Please support democracy

Without your support, Democracy Watch can't win key changes to stop governments and big businesses from abusing their power and hurting you and your family. Please click here to support democracy now

Category: Uncategorized

Queen Elizabeth, Britain’s politicians and public know rules for its minority government because they are written – B.C.’s Lieutenant Governor, politicians and public don’t because rules are unwritten

Posted on by admin

B.C. Party leaders should agree to written rules – as British MPs did in 2010 – making it clear when the legislature can be closed, what a vote of non-confidence is, when and how opposition parties will get a chance to govern, what will trigger next election etc.

As showdown over Speaker of the B.C. legislature continues, DWatch’s proposal to change to non-partisan, non-MLA Speaker is still the best solution (would be similar to B.C.’s non-MLA ethics and information commissioners, and AG and CEO)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Tuesday, June 20, 2017

OTTAWA – Today, with B.C.’s legislature finally opening in two days, Democracy Watch called on the B.C. party leaders and the Lieutenant Governor to agree on public, written rules for a minority government, as more than 80% of Canadians want and as Britain’s Parliament did seven years ago with its 110-page Cabinet manual. Agreeing on and writing down the rules now (and making them law as soon as possible) will help ensure the legislature runs fairly and democratically through to the next election.

The rules should make clear: when the legislature can be closed; what a vote of non-confidence is; when and how the opposition parties may get a chance to govern, and; when and how the next election can be called before the fixed election date (See Backgrounder below for the rules).

“Queen Elizabeth, Britain’s politicians and public know the rules for its minority government because its rules are written but B.C.’s Lieutenant Governor, politicians and public don’t because its rules are unwritten,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “If B.C.’s politicians don’t agree to written rules for the minority government, several constitutional crises will very likely happen with politicians, lawyers and academics having ridiculous arguments, and the unelected, unaccountable Lieutenant Governor forced to make decisions, based on conflicting opinions about unwritten rules. Meanwhile, in Britain everyone will be following clear, written rules.”

“Nobody knows for sure what an unwritten rule says, and that’s why Britain, Australia, New Zealand and most other countries have written down their key constitutional rules,” said Conacher. “It’s clearly in the public interest that the rules be written down to stop unfair abuses of power by the ruling parties that will violate the rights of the legislature and the democratic will of the majority of voters right through to the next election.”

For example, Queen Elizabeth, Britain’s politicians and public all know that the only way an election can occur before the next fixed election date under Britain’s Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 is if at least two-thirds of MPs vote in favour of a motion to call an early election or if a resolution is passed that states the legislature has no confidence in the government and that resolution is not reversed within 14 days. Many commentators claimed Britain’s Prime Minister Theresa May called a “snap” election – she didn’t she proposed an early election and more than two-thirds of MPs approved her proposal.

In contrast, B.C.’s Lieutenant Governor, politicians and public do not know how the next election could happen – which gives the unelected Lieutenant Governor enormous, unaccounable power. The current rules in B.C., are unclear because they are unwritten constitutional conventions – even constitutional scholars disagree what lines they draw (and, as a result, a large majority of scholars agree they should be written down). The vagueness in the rules effectively allows the elected Premier and ruling party to abuse their powers and violate the rules, as the only way to stop violations is for the unelected, unaccountable Lieutenant Governor to decide that a violation has occurred and to try to stop the elected Premier from doing what they want.

Lieutenant governors in B.C. other provinces have almost never stopped a premier from doing whatever they want, and have allowed premiers to abuse their powers by not opening the legislature after an election, shutting it down arbitrarily for months, and calling snap elections in violation of fixed-election-date laws. The Governor General allowed Prime Minister Harper to call a snap election in 2008 in violation of the (too vague) fixed-election-date law, to prorogue Parliament in a very questionable minority government situation, and to declare many votes in Parliament as confidence votes even though they were clearly not confidence votes.

In Britain, Australia and New Zealand, political party leaders and MPs agreed years ago to clear, public constitutional rules to ensure the legislature runs fairly (especially during a minority government) for all the parties, and for voters. Most countries in the world also have clear, public rules written down in laws or their constitution concerning how the legislature runs and how elections happen.

As well, a survey of more than 2,000 Canadians by Harris-Decima in November-December 2012 showed that 84% of adult Canadians want enforceable rules to restrict key powers of the Prime Minister and provincial premiers.

The Governor General also said last August in an an interview with the Hill Times that he thought these unwritten constitutional conventions should be written down.

After initial rules are enacted into law, the B.C. legislature should, as the legislatures in Britain, Australia and New Zealand have, examine and enact other fairness rules to ensure the legislature and MLAs can hold the government accountable. The rules should cover the following key areas: when the legislature is required to open after an election; which party has the right to attempt to govern first after an election; what can be included in omnibus bills; the freedom and powers of individual politicians to vote how they want on resolutions and bills; how members of legislature committees are chosen; what a Cabinet can do during an election campaign period until the next Cabinet is chosen.

As the showdown over the Speaker of the B.C. legislature continues, Democracy Watch again called on B.C. party leaders to change the province’s Constitution Act (section 37) so that the legislature has a non-partisan, non-MLA as Speaker. The change would take at most a month, as the Standing Orders of the Legislature (PDF) state in section 81: “On urgent or extraordinary occasions, a Bill may be read twice or thrice, or advanced two or more stages in one day.”

Establishing a non-MLA Speaker would be similar to the non-MLA B.C.’s legislature has already established for its other Officers of the Legislature – the Conflict of Interest Commissioner, Information Commissioner, Auditor General and Chief Electoral Officer.

In the interim any MLA could serve as Speaker, even an MLA from the likely NDP-Green partnership government, as they could vote to break any ties in favour of the government without violating any constitutional convention given that conventions are vague, unwritten standards (which is why they should be written down as clear rules – see details above).

