so that a Cabinet can’t change it without introducing a public bill that is debated by the legislature and the public.
  2. The Minister of Justice and Cabinet appoint a majority of the seven members of each Judicial Advisory Committee. They appoint:
    1. three of the members directly;
    2. one from a list of nominees submitted by the Law Society of the province/territory;
    3. one from a list of nominees submitted by the provincial or territorial chapter of the Canadian Bar Association;
    4. one from a list of nominees submitted by the jurisdiction’s Attorney General, and;
    5. then the chief judge of the jurisdiction chooses the last member of each committee.

In contrast, Cabinet ministers in Quebec (sections 15 and 16) do not select any of the advisory committee members, and in Manitoba (s. 3.3) and B.C. (s. 21) choose a minority of the members of the advisory committee for their provincial courts. Ideally, the Cabinet should not choose any of the members of the committees. The federal Minister alone chooses to promote sitting judges to appeal courts. Ideally, a fully independent committee should be recommending a short list of 1-3 sitting judges as candidates for promotion to appeal courts.

  1. The federal judicial advisory committees are appointed by the Minister and Cabinet to renewable two-year terms. Ideally, even if the Minister and Cabinet members are removed from appointing any of the committee members (as recommended above in #2) the terms should not be renewable, to ensure regular turnover of committee members.
  2. Each committee submits a long list of candidates, which gives the Minister a lot of leeway to appoint whomever s/he wants. Ideally, the committees should submit only 1-3 candidates for each open judge position, with the minister required to choose from that short list, as in Quebec and the UK (and in the UK, where the committee only submits one candidate, the minister must explain in writing to the committee if s/he rejects the recommended candidate).
  3. Before making the final choice, the Minister shares each list of candidates with Cabinet ministers and MPs, and also party officials, from the province or territory. Ideally, the Minister should be prohibited from sharing the list with anyone.