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Alert: Stop Senate scandal cover-up!

                                 

Prime Minister Harper and RCMP Commissioner Paulson:
Stop the Senate cover-up!

This week, Canadians from across the political spectrum were appalled to hear Senator Mike Duffy’s accusation that Prime Minister knew all about and was involved in negotiations that led to the $90,000.00 cheque written by the PM’s chief of staff to hush the senate scandal up!! When the scandal broke last spring we heard time and again from Prime Minister Harper that he and other senior members of the Government had no knowledge of the cheque.

Canadians deserve to know the truth! This scandal is no longer just about the misspending of taxpayer dollars but about the integrity of our political leaders. It is unclear what is really happening in the Senate, but it’s certain that the public has been lied to.

Please click here to sign the petition calling on Prime Minister Harper and federal opposition leaders to appoint a fully independent prosecutor who can ensure the Senate scandals are investigated fully, and everyone who did wrong is prosecuted and held accountable!

And also please click here to send a letter calling on RCMP Commissioner Bob Paulson to ensure the RCMP’s investigation of the Senate scandal is complete, effective and transparent.
(NOTE: Democracy Watch is sending this letter jointly with LeadNow).

And please Share this – thank you!

Currently, those investigating the scandal are too close to the Government for us to trust the results of the investigations. The scandal involves Senators and now Prime Minister Harper and his staff; however the investigation is being conducted by the RCMP and the Commissioner of Canada Elections, and it is overseen by prosecutors who likely serve under Harper and his Minister of Justice Peter MacKay. The RCMP’s independence is very questionable given the RCMP Commissioner’s widely criticized new policy revealed in April 2013 that connects his office directly with the Conservative Minister of Public Safety.

There are many reasons to believe we can win these key independence and transparency guarantees – to ensure the Senate scandal truth comes out. In similar spending scandal situations, and after loud public outcry, many provincial governments, including in B.C. and Ontario, have appointed independent prosecutors to ensure that investigations are conducted properly and thoroughly, and to ensure that decisions to prosecute are not undermined by career ambitions or other dangerous conflicts of interest.

Please also help keep this campaign running until independent Senate scandal investigations and prosecutions have been guaranteed – you can donate $10-$20 a month here. Democracy Watch is not funded by corporations or the government. We only accept money from people like you!

Thank you for your support!

Group launches satirical campaign: Colbert for King of Canada

Colbert For King of Canada

Canadians to Rally for First Elected Head of State

Ottawa (July 28, 2013) – Heading into Canada Day, Democracy Watch announces a satirical campaign calling on all Canadians to sign a petition to elect Stephen Colbert as King of Canada.

The goal is to rally at least 100,000 Canadians to visit www.colbertforking.ca, sign a petition and persuade Stephen Colbert to come to Ottawa later this summer to be crowned the King of Canada on Parliament Hill.

Behind this fun, provocative “Colbert For King” campaign is a more serious issue – namely, the need for an elected Canadian Head of State. The mass appeal campaign seeks to engage Canadians in rethinking the current system and question the British monarchy as our Head of State. It rallies for an elected Head of State who can challenge the government and enforce the Canadian Constitution.

“Queen Elizabeth and her representatives are purely symbolic officials who don’t have the legitimate democratic power needed to stop abuses of power and lead our country,” says Tyler Sommers, Coordinator of Democracy Watch. “We need Canadians to come together in support of an elected Head of State who has the democratic authority to enforce the constitution and uphold the public interest. Calling on Stephen Colbert to be elected as King of Canada is a spirited way to get attention and spark discussion.”

The majority of Canadians agree with the need for an elected Head of State. A survey of 2,024 Canadians conducted by Harris-Decima in May 2012 shows that a majority of Canadians (55%) want to “change it up” and move towards an elected Canadian Head of State, while only 34% want to continue with a member of the British royal family.

Democracy Watch invites Canadians to visit www.colbertforking.ca and sign the petition to elect Stephen Colbert as King of Canada. The hope is to raise awareness and start a new conversation towards change.

About Democracy Watch

Democracy Watch is a national non-profit, non-partisan organization, and Canada’s leading citizen group advocating democratic reform, government accountability and corporate responsibility. Since it opened its doors in fall 1993 – it has won more than 110 changes to federal and provincial good government and corporate responsibility laws, many of which are world-leading. Visit www.democracywatch.ca for further details.

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For more information, or to schedule an interview, please contact:

Martha Grant – 416.302.4957, [email protected]

Tyler Sommers – 613.241.5179, [email protected]

Did you file a complaint with Elections Canada? Please send in the letter Elections Canada sent you back

Please Like and Share this page with everyone you know. Canadians deserve to know that their election rules are being enforced effectively.

For the past year, Democracy Watch has been trying to get Elections Canada to tell Canadians how they’ve handled the thousands of complaints they’ve received from Canadians. This information is important for Canadians because it will show whether Elections Canada is an effective democracy watchdog or an ineffective lapdog.

Unfortunately Elections Canada has only provided details on a handful of complaints and has used a sweeping discretionary exemption to keep all other information hidden from the public (for details click here)

To get around Elections Canada’s secrecy, Democracy Watch is asking you, if you filed a complaint with Elections Canada since 1997 and received a response letter or email, to send in a copy of any letters/emails you received from the Commissioner of Elections or Elections Canada by mail to P.O. Box 821, Stn. B, Ottawa K1P 5P9, by email to: [email protected] or by fax to: 613-241-4758.

If you would like to submit the letter you received from the Commissioner of Elections or Elections Canada anonymously, either let us know when you send it and we will be sure to keep your identity confidential, or cover up your name and address etc. in the letter, make a copy and send the letter to Democracy Watch by fax or email through a fax number or email address that does not identify you.

If you have not filed a complaint with Elections Canada, but are concerned with secrecy at Elections Canada and would like to send key politicians an email, please fill out to the form to the right and send your email to key politicians!