Some commentators have claimed that the legislature must also have a Deputy Speaker – in fact, section 37(3) of the Constitution Act says that the legislature “may” choose a Deputy Speaker so there is no requirement.

“Politicians shouldn’t ever be in a position like the speaker of a legislature where they judge other politicians because they are in a conflict of interest when doing so, and can easily make decisions for partisan, political reasons,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “To prevent bad political decisions by the speaker of the B.C. legislature, and because of the current seat-split, it is a great time to change to a non-partisan, non-MLA speaker for the legislature.”

At the federal level, former Speaker of the House of Commons Andrew Scheer was a great example in 2014 of why you don’t want a partisan politician as Speaker when he let fellow Conservative MP Paul Calandra off the hook for clearly violating the rules concerning answering questions during Question Period.

– 30 –

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
[email protected]

Democracy Watch’s Democracy Watch’s Stop PM/Premier Power Abuses Campaign

BACKGROUNDER

8 Key Rules for Minority Government

  1. Even if the leaders of parties that represent a majority of members of the legislature do not indicate lack of support for the party that wins the most seats before that party’s Speech from the Throne, if they subsequently indicate lack of support for the Speech, the Lieutenant Governor will not allow the Premier-designate to prorogue the legislature before the Speech from the Throne is voted on by members of the legislature;
  2. If a majority of members in the legislature vote against the Speech from the Throne, the Lieutenant Governor will give the opposition parties an opportunity to govern (through either a formal coalition or legislative agreement) before calling an election;
  3. After the vote on the Speech from the Throne, the only vote in the legislature that shall be a vote of non-confidence is a vote on a motion that states: “The legislature does not have confidence in the government.”
  4. If opposition parties introduce a motion of non-confidence in the governing party at any time after election day, the Lieutenant Governor will not allow the Premier to prorogue the legislature before the motion is voted on by the legislature;
  5. If a majority in the legislature votes to approve a motion of non-confidence in the governing party before the next fixed-election date, the Lieutenant Governor will give the opposition parties an opportunity to govern (through either a formal coalition or legislative agenda agreement) before agreeing to any request by the Premier that the Lieutenant Governor call an election;
  6. After the next election, until the Lieutenant Governor has communicated directly with all the party leaders, the Lieutenant Governor will not make a decision about which party or parties (through either a formal coalition or legislative agreement) will be given the opportunity to govern first (i.e. to appoint a Cabinet and introduce a Speech from the Throne in the legislature);
  7. The party that wins the most seats in the next election will be given the first opportunity to govern, including in partnership or coalition with another party, unless the leaders of other parties representing a majority of members of the legislature indicate clearly to the Lieutenant Governor that they will not support that party and that they have agreed to form a coalition government or have agreed on a common legislative agenda, and;
  8. Within 30 days after the Lieutenant Governor decides which party or parties will be given the first opportunity to govern, the Lieutenant Governor and the governing party/parties will open the legislature with a Speech from the Throne.

B.C. legislature should change to non-partisan, non-MLA Speaker – B.C.’s Constitution Act allows any MLA to preside over legislature until Act is changed

Posted on by admin

Party leaders should also agree to written rules making it clear when legislature will open, what a vote of non-confidence is, what will trigger next election etc., and should pass bill making the rules law

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Monday, June 5, 2017

OTTAWA – Today, Democracy Watch called on B.C. party leaders to change the province’s Constitution Act (section 37) so that the legislature has a non-partisan, non-MLA as Speaker. The change would take at most a month, as the Standing Orders of the Legislature (PDF) state in section 81: “On urgent or extraordinary occasions, a Bill may be read twice or thrice, or advanced two or more stages in one day.”

In the interim any MLA could serve as Speaker, even an MLA from the likely NDP-Green partnership government, as they could vote to break any ties in favour of the government without violating any constitutional convention given that conventions are vague, unwritten standards (which is why they should be written down as clear rules – see details below).

Some commentators have claimed that the legislature must also have a Deputy Speaker – in fact, section 37(3) of the Constitution Act says that the legislature “may” choose a Deputy Speaker so there is no requirement.

“Politicians shouldn’t ever be in a position like the speaker of a legislature where they judge other politicians because they are in a conflict of interest when doing so, and can easily make decisions for partisan, political reasons,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “To prevent bad political decisions by the speaker of the B.C. legislature, and because of the current seat-split, it is a great time to change to a non-partisan, non-MLA speaker for the legislature.”

At the federal level, former Speaker of the House of Commons Andrew Scheer was a great example in 2014 of why you don’t want a partisan politician as Speaker when he let fellow Conservative MP Paul Calandra off the hook for clearly violating the rules concerning answering questions during Question Period.

Democracy Watch also called on the B.C. party leaders and the Lieutenant Governor to agree on eight public, written rules for a minority government, as more than 80% of Canadians want. Agreeing on the rules now will help ensure the legislature runs fairly and democratically through to the next election.

The rules should make clear: when the legislature will open; when it can be closed; what a vote of non-confidence is; when and how the opposition parties may get a chance to govern and; when and how the next election can be called before the fixed election date. (See Backgrounder below for the eight rules)

The current rules are unclear because they are unwritten constitutional conventions – even constitutional scholars disagree what lines they draw (and, as a result, a large majority of scholars agree they should be written down). The vagueness in the rules effectively allows the elected Premier and ruling party to abuse their powers and violate the rules, as the only way to stop violations is for the unelected, unaccountable Lieutenant Governor to decide that a violation has occurred and to try to stop the elected Premier from doing what they want.

Lieutenant governors in B.C. other provinces have almost never stopped a premier from doing whatever they want, and have allowed premiers to abuse their powers by not opening the legislature after an election, shutting it down arbitrarily for months, and calling snap elections in violation of fixed-election-date laws. The Governor General allowed Prime Minister Harper to call a snap election in 2008 in violation of the (too vague) fixed-election-date law, to prorogue Parliament in a very questionable minority government situation, and to declare many votes in Parliament as confidence votes even though they were clearly not confidence votes.

In England, Australia and New Zealand, political party leaders and MPs agreed years ago to clear, public rules so what happens after an election is fair for all the parties, and for voters. Most countries in the world also have clear, public post-election rules.

As well, a survey of more than 2,000 Canadians by Harris-Decima in November-December 2012 showed that 84% of adult Canadians want enforceable rules to restrict key powers of the Prime Minister and provincial premiers.

The Governor General also said last August in an an interview with the Hill Times that he thought these unwritten constitutional conventions should be written down.

“There are no legal or other justifiable reasons for B.C.’s political party leaders and Lieutenant Governor to fail to approve eight key rules for a minority government,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “It is clearly in the public interest that the rules be approved to stop unfair abuses of power by the ruling party that violate the rights of the legislature and the democratic will of the majority of voters.”

After the eight rules are enacted into law, the B.C. legislature should, as the legislatures in England, Australia and New Zealand have, examine and enact other fairness rules to ensure the legislature and MLAs can hold the government accountable. The rules should cover the following key areas: what can be included in omnibus bills; the freedom and powers of individual politicians to vote how they want on resolutions and bills; how members of legislature committees are chosen, and; what a Cabinet can do during an election campaign period until the next Cabinet is chosen.

“As long as the rules for the legislature are unwritten and unclear in B.C., the premier and ruling party will be able to abuse their powers and the legislature’s ability to hold the government accountable will be undemocratically restricted,” said Conacher.

– 30 –

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
[email protected]

Democracy Watch’s Stop PM/Premier Power Abuses Campaign

BACKGROUNDER

8 Key Rules for Minority Government

  1. Until the Lieutenant Governor has communicated directly with all the party leaders, the Lieutenant Governor will not make a decision about which party or parties (through either a formal coalition or legislative agreement) will be given the opportunity to govern first (i.e. to appoint a Cabinet and introduce a Speech from the Throne in the legislature);
  2. The party that wins the most seats in the election will be given the first opportunity to govern, including in partnership or coalition with another party, unless the leaders of other parties representing a majority of members of the legislature indicate clearly to the Lieutenant Governor that they will not support that party and that they have agreed to form a coalition government or have agreed on a common legislative agenda;
  3. Within 30 days after the Lieutenant Governor decides which party or parties will be given the first opportunity to govern, the Lieutenant Governor and the governing party/parties will open the legislature with a Speech from the Throne;
  4. Even if the leaders of parties that represent a majority of members of the legislature do not indicate lack of support for the party that wins the most seats before that party’s Speech from the Throne, if they subsequently indicate lack of support for the Speech, the Lieutenant Governor will not allow the Premier-designate to prorogue the legislature before the Speech from the Throne is voted on by members of the legislature;
  5. If a majority of members in the legislature vote against the Speech from the Throne, the Lieutenant Governor will give the opposition parties an opportunity to govern (through either a formal coalition or legislative agreement) before calling an election;
  6. After the vote on the Speech from the Throne, the only vote in the legislature that shall be a vote of non-confidence is a vote on a motion that states: “The legislature does not have confidence in the government.”
  7. If opposition parties introduce a motion of non-confidence in the governing party at any time after election day, the Lieutenant Governor will not allow the Premier to prorogue the legislature before the motion is voted on by the legislature, and;
  8. If a majority in the legislature votes to approve a motion of non-confidence in the governing party before the next fixed-election date, the Lieutenant Governor will give the opposition parties an opportunity to govern (through either a formal coalition or legislative agenda agreement) before agreeing to any request by the Premier that the Lieutenant Governor call an election.

Democracy Watch calls on Elections BC to request a prosecution within 30 days of everyone who illegally concealed political donations, and to issue a public report within 60 days on all likely concealed donations

Posted on by Bradford

Special prosecutor needed for all cases to prevent political interference – Saturday’s Globe and Mail article shows Elections B.C. has been negligent in enforcing law

B.C. political parties should also democratize province’s political finance system to match Quebec’s $100 annual donation limit and other world-leading measures

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Monday, March 6, 2017

OTTAWA – Today, Democracy Watch called on the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) of Elections B.C. to end its negligent enforcement of the provincial political donation rules by, within 30 days, investigating and recommending prosecution of everyone revealed by Saturday’s Globe and Mail article to be involved in schemes where lobbyists made donations to the B.C. Liberals and then were reimbursed by their clients.

Democracy Watch also called for a special prosecutor to be appointed to handle all the cases to help prevent political interference in the prosecutions by the B.C. Liberal Cabinet. Under B.C.’s provincial Elections Act section 252, the CEO must approve all prosecutions and, especially because so few such cases have been in the courts in the past, the policy of the CEO for these cases should be to request prosecution of all of the individuals involved and let the courts decide whether they have violated the law.

“The fact that the media is discovering violations of political donation rules that Elections B.C. hasn’t even looked for shows that Elections B.C. has been negligent in enforcing the rules,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “Elections B.C. has to start enforcing the law properly by requesting prosecution within 30 days of everyone who has been involved in illegal donation concealed schemes in the past year, and by immediately auditing donation lists to find all illegally concealed donations since the last election and issuing a report within 60 days.”

“It would not only be negligent for Elections B.C. to let anyone who has violated the rules off the hook with just a warning, instead of requesting that they be prosecuted, it will also encourage more violations in the future,” said Conacher. “A special prosecutor is needed for all these cases to prevent interference by the B.C. Liberal Cabinet.”