Please Like and Share this page with everyone you know. Canadians deserve to know that their election rules are being enforced effectively.

And please help Democracy Watch keep this campaign going until all election laws across the country are effectively enforced to ensure fair elections – please donate now here.

Thank you very much!

Did you file a complaint with Elections Canada? Please send in the letter Elections Canada sent you back

For the past year, Democracy Watch has been trying to get Elections Canada to tell Canadians how they’ve handled the thousands of complaints they’ve received from Canadians.  This information is important for Canadians because it will show whether Elections Canada is an effective democracy watchdog or an ineffective lapdog.

Unfortunately Elections Canada has only provided details on a handful of complaints and has used a sweeping discretionary exemption to keep all other information hidden from the public (for details click here)

To get around Elections Canada’s secrecy, Democracy Watch is asking you, if you filed a complaint with Elections Canada since 1997 and received a response letter or email, to send in a copy of any letters/emails you received from the Commissioner of Elections or Elections Canada by mail to P.O. Box 821, Stn. B, Ottawa K1P 5P9, by email to: [email protected] or by fax to: 613-241-4758.

If you would like to submit the letter you received from the Commissioner of Elections or Elections Canada anonymously, either let us know when you send it and we will be sure to keep your identity confidential, or cover up your name and address etc. in the letter, make a copy and send the letter to Democracy Watch by fax or email through a fax number or email address that does not identify you.

 

Please share this page with everyone you know.  Canadians deserve to know that their election rules are being enforced effectively.

Democracy Watch’s five federal ethics complaints that are still awaiting fair, impartial investigations and rulings

Background

Five Complaints from 2001-2004 Finally Ruled On in 2011-2012


 

Five Complaints from 2001-2004 Finally Ruled on in 2011-2012

In December 2002, Democracy Watch applied to the Federal Court of Canada for a review of federal Ethics Counsellor Howard Wilson’s bias and failure to uphold legal duties because of the delay in ruling on 8 complaints Democracy Watch had filed with the Ethics Counsellor.

In 7 of the 8 complaints, the complaint was based upon activities of a lobbyist which Democracy Watch believed violated Rule 8 of the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct which prevents lobbyists from undertaking any activity that constitutes improper influence and puts a federal public office holder in a conflict of interest situation.  The eighth complaint, filed on April 12, 2001 and concerning John Dossetor, alleged that Dossetor violated the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct by failing to register as a lobbyist.

Rule 8 is as follows:

“8. Improper Influence
Lobbyists shall not place public office holders in a conflict of interest by proposing or undertaking any action that would constitute an improper influence on a public office holder.”

In response to Democracy Watch’s December 2002 court application, Ethics Counsellor Howard Wilson in January 2003 issued an interpretation bulletin of Rule 8 (that Wilson backdated to September 2002) of the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct that stated that in order to violate Rule 8 a lobbyist would, among other things, have to “interfere with the decision, judgment or action” of a federal politician or federal government official in a way that amounts to “a wrongful constraint whereby the will of the public office holder was overpowered . . . and induced to do or forbear an act which he or she would not do if left to act freely” involving “a misuse of position of confidence” or taking “advantage of a public office holder’s weakness, infirmity or distress”.

Ethics Counsellor Howard Wilson’s interpretation bulletin essentially states that a lobbyist only violates Rule 8 if the lobbyist enslaves a federal politician or other federal government official or extorts them, thereby forcing them to do something they would not do if they had a free will.  In other words, the Ethics Counsellor ruled that in order to violate Rule 8, a lobbyist would also have to violate the Criminal Code of Canada measures that outlaw enslavement and extortion.

At the same time, according to Ethics Counsellor Howard Wilson’s interpretation of Rule 8, a lobbyist could violate the Criminal Code of Canada measures that outlaw bribery without violating Rule 8 (because bribery would not force a federal politician or other federal government official to do something they would not do if they had a free will, as they would take the bribe willingly).

Using this ridiculous interpretation of Rule 8, Ethics Counsellor Howard Wilson proceeded through March 2003 to rule on 4 of Democracy Watch’s 8 complaints about lobbyists violating Rule 8.  As none of the complaints were about a lobbyist enslaving or extorting a federal politician or other federal government official, the Ethics Counsellor ruled that none of the lobbyists had violated Rule 8.

In April and May 2003, Democracy Watch filed applications in the Federal Court of Canada for a judicial review of the 4 rulings by the Ethics Counsellor (May 23, 2003 news release about the judicial review court applications).

On Thursday, May 13, 2004, with the hearing of Democracy Watch’s applications scheduled for Monday, May 17th, the federal government had the gall to file a motion with the Federal Court for dismissal of Democracy Watch’s applications, on the basis that the federal Cabinet proclaimed Bill C-4 into law on May 10, 2004.

Bill C-4 eliminated the Ethics Counsellor position and created the new positions of Ethics Commissioner (to enforce the then-in-force Public Office Holders Code and other ethics rules established by the Prime Minister), and the MPs Code that first came into force in October 2004) and the position of Registrar of Lobbyists (to enforce the Lobbyists Registration Act and the Lobbyists’ Code).  The federal government’s argument was that since the Ethics Counsellor position had ceased to exist, the issues raised by the judicial review applications were moot (meaning no longer relevant) and therefore Democracy Watch could no longer challenge the Ethics Counsellor in court.

On May 17, 2004 the Federal Court dismissed the federal government’s motion, ruling that the applications were not moot, and that even if the issues raised in the applications were moot, there were still issues raised by the treatment of Democracy Watch’s complaints by the Ethics Counsellor, and there were still issues of national importance that warranted rulings by the court. Federal Court 2004 ruling (See especially paragraphs 25-31 in the ruling).