Democracy Watch called on the CEO to issue a special public report within 60 days on all large individual donations that were likely funneled from businesses or unions through their executives (or their family members), employees or lobbyists since the last election. This report can easily be done, and should have been done every year in the past by Elections B.C., by comparing the donation database with the lobbyists registry database, and with the business registry database, and with the list of executives of B.C.’s unions.

Elections B.C. should then follow up on that report by investigating and requesting prosecution of everyone who has been involved in an illegally concealed donation scheme in the past four years.

Democracy Watch and the PIPE UP Network are currently challenging in court the B.C. Liberal Cabinet’s approval of the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline because of the appearance of conflict of interest caused by more than $550,000 in donations to the B.C. Liberals from pipeline related companies in the past few years.

Democracy Watch is also challenging in court the B.C. Conflict of Interest Commissioner’s ruling that no conflicts of interest were caused by B.C. Premier Christy Clark’s high-priced, exclusive fundraising events.

Democracy Watch and the nation-wide Money in Politics Coalition also called on the B.C. government to make the same world-leading changes to the province’s political donation system (including at the municipal level) as Quebec made in 2013 when it lowered its individual donation limit to $100 annually to each party, with an additional $100 allowed to be donated to an independent candidate, and required donations to be verified by Elections Quebec before being transferred to parties and candidates.

Democracy Watch detailed in a January 31st news release the key changes needed stop cash for access or the unethical influence of big money donations. More than 6,000 B.C. voters have called for these changes to B.C.’s provincial donation rules through Democracy Watch’s Change.org petition.

“The only way to stop the unethical and undemocratic influence of big money in B.C. politics is to stop big money donations,” said Conacher. “Any political party that refuses to support key changes to the B.C. political finance system changes is essentially admitting they are up for sale and that they approve of the unethical and undemocratic best-government-money-can-buy approach to politics.”

– 30 –

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
[email protected]

Democracy Watch’s Government Ethics Campaign and Money in Politics Campaign

Democracy Watch appeals ruling that Conflict of Interest Commissioner’s decision on B.C. Premier Christy Clark’s $50,000 salary and “cash-for-access” events can’t be challenged in court

Posted on by Bradford

Ruling means complaints to Conflicts Commissioner by members of the public about the Premier or Cabinet Ministers are effectively a meaningless dead end

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Friday, February 24, 2017

OTTAWA – Today, Democracy Watch appealed B.C. Supreme Court Justice Affleck’s ruling in January that no court challenges are allowed of B.C. Conflict of Interest Commissioner Paul Fraser’s decisions because they are unreviewable opinions with no direct legal effect limiting the Premier’s conflicts of interest. The notice of appeal to the B.C. Court of Appeal can be seen here.

The decision under appeal means that members of the public who make a complaint to the Commissioner about the Premier’s conflicts of interest are not entitled to a remedy, and are not even entitled to any assurance that the Commissioner himself has not been compromised by his own conflict of interest.

The ruling also stopped Democracy Watch’s court case filed last October challenging the Commissioner’s decisions last May and August that Premier Christy Clark’s high-priced, exclusive fundraising events don’t create conflicts of interest for her, and that the donations made at the events do not benefit her personally. Democracy Watch also challenged the Commissioner’s own conflict of interest in ruling on the situation given his son works for Premier Clark’s Cabinet.

“The court unfortunately decided that no one can challenge Commissioner Fraser’s unethical decision that it is legal and ethical for Premier Clark and Liberal Cabinet ministers to sell access to themselves at high-priced, invite-only secretive fundraising events, and that the events don’t create any conflicts of interest,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch. “Commissioner Fraser stepped aside from ruling on a situation involving Premier Clark in 2012 because of his son’s work with the B.C. Liberals, and he should have stepped aside again this time, and the court did not even consider this issue. For all these reasons, Democracy Watch is appealing the ruling.”

Jason Gratl of the law firm Gratl and Company, who is Democracy Watch’s counsel for the case, said: “We say simply that it is an error to find that conflicts of members of the Executive Council, including the Premier, are not always and not in this case protected by legislative privilege”.

According to media reports, Premier Clark has hosted or attended several, invitation-only fundraising events for the B.C. Liberals with he was in a conflict of interest, and also attended an event in her riding association sponsored for $2,500 each by four sponsors. Premier Clark received an annual salary from the B.C. Liberals for, in part, fundraising activities over the past few years, and that is part of the reason she is in a conflict of interest.

The B.C. Members’ Conflict of Interest Act prohibits the Premier and all MLAs from exercising their official powers or performing any official duties or functions if they have an opportunity to further their private interest or if there is a reasonable perception that their private interest affects their actions or decisions (sections 2 and 3). It also prohibits them from receiving any gift or personal benefit directly or indirectly connected to their position (section 7).

Democracy Watch, which filed a complaint with Commissioner Fraser about the Premier’s fundraising events last March, takes the position that Premier Clark benefited personally and was in a conflict of interest when attending the events because she receives some of the money raised as her salary from the B.C. Liberal Party. Democracy Watch’s position is also that the events created ongoing conflicts of interest for Premier Clark that prohibit her from making decisions that affect any company or organization that had a representative at any of the events.

Commissioner Fraser ruled on May 4 and August 9, 2016 that the donations made at the events did not benefit Premier Clark personally, and did not amount to a private interest that put her in a conflict of interest. He essentially refused to rule on whether the donations created ongoing conflicts of interest for Premier Clark when she is making policy decisions that affect the donors – he didn’t even investigate to find out who attended the events.

Democracy Watch’s case also asked the court to rule that Commissioner Fraser should not have ruled on the complaints filed about the events because he was in a conflict of interest given that his son works as a deputy minister for the B.C. Liberal Cabinet. In 2012, Commissioner Fraser stepped aside and didn’t rule on a complaint filed about Premier Clark because of his son’s connection to the B.C. Liberals. Democracy Watch wanted the court to order a reexamination of the complaints by another person who is fully independent of all B.C. political parties. Justice Affleck did not consider this issue in his ruling.

“Democracy Watch’s position is that big donations made at private fundraising events where the politician is essentially selling access to themselves are a clear violation of the conflict-of-interest law, and we hope the B.C. Court of Appeal will agree and overrule Commissioner Fraser’s decision that the donations didn’t benefit Premier Clark or put her in a conflict of interest,” said Conacher. “Commissioner Fraser stepped aside from ruling on a situation involving Premier Clark in 2012 because of his son’s work with the B.C. Liberals, and he should have stepped aside again this time. Commissioner Fraser’s apparent conflict of interest and the legal errors in his ruling give the appeal court many reasons to reject his ruling on Premier Clark’s fundraising events.”

Democracy Watch and the nation-wide Government Ethics Coalition also called on B.C.’s political parties to change the provincial Conflict of Interest Act to make the Commissioner’s rulings clearly binding on politicians, and also to allow anyone to appeal to the courts for a review of any decision by the Commissioner, including about the Commissioner’s conflicts of interest.

“It is dangerously undemocratic for B.C. to have an ethics law that politicians can ignore, and an ethics commissioner who is an unaccountable czar, and so B.C.’s political ethics law must be changed to ensure the commissioner’s rulings are binding and that court challenges of the commissioner’s rulings and the commissioner’s conflicts of interest are allowed,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch.

Democracy Watch and the nation-wide Money in Politics Coalition also called on the B.C. government to make the same world-leading changes to the province’s political donation system (including at the municipal level) as Quebec made in 2013 when it lowered its individual donation limit to $100 annually to each party, with an additional $100 allowed to be donated to an independent candidate, and required donations to be verified by Elections Quebec before being transferred to parties and candidates.

Democracy Watch detailed in a January 31st news release the key changes needed stop cash for access or the unethical influence of big money donations.

“The only way to stop the unethical and undemocratic influence of big money in B.C. politics is to stop big money donations,” said Conacher. “Any political party that refuses to support key changes to the B.C. political finance system changes is essentially admitting they are up for sale and that they approve of the unethical and undemocratic best-government-money-can-buy approach to politics.”

– 30 –

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
[email protected]

Democracy Watch’s Government Ethics Campaign and Money in Politics Campaign

Thank you for donating!

Posted on by Bradford

Thank you very much for your donation to support Democracy Watch’s campaigns to stop abuses of power by governments and big businesses across Canada, and to make Canada the world’s leading democracy.

Your transaction has been completed, and a receipt for your donation should have been emailed to you. If you donated using PayPal, you may log into your account at www.paypal.com to view details of your transaction.

If you donated using your credit card, your next monthly statement will show details of your donation to Democracy Watch.

Thank you again – we couldn’t win key democracy changes for you and all Canadians without your support!

Cheers,
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
and the whole Democracy Watch team

As Quebec’s experience shows clearly, Ontario Liberals proposed annual political donation limit of $7,750 to each party won’t do anything to stop unethical influence of wealthy interests

Posted on by Bradford

Should be lowered to Quebec limit of $100, and annual per-vote public funding amount also much too high — ban on corporate, union etc. donations, and limits on party and third-party ad spending, are good

Changes should be made at same time to municipal system across province

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Monday, May 6, 2016

OTTAWA – Today, Democracy Watch and the 50-member group Money in Politics Coalition applauded some of the Ontario Liberals’ proposed political finance reforms, but called on them to lower their proposed annual political donation limit, and annual per-vote funding amount, because both are much too high. The Liberals should also make their proposals available to the public – they were only provided to opposition parties and the media yesterday and are not on any Ontario government website.

According to media reports, the Liberals are proposing the following good changes: a ban on donations by corporations, unions and other organizations; limits on political party and third party advertising leading up to an election, and during an election campaign period, and; limits on donations to party leadership race candidates.

However, instead of matching Quebec’s world-leading political finance system of a $100 annual individual donation limit to each party, and annual public per-vote and matching funding, the Liberals are instead proposing that individuals be allowed to donate up to $7,750 annually to each party, as follows: $1,550 annually to a political party; $1,550 annually to an individual candidate (with a maximum of $3,100 to all of a party’s candidates); and $1,550 to a constituency association (with a maximum of $3,100 to all of a party’s constituency associations). And the Liberals are not proposing to limit loans at all.

“The Ontario Liberals’ proposed annual individual political donation limit of $7,750 to each party is clearly undemocratic because it is almost 80 times higher than an average voter can afford,” said Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch and Chairperson of the Money in Politics Coalition. “As Quebec’s corruption scandal shows clearly, such a high donation limit will allow wealthy individuals to continue to use money as an unethical way to influence politicians, and will also allow corporations, unions and other organizations to continue to donate large amounts by having their executives and their family members all make the maximum donation each year.”

“The Ontario Liberals’ proposed high donation limit will only hide the corrupting influence of donations from wealthy interests, not stop it,” said Conacher.

Even if funneling donations is made illegal (as it was in Quebec), the donors will just claim they were not forced by their company or union to make the donation, and no one will be able to prove otherwise.

Few have been charged in Quebec’s corruption scandal even though an Elections Quebec audit found $12.8 million in likely illegally funneled donations from 2006-2011. To stop the corruption, in 2013 Quebec llowered its individual donation limit to $100 annually to each party , with an additional $100 allowed to be donated to an independent candidate), and required donations to be verified by Elections Quebec before being transferred to parties and candidates. Ontario should make the same democratic changes.

The Ontario Liberals should also lower the proposed annual per-vote public funding subsidy from $2.26 per vote to no more than $1 per vote, and implement the same annual public funding matching system as Quebec ($2.50 for the first $20,000 raised annually by each party, and $1 for the first $200,000 raised annually). Elections Quebec has analyzed the results of Quebec’s changes and found that the parties are still adequately funded.