On July 9, 2004, the Federal Court ruled that the Ethics Counsellor was institutionally biased (because of his lack of independence from the Prime Minister) and also specifically biased against Democracy Watch (because of his delay in dealing with Democracy Watch’s complaints).   The Federal Court in effect ordered that Democracy Watch’s 8 complaints must be re-considered by the new Ethics Commissioner and the new Registrar for Lobbyists. Federal Court 2004 ruling

The new Ethics Commissioner, Bernard Shapiro, refused to rule on any of the complaints.  For this reason, and other completely negligent and weak enforcement actions by Shapiro, Democracy Watch filed a complaint with the Ethics Commissioner on June 29, 2005 alleging that the Ethics Commissioner himself was violating the federal Public Office Holders Code and calling on Commissioner Shapiro to arrange an independent review of his actions and statements. Link to June 29, 2005 news release

In early August, Ethics Commissioner Shapiro responded to Democracy Watch’s complaint, refusing to ensure an independent review of his actions and statements.

Unfortunately, the new Registrar of Lobbyists position was structured in a similar way as the former Ethics Counsellor position.  The former Ethics Counsellor had no independence from the Prime Minister, while the new Registrar had no independence initially from the Industry Minister, and after September 2005 from the Treasury Board minister.  As a result, Democracy Watch’s position was that the Registrar was also biased and incapable of fairly and impartially upholding the Lobbyists Registration Act and Lobbyists’ Code.

As a result of the biased actions and statements of federal Ethics Commissioner Bernard Shapiro, and the biased structure of the Office of the Registrar of Lobbyists, Democracy Watch launched a court challenge in September 2005 of the bias and incompetence of Commissioner Shapiro and Registrar Nelson. Link to September 29, 2005 news release

As a result of Democracy Watch’s September 2005 court challenge of Ethics Commissioner Shapiro and Registrar Michael Nelson, the federal government changed (through the so-called “Federal Accountability Act” (FAA)) the Commissioner position into the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, and the Public Office Holders Code into the Conflict of Interest Act, and the Registrar of Lobbyists position into the Commissioner of Lobbying, and Lobbyist Registration Act into the Lobbying Act. To see the details about the FAA changes, click here.

As a result of Democracy Watch’s lawsuit and the passage of the FAA, Bernard Shapiro resigned as Ethics Commissioner, and the new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner Mary Dawson was appointed on July 9, 2007, and Michael Nelson resigned as Registrar of Lobbyists, and the new Commissioner of Lobbying Karen Shepherd was appointed in November 2008.

However, in October 2006 (just before the Federal Accountability Act became law), Registrar of Lobbyists Michael Nelson finally issued his first ruling on one of Democracy Watch’s 8 outstanding complaints (using Ethics Counsellor Howard Wilson’s September 2002 interpretation of Rule 8 of the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct (described above)).

Democracy Watch filed a court challenge of the Registrar’s ruling in November 2006 — for details about the court challenge, and to see the Registrar’s ruling, click here.

In addition, Registrar of Lobbyists Michael Nelson issued on May 31, 2007 a new ruling on another of Democracy Watch’s 8 complaints, and issued on September 7, 2007 a ruling on another of the complaints.  For various reasons, Democracy Watch did not challenge either of these rulings in court.

On January 28, 2008, a hearing of Democracy Watch’s court challenge of the Registrar of Lobbyists ruling occurred in the Federal Court of Canada in Toronto.  On February 19, 2008 (just three weeks after the court hearing), Deputy Judge Frenette issued his ruling upholding the Registrar of Lobbyists’ ruling and ordering Democracy Watch to pay the costs of the other parties.

In March 2008, Democracy Watch filed an appeal of Deputy Judge Frenette’s ruling, and the Federal Court of Appeal hearing of the appeal was on January 12, 2009 — To see details about Frenette’s ruling and Democracy Watch’s appeal of the ruling, click here.

On March 12, 2009, the Federal Court of Appeal overturned Deputy Judge Frenette’s ruling in every way, and rejected the Ethics Counsellor’s/Registrar’s interpretation of Rule 8 of the Lobbyists Code as “deeply flawed” — To see details, click here.

Five Complaints from 2001-2004 Finally Ruled on in 2011-2012

As of spring 2011, Democracy Watch was still waiting for rulings from the Commissioner of Lobbying on the following 5 of its original 8 complaints.

Thankfully, on November 6, 2009 the Commissioner of Lobbying complied with the March 2009 Federal Court of Appeal ruling Democracy Watch had won, and issued a new, mostly legally correct and effective Guideline for Rule 8 of the Lobbyists’ Code of Conduct.

However, Commissioner of Lobbying Karen Shepherd failed to apply the Guideline properly when she finally ruled on the following 5 complaints in late 2011-early 2012:

  1. On March 27, 2001, Democracy Watch petitioned the Ethics Counsellor to investigate René Fugère, who was investigated by the RCMP for failing to register as a lobbyist.  Fugère was not charged even though clear evidence existed that Fugère was lobbying.  Given that Fugère is an unpaid aide to Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, and that the Prime Minister’s office was involved in at least one of the same grant decisions, Democracy Watch also believes that Fugère’s lobbying activities put the Prime Minister in a conflict of interest. RULING:  On November 1, 2011, the Commissioner of Lobbying finally issued a ruling (PDF) finding Fugère guilty of violating the Lobbyists’ Code in one case.  Concerning another situation, the Commissioner issued a ruling (PDF) that Fugère was not in violation of the Code.
  2. On June 17, 2002, Democracy Watch petitioned the Ethics Counsellor to investigate possible violations of the Public Office Holders’ Code and the Lobbyists’ Code arising from activities of nine particular lobbyists who have worked with either the Prime Minister, a Cabinet minister or opposition MP while also lobbying the federal government.  (NOTE: The Ethics Counsellor ruled on this complaint on March 21, 2003; Democracy Watch’s court challenge was filed on April 23, 2003, Federal Court File #T-641-03).  RULING: On August 22, 2011, the Commissioner of Lobbying finally issued a ruling (PDF) that stated that too much time had passed, and standards had changed, and therefore the Commissioner was refusing to find any of the lobbyists guilty.
  3. On October 17, 2002, Democracy Watch petitioned the Ethics Counsellor to investigate possible violations of the Public Office Holders’ Code and the Lobbyists’ Code arising from secret donations of lobbyists to the leadership campaigns of John Manley, Sheila Copps and Allan Rock. (NOTE: The Ethics Counsellor ruled on this complaint on March 31, 2003; Democracy Watch’s court challenge was filed on May 5, 2003, Federal Court File #T-711-03).  RULING: On January 26, 2012, the Commissioner of Lobbying finally issued a ruling (PDF) that stated that too much time had passed, and standards had changed, and therefore the Commissioner was refusing to find any of the lobbyists guilty.