“To match Quebec’s world-leading democratic system, Ontario must limit individual donations to about $100 annually and use per-vote and matching public funding to give parties and candidates funding based on their actual level of voter support,” said Conacher. “Similar changes should be made to Ontario’s municipal law, taking into account that there are no parties at the municipal level, so that every municipality in the province has the same democratic rules.”

The key changes Ontario must make to actually democratize its provincial political finance system are as follows (and similar changes should be made province-wide to the municipal political finance system, taking into account that there are no political parties at the municipal level):

  • a ban on donations by corporations, unions and other organizations (Quebec enacted such a ban in the late 1970s);
  • a limit on annual donations by individuals to each party of $100-200 annually (Quebec’s limit is $100) with donations routed through the election watchdog agency (as in Quebec);
  • a prohibition on loans to political parties, riding associations and candidates, except from a public fund (with loans limited to the average annual amount of donations received during the previous two years);
  • a limit on spending during leading up to, and during election campaigns by parties, nomination race and election candidates, third party interest groups, and candidates in party leadership races;
  • disclosure of all donations and gifts of money, property, services and volunteer labour given to any party, riding association, politician, nomination race, election or party leadership candidate, including the identity of the donor’s employer, and board and executive affiliations (and the identity of organizers of any fundraising event);
  • a base amount of annual public funding for parties based on each vote received during the last election (which Quebec has — no more than $1 per vote, with a portion required to be shared with riding associations);
  • annual public funding for parties matching the first $100,000-$200,000 raised (as in Quebec);
  • public funding for candidates matching the first $20,000 raised (as in Quebec), and;
  • a requirement that election, donation and ethics watchdogs conduct annual random audits to ensure all the rules are being followed by everyone.

– 30 –

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Duff Conacher, Co-founder of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
Cell: 416-546-3443
[email protected]

Democracy Watch’s Money in Politics Campaign

Backgrounder Part II on Bill C-23, the proposed so-called “Fair Elections Act”

Posted on by admin

by Democracy Watch
back to Monday, March 17, 2014 news release

To send your letter calling for key changes to make the Fair Elections Act, and federal elections, actually fair, click here

Jump to part 2

A. The 10 Really Unfair Measures in Bill C-23 (the so-called “Fair Elections Act”)

Set out below are details about the 10 really unfair measures in Bill C-23 listed in Democracy Watch’s news release.

1. Requiring more ID to vote and eliminating vouching

Not only is the elimination of “vouching” for the identity of a voter unfair, but even more so is the prohibition on using the voter registration card (known as the “voter identification card” or “VIC”) as one of the pieces of ID that voters can use to prove their identity and residence.  Why do we have a voter registration system if the registration card sent to voters under the system won’t be allowed to be considered valid ID?

The Conservatives are citing estimates from one study that don’t prove vouching fraud occurred (only “irregularities”), and are ignoring the fact that large scale fraud using vouching would be very difficult (given that under subsection 143(3) and (5) of the Canada Elections Act (CEA) each voter is only allowed to vouch for one other voter and only in their riding).

Even though 39 types of ID are accepted at the ballot box, and the CEA (under section 143(2.1) allows the CEO to add as many more as he likes, and even if only 0.8 percent of voters used vouching in the last federal election, there really is no justifiable reason to prohibit vouching.

So the measures increasing the ID required to vote should be removed from Bill C-23 (ie. delete subsections 48(1) to (4), and sections 53-54, and subsections 56(1) and (4), and sections 57, 59 and 62 of the bill) so the current voter identification system maintained that voters will be allowed to vote if vouched for by another registered voter (with the limit maintained that a registered voter can vouch for only one other voter), or if they present one piece of government ID, or one piece of ID showing their name along with another showing their name and address.

As well, the voter registration card (VIC) that Elections Canada sends out should be added to the current list of valid ID that can be presented along with another piece of ID.

Finally, Elections Canada should be empowered, and provided with adequate funding, to hire and fully train all election workers well before each election, and to make the voter registration list even more accurate (which will help prevent difficult ID situations, and also ensure that all election workers are properly checking and accepting ID).

As well, Bill C-23 should  require Elections Canada to work proactively with all the 39 institutions on its list that issue ID (and other new institutions) to ensure they all include addresses on the ID they issue.

2. Hiking donation limits instead of democratizing the federal political finance system

Concerning political donations, some commentators have claimed it is a big problem that Bill C-23 increases the election year donation limit for individuals from $3,600 to $4,500 (currently anyone can give $1,200 annually to each party, and another $1,200 as a combined total to the riding associations of each party, and another $1,200 combined total to the election candidates of each party, and all three limits will be increased to $1,500 and then by $25 each year (under subsection 80(1) of Bill C-23 which changes clauses 405(1)(a) to (c) of the CEA temporarily, and then section 87 of Bill C-23 which adds new subsection 367(1) of the CEA)).

However, the real problems are:

  • that the current donation limit is 10 times higher than an average voter can afford;
  • that the high donation limits make it easier for businesses and other organizations to funnel large donations through their executives and employees, and;
  • that the Conservatives are eliminating the most democratic part of the federal political finance system – namely the per-vote annual funding that parties receive.

As well, most commentators (and most media) have ignored the even more undemocratic political finance change in Bill C-23 – the increase in the donation a candidate can make to their own campaign from $1,200 to $5,000, and for party leadership candidates from $1,200 to $25,000 (under subsection 80(3) of Bill C-23, which adds new clauses 405(4)(4.1) to (4.3) the CEA temporarily, and then section 86 which replaces those clauses with new subsections 367(6) to (8) to the CEA).

These are huge, and hugely undemocratic, increases that will only benefit wealthy candidates.