(NOTE: Ethics Counsellor Howard Wilson ruled on the above 3 complaints, but in July 2004 the Federal Court of Canada rejected all 3 of Wilson’s rulings because he was biased)

4. On September 26, 2002, Democracy Watch petitioned the Ethics Counsellor to investigate possible violations of the Public Office Holders’ Code and the Lobbyists’ Code arising from the activities of numerous lobbyists paying to attend (and paying to golf with Cabinet ministers) at a federal Liberal Party golf tournament  held on August 19, 2002 in Chicoutimi, Quebec.  RULING: On November 8, 2012, the Commissioner of Lobbying finally issued a ruling (PDF) that stated that too much time had passed, and standards had changed, and therefore the Commissioner was refusing to find any of the lobbyists guilty.

5. The complaint was filed against Paul Martin, Sheila Copps, and John Manley, alleging that they had violated the Public Office Holders Code by taking large donations from several corporations registered to lobby them and the federal government, and that the corporations had violated the Lobbyists’ Code by making the donations (January 30, 2004 news release about the ethics complaints).  RULING: On January 26, 2012, the Commissioner of Lobbying finally issued a ruling (PDF) that stated that too much time had passed, and standards had changed, and therefore the Commissioner was refusing to find any of the lobbyists guilty.

Elections Canada needs new powers to clean up election system, but has an enforcement problem


Set out below is a letter-to-the-editor by Democracy Watch Coordinator Tyler Sommers which was published in the The Hill Times on August 6, 2012


Re: “Elections Canada already has power to clean up election system, it has an enforcement problem, say experts,” (The Hill Times, July 30, p. 1), should have been entitled, “Elections Canada needs new powers to clean up election system, and has an enforcement problem, say most experts.”

Only one expert quoted in the article said he thought that the Canada Elections Act gives Elections Canada all the powers it needs because, among other sections, Sec. 482 “makes it an offence to attempt to suppress votes.”

However, this is not correct. Because of Elections Canada’s interpretation used in its July 4 ruling on a complaint that Democracy Watch recently released publicly, Sec. 482 and other sections only prohibit actually suppressing votes (or actually getting voters to switch their votes) by providing false information.

While Democracy Watch believes this interpretation is legally incorrect, Elections Canada has essentially made Sec. 482 and other sections unenforceable because it has established that it must prove the improvable—that a person actually switched their vote or didn’t vote due to a false call to the voter or false information provided to the voter.

The other experts quoted in your article essentially say that changes to the Canada Elections Act are needed to help stop this false voter baiting, but some claim that changes to the act won’t make much difference.

I don’t think they are considering what effective changes would mean. If, as the Conservatives should do to comply with the motion passed in March by the House of Commons, they introduce and pass a bill this fall that makes it clear that “attempting to convince” a voter to do something using false information is illegal, and if the bill requires every organization that has phone lines/voice over internet/robocall equipment to register the actual identity of anyone or any organization that books or does a robocall/mass email during an election campaign period, and to keep a copy of the message sent by the call/email, with severe jail terms as the penalty for violators, then it will become relatively easy to identify these people and charge and convict them if their call provides false information to voters.

And if the bill also requires Elections Canada to disclose publicly the rulings it has made on more than 3,000 complaints it has received since 1997, then the enforcement problems it has will likely be corrected and cleaned up.


For more details, go to Democracy Watch’s Voter Rights Campaign

Ruling by Commissioner of Canada Elections much too narrowly interprets key Canada Elections Act measures that prohibit influence of voters by foreigners, and uses invalid excuses for not investigating

News Release

Ruling by Commissioner of Canada Elections much too narrowly interprets key Canada Elections Act measures that prohibit influence of voters by foreigners, and uses invalid excuses for not investigating

Ruling means no foreigner will likely ever be prosecuted, and raises questions about enforcement standard being applied in robocall and many other cases

Public inquiry is clearly now needed to disclose and audit rulings on more than 3,000 complaints filed with the Commissioner since 1997 to ensure past enforcement has been proper and effective, and will be in the future

Thursday, July 12, 2012

OTTAWA – Today, Democracy Watch made public what it believes is a legally incorrect ruling by the Commissioner of Canada Elections on a recent complaint.  Democracy Watch received the ruling from the person who filed the complaint.  In the ruling, the Commissioner refused to investigate the complaint based upon a much too narrow and restrictive interpretation of a key measure in the Canada Elections Act that prohibits influence of voters by foreigners.

Given this very flawed recent ruling, Democracy Watch called for a public inquiry into the Commissioner’s enforcement standards and practices from the past 15 years.

The Commissioner also refused to investigate the complaint because “some of the relevant information or persons are not within Canada.”  These were the same excuses that the Commissioner used in 2008 after failing to investigate fully the complaints about a fraudulent election robocall scheme filed by voters in the B.C. riding of Saanich-Gulf Islands.  That failure likely encouraged the people behind the massive fraudulent robocall scheme during the 2011 federal election.

The Commissioner also says in the ruling that “the activity complained of was of very limited duration” – essentially setting a ridiculous enforcement standard that means if what you do to illegally influence voters doesn’t last very long, you will not be prosecuted.

Overall, the ruling indicates clearly that the Commissioner will likely never prosecute a foreigner for illegal influence of voters in Canadian federal elections.

As a result, the ruling calls into question what standards the Commissioner has been using for enforcement for the past several years, and is using in the 2011 fraudulent robocall scheme cases.  Democracy Watch recently filed an access-to-information request with the Commissioner after the office refused to disclose the rulings it has made on more than 3,000 complaints from the 1997 election on through the 2011 election.

“Elections Canada’s ruling on this complaint guts enforcement of a key measure aimed at prohibiting foreigners from influencing Canadian voters, and makes it clear that a public inquiry is now needed to disclose and publicly audit the Commissioner’s rulings on the more than 3,000 complaints filed since 1997 to ensure the Commissioner has been enforcing the law properly and effectively, and will do so in the future,” said Tyler Sommers, Coordinator of Democracy Watch.

The complaint was filed on March 19th with Elections Canada about a non-Canadian campaigning for Rick Dykstra and Julian Fantino in their ridings in St. Catharines and Vaughan in Ontario.  As set out in the complaint, after flying in from the United States, Front Porch Technologies president Matthew D. Parker tweeted that he was “Knocking on doors for MP Rick Dykstra (St. Catharines)” and was photographed working in the campaign office of Julian Fantino.

Section 331 of the Canada Elections Act states specifically that non-residents who are not Canadian citizens or permanent residents of Canada are prohibited from doing anything during an election period to “in any way induce electors to vote or refrain from voting or vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate.”

In the July 4th ruling, the Commissioner interpreted this measure as meaning that, in order even to investigate, the Commissioner would have to have evidence indicating that a voter “was actually induced or affected in their voting behaviour due to the activity complained of.”

In Democracy Watch’s opinion, the legally correct definition of this measure is that “induce” also includes trying to persuade someone to vote one way or another (or not to vote), especially given that the heading of section 331 reads “Non-Interference by Foreigners” and the sub-heading is “Prohibition – inducements by non-residents”.  “Interference” of course includes any act of interfering whether or not it is successful, and “inducement” is defined in the dictionary as: “the act of reasoning or pleading with someone to accept a belief or course of action (e.g. gave up smoking only after prolonged inducement by all the other family members).”

As Democracy Watch does not know whether Matthew Parker is a Canadian citizen or resident, it is not in any way alleging that Mr. Parker violated the Canada Elections Act measures.  It is only questioning the Commissioner’s decision not to investigate the situation based upon what it believes is an incorrect interpretation of the Act, and a much too weak enforcement approach.

The Commissioner’s ruling also calls into question what enforcement standards are used for other situations, in particular cases involving alleged violations of section 5 of the Act (which prohibits actions to “induce” a person to vote who is not qualified to vote); section 282 and 482 (which prohibit actions to “compel” voters through “intimidation” or “duress”, or to “induce” voters “by any pretence or contrivance” to vote a certain way or not vote); subsection 549(4) (which prohibits actions to “induce” a person to falsely take an oath), and; subsection 281(h) of the Act (which prohibits actions that “wilfully prevent or endeavour to prevent an elector from voting at an election”).  Clearly, prohibitions on illegal influence actions by foreigners must also be extended to cover actions by residents and citizens of Canada.

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FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:
Tyler Sommers, Coordinator of Democracy Watch
Tel: (613) 241-5179
[email protected]

Democracy Watch’s Voter’s Rights Campaign



Canada Elections Act (S.C. 2000, c. 9)

NON-INTERFERENCE BY FOREIGNERS

Prohibition — inducements by non-residents

331. No person who does not reside in Canada shall, during an election period, in any way induce electors to vote or refrain from voting or vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate unless the person is

(a) a Canadian citizen; or

(b) a permanent resident within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

2000, c. 9, s. 331; 2001, c. 27, s. 211.

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Democracy Watch plans court challenge of Elections Ontario’s failure to inform voters of their right to decline their ballot

News Release

Democracy Watch plans court challenge of Elections Ontario’s failure to inform voters of their right to decline their ballot

Information and ads during election campaign missing key messages to encourage voter turnout

Thursday, September 22, 2011

OTTAWA –  Today, Democracy Watch announced that it is exploring a court challenge of Elections Ontario’s continuing negligence in failing to correct its provincial election website, advertising and voter information cards to let Ontario voters know they have the legal right to decline their ballot.

Democracy Watch also called on Elections Ontario to produce new advertising with key messages to encourage voters to turn out at the polls.

On the main pages of its “We Make Voting Easy” website, Elections Ontario does not mention that Ontario voters have the right under section 53 of the Elections Act to decline their ballot and have it counted separately from a vote for a candidate or a spoiled ballot.  The sub-pages on the website, including the page entitled “Voting in Person”, also fail to inform voters of this right.

Elections Ontario’s civics education program “Voting Rules Fact Sheet” is likely also incorrect, and as a result is misleading young voters on their voting rights.

In addition to the incomplete information on its website, Elections Ontario’s newspaper advertisements and voter information cards mailed to voters also fail to mention the right to decline your ballot, even though both have lots of blank space in which this information could have been provided.

As a result, Elections Canada is failing to properly use its legal powers to educate voters about their voting rights (set out in sections 114.1 and 114.2 of the Ontario Elections Act).

Chief Electoral Officer Greg Essensa’s message on the Elections Ontario website says “We are on a mission to make voting easy, and that means putting the needs of the elector first.”