As Elections Canada has pointed out, Bill C-23 also fails to close loopholes in the rules for campaign spending by nomination race and party leadership candidates.  Unlike election candidates, nomination and leadership candidates do not have to count goods or services as campaign expenses.

In addition, while Bill C-23 contains measures to limit loans to candidates at the same levels as donations, it allows unlimited bank loans to candidates and parties (under section 83 of Bill C-23, which changes section 405.3 of the CEA temporarily (and then under section 86 of the Bill C-23 which replaces section 405.3 with new section 370(2) of the CEA)).  Banks are regulated by the federal government, and this measure will allow them to pick and choose candidates and parties to support (likely only sure winners) and buy influence with them through loans.

So to have a fair, and democratic political donations system, the donation and loan limits must all be decreased to $200 (Quebec recently lowered its limit to $100).  And the per-vote funding must be reinstated (although it should be reduced to 75 cents annually because the past amount of $1.95 annually allowed some parties to prosper financially without having to reach out and maintain the support of voters in between elections).

Bill C-23 also fails to correct the following other flaws with the current federal political finance system:

  • donation limits and disclosure requirements are needed for “volunteer labour” donated to parties and candidates any time, including during nomination races, election and party leadership campaigns, and including disclosure of people who organize fundraising events or volunteer for riding associations, to close this existing secret donations loophole;
  • as federal political party leadership campaign candidates are required to do, all candidates, politicians, parties and riding associations must be required to disclose publicly all donations, gifts, and the status of any loans, regularly and during the week before election day, so voters know who is bankrolling them;
  • disclosure of the identity of each individual donor’s employer must be required (as in the U.S.) and disclosure of each donor’s direct organizational affiliations must also be required (to help ensure that corporations, unions and other organizations are not funneling donations through their employees or board members);
  • riding associations and political parties must be prohibited from spending the money they raise in improper ways such as giving grants to community groups or individuals as a way of buying votes;
  • riding associations and political parties must be prohibited (as federal election candidates and MPs have been) from having a secret trust fund and from taking secret, unlimited donations into the fund;
  • secret, unlimited donations to all candidates in nomination race, election and political party leadership campaigns must be banned (as they have been banned for federal election candidates);
  • as the UN Convention Against Corruption and other international standards require, the bank accounts of all public officials who have decision-making power must be monitored for suspicious transactions;
  • the penalty for taking a secret donation of money, property or services, or having a secret trust fund, or violating spending rules, must be increased to minimum $100,000 fine and a multi-year jail term, and loss of any severance payment, and a partial clawback of any pension payments;
  • a public funding system should be established that matches the donations made to any nomination race, election, and party leadership candidate who raises a specific minimum amount of money showing they have voter support;
  • the system of per-vote public funding of federal political parties should be maintained, and similar systems established across the country, but the annul amount should be only be $0.75 per vote received (to ensure that in order to prosper parties need to have active, ongoing support of a broad base of individuals) and riding associations should be required to receive a fair share of this funding (to decrease the control of party headquarters over riding associations);
  • spending limits must be established for political party leadership campaigns to ensure a level playing field for all candidates.
  • wherever election dates are fixed every few years, spending by candidates, riding associations, political parties and third party interest groups must be limited for a few months before each election day, and;
  • donations by political parties to riding associations and candidates must be limited to decrease the possibility of party headquarters influencing the selection of candidates by riding associations, and to make associations and candidates more independent from party headquarters.

3. Creation of a new secret election campaign spending loophole for political parties

Bill C-23 increases election spending limits for parties by exempting from expenses that have to be counted the costs of commercial services contracted to solicit money from contributors who have donated $20 or more in the previous five years (section 86 of Bill C-23 adds new subsection 376(3) to the CEA).

This change will create a secret hole of unreported party spending, in direct contrast to all the changes that have been made in the past 20 years to increase disclosure of election spending.  As well, Bill C-23 increases the overall amount allowed to be spent by each party by five percent (section 86 also adds news subsection 430(2) to the CEA).

4. Allowing the ruling party to appoint more election workers, instead of empowering Elections Canada to appoint all election workers

Sections 18, 19, 21 and 44 of Bill C-23 (which change subsections 34(1), 35(1) and 39(3) and (4), and 124 of the CEA, respectively) should be changed to say that the returning officer may appoint as a deputy returning officer or poll clerk or registration officer or central poll supervisor any qualified person suggested by anyone.

Currently those subsections of Bill C-23 say that if the winning or second party from the previous election suggest people to fill these positions, the returning officer can only appoint those people, which essentially ensures that the people who fill these positions all have dangerous partisan conflicts of interest).  NOTE: If this change is made, sections 36, 37 and 39-42 and 44 of the CEA should be deleted.

5. Allowing parties, riding association and candidates to choose their own auditors, instead of empowering Elections Canada to appoint all auditors

Sections 377 and 403.11 of the CEA should be changed to empower Elections Canada to appoint the auditors for all the parties, riding associations and candidates.

Allowing these entities to choose their own auditors is a recipe for corruption and violations of the election spending limits, and general donation and spending rules, in the CEA.

6. The failure to require (finally) that the Commissioner of Canada Elections (CCE) disclose the results of investigations and his rulings on all complaints, and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to disclose reasons for not prosecuting.

Some commentators have expressed the concern that the Commissioner of Canada Elections (CCE) will not be as effective at enforcement when the CCE is shifted from being a Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) appointee to being a DPP appointee.

No one would even be able to tell if the CCE’s enforcement record worsened because the CCE is currently not required to disclose details about his record (and doesn’t do so voluntarily).  In refusing to disclose his rulings on more than 3,000 complaints he received since 1997 when Democracy Watch requested them in April 2012, the CCE gave the unjustifiable reason that the rulings might make him look bad.