“Elections Ontario claims to put the needs of voters first, but continues to fail to respond to media coverage and calls to inform voters with its website, advertising and voter information mailings that they have the legal right to decline their ballot,” said Duff Conacher, Founding Director of Democracy Watch.  “As a result, Democracy Watch is exploring a court challenge against Elections Ontario to try to stop its negligent and undemocratic failure to inform voters of their full voting rights.”  (To see Democracy Watch’s August 24, 2011 news release, click here (archive website), and to see some of the related media coverage, click here and click here)

“Some voters may not support any party that has a candidate in their riding, or may not support any of the parties’ platforms, and they have the right to be informed by Elections Ontario that they have the right to vote for ‘none of the above’ by declining their ballot,” said Conacher.

Section 53 of Ontario’s Election Act states as follows:
“Declined ballot
53.  An elector who has received a ballot and returns it to the deputy returning officer declining to vote, forfeits the right to vote and the deputy returning officer shall immediately write the word “declined” upon the back of the ballot and preserve it to be returned to the returning officer and shall cause an entry to be made in the poll record that the elector declined to vote.
R.S.O. 1990, c. E.6, s. 53.”

Elections Ontario has failed to inform voters for the past 20 years of their right to decline their ballot in the printed material sent to voters, and print, billboard, TV and radio advertisements about voting.

Democracy Watch was consulted by Elections Ontario in the spring about its planned voter information and advertising campaign, and suggested very strongly that the information and the ads must mention the right to decline your ballot.  As well, it strongly suggested that if the ads hope to encourage higher voter turnout, they must also contain the following key messages:

  • “You never know when your vote may count” — with examples from past provincial elections such as 1985 and 1990, and from specific ridings in various elections, all  of which show clearly that local and provincial election results cannot be predicted in advance, and;
  • “If you don’t vote, you don’t count” — making it clear that politicians don’t really care about you if you don’t vote because non-voters do not help them get elected, or defeated.

“As it has in past elections, Elections Ontario is again spending hundreds of thousands of dollars on an ad campaign that has the wrong messages, and again negligently failing to inform voters of their right to decline their ballot, so no one should expect voter turnout to increase significantly in the October provincial election,” said Conacher.

The federal government, and every provincial and territorial government, should add the right to vote “none of the above” and to give a reason, to their election laws (include the election laws for municipal elections in each jurisdiction).

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FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT:

Duff Conacher, Board member of Democracy Watch

Tel: (613) 241-5179

Democracy Watch’s Ontario Election 2011 (archive page) page

Canada’s voting systems still need to be changed in many ways before they will be fully democratic

Set out below is a book review of John C. Courtney’s book Elections by Democracy Watch Coordinator Duff Conacher which was published in edited form in the September 2004 issue of the Literary Review of Canada


“Elections are a key element of any political system that claims to be a democratic” (p.5) writes University of Saskatchewan professor John Courtney early on in his book Elections.  To the uninitiated in debates about politics, such a statement may not be seen as revealing the author’s endorsement of political systems that include elected officials, but to those involved in political debates, no such statement can be accepted unquestioningly as a key democratic standard.

Is Courtney saying that political systems in which citizens directly make decisions themselves through referenda or town hall meetings, without electing representatives, are undemocratic?  Probably not.  But as in many debates about political issues, Elections contains such statements which seem reasonable (and sometimes obvious), until you consider the alternatives.

Considering the alternatives is essential to Courtney’s task, as Elections is one of nine books on specific aspects of Canada’s political system produced in association with the Centre for Canadian Studies at Mount Allison University as part of its Canadian Democratic Audit project.

Auditing a political system may seem to be a less straight forward process than financial auditing, but given the widely varied auditing standards we have witnessed in corporate Canada and corporate America in recent years, both have been revealed as complex processes that depend entirely on the standards applied.  It seems that financial auditors can define “legitimate expense” and “profit” or “loss” and “value for money” in as many varied ways as political auditors can define “inclusive”, “responsive”, and “representative”, all the while staying within the bounds of logic and reasonable argument.

And, of course, in auditing the auditor through this book review, I am bringing my own definition of the standards that should be used to audit Canada’s electoral system, a definition based fundamentally on my values.

Elections may not be a key element of every democratic political system, but they are a key element of Canada’s and most other existing systems.  The difficulties involved in holding fair elections are heightened by the difficulties of overturning an election result.  Any regulatory body considering a complaint about one or more candidates breaking election rules often must determine the impact of the rule violations on the election outcome, an often close to impossible task.  In other words, no matter how tightly regulated, candidates are aware that there is often no effective way to hold them accountable for election rule violations.

Unlike many other challenges to political system decisions, challenges to election outcomes call into question the very existence of a particular government (or at least the choosing of one or more representatives in the ruling party), and striking a government down through a written ruling is something I believe we will never see Canadian courts do, no matter what the evidence before them, unless an election upsets the mainstream status quo of Canadian society (in which case I see a possibility that a fair election would be overturned on unfair grounds).

My lack of faith in Canada’s rule of law as applied to elections is based upon a combination of the difficulties of proving that any election rule violations affected an election outcome, the likelihood that such a challenge to an election outcome will occur after a closely contested election, the difficulty politically any regulator or court would have in overturning an election, and the ruling party’s control of judicial and Chief Electoral Officer appointments in most jurisdictions in Canada.

In addition, I have watched closely for the past decade (and not as closely for another decade) as the rule of law has been routinely ignored when it comes to the actions of politicians and public officials, mainly because of flaws in the systems regulating their actions.  These flaws are common in most of the systems Canada has set up to regulate human action (including the actions of humans in corporations) — either violations are easily hidden, rules have loopholes, enforcement agencies lack independence, powers or resources, penalties are too weak, or citizens are not even empowered to challenge rule violations.

In short, the rule of law in Canada is often a guideline, especially when powerful people are involved.  A specific example of this is that few people have ever been fined significant amounts even when they have violated the the federal elections law, and no one has ever been imprisoned.

Finally, I am an advocate not an academic, and I have the benefit of having just observed the 2004 federal election which revealed some up-to-date information about which Courtney could only speculate.  With this different, more skeptical and advocacy-based, starting point than Courtney (who instead emphasizes how wonderfully far Canada has come since Confederation, especially compared to other countries), I of course end up with a more critical conclusion, seeing more flaws in the current electoral system, and more urgency in fixing the flaws.

This is not at all to say that Courtney glosses over cracks in Canada’s electoral system.  Starting with identifying the impacts elections have on Canadian political parties, citizens, and overall legitimacy of government, and ending with discussion questions for each chapter and recommendations for reform and additional reading, Elections provides a mostly thorough (within the confines of the length of a book) analysis of the system, including many interesting details about its history.

The group of academics involved in the Canadian Democratic Audit project decided that the overall benchmarks for each of the nine areas audited would be public participation, inclusiveness and responsiveness.  Within this framework, each audit adds other more specific benchmarks.  It is also important to note that not all levels of government are fully audited in Elections (and likely couldn’t be due to book-length restrictions), nor are First Nations governments audited at all — the focus is mainly on the federal government.  These limitations, and limitations in the book overall, leave much auditing to be done before the overall conclusions of the book should have been stated, I believe.

Who is allowed to vote is the first of Courtney’s five “electoral building blocks” (p. 9) audited.  He documents that, as in many other parts of Canadian society, and in elections, the development of voter eligibility is revealed as a process of provinces influencing provinces and the federal government, and the federal government influencing provinces and territories.

It is of course laudable that Canadian jurisdictions have moved from a voter eligibility system that only allowed white males who owned property to vote (15% of the population in 1867) to a system in which all official citizens resident in Canada over the age of 18 can vote (69% of the population in 2000), as Courtney describes over 17 pages.  But I was left wanting more than a three-page analysis of the many Supreme Court of Canada Charter decisions that have struck down measures that prohibited voting by judges, mentally challenged Canadians, and prisoners (by a 5-4 split ruling) or allowed the prohibition on voting by citizens younger than 18, and by citizens who live outside Canada more than five years.  In addition, there is little discussion of allowing voting by landed immigrants and other not-quite-officially-Canadian citizens.

Auditing a system requires, I believe, going beyond simply summarizing what the majority of the Supreme Court thought about various voter eligibility rules and then concluding that “The current Canadian electoral system is a model of inclusiveness.” (p. 39).  I think Canadians age 17 and under may have a different view and, even if they didn’t, is the debate about these measures really over, as Courtney seems to say?

Courtney does better in the next section on defining electoral districts, probably because fewer questions are raised by the current status of this aspect of elections.  Once again the history shows that Canada has made great progress through provincial experimentation, moving from infrequent, ruling-party-controlled district drawing processes to arms-length appointed commissions with expert members, public hearings, regular reviews and enforceable criteria.

The current system’s integrity has helped it deal with the key issue of how to draw lines around districts so that as many constituencies in Canadian society (defined by race, ethnicity, language or other factors) as possible have a realistic opportunity of being represented in a legislature.  Again the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Charter has played a leading role in this process, as it set the standard in a 1991 decison that districts do not have to equalize all voters’ power, but instead must ensure a relative parity of voting power (through parity of the population size of districts within a province), with allowance for variations to make overall, pluralistic and group-based effective representation possible for all voters.

This decision set the basis for Nova Scotia creating districts in 1992 that give its black and Acadian minorities a better chance of electing a representative from their communities, and allowed Saskatchewan to maintain two northern districts even though they were much smaller in population than other districts.  Courtney also details the history of the proposal to create dedicated “Aboriginal Electoral Districts” — ably setting out the pros and cons (including the view by some Aboriginal leaders that it is better for aboriginals to be spread out among many districts with the potential to be the deciding vote factor in many closely fought local elections).

An increasingly important issue, which Courtney also explores well, is the difference in size of federal districts in different provinces.  The Constitution requires that no province shall have fewer MPs than senators, while a 1985 federal law requires no fewer MPs than a province had in the 33rd Parliament (1984-85) or in 1976 (whichever is less).  As a result of these rules and population changes in the past few decades, it currently takes about three times as many British Columbians than Prince Edward Islanders to elect an MP.

The third section of Elections addresses the electoral building block of registering voters, in which Courtney explores the issues of ease of registration and completeness of the list of voters.  From 1938 to 1997 Canada developed the federal voting list through a national door-to-door enumeration during each federal election campaign period, and most provinces continue to use this system.

In 1998, the enumeration process was ended and the list (now called the National Register of Electors) is now updated through combining various public information registries (such as the registry of taxpayers etc.).  The change was made for several good reasons, and as Courtney notes it is still too early to judge the success of the Register.

However, during the 2000 federal election campaign period, 3.6 million updates had to be made to the Register (including 1.05 million on election day), and an Elections Canada post-election survey (“Explaining the Turnout Decline in Canadian Federal Elections: A New Survey of Non-voters” Elections Canada, March 2003) showed that about 17 percent of voters were not accurately in the Register and that about 5-7 percent of voters (especially Aboriginal, youth, low-income and mobile voters) experienced barriers to inclusion in the new system and did not vote as a result.

In addition, voter turnout in 2000 was thought to be 61.2 percent (the lowest since Confederation), but in June 2004 Chief Electoral Officer Jean-Pierre Kingsley finally made public something he should have made very clear two years ago, namely that Elections Canada had discovered one million duplicate registrations in the Register in 2001.  Once the duplicates were removed, actual voter turnout in 2000 increased to 64.2 percent.

Courtney makes the case for continuing the door-to-door enumeration periodically based on the evidence of problems with the Register, but also the finding in some studies that the personal contact of the enumeration process actually encourages voting.  A post-2004 election survey should give updated information about the extent of the problems with the Register (and other reasons for decreasing voter turnout, given that turnout for the 2004 Canadian federal election dropped to 60.5 percent, the lowest since Confederation).