One of the past rulings that points to why the accountability of the CCE needs to be increased is the ruling on complaints about fraud robocalls in the 2008 federal election in the B.C. riding of Saanich-Gulf Islands.  Essentially, the CCE gave up on that investigation, laying the basis for the much greater fraud robocall scam in the 2011 federal election.  The CCE’s weak enforcement actions only became public because the complainants disclosed the letters they received from the Commissioner.

Bill C-23 gags the CCE by adding a new measure that prohibits the Commissioner and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) from disclosing the results of investigations and the Commissioner’s rulings on complaints unless, essentially, the Commissioner does a compliance agreement with the violator, or if the DPP prosecutes the violator.  These measures are in section 108 of Bill C-23 which adds a new confidentiality section 510.1 to the CEA, and under section 146 which adds new section 16.31 to the Access to Information Act, and under section 152 which changes subsection 16(1) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act.

It is important to note that these measures do not apply to the CEO – he would still be able to disclose information complainants submit to him alleging violations of the CEA through his annual and post-election reports to Parliament, and in testimony before parliamentary committees or interviews with the media, as well as submitting the evidence he receives to the CCE for investigation.

The DPP is also not required to publish their reasons whenever they decide not to prosecute, and whenever they decide to agree to a plea deal (as they did, very questionably, when they had clear evidence that Doug Finley and Irving Gerstein deliberately executed the in-and-out advertising funding scheme that the Conservatives used in the 2006 federal election).

So to ensure actually fair and proper election law enforcement, Bill C-23 must be changed to require the Commissioner to disclose his rulings on all complaints (after he has completed his investigation), and Bill C-23 must be changed to require the DPP to explain publicly whenever he decides not to prosecute.

7. The restriction on all pre-election campaign advertising spending by interest groups, but not on spending by political parties and candidates

While Bill C-23 increases the amounts parties can spend on elections, it sneakily decreases the advertising spending limit for interest groups and voters (so-called “third parties) by expanding the limit to cover all ads “in relation to” an election or by-election (section 78 of Bill C-23 makes this change to section 350 of the CEA).

Currently, only ads run during the election campaign period are counted, but this change means the full costs of an ad run just before an election and into the election period by an interest group or voter could be counted toward the total amount of paid advertising that an interest group or voter is allowed to run during the election period.

It makes sense to extend the limit on pre-election advertising given that federal election dates are now, sort of, fixed every four years.  The fixed election date allows parties, candidates and third parties to spend strategically before the election campaign begins, as that spending is not restricted by current limits.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld limits on paid advertising spending during election campaign periods in the 2004 ruling in the Harper v. Canada case.  But the SCC made it clear in that ruling that the limit had to be reasonable.  The calculation of reasonable takes into account the definition of advertising, the cost of advertising (how many ads could be run), and the period of time the limit applies.  The B.C. Court of Appeal rejected a provincial limit on third party advertising spending in a 2011 ruling because the definition of advertising was too comprehensive.

The reasonable compromise that should be made is to limit pre-election paid advertising spending by third parties for the 90-day period leading up to the election campaign period, and to set the limit for that period at a reasonable amount.  The current limit for the election campaign period of 35 days is $200,100, so by extension a reasonable limit for the 90-day pre-election period would be $515,000.

However, what is not taken into account by these limits is the actual cost of advertising, which does not necessarily go up or down by the rate of inflation (which is how the legal limit is currently changed each year).  A better way to determine what both limits should be would be to take the original limit back in 2004 ($150,000) that was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, and to calculate how that amount should be changed annually based on a “market-basket” calculation of the actual cost of advertising.

As well, to be fair, political party and candidate ad pre-election ad spending should be limited during that 90-day period by extending the current election campaign period limitations.  Liberal Senator Dennis Dawson has introduced a private member bill to cover paid advertising by parties and candidates for that three-month period but the bill simply extends the current election spending limit to cover that period, so it doesn’t really address what the limit should be during the two periods (pre-election vs. election campaign) or whether the current limit should be increased.

8. The failure to monitor and prevent fraud robocalls fully

Bill C-23 only requires people or entities that make robocalls to register and keep just the script and recording of the call for only 1 year.

It should be changed to require anyone or any entity that uses robocalls to file a copy of each robocall script and recording, and a list of the numbers called, with the CRTC for the CRTC to keep for 5 years (by changing all the sections of the CEA that are changed by section 77 of Bill C-23 to require all the entities covered by those sections.

As well, Bill C-23 should also require political parties to keep a record of who accesses their voter database, and to make it a violation for political parties to allow their database to be misused.

NOTE: Despite these new measures, it will always be difficult to stop someone doing anonymous fraud robocalls through an offshore or foreign provider as it will be difficult to effectively prosecute businesses located in other jurisdictions or in the “cloud”.

9. The failure to establish effectively high fines

Bill C-23 fails to increase the amount of all proposed fines to a level that will actually discourage violations.  All the fines proposed in Bill C-23 should be 10 times higher (by changing sections 100-107 of Bill C-23, which change sections 500-507 of the CEA — — for example increase the fine in subsection 500(1) of the CEA from $2,000 to $20,000).

As well, the failure to require courts to impose the maximum fine unless extraordinary circumstances mean it would be unjust to do so.

10. The failure to give voters adequate opportunity to challenge election results

Voters only have 30 days now to file a challenge to an election result for the reason that fraud changed the result – this should be changed to one year (under subsection 527(1) of the CEA).  As well, they have to file an application (under section 524 of the CEA) and they should also be allowed to file an action that allows for disclosure of evidence.

As well, the requirement in Bill C-23 that a voter must give written notice to the returning officer when the voter applies to a judge for a recount should be removed because it will make it more difficult to challenge election results as it may be difficult for a voter to locate a returning officer after an election. (remove it by deleting section 68 of the bill (which changes subsection 301(1) of the CEA)).