The inaccuracy of the Register should, I believe, have been returned to in Courtney’s audit of the fourth building block, the administration of elections.  Once again Canada’s system has developed through federal and provincial experimentation, with the first creation of an agency to handle elections occurring in 1920.   However, the returning officers for each district in federal elections are still chosen by the ruling party cabinet.  As a result, the possibility that these officers are unjustifiably turning away voters who have had difficulty getting listed in the Register should be explored more fully as a barrier to voting and cause of lower voter turnout.

Even if not many examples of blatant corruption by returning officers are found, apparent and potential conflicts of interest are constantly present for these officers (who make all front-line rulings on election operations).  For all Canadians to have confidence in election results, and especially given the difficulties of overturning election results, the impartiality of election officials must be unquestionable.  Therefore, the federal government should immediately, and finally, respond to the widespread criticism and transfer the power to appoint returning officers from cabinet to the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) of Elections Canada.

An interesting exploration of Internet and telephone voting is part of the audit of election administration, with the usual concerns about the accuracy/security of these alternatives highlighted.  Courtney also usefully points out that even if the security concerns of Internet voting could be addressed, it may not increase voter turnout as much as hoped given that turnout is lowest among less-educated, lower-income Canadians of any age, people who also have the least access to the Internet.

For reasons I could not fathom, the chapter on election administration also contains a seven-page section on dual-member ridings, infant parties, accommodative representation and uncontested elections that would fit much more clearly in the following two chapters on the fifth building block audited, Canada’s plurality (first-past-the-post (FPTP)) voting system.  And in the chapter on FPTP, Courtney includes two pages on the phrase “Canada’s democratic deficit” and how various interests have been trying to define it — a discussion I think would fit much better in the book’s introduction or beginning of the book-framing Chapter 1.

An audit of the FPTP voting system of course raises the key question of what exactly ensures that any voter is effectively represented by a government (although this question also applies directly to the second section on electoral districting).  Courtney thoroughly and fairly explores different definitions of “effective representation”, and how the factors of elected officials as “trustees” vs. “delegates” of voters, territory and population, and identity politics have affected the ongoing debate about the method of voting in Canada.

The pros and cons of the FPTP system vs. a proportional vote-counting system are also fairly and fully explored, including the interesting turn to proportional voting by Manitoba and Alberta in the 1920s and their return to the FPTP system 30 years later.  Again, Courtney usefully summarizes data from provinces and other countries that shows why changes in vote-counting may not result in proponents’ hoped for increases in the diversity of parliamentarians and in voter turnout.  For example, voter turnout in Manitoba and New Zealand dropped when they changed to a proportional system, while many countries are behind Canada in terms of the share of women in their parliaments even though they use a proportional system.

Courtney’s overall conclusion is that changing to a proportional voting system will likely usually create minority federal and provincial governments in Canada, but it is not possible to know what other intended and unintended effects could occur (or even be likely to occur).

Unfortunately, I think Courtney reveals a bias against proportional voting when he claims that this change would be unlike changes in other areas of Canada’s election system because those changes had predictable effects.  It is hard to believe that the early 1900s change that allowed women to vote did not have, especially for those considering it, just as many possible, unpredictable, effects.  Courtney further reveals his bias when he not only notes that the FPTP system encourages parties that want to form a federal government to build a “big tent” party accommodating many interests, but also that any changes to the system should not encourage parties “to pursue other more narrowly or sectoral” bases because this would be incompatible with Canada’s history and traditions. (p. 175)

This is not to say that Courtney jumps to worst-case scenarios to reject changing to proportional voting, just that his overall conclusions in this and many sections of the book are over-reaching and too-often not based upon the facts and figures presented before the conclusions, but instead upon a personal preference or the traditional status quo.  As a result, I highly recommend reading the list of “Discussion Questions” (pp. 178-9) at the back of the book as a counter to Courtney’s conclusions, as they highlight how many aspects of Canada’s election systems remain open to debate.

Given that two of the Canadian Democratic Audit project’s overall benchmarks for each audit are “public participation” and “inclusiveness”, I was also very surprised to see no discussion in the book of the criteria candidates and parties need to fulfill in order to get on the ballot, nor of the election financing and spending systems for both parties and third parties (all of which have been the changed and challenged in court in recent years).  Meanwhile, four pages are devoted to the concept of compulsory voting, even though this measure is on the margins of public debates and has not been proposed or acted upon by any government in Canada.

Even more surprising is that Courtney completely ignores the issue of promise-keeping by politicians and political parties.  I admit I am personally and organizationally interested in the issue of “honesty in politics” but in addition all evidence shows that this is a much more important issue to many more Canadians than is the way votes are counted (which Courtney views as the current central election-related issue).  For example, many surveys over the past decade show that almost 90 percent of Canadians believe that politicians lie to win elections (and this belief is backed by many specific examples), and according to Elections Canada’s post-2000 election survey, the highest-ranked reason for non-voters decreased interest in politics was politicians’ false promises/dishonesty/lack of confidence in politicians.

Another benchmark of the Democracy Audit project is “responsiveness”, and as well Courtney states that elections are “the basic mechanism holding a government accountable for its policies and actions” (p.5).  So why no discussion of the common practice of election promise-breaking which so completely marks a government as non-responsive and so thoroughly thwarts attempts by voters to hold governments accountable?

Overall, as a result of these issue gaps in Elections and the focus on applauding the history of election developments in Canada — as opposed to presenting complete, open-minded assessments of all aspects of the present system — I can only offer a qualified recommendation to read this book.  It is a useful overview, and the beginning of an audit, but much more remains to be debated before solid conclusions should be stated about many aspects of elections in Canada.


For more details, go to Democracy Watch’s Voter Rights Campaign